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Printed in Germany Foreword by the editor 
Since  1980 alone,  over 800.000 workers have been forced to  leave their jobs as  a result of 
restructuring  in  the  Community  coal  and  steel  industries.  The  European  Community  has 
contributed significantly,  through  financial  and various  other means,  to  the  social measures 
implemented to cushion the impact of  this restructuring on the workers involved. In so doing, it 
has supported the programmes set up by undertakings, national authorities and other organisa-
tions involved in the process. The Community's effort has concentrated particularly on making 
good income losses and also, in a major way, to the reemployment of  the effected workforce in an 
often seemingly desperate labour market. 
Unfortunately, today we are  in the midst of major fresh waves of job losses in the ECSC 
industries, and this in the context of high unemployment in Europe overall. 
It is my hope that this handbook will be of use not only now in the Member States of the 
European Union, but also in the countries of  Central and Eastern Europe where similar problems 
are faced. The aim is to provide concrete assistance to those faced with the need for social crisis 
management. 
The wish is supported by my conviction that examples of  success stories do indeed bring hope 
to the workers who are affected. 
Padraig Flynn 
Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Industrial Relations 
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This book would not be complete without my thanks to all those who supported me with practical 
help and advice. 
First of all, I wish to thank Antoon Herpels and Diane Marshall of the Commission of the 
European Communities, Directorate-General V/  A/4, for their confidence in me and for giving me 
the task of producing this reference book. Despite their understandable impatience, due to the 
overall pressure of  the crisis, they showed understanding for the missing of  promised deadlines. 
This was very helpful, and relieved some of the pressure on myself. 
The fact that, despite delays in the production of  some case studies for Section E, the book was 
finished in little more than a year is due to the support of a number of my colleagues from the 
Sozialforschungsstelle Dortmund, in particular Uwe Jiirgenhake and Rainer Lichte. My discus-
sions with them, and their criticisms, made the writing of  a number of  chapters easier. Particular 
thanks go to DetlefUllenboom, who he"lped me in many respects, particularly as a conscientious 
proofreader and tenacious critic of  unclear phrasing, but also as an expert "tracer" of  the heading 
index. 
Finally, my thanks go to  those colleagues from  a number of institutes whose case studies 
provided the basis for most of  the chapters in Section E, "Models for social crisis management". 
Hans-Werner Franz 
Dortmund, September 1993 
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Introduction 
and guidance 
on using this 
manual 
The ongoing coal and steel crisis has given 
rise to a range of tools for dealing with the 
social crisis. This manual is  an attempt to 
present these instruments in  a  systematic 
fashion, to describe models developed in the 
Member States ofthe European Community 
and to report on experience gathered. 
The structure of the 
reference book 
The manual begins (Section A: Crisis) with a 
description of  the characteristics and develop-
ment of the crisis in the coal and steel sectors 
and,  against this  background, points out the 
range of contributions made by the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and other 
European Community funds and programmes. 
The second stage (Section  B:  Social crisis 
management) is to ask who will or should take 
action in a crisis, and who is to manage the crisis. 
The third section (Section C:  Social crisis 
management  as a planning  process) attempts to 
determine what can be done in a crisis and how 
quickly. 
This is followed(Section D: Instruments  for 
social crisis management) by a schematic pres-
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entation in accordance with established criteria 
of the  (hopefully)  full  range  of instruments 
from the point of  view of affected businesses. 
The  introduction  to  this  section attempts  to 
define what might be understood by "social 
instruments for managing the crisis". 
The final  section (Section  E:  Models for 
social crisis management) describes the mani-
fold ways and means by which instruments for 
managing the social crisis may be combined, 
using specific national examples or case stud-
ies. 
A  separate  section originally planned, to 
cover experiences of  social crisis management, 
proved to be redundant in too many respects. 
Without repeating the .conditions  relating  to 
each model, it would have been very difficult to 
classify experiences properly and make them 
comparable. Experiences are subjective and in 
many ways influenced by the particular circum-
stances of  each situation. This section was there-
fore  left out.  Where information is available, 
experiences with individual models have been 
presented in the corresponding chapter of  Sec-
tion E, either as an assessment by the parties or 
people  taking  part,  an  assessment by those 
affected or, frequently, as a systematised pres-
entation of the  specific "crisis career" of the 
miners or steelworkers affected. 
The focus here was always on the method-
ical aspects. There was no attempt to measure 
success or failure,  and no  comparisons were 
made.  The conditions in individual countries 
and cases differ too widely for this: laws, insti-
tutions and associations, the financial possibil-
ities and, last but not least, the people: those 
who have to act and those who have to cooper-
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those who have to act and those who have to 
cooperate.Models are not prescriptions. What 
was "successful" in  a certain place and under 
certain conditions will not necessarily be suc-
cessful in another place under different condi-
tions. The opposite also applies: what did not 
work in one place might be successful else-
where. 
As the proverb says, "necessity is the moth-
er of invention". If this reference book points 
this out, it will have gone a long way towards 
fulfilling  its purpose.  Necessity, however,  is 
also  the  mother  of emergency  solutions.  It 
should always be kept in mind that, for those 
affected by the  crisis,  almost  every solution 
initially appears to be an emergency solution, 
although it may look different with hindsight. 
The  basic  assumption behind this  refer-
ence book is  as  follows:  "social" measures 
are those seen as  social by those involved 
according to the situation at that time. For 
example, it is becoming increasingly doubtful, 
at least in the coal and steel sectors, that early 
retirement will still be regarded in a few years' 
time as a standard instrument for social crisis 
management. 
•  Who could be given early retirement when 
there is  scarcely anyone of a suitable age 
still  employed? 
•  Can  society  still  afford  (and not  only  in 
financial terms) to retire people over 50, or 
even over 45, however it is presented? 
•  Quite  apart  from  the  social  costs,  is  it 
desirable to dispense with the knowledge, 
competence and experience of these peo-
ple? 
Introduction 
This book provides no answers to these basic 
questions. 
One final comment should be made regard-
ing  the  form  of this  reference  book.  It was 
given  a  loose-leaf format because  both the 
publisher and  author took the  view  that the 
number of  models presented could be expand-
ed and that there  could soon be  new instru-
ments and models to add, partly for the reasons 
given  above.  With  this  in  mind  it  seemed 
advisable to choose an open, extendable form 
of binding. 
Finally,  I would like to  express the hope 
that this reference book becomes what it was 
intended to be:  a reference book for practi-
tioners.  The publisher and author would be 
grateful for criticisms and suggestions for ad-
ditions to the current sections or for new sec-
tions.  As  much  room  as  possible  has  been 
included throughout for making notes, in order 
to keep track of any ideas. 
Guidance 
for using this manual 
It is to be hoped that long explanations of the 
breakdown ofthis book are not required, and so 
only a few indications will be given here. 
Pages  are  not  numbered  consecutively 
throughout.  Each  chapter  has  its  own  page 
numbering.  Section B  is  the  sole  exception, 
being consecutively numbered in order to save 
space, as each new chapter begins on a right-
hand (odd) page. Were this not the case, there 
would be almost two pages provided for notes 
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more often than is the case in this introduction 
and more often than is  strictly necessary. 
As an aid to reference, sections are not only 
separated by dividers but are also colour-cod-
ed. 
Within the chapters there are repeated cross-
references to  relevant passages in other sec-
tions  or chapters,  which are  intended to  aid 
comparison, reference or the following of an 
argument which is  developed in  more  detail 
elsewhere. 
Notes 
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As a further aid, an index is provided at the 
end of  the handbook. This has all the custom-
ary advantages and disadvantages of such in-
dexes. We have tried, by the use of numerous 
cross-references in the index, to provide trans-
parency and make searching easier. It  is for the 
reader to decide whether we have succeeded. 
Finally, readers wishing to use the abbrevi-
ations as  signposts to particular chapters may 
use the information section, as  the abbrevia-
tions  are  accompanied  by  references  to  the 
main relevant sections. 
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Section A 
Contents 
Crisis The crisis of coal and steel 
Development 
and 
structures of 
the crisis  ... 
••• in the 
coal mining industry 
When the European Coal and Steel Community 
came into being in June 1952, nobody dreamed 
that it would soon be  faced with the task of 
regulating a crisis caused by overproduction. 
Coal and steel were among the leading sectors 
in  the  post-war economy  and  were  in  short 
supply. Insufficient capacity within the Com-
munity even made it necessary to import coal to 
cover the shortfalls. 
1958 marked a turning point for coal. The 
slowly emerging change in the pattern of  ener-
gy  consumption coincided with  a decline in 
economic activity. This triggered a coal crisis 
affecting all Community countries with a coal 
mining industry. Coal began to be stockpiled. 
Its share in the Community's energy production 
sector declined in both absolute and relative 
terms: while it had been 80% in  1950, it was 
barely 65% in 1958. 
Oil  in  particular became  an  increasingly 
popular alternative energy source, supplemen-
ted over the following decades by natural gas 
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and nuclear power. In 1992, the proportion of 
Community primary energy generated by coal 
was 21.5% (ofwhich 5.3% was lignite), while 
the figure for oil was 44%, for gas 19.1% and for 
nuclear power 13.3%. The coal used, of  course, 
was not exclusively of Community origin. In 
1992, 137 million tonnes of  coal was imported 
into the European Community, primarily from 
the USA, South Africa and Australia. The Com-
munity itself  produced 184 million tonnes. The 
contribution of Community coal to  the EC's 
primary energy consumption was therefore even 
smaller in relative terms. 
Over the last 40 years, the Community coal 
industry has undergone a continuous decline in 
terms of both production and employment. In 
1952, 239 million metric tonnes of coal were 
mined in the six-member Community, with the 
United Kingdom (not then a member) produ-
cing a similar amount (230 million tonnes). In 
1992,  the  12-member Community produced 
184 million tonnes. The decline in the number 
Pagel  Al 
European 
Community 
The  mining chapter 
in A1 is partly based 
on  a  contribution 
from  Uwe  Jiirgen-
hake 
in metr.  t  Hard coal production in Western Europe* 
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of  people employed was equally dramatic. The 
12-member Community had  150 000 people 
employed below ground in 1992. In 1953, those 
employed in  the  mining  industry in  the  six-
member Community and in the United King-
dom  totalled  1 250 000.  The  resulting  tasks 
facing the Community's coalfields were consi-
derable and, without the support of  the ECSC, 
could not have been overcome without socially 
unacceptable consequences. 
The continuous process of  contraction led, 
as early as the  1960s, to a virtual cessation of 
mining  in  the  Netherlands,  with  production 
finally  ceasing  completely  in  1974.  By the 
beginning of  the 1990s, coal was being produ-
ced in  significant quantities in  five  Member 
States: Belgium, France, Germany, Spain and 
the United Kingdom. Ireland and Portugal pro-
duce only small amounts. Over 90% of  produc-
tion was accounted for by Germany, Spain and 
the United Kingdom. By this time, Belgium had 
developed a programme for the complete ces-
sation of  coal mining by 1992 and France, too, 
was preparing to shut down the industry com-
pletely.  Coal mining in  the  Community was 
thus essentially concentrated in the coalfields in 
the three remaining major coal producing coun-
tries. 
In these countries, the mines had been natio-
nalised  or  semi-nationalised.  Without  subsi-
dies, scarcely any Community pits would still 
be viable.  These subsidies have been paid at 
national level for more than 30 years following 
approval by the  Council of Ministers on the 
basis of  Article 95 of  the ECSC Treaty. Howe-
ver, a further reduction in  coal  production is 
anticipated. 
The  crisis of coal and steel 
Summary 
Summarising the development of  an almost 40-
year crisis  in  the  mining  industry,  there  are 
three main characteristics: 
•  Due to national concerns for an independent 
source of  energy, the process of  decline was 
slowed in order to make it easier to over-
come the effects on the people and regions 
concerned. This may not appear to be the 
case in some instances, and to some it pro-
bably did indeed not appear to be so. But 
without political intervention this process, 
left to the mercy of market forces, would 
have been much more brutal. 
•  The financial cushion provided by  the ECSC 
and its crisis fund had much to do with the 
fact that the changes brought about in the 
jobs and lives of the affected workers and 
their families, up to and including emigrati-
on, were achieved at relatively little risk. It 
is for this psychological reason that the long 
history of the decline of the coal mining 
industry is not also much more a story of 
bitter conflict. 
•  Money, however~ is not everything. In the 
final analysis it must not be forgotten that 
against the background of these first two 
characteristics of  the crisis the social situa-
tion was managed in a highly  imaginative 
way which led to the development of  instru-
ments and models for overcoming the social 
crisis and creating stability in the midst of 
change. They became an example for most 
of  the solutions later applied in other bran-
ches of  industry, particularly the steel indu-
stry. 
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The future for coal 
Arguments for maintaining European coal re-
sources are based - apart from the social and 
economic problems in the coalfields - on the 
principle of  maintaining a source of  supply, but 
also on the fact that, in the medium term, rising 
energy prices could again make EC coal com-
petitive. 
The fear that stalks the Community's remai-
ning coalfields in Germany, Spain and the Uni-
ted Kingdom is only partly related to the steel 
crisis. Only in Spain and Germany is domestic 
coal  still  being  processed into  blast furnace 
coke. The decline in pig iron production and the 
increasing speculation about ending the tradi-
tional blast furnace  and  convertor process in 
favour of  electrical steel plants and using chea-
per imported coal, however, are increasing the 
pressure on the European coal industry. 
The power generation market in individual 
Member States  is  based on widely differing 
energy policy principles. Responsibility for coal 
policy  measures  still  rests  with  the  govern-
ments ofthe Member States. There are as yet no 
signs of a single European energy policy.  In 
Spain and Germany, coal policy supports sales 
to  power  stations.  In  the  1980s  Spain  even 
registered a significant rise in coal production. 
However, the coal  subsidies,  which are now 
very high, must be declared to the Commission 
of  the European Communities and unanimous-
ly approved by the Council under Community 
aid schemes. 
The German coal agreement for the period 
following  the  expiry of the "Jahrhundertver-
trag" (''contract of  the century") in 199 5 is not 
yet in danger. However, declining consumption 
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of blast furnace coke has led to consideration 
being given to further mine closures. The situa-
tion in England is rather different. The level of 
subsidies is lower and the degree of  modernisa-
tion is higher. At the same time, however, the 
British government's privatisation efforts are 
now  also  being  directed  at  the  nationalised 
British Coal. Since only profitable mines can be 
privati  sed, all those not suitable for privatisati-
on are to  be closed. It is  however debatable 
whether, and how many, mines can continue to 
operate in the longer term under private ow-
nership. In addition, a heated discussion of  the 
value and contribution of  British Coal to energy 
policy is underway as a result of  the attempts by 
the recently privatised electricity producers to 
convert  from  coal-fired  to  mainly  gas-fired 
generation. The bitter battle to preserve British 
pits has been going on since the autumn of  1992. 
In spite of  these national considerations, the 
question of  the future of  the coal industry also 
has a European dimension, partly due to  the 
degree to  which all  remaining coalfields are 
affected and partly due to the close ties between 
the coal sector (as a part of  the national energy 
sector) and the respective national economies 
which are in turn connected to form a commo~ 
market under the EEC Treaty. 
If, in the context of  the next amendment of 
the European Treaties, the idea of an "energy 
chapter'', rejected in Maastricht, was to be ap-
proved for the EEC Treaty, this would have to 
be subject to the principle of subsidiarity esta-
blished in Maastricht.  Such a chapter would 
have to  contain a definition of energy policy 
goals  and the  principles  for  achieving these 
goals, while leaving Member States room to 
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formulate an energy policy to suit their respec-
tive  national  circumstances,  otherwise  the 
Commission's strictly market economy-orien-
ted  course,  striving  towards  the  removal  of 
subsidies, could endanger the future of Euro-
pean coal as an energy resource. 
Abandoning the energy policy consensus, 
under which European coal reserves are valued 
as a "European energy reserve", would bring 
the European mining sector under pressure from 
two sides. A world market-oriented energy po-
licy increases the importance of  imported coal 
from non-member countries, where the world 
market  price  is  significantly  lower than  the 
production costs of  Community coal. 
In addition to the unmistakable competitive 
disadvantages of existing production capacity 
Notes 
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there is also a general environmental argument, 
although it applies equally to oil and gas: the use 
of  fossil fuels for energy production contributes 
to  the  greenhouse effect, the climatic conse-
quences of which must be reduced by restric-
ting carbon dioxide emissions. 
The result of this development would be a 
coal  sector forced  to  justify itself,  with  the 
danger that the interests of  the remaining em-
ployees and of  those threatened by further red-
undancies would take a back seat. Clearly the 
structural problems of  the European coal indu-
stry cannot be solved at national level alone, 
since the effects of  energy policy decisions by 
the  European  Community can  override pre-
vious regional, sectoral and sociopolitical ef-
forts. 
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•••  in the 
steel industry 
A glance at the diagram shows that the character 
and progress of  the crisis in the European steel 
industry cannot be compared with those in the 
coal industry. The conclusion that, for the rea-
sons mentioned above, coal mining is without a 
doubt in decline and has died out completely in 
some  countries  does  not  apply  to  the  steel 
industry. 
Firstly, the crisis set in much later (1975 ). 
Despite all economic and structural fluctuati-
ons, steel production has remained relatively 
stable over a period of20 years or, to put it more 
negatively,  it  has  stagnated.  Even  compared 
with the boom year of 1974, steel production in 
1990 is only approximately 20 percent lower. 
No Member State has ceased steel production, 
although employment in the sector has halved 
during this period. 
This first rough analysis leads to only one 
initial conclusion: that the steel industry is not 
in decline. Strictly speaking, there is not even 
a steel crisis, i.e. relating to the product: it is 
rather a crisis relating to the structure of steel 
production in Western Europe, which has been 
met by extensive and intensive modernisation 
and  rationalisation measures.  The  so-called 
steel crisis is therefore, at least as  far as this 
book is concerned, primarily an employment 
crisis, albeit of a dimension and with a speed 
of development which required tremendous 
energy and imagination on the part of all the 
those affected and involved to ensure a crisis 
management which could be termed "social''. 
Manual Social Crisis Management 
The main causes of the crisis were as fol-
lows: 
•  previously built up overcapacity; 
•  changes in the supply structure on the world 
market, particularly with the development 
of  steel industries in the developing coun-
tries and, more recently, due to the changes 
i~ Eastern Europe; 
•  large-scale technical modernisation; 
•  equally large-scale modernisation of pro-
duction control (microelectronics, new in-
formation  and  communication  technolo-
gies); 
•  the associated organisational rationalisati-
on of  the sector as a whole (concentration), 
of  individual companies and of  production. 
This  applies  to  each  individual  Member 
State and,  to  an increasing extent, to the 
whole of  Europe. 
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All ofthis also applies in one form or another to 
mining. There, too, production per shift and per 
hour has approximately tripled since the 1950s. 
In contrast to coal mining, however, the steel 
sector is not in danger providing it succeeds in 
continuing to specialise, as it is well on the way 
to doing, in high-value and increasingly com-
plex steel products (components). In other words 
it will survive as an industry, but the process of 
modernisation and rationalisation will continue 
unabated and the number of  people employed 
will continue to decline. 
As  the table  shows,  in  the  course of the 
structural crisis employment has declined by 
more than half  in only 15 years and, depending 
on the country, was linked sooner or later to the 
closure of entire plants. This is another aspect 
which will continue to play a central role, partly 
because the concentration process will  conti-
nue, with the  advantages and disadvantages 
relating to location playing an important role 
with regard to internal (European) and external 
competition. 
A new process technology awaits the steel 
industry:  the  casting of almost-finished pro-
ducts, which will make entire processing stages 
superfluous (in a production process which has 
already been significantly shortened during the 
previous  crisis).  The  deciding  factor  in  this 
coming innovation, however,  is  not only the 
fact that a large number of jobs in the  areas 
concerned will become superfluous; that is al-
ready  recognised.  The  minimum production 
level necessary for profitability can, as  in  the 
case of the "mini" steelworks manufacturing 
long and shaped products, be reduced to such an 
The  crisis of coal and steel 
extent that completely new and much smaller 
plants become feasible, able to do without their 
own blast furnaces  and produce  liquid steel 
from scrap in electric furnaces. The question of 
location therefore takes on a completely new 
dimension. 
To take one of  several possible scenarios: 
In  2010 the  West European steel industlJ' is 
divided into  three  large European  concerns 
(French, British and German). Only  five large 
integrated  smelting  works (blast  furnaces, steel-
works, rolling mills) remain. Most other  plants 
are either pure rolling mills (re-roller) or work 
with electric steelworks, plant  for the casting of 
almost-finished  products and  the  still~necessa­
J}' rolling mills in close association with those 
companies supplying the final customer, for 
example the vehicle industlJ'. Nearly all of  them 
are close to their major customers (e.g. vehicle 
plants) and their suppliers.  The  old locations 
could only be preserved where products of 
regional importance (structural steel. etc.) are 
produced or where major customers were al-
ready established nearby or have moved to the 
area as a result of  the concentration process 
which the industry has undergone. But there are 
fewer locations  than  had been  hoped at the 
beginning of  the 1990s. 
Regions in crisis 
Back to the present: From the point of view of 
the affected regions, another factor in conside-
ring the crisis in the steel industry is that steel 
making regions have mostly also  been coal-
producing areas and  that a crisis in  the steel 
industry, in so  far as there has been one, has 
exacerbated and accelerated the decline of  the 
Manual Social Crisis Management The crisis of coal and steel 
coal industry, to  say nothing of all  the  other 
economic activities dependent on the two sec-
tors. 
Such  a  region  therefore  has  to  bear the 
burden not only of unemployment but also of 
reorientation. The uncertainties surrounding the 
finding of a new identity weigh more heavily 
than the financial burdens, which can be relie-
ved. 
It is easy for outsiders to keep pointing out 
the need to  take account of and develop the 
inherent potential of  a region, that regions and 
people should where possible be dealt with in 
situ and that regional development is also asso-
ciated with  the  quality of life  and of work. 
Those  with  15  percent,  20  percent  or more 
unemployment will  clutch at  any  straw,  for 
instance the discount furniture warehouse re-
quiring 30 jobs for a sales area of 30 000 m
2
• 
The major steel companies have a  social 
responsibility here which extends far beyond 
the duty of care by an employer towards his 
Notes 
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employees to  include a responsibility for the 
fate of the regions in which they exist, which 
they have  frequently  (mostly  in  conjunction 
with mining) created and cannot simply leave 
behind them with their vast areas of  contamina-
ted land covered in five metres of concrete. It 
goes  without  saying  that  on  their own they 
cannot bear the immense costs associated with 
returning such former industrial sites to a useful 
state, whether for commercial purposes or other-
wise, but their participation is necessary. 
It is also necessary for attracting new econo-
mic activities into the old regions and providing 
new opportunities. As some models show (par-
ticularly ER) it can even be economically bene-
ficial, provided that it is not a subsidised busi-
ness. 
Most of  the models in this book (see Section 
E) therefore give due acknowledgement to such 
commitment where it exists. 
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The role of 
the European 
Communities 
The European Coal and 
Steel Community 
The signing of  the Treaty of  Paris in 1951 by six 
countries (France, Germany, Italy and the Ben-
elux countries) established the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC), with a lifespan 
of 50 years.  Today all  Member States of the 
European  Community belong to  it.  Its  main 
purpose was not to overcome industrial crises 
in these two basic sectors on the social level; 
rather,  with  the  post-war  expansion  of the 
European economy, its primary function was to 
regulate the market. 
With the deepening crisis in both industries 
(A 1  ), overcoming that crisis became one of its 
main  aims.  This  applied  both  to  its  market 
regulatory function (primarily through the es-
tablishment of national  quotas)  and  increas-
ingly to overcoming the serious social conse-
quences of the crisis. The relevant Article 56 
(2b  and  lc) of the ECSC  Treaty became the 
broadly  interpreted basis  for  the  (partial)  fi-
nancing  of almost  all  important  instruments 
for managing the social crisis. The most impor-
tant source of  finance for the so-called readap-
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tation aid, which is non-repayable, was the levy 
on coal and steel production paid by companies 
in the Member States. 
During the 1960s, the main priority was to 
provide  social  protection  for  those  workers 
affected  by  restructuring  and  to  offer  them 
alternative  employment  opportunities.  When 
economic expansion slowed in the 1970s, the 
possibility of alternative employment became 
increasingly restricted so that other, more ex-
tensive measures became necessary. Untill989 
Article 56(b) represented the only legal basis 
for allocating ECSC readaptation aid.  Subse-
quently, Article 56( 1  c) has also been applied in 
the coal industry in order to ensure the inclu-
sion of  employees affected by the introduction 
of  new technology but ineligible for aid under 
the terms of Article 56(2b  ). 
The principle behind this is that this aid is 
additional and complementary and has a har-
monising effect: 
•••••••••••••••••••••••  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
General aims of  ECSC 
readaptation aid 
•  •  •  •  •  •  To gain acceptance for  essential  • 
industrial  restructuring  by those  •  •  people affected;  • 
•  •  to reduce the number of employ- • 
ees;  •  •  •  to  guarantee  social  protection  • 
measures for affected workers;  •  • 
•  to  provide  new  employment  in  •  •  other companies.  • 
•  ••••••••••••••••••••••• 
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Article 56 
(Assistance  with  redundancies) 
1.  If  the  introduction,  within  the 
framework  of  the  general  objectives 
of the High Authority, of new technical 
processes  or  equipment should  lead 
to an exceptionally large reduction in 
labour requirements in the coal or the 
steel  industry,  making  it  particularly 
difficult  in  one  or  more  areas  to  re-
employ redundant  workers,  the  High 
Authority,  on  application by the  gov-
ernments  concerned: 
a) shall obtain  the opinion of  the Con-
sultative Committee; 
b) may facilitate, in the manner laid 
down in Article 54, either in the industries 
within its jurisdiction or,  with the assent 
of  the Council, in any other industry, the 
financing of  such programmes as it may 
approve  for the  creation of  new  and  eco-
nomically sound activities capable of 
reabsorbing the redundant  workers into 
productive employment; 
c)  shall  provide  non-repayable aid 
towards: 
- the  payment  of  tideover  allow-
ances to  workers; 
- the  payment of  resettlement  al-
lowances  to  workers; 
- the  financing  of  vocational  re-
training for workers having to change 
their  employment. 
The High Authority shall make  the pro-
vision of  non-repayable aid conditional 
upon  payment  by  the  State concerned of 
a special contribution of  not  less than the 
amount  of  that  aid, unless an exception 
is authorised by  the CounciL acting by  a 
two-thirds majority. 
2.  If  fundamental  changes,  not  di-
rectly  connected  with  the  establish-
ment of the common market, in  mar-
ket conditions for the coal or the steel 
industry  should  compel some  under-
takings  permanently  to  discontinue, 
curtail  or  change their  activities,  the 
High  Authority,  on  application by the 
Governments  concerned: 
a)  may facilitate, in the manner laid 
down in Article 54, either in the industries 
within its jurisdiction or,  with the assent 
of  the CounciL in any other industry, the 
financing of  such programmes as it may 
approve  for the creation of  new  and  eco-
nomically  sound activities or for the con-
version of  existing undertakings capable 
of reabsorbing the redundant workers 
into production employment; 
b) may provide  non-repayable aid 
towards: 
- the  payment  of  tideover  allow-
ances to  workers; 
- the payment of allowances to un-
dertakings to enable them to continue 
paying such  of  their  workers  as  may 
have to  be temporarily  laid  off  as  a 
result  of  the undertakings'  change of 
activity; 
- the  payment of  resettlement  al-
lowances  to  workers; 
- the  financing  of  vocational  re-
training for workers having to change 
their  employment. 
The High Authority shall make the pro-
vision of  non-repayable aid conditional 
upon  payment  by  the  State concerned of 
a special contribution of  not  less than  the 
amount  of  that  aid, unless an exception 
is authorised bytheCounciL acting by  a 
two-thirds majority. 
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•  additional, because each recipient country 
provides at  least 50 percent of the public 
assistance guaranteed to workers; 
•  complementary, because other Communi-
ty resources (e.g. from the Structural Funds) 
will  be involved  in  accompanying  social 
and regional measures; 
•  harmonising, because the Community en-
sures that the treatment of  individual work-
ers is in accordance with social standards in 
their native country and/or that individual 
countries with their differing economic and 
social conditions do  not receive a dispro-
portionate share of the "cake". 
Readaptation aid is implemented by means 
of bilateral agreements between the Commis-
sion  of the  European  Communities  and  the 
Ministry of Labour of a Member State.  The 
(then valid) bilateral agreements of 22 March 
1989  made  provision  for  the  following  five 
standard situations for aid: early retirement, 
unemployment, internal redeployment,  exter-
nal redeployment and vocational training (see 
table). 
There are basically eight standard instru-
ments (see below) available to deal with these 
situations. However, they are used in different 
ways in different countries and can therefore 
only be presented in  schematic form here.  In 
connection with the model descriptions (Sec-
tion  E),  different  applications  and  combina-
tions are presented. 
Standard instruments 
Early retirement and associated  tempo-
rary allowances and the preservation of  net 
income (see D32, D33); 
tideover allowance (see D32, D33, El3); 
compensation for loss of income (wage 
and salary allowances) (see Dl); 
to  encourage geographical mobility (travel 
expenses; removal costs; separation allow-
ance) (see Dl, most models under E); 
compensation payments (see Dl); 
training allowances for employees andre-
imbursement  to  companies  of expenses 
Standard  situation  Maximum  contribution 
(in% of  earned income) 
Maximum 
duration 
(months) 
Early retirement 
Unemployment 
Internal redeployment 
External redeployment 
Vocational  training 
12%  (18%)* 
12%  (18%)* 
5% 
10% 
55%  (65%)* 
*in economically  weak  regions 
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18 
15 
12 
12 
12 
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involved in organising retraining (see Dl. 
D2, D21, D22, D26); 
short-time working (see D24)~ 
allowances to former coal industry employ-
ees by virtue of the decline in demand for 
domestic coal (£3, E8,  Ell. El3). 
The ECSC participates in the financing of 
these instruments; maximum proportions and 
duration are laid down in the respective Bilat-
eral Agreements. 
The methods used to overcome the social 
crisis  in  the  coal  and  steel  industries,  made 
possible as a result ofECSC financing, have set 
the  standards  in  all  Member  States  of the 
European Community. For instance, the Ger-
man  social  plan  (see  El  3),  set  out  in  1972 
under  the  reform  of paragraph  112  of the 
Labour-Management Relations  Act,  was  de-
rived and adopted from established practice in 
the coal and steel industries. 
Notes 
The Structural Funds 
of the European 
Communities 
Under the terms of  Article 130 of  the Treaty of 
Rome  establishing  the  European  Economic 
Community, the aim of the Community is to 
strengthen economic and social cohesion, and 
it has created a number of  instruments in order 
to achieve this aim. The most important funds 
are the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF). 
As  they have  been of great  significance  in 
many instances as sources of  finance for over-
coming the  structural  crises in the  coal and 
steel industries, some mention should be made 
of them here.  For completeness, two others 
should also be mentioned: the European Agri-
cultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EA-
GGF)  and  the  European  Investment  Bank 
(EIB). 
Finally, mention should be made of  the fact 
that a special cohesion fund is to be established 
in addition to the existing Structural Funds as 
part of  the implementation of  the decisions of 
the Maastricht summit. The aim of  this fund is 
to  support those  Member  States  whose per 
capita gross national product is less than 90% 
of  the Community average. Infrastructure and 
the environment are intended to be the main 
beneficiaries. 
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••••••••••••••••••••••  The  •  ERDF 
Objectives  •  •  European Regional  of  the  •  • 
Structural Funds  •  Development Fund  • 
1.  Promoting the development and  •  Helping to redress regional  • 
structural adjustment of the re- •  imbalances 
gions whose development is lag- •  •  The  European  Regional  Development  Fund 
ing behind ("'Objective 1  ");  •  (ERDF)  was  established  in  1975  and  is  the  •  2.  Converting regions, frontier re- •  most important of  the Structural Funds. Under 
•  gions or parts of  regions (includ- •  the tenus of  Article 130c, the task of  the ERDF  •  •  •  ing labour market regions and  •  is to  help to redress the main regional imbal-
•  urban areas seriously affected  •  ances  in  the  Community.  This  includes,  in 
•  by industrial decline  ("Objec- •  particular, reducing the gap between the vari- •  •  •  tive 2");  •  ous regions and helping the less-favoured re-
•  •  gions to  catch up.  This means:  •  3 .  Combating long-term and youth  •  •  unemployment and facilitating  •  • participating in the development and struc- •  •  the occupational integration of  tural adaptation ofless-favoured regions of 
•  young people, women  and the  the European Community (objective 1 are- •  •  socially disadvantaged (""Objec- as) 
•  tive 3");  • supporting the conversion of declining in- •  •  4.  Facilitating adjustment to eco- dustrial areas (objective 2 areas) and finally 
•  nomic  change  and  organising  •  • participating in rural  measures (objective 
•  the social aspects of innovations  5b areas) .  •  at  company level; preventing un- •  Since  coal  and steel,  together with  other 
•  employment,  particularly  in  industrial sectors such as textiles or shipbuild- •  small and medium-sized under- •  ing, are often decisive elements in the econom-
•  takings (""Objective 4");  ic structure and the labour market of a region,  •  •  5.  With regard to the reform oft  he  ERDF operations are often a valuable supple-
•  Common Agricultural Policy:  ment to  regional accompanying measures for  •  •  a)  Accelerating  the  adjust- the extensive redundancies which have taken  Contact:  •  ment of agricultural structures;  or are taking place in the coal and steel sectors.  •  EC Commission 
•  b)  Promoting rural develop- The Fund provides subsidies to a maximum  DGXVl 
•  •  ment ("'Objectives Sa and Sb")  .  of7  5 percent in objective 1 areas and 50 percent  Regional Policy 
•  in objective 2 areas. It contributes in particular  200, rue de la Loi 
•  B-1 049 Brussels 
••••••••••••••••••••••  to supporting the following: 
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•  productive investments to create or  preserve 
jobs; 
•  infrastructure investments contributing to 
the  development  or reconversion  of the 
affected region; 
•  measures  to  exploit  the  potential  of the 
region through counselling, financial sup-
port and  individual infrastructure support 
for  undertakings,  particularly  small  and 
medium-sized ones, and local development 
initiatives; 
•  cross-border studies or pilot projects. 
The European Social 
Fund 
Measures to support vocational training and 
promote employment 
The European Social Fund (ESF)  was  estab-
lished in 1958 as a direct result of the Treaties 
of  Rome and today (i.e. following the reform of 
the Structural Funds in 1988) has the primary 
task  of combating  long-term  unemployment 
and promoting the occupational integration of 
young people. ESF support is  accordingly di-
rected to the groups of  people referred to under 
objective 3: 
•  young people who have completed compul-
sory full-time education; 
•  the long-term unemployed; 
•  women wishing to enter or re-enter employ-
ment; 
•  the socially disadvantaged. 
In particular, support includes vocational 
training measures, recruitment allowances and 
assistance  in  establishing  self-employed ac-
tivities for the long-term unemployed on the 
one hand, and on the  other measures to en-
courage the  integration into  working life of 
young people, women and the socially disad-
vantaged. 
The ESF also contributes to the financing 
of the measures referred to above where they 
contribute to the achievement of  objectives 1, 
2 and  5b.  They therefore  benefit the unem-
ployed and those threatened with unemploy-
ment as well as the groups referred to above, 
with the aim of providing these people with 
the  vocational  qualifications  required either 
to  ensure their continued employment or to 
develop  new  employment  opportunities  for 
them. 
Notes 
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Measures and 
initiatives linked to the 
Structural Funds 
There  are  a  number of structurally  oriented 
programmes with the following aims: 
•  to help offset the negative effects of other 
Community policies; 
•  to encourage the use of  specific Community 
policies at regional level (e.g. environmen-
tal measures); 
•  to support solutions forregions whose prob-
lems have common characteristics. 
This last category of  programmes includes 
those  aimed at  overcoming sectoral  crises  at 
regional level.  In  addition to programmes for 
the  textile  and  shipbuilding  industries  (RE-
TEX and RENA  VAL) in certain regions there 
is (was) also a programme for the steel industry 
(RESIDER, which expired at the end of 1992) 
and the coal industry (  RECHAR, to run until the 
end of 1993 ). 
RESIDER 
Reconversion in the iron and steel 
sector 
RESIDER, the Community reconversion pro-
gramme for the iron and steel sector, support-
ed the restructuring process in areas where the 
steel industry was or still is a leading sector. 
Its  objective was to support efforts to create 
alternative jobs to  replace those lost during 
the restructuring and to  develop appropriate 
opportunities  for  new  employment in  other 
Manual Social Crisis Management 
sectors in the affected regions. It is  possible 
that a new programme will be introduced if 
required. The steel industry was considered to 
be of major structural importance in a region 
when: 
•  it accounted for a certain minimum number 
of  jobs in the region; 
•  jobs in other sectors were highly dependent 
on the steel industry; 
•  a large number of  jobs had been lost in the 
steel industry; 
•  the  employment  situation  in the  affected 
region was particularly serious. 
The  programme  had  a  total  budget  of 
ECU 300 million and was implemented under 
regional programmes in combination with re-
sources provided by the Member State. 
RECHAR 
Reconversion of  the coalfields 
RECHAR, the Community initiative for the 
economic reconversion of the coalfields, is 
intended to assist the worst affected regions 
with, among other things, restoring the envi-
ronment, promoting new economic activities 
and  developing  the  potential  of the  work-
force. 
Objective 1, 2 and 5b areas are eligible for 
support, as are regions in which the decline of 
coal mining will lead, or has already led, to 
serious  economic  problems  and  a  large  in-
crease in unemployment. There must be coal 
or lignite mining, either underground or open 
cast, in these regions and on or after 1 January 
1984 there must have been at least 1 000 peo-
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pie employed in mining. These regions must 
also fulfil the following conditions: 
•  they must have lost at least  1 000 mining 
jobs since 1 January 1984; 
•  the total number of  job losses confirmed or 
announced must be 1 000 or more; 
•  the total of  jobs lost or threatened in coal 
mining must be at least  I 000. 
The  following  measures  are  regarded  as 
suitable (summary): 
Suitable measures 
•  Measures to  improve the environment in 
areas heavily affected by coal mining; 
•  Promoting infrastructure measures; 
•  Building turnkey factory units and estab-
lishing  industrial  areas; 
•  Promoting smal1 and medium-sized under-
takings through investment, infrastructure 
projects, research and consultation; 
•  Supporting tourism, especially in conjunc-
tion with the preservation of the industrial 
heritage; 
•  Promoting regional development agencies; 
•  Training  and  further  training  measures 
under the RECHAR initiative; 
•  Interest  subsidies on  ECSC loans for  in-
vestment by SMEs. 
The RECHAR budget amounts to ECU 300 
million  from  the  Regional  and  Social  Funds 
and up  to  ECU  160  million  from  ECSC  re-
sources and loans from  the  European Invest-
ment Bank. 
All Member States of the European Com-
munity are eligible to apply. They must be able 
to  present  a  coherent  regional  development 
strategy  as  the  objective  of a programme of 
measures which must be partly financed by the 
national  and regional  authorities  in  order to 
demonstrate the  additionality of Community 
resources. 
Initiatives 
and programmes 
under the 
European Social Fund 
As with the European Regional  Development 
Fund, some resources (a maximum of  10%) arc 
reserved for programmes and initiatives aimed 
at specific problem areas and groups of people 
or intended to support other related programmes. 
Current examples of  this are the EUROFORM, 
NOW and  HORIZON  initiatives,  promoting 
transnational  pminerships  in  certain areas  of 
activity.  Under  the  reform  of the  Structural 
Funds, however, from 1994 onwards they should 
be consolidated into a single Community initi-
ative (ADAPT). To describe all  relevant pro-
grammes in detail would be outside the scope of 
this book, and only a brief  summary is therefore 
gtven. 
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EUROFORM 
EUROFORM is an initiative encouraging cross-
border projects and partnerships relating to: 
- (initial) vocational training and/or the pro-
motion of  employment; 
- the harmonisation of vocational qualifica-
tions  in  the  Community,  particularly be-
tween less developed and other, more high-
ly developed regions. 
The budget for  EUROFORM amounts to 
ECU 300 million. Duration: 1990-1993. 
NOW 
NOW is an initiative for promoting equal op-
portunities for women in the areas of employ-
ment and vocational training. Here, too, tran-
snational measures and projects are supported 
which: 
contribute to the upgrading and promotion 
of  qualifications for women and to changing 
the corporate culture; 
- contribute to  the  reintegration of women 
into the "regular" labour market. 
The budget for NOW is ECU  120 million. 
Duration: 1990-1993. 
HORIZON 
HORIZON is an  initiative for disabled people 
and  certain  disadvantaged  groups,  aimed  at 
improving their position in the labour market 
and their general competitiveness by means of 
vocational training for new technologies. 
The budget for HORIZON is ECU 180 mil-
lion. Duration: 1990-1993. 
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ESF  programmes  supported  by  EURO-
FORM, NOW and HORIZON 
All  three  initiatives,  but particularly EURO-
FORM, have the task of supporting measures 
and  projects  under  thematically-related  pro-
grammes and providing them with a European 
dimension by promoting transnational partner-
ships. These programmes are as follows: 
- EUROTECNET II (1990-1994):  to  pro-
mote innovation in both initial and continu-
ing vocational training in the  light ·of the 
effects of  technological change; 
- FORCE ( 1991-1994  ): an action programme 
to promote continuing vocational training, 
with the emphasis on SMEs; 
- LEDA II ( 1990-1993 ): an action programme 
to  promote successful and innovative job 
creation schemes at local level through cross-
border networking and exchanges of  expe-
nence; 
- ERGO II (1993-1996):  to  support initia-
tives to combat long-term unemployment; 
PETRA II ( 1992-1994  ):  vocational train-
ing for  young people and preparation for 
adult and working life. 
Notes 
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Bl 
Introduction: 
Who takes action? 
Those expected to 
respond in the event of 
crisis 
One might normally assume that there is no 
need to ask who will take action in the event 
of crisis.  The people who  are  affected and 
who realise that they are affected will take 
action of their own accord.  But the people 
who are affected do  not always realise that 
they are affected. Not least because it may 
cost money. This type of  thinking may cost a 
company, a region and sometimes a govern-
ment dear. 
The question that should be asked is, as a 
general  rule:  Who will  not take  action?, 
Who will take action in what way?, and 
Who should take action in what way? 
Monuo/Social  Crisis Management 
These questions will determine who must 
activate whom, and in what way. These are the 
questions that decide on conflict or consen-
sus.  This  manual,  which  deals  with  social 
crisis management, naturally seeks primarily 
to  find a balance of interests and consensus, 
while  conceding  that  consensus  frequently 
cannot be achieved without conflict. 
The crises referred to here are usually of 
vital importance for the majority of  those con-
cerned. This gives rise to many imponderable 
factors.  If you allow people to get into hope-
less situations, or even if  you simply contrib-
ute to a climate where the subjective impres-
sion of hopelessness can arise, you must ac-
cept that you  are  creating  an  unpredictable 
situation.  The  same  applies  in  the  opposite 
case: anyone who smooth-talks situations and 
makes untenable promises will be judged by 
his promises. 
In this book we can only give a very ap-
proximate indication of  the way in which cri-
ses in major companies or entire sectors of  the 
economy should be managed in a particular 
country or region, as this is dependent on: 
•  the  structures and procedures existing in 
the  country concerned and the  forms  of 
regulation  laid  down  through  laws,  de-
crees, collective wage agreements and lo-
cal plant agreements; 
•  the national industrial culture and the polit-
ical culture of  a country or a region; 
•  the company philosophy in each case, and 
perhaps even the sector philosophy (such 
as the German Iron and Steel Codetermina-
tion Law of  21  May 1951 ); 
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•  ideologies and strategic tendencies within 
organizations  and  institutions  and  in  the 
heads of  their leading representatives~ and 
•  last, but not least, the persons on both sides 
of  any negotiations. 
This is why nothing more than an appro  xi-
mation can be given here of  what is to be done 
by whom.  The  following  list of players and 
tasks can be used as a check-list and a source of 
ideas. It  is clear that when coalitions are created 
with the aim of  damage limitation and problem 
solving,  new solutions will  emerge  in  every 
new crisis. 
One  exceptionally  important  actor  is  not 
included in this list: the media. The manner in 
which  they  describe  and portray events  and 
developments often plays a major part in the 
development of the social climate in a region. 
The media are jointly responsible for the collec-
Notes 
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tive frame of mind of the people living there. 
They put a face on the crisis. 
The journalists are not the ones who make 
the news, of  course, although they select items, 
report  on  them,  write  them  down  and  give 
expression to them. The manner in which they 
do this contributes to a sense of  indignation or 
matter-of-factness, realism or uncontrollabili-
ty, dejection or rolling up the sleeves ready for 
action. 
Conflict  or consensus  - all  players  seek 
media presence  and  are  tempted  to  use  the 
media for their own purposes. It is the duty of 
everyone to discover ways out of  the crisis, and 
to forge a profile for the future. Ifthey are not up 
to this task, then it is the job of the media to 
remind them of  their responsibilities and even 
to seek ways out themselves- if necessary by 
drawing on news items from elsewhere. 
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Board of Management 
and Supervisory Board 
They are  responsible  for  the  company,  and 
their first duty is to ask themselves how they 
are involved in the crisis. The answer to this 
question will have a decisive effect on deter-
mining the future prospects for the company or 
plant. These prospects will in turn play a very 
large part in determining the strategy and com-
bination  of measures  to  be  used  to  reduce 
personnel. 
Top management thus has responsibilities 
for the  workforce and their families and,  in 
view of the size and regional significance of 
the plants, generally for the region, too. If  they 
are insufficiently aware of  this social responsi-
bility, there will be no  shortage of people to 
remind them of  it publicly, on the street and in 
the media, and at numerous meetings and as-
semblies. 
Finding a balance between the interests of 
all these parties, and making a sincere effort to 
establish it are the criteria by which they will 
be judged as persons. 
Their first and most important obligation is 
to  inform employees of the company,  or at 
least the body representing their interests, in 
good time and in detail about the situation and, 
if possible, about the  intended nature of the 
approach to be adopted to it. 
The challenge will then be to identify the 
correct  level  for  negotiating  accompanying 
Manua/Social  Crisis Management 
measures to deal with social crisis. In the case 
of sector-wide  crises,  agreement  must  be 
reached with the sector representatives on both 
sides  (employers'  association and trade un-
ion),  in order to  place an  obligation on the 
national government, which must be involved 
in any case because of  the ECSC aid available. 
The size of  the package of  measures normally 
also  means  that early retirement,  in-service 
training and retraining programmes and un-
employment have  to  be  discussed  with  the 
Labour Market Administration at national lev-
el. 
Irrespective ofthe degree of  prominence of 
the federal or regional autonomy structures in 
the individual countries, this level is of great 
significance both for the  implementation of 
regional support programmes appropriate to 
the situation, and for their concrete adminis-
tration and realization locally. Effective coor-
dination of  the efforts of  the individual munic-
ipalities concerned may play a decisive role in 
the success of a re-industrialization strategy, 
especially in the absence of  developed consen-
sus-forming structures at this inter-communal 
level. 
This aspect is important for the company 
management  even  if it  is  not  interested  in 
assuming regional responsibility, or if  the one 
or more  plants in this region are to  be shut 
down for good. Not least because the market-
ing of  the abandoned industrial sites depends 
on the efficiency of such re-industrialization 
programmes, and hence a considerable margin 
of liquidity or scope for investment. 
This is all the more relevant if it is hoped 
that the company and one or more of  its plants 
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in the region will survive, or possibly even be 
strengthened by, the crisis. Then an important 
factor  in  choosing  a  company  site  will  be 
whether the regional economic structure, new-
ly created or emerging from the efforts at re-
industrialization, meets the changed needs of  a 
modernized major company. 
Notes 
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This  calls  for  a  clear  forward  plan  and 
modernization strategy, showing definite pol-
icy choices to the company employees and the 
outside  world.  This  should  be  seen  as  the 
principal duty of the top management of the 
company, alongside the  task of creating fa-
vourable framework conditions for the man-
agement of social crisis. 
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Personnel Department 
Crises on the scale discussed here are without 
any  doubt  a  matter  for  senior  management. 
However, the planning, preparation and imple-
mentation of staff cuts and all the accompany-
ing social measures are a matter for the Person-
nel Department. Careful concertation and, where 
appropriate, the negotiation of an accompany-
ing package of  social measures with the Works 
Council or the trade unions are central tasks. 
The factual expertise and social sensitivity of 
the Personnel Department can greatly influence 
the conduct of  negotiations, the atmosphere and 
thus the human element over and above purely 
functional aspects. 
This can upgrade the specific gravity of  the 
Personnel Department in the internal balance of 
Notes 
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power within the company. This specific grav-
ity is  frequently not highly developed during 
normal periods in the mining and steel sectors. 
But it should be possible to prolong this upgrad-
ing effect, at least in the medium term, if the 
process of staff reductions can be successfully 
combined with  setting new trends  for  future 
employment policy as part of a modernization 
programme (to the extent that it is to proceed at 
all). 
This upgrading effect is particularly clear in 
the increased importance of  training and/or fur-
thertraining activities associated with the many 
transfers that result from early retirement and 
other forms  of non-targeted personnel reduc-
tions. The greater the success achieved in gain-
ing the initiative in organizational changes, the 
larger and more durable the upgrading effect 
should be. 
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B4 
Works Council 
Not all countries of  the EC have Works Coun-
cils. Where they do not exist at all -or not in the 
form meant here -the trade union( s) will take on 
many of  the tasks. The expression'  Works Coun-
cil' is used here to denote any representation of 
interests  elected by the  employees  (not just 
those who belong to  a union) in a  works or 
company. It is only possible to make an educat-
ed guess at how the weighting, and thus possi-
bly the work,  is  split between the two where 
there is both a Works Council and a union. 
Provided that it is not steering an out-and-
out collision course, the Works Council will 
almost unavoidably find itself  cast in a manage-
ment role in serious crisis situations - meaning 
eitherco-managementorcounter-management. 
In any of  these two cases: solidarity demands 
efficient  management.  The  Works  Council 
would be well advised to assume this role con-
sciously. It  is its first and most important task. If 
it is a matter of  negotiating a balance of inter-
ests, and the best possible conditions and ac-
companying measures, then theW  orks Council 
has no option but to bargain over the  funds 
available for distribution. I  fit is not offered such 
involvement, then  it should fight  for  it.  It is 
·essential in such a case for it to think and act 
consistently from the point of  view of  the work-
force (its own future will of  course be at stake in 
the event of  total closure). 
As  a  rule,  the  Works  Council  is  just as 
familiar with the ins and outs of  staff  cuts as the 
Social  crisis  management 
Personnel Department. It is thus not unusual for 
the Works Council to recommend the use of 
other instruments, or a different combination of 
instruments, from those proposed by the Per-
sonnel Department, if  only because this enables 
more  employees  to  keep  their jobs  - albeit 
perhaps only for a little longer. 
If, though, a works is to continue to operate 
with reduced manning, or if  there are plans for 
very far-reaching modernization measures, the 
Works Council will simply have to formulate its 
own view and (negotiation) basis and take a 
longer-term look at its jobs and organizational 
and training measures.  And why  should the 
Works  Council  not also  turn its  attention to 
investment  measures,  new  technologies  and 
new product lines?  In times of crisis,  plans 
always  tend to  be  laid  for  the  longer term, 
whether consciously or unwittingly. If  manage-
ment  for  its  part  fails  to  give  any  strategic 
consideration to continued production, then the 
Works Council must urge it to do so, so that this 
specific  aspect of crisis management can be 
discussed openly, and indeed publicly. 
The Works Council, that is, the body elected 
by the employees to represent its interests, also 
has a regional responsibility. It cannot see itself 
simply as representing the people who are in 
work.  People without a job, or in  imminent 
danger of losing it, have just as much right to 
have  their  interests  represented.  Who,  other 
than the Works Council,  should act on their 
behalf inside the  company and,  for  instance, 
bring pressure to bear for investment to take 
place in that region and nowhere else? It might 
be said that this marks the start of  the unions' 
responsibility in the region. That is not enough, 
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however. Works Councils frequently have di-
rect access to information and are involved in 
decisions. They are able to do a lot and to make 
a lot happen - the kind of things that no one 
would give a thought to if  the Works Councils 
did not address them. 
Precisely  because  they  are  able,  in  their 
capacity as advocate of the employees' inter-
ests, to argue unswervingly from the point of 
view of the  region,  they are  frequently  in  a 
position to formulate clear and thoroughly rea-
soned objectives and strategies, and so desig-
nate and forge the necessary alliances. 
.Seeking allies for the region, in the region 
and beyond the region: this is the second central 
task of  the Works Council. Each of its elected 
members must first ensure that "his" union, in 
which he usually also performs an important 
function,  is  involved  in  the  mobilization  of 
resources at all levels up to and including the 
national government. There have also been cas-
es where even the national government had to 
be by-passed in order to secure assistance from 
Notizen 
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the European Community, for example funding 
for re-industrialisation. 
The Works Council needs allies above all in 
the region. Conflict or cooperation: It must seek 
out public support in order to  have a  strong 
presence at the negotiating table. Depending on 
the scale of  the crisis, a broad alliance is neces-
sary: the media, local authorities, businessmen, 
churches, associations, and the whole of  organ-
ized society all have to send out signals-not  just 
an SOS, more like a rolling-up of  sleeves and an 
appeal to society's vision of  the future. It is truer 
in times of  crisis than at any other time that help 
is only forthcoming to those who show signs of 
helping themselves. 
This mobilization can only succeed if the 
Works Councils, i.e. the people who belong to 
the Works Councils, are perceived as standing 
for solidarity and vitality. This is a part of the 
responsibility  for  which  they  stood  and  for 
which they were  elected.  Simply calling for 
something to be done is rarely enough. 
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into 
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B5 
Trade unions 
Where there is no  division of work between 
W arks Councils and the  trade union( s  ),  the 
tasks of the former will also fall to the latter 
(see Section B4). The boundaries are flexible, 
however, and the allocation of tasks is never 
exclusive. As  a general rule, individuals are 
elected to  the  Works  Council  from  lists  of 
candidates drawn up by the unions. And with-
out the  support  of the  unions,  most W arks 
Councils would find it virtually impossible to 
undertake the activities demanded of them. 
What are the most typical tasks facing the 
unions in times of crisis? The answer is  the 
same as for the W arks Councils: to organize 
solidarity and mobilize an imaginative re-
sponse. As a country-wide organization, they 
are able to offer support at local, regional and 
national level. If  they actually succeed in pull-
ing together with the  representatives on  the 
employers'  side on a series of central ques-
tions, it will be easier to enforce demands at 
national and European level. The task facing 
them is thus, in the first place, to offer solidar-
ity as a trade union and to forge links with the 
principal objective of preserving jobs in the 
regions concerned. 
Given the  situation in  the  coal  and steel 
industries, there is no longer any point, and has 
not been for some time, in saving jobs uncon-
ditionally  in  the  old  industries.  Structural 
change must always be included in the equa-
tion. In the interests ofthe affected regions, the 
Social  crisis  management 
unions must ensure that there are new jobs to 
replace the old. With this as their objective, 
they can become the most important allies of 
the regions. 
Companies rely on being offered favoura-
ble framework conditions for modernization 
or new investment.  If a traditional industrial 
region  is  unable  to  guarantee  this,  there  is 
always another which can. In the interests of 
the  large  concentration of jobs in  these  re-
gions,  a quasi-natural alliance could be  pre-
sumed to  exist between the  unions  and the 
regions in respect of  the defence and winning 
of  jobs. Unfortunately, this is not always how 
the two sides see the situation and respond in 
practice. 
There is one further important area in which 
they could and should pull together: the qual-
ity of  the jobs and the quality of  the workforce 
in  a region.  A structural  crisis provides the 
opportunity for considering this in depth. Many 
is the union that will be obliged to change its 
spots more than once, because it also means 
that its clientele changes and that it must change 
itselfifit is to remain or become attractive for 
''the new workers'' in more modern or modern-
ized industries. Structural crises are crises of 
identity and existence for  the  unions.  Their 
principal task is  thus:  to turn development 
into progress. 
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Business Federations 
The role and importance ofbusiness federations 
differ very widely from country to country and 
from sector to sector. They exist as pure pres-
sure groups or as employers' federations em-
powered to  enter into  collective agreements, 
and even combine the two functions. We have 
assumed here, for the sake of simplicity, that 
they combine the two. Whatever is said about 
their (possible) role  in crisis management in 
each individual case must be set against their 
actual function and their ability to bring influ-
ence to bear. 
For one thing, their natural task is to look 
after  their  members'  interests.  A  great  deal 
depends on a coordinated and purposeful proce-
dure in the event of  an industry-wide structural 
crisis. This applies not only to giving guidance 
to members, but also to negotiations with the 
unions andnegotiations with the government. 
Creating such clarity of  purpose is thus of  great 
importance.  This  includes  making  a  careful 
analysis ofthe international market and its prin-
cipal trends, as well as continuously observing 
the direction of  technological innovation. Both 
count  as  standard tasks.  A  further  function, 
although one which is performed far less fre-
quently, is the supply of  detailed information to 
members in respect of  what scale of  job-shed-
ding is considered socially acceptable. And the 
extremely important task of  generating discus-
sion on what changes are needed in terms of 
work organization and qualifications in the wake 
of  modernization and drawing attention to new 
Manua/Social  Crisis Management 
developments is generally regarded as down-
right "dirty". 
It is highly advantageous if  the entire sector 
can speak with one voice in its approaches to 
government, i.e. the unions must also pull to-
gether, and in the same direction, at least on 
fundamental  positions.  This  even  applies  to 
conservative (i.e. more capitalist-inclined) gov-
ernments.  To achieve this,  it is necessary to 
negotiate with the unions, provided that they are 
willing, and to search for these common funda-
mental positions. Any offer that is both serious 
and capable of negotiation will strengthen the 
position in the eyes of  the public and the politi-
cians. 
Business federations are organized nation-
ally and regionally as a general rule. Both levels 
are required to take regional responsibility in 
the event of structural crises. Large industries 
are frequently concentrated on only a few re-
gions,  and in  the  case  of coal  and steel  the 
regions are almost always the same for both, for 
historical reasons. This is why the national level 
must also include in its negotiations with the 
national government proposals to support the 
regions affected. Although  th~  regions them-
selves are also represented for the most part in 
such negotiations, they will still be thankful for 
this support. 
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Local authorities 
Alongside the persons affected themselves, the 
local authorities are the sufferers in a structural 
crisis, and in particular if  an entire site is closed 
down.  Structures which have grown up  over 
many generations can be called into question or 
dismantled over the course of  only a few years. 
The major mining or steel companies: 
•  were  at the  centre of economic  life,  and 
numerous other businesses were dependent 
on them; 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
determined the labour market; 
were the principal providers of vocational 
training; 
represented the main source of  income for a 
very large number of  families; 
not infrequently also dominated large parts 
of  the housing market; 
as taxpayers, represented the principal source 
of  revenue for the local authority (in Germa-
ny: local trade and industry tax); 
played an essential role in the organization 
of  public life, through their support for asso-
ciations, cultural events and, not least, for 
local  politics,  even to  the  extent of their 
internal  company  management  structure 
giving a  lead for  the  social  and political 
culture ofthe municipality, or even of  entire 
regions, as in the case of  German "codeter-
mination". 
It is  these local authorities which have to 
deal with structural upheaval. If they are to 
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survive at all as a viable industrial location, they 
frequently have to cope with a veritable "leap in 
time". 
In  the  absence  of a  time  machine,  their 
principal task is to bridge structural upheaval, to 
create temporary solutions, and to plan a new 
start. The time available to them for this varies. 
Many structural crises last for ten, twenty or 
more years, with peaks, brief  pauses for reflec-
tion, and troughs when unemployment is rife. 
People learn to live with this, however. In other 
cases the upheaval occurs within only a few 
years. 
No matter what the situation may bring in 
individual  cases,  such upheaval  can only be 
managed successfully if, in the final analysis, 
the local level (meaning politicians, authorities 
and institutions) succeeds in consolidating at 
least the most important social forces,  in for-
mulating  objectives  capable of attracting 
consensus and in establishing decision mech-
anisms capable of leading to consensus. If 
not,  any  structural  innovation  will  lead  to 
strength-sapping conflict. And in the competi-
tion between municipalities, others will make 
the running, with more finely-tuned proposals, 
for the pots of gold on offer from the regions, 
national governments and the European Com-
munity. The fact is that public-sector aid repre-
sents the lion's share of  the money with which 
existing  small  and  medium-sized  companies 
can be reorganized, maintained or supported in 
their expansion, new investors can be attracted, 
and new firms created in the region. 
Especially large amounts of financial sup-
port are required for the development of new 
industrial areas or, frequently more important, 
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for the decontamination of  old industrial areas, 
given that this  is  frequently not done  by the 
companies which contaminated them in the first 
place, or in view of  the enormous sums which 
such work entails,  cannot  be  done  by them 
without jeopardising jobs elsewhere. 
The indispensable structural services which 
have to be provided by the local authority in 
overcoming such upheaval include the expan-
sion (or, if  need be, creation) and professional-
ization of  a department foreconomic, structur-
al and  employment promotion. An error which 
is  frequently  (initially) committed in this re-
spect is to attach such excessive importance to 
the economic promotion activities that employ-
ment promotion is left to trail behind. 
Employment promotion, however, with its 
dual task structure (jobs supported from public 
funds, and mixed public/private-sector in-serv-
ice training and retraining) serve as an impor-
tant bridge between the past and the future. The 
strength of this  bridge is perceived by many 
investors to be just as important as good (phys-
ical) communications. The attractiveness of a 
location will  decline abruptly without a well 
trained, flexible and adaptable workforce (and 
concrete evidence of its  existence  for  inves-
tors). 
This forms part of a more comprehensive 
approach involving the realisation and expan-
sion of  the endogenous potential of  a munici-
pality  (or region).  Of course,  that  does  not 
exclude  the  possibility  of introducing  com-
pletely new elements into the economic struc-
ture. After decades of  monostructure or a unilat-
erally dominated economic structure, diversifi-
cation now belongs to the basic principles of 
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municipal common sense.  Experience never-
theless shows that the establishment of large 
businesses tends to be the exception, whereas 
the bread-and-butter involves providing sup-
port for  small and medium-sized businesses. 
Consequently, the  care and maintenance of 
existing businesses is one of the most urgent 
tasks facing properly conceived economic and 
structural promotion. 
Finally, local authorities would do well to 
treat neighbouring municipalities not only as 
competitors, but also as potential partners in the 
development of mutually beneficial structures 
and cooperating with them on matters of  com-
mon interest (for instance,  roads,  waterways 
and airports). 
It is no easy matter to achieve all this, at a 
time  when  tax revenues  are  falling  with the 
crisis  and the  escalating (duration of) unem-
ployment  is  increasing  the  burden  of social 
services. It calls for integrational ability on the 
part of  the politicians and the courage to grasp 
new opportunities. 
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Region 
The meaning of  the word 'region' is admittedly 
somewhat imprecise, but it has to be used here 
to  overcome  the  considerable  differences  in 
State  structures  within  Europe.  The  signifi-
cance of decentral territorial units varies very 
considerably in the different countries. Region 
is  used here to  denote both partially autono-
mous  federal  units,  including provinces and, 
depending on their size,  administrative  units 
below this level, and simple coherent areas with 
certain common characteristics and interests, 
such as coal and steel and their structural crisis. 
The Ruhr (Germany), for instance, is not in any 
way a decision-taking or administrative unit. 
Nevertheless, it has a well organized lobby in 
the form of  the Association ofRuhr Municipal-
ities (which has no formal powers). 
No matter how a region is  or is not com-
posed, if  it wishes to acquire maximum levels of 
aid at a national or European level in order to 
manage  structural  change,  it  is  advisable  to 
identify common objectives for the entire re-
Notes 
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gion or, should this not prove possible, to find at 
least a ''common language" in order to be ac-
cepted  as  worthy  of support,  and  to  obtain 
support. This can occasionally prove very diffi-
cult in times of  neo-liberal governments. 
Final decisions regarding the distribution of 
aid still have to be taken, though, especially in 
large regions which are sub-divided internally 
and have a number of  centres. A method which 
has proved successful here is, in  line with the 
EC aid philosophy, for the principle of  subsid-
iarity to be applied to the decision-taking proc-
ess in such a way that decision-taking expertise 
is maximised as close as possible to where the 
aid is needed. This nevertheless calls for region-
al consensus-building mechanisms, bringing in 
all  relevant players in  a proper balance.  Not 
only does this reduce conflicts; it is at the same 
time an instrument for monitoring the applica-
tion of funds. 
It is at least equally important to encourage 
involvement and so create a broad awareness of 
responsibility for the reconstruction of the re-
gion. It is absolutely essential to avoid giving 
the impression, both internally (for one's own 
self-awareness) and externally (for the image of 
a region), of  being a helpless patient. 
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National Government 
Regions which are facing processes of  upheaval 
on the scale of  the coal and steel sectors cannot 
be left to their fate.  They need many forms of 
help  and  support.  This  is  in  no  way a  self-
evident  fact  in  times  of neo-liberal  govern-
ments. 
East Germany provides a unique example of 
the  devastating effect of neo-liberal policies, 
showing with frightening clarity how total blight 
can result if  regions are simply left prey to the 
notorious "self-healing" forces of  the market. It 
also  shows  how  enormously  difficult,  if not 
impossible, it is to arrest or even reverse a de-
industrialization process once it has got under 
way or, even worse, reached its logical conclu-
sion. 
The dismantling of large  industries  on  a 
massive scale in a region must accordingly be 
associated from the start with measures aimed 
at re-industrialization and at attracting poten-
tially successful businesses and services. This 
cannot be done without external aid. It is thus 
the  task  of national  government to  organize 
national solidarity or,  to put it more plainly: 
financial  redistribution,  and  also  to  obtain 
support funding for this purpose from the EC. 
What was stated in Section B8, Regions, about 
the application of the principle of subsidiarity 
also applies here. However, this calls for a more 
federal approach, which is not in favour in all 
European countries. 
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The provision of  aid just one of  a number 
of  forms which are conceivable and practica-
ble. The possibility exists of  combining large 
amounts of support for new plants in other 
sectors with the obligation to locate the plant 
at a particular site. The support of  the national 
government may be of  critical importance in 
attracting foreign investors. It is not absolute-
ly essential for national authorities and insti-
tutes, etc., to have their offices in the capital 
in order to operate effectively. This principle 
can be adhered to at least when setting up new 
authorities.  This  is  the  case  in  traditional 
industrial regions, in particular when estab-
lishing environmental protection facilities. 
Alongside these future-oriented activities, 
it should not be forgotten, of course, that the 
main concern is to help the people who are 
directly affected. The national government is 
required under the terms of  the bilateral agree-
ments with the ECSC to come up with at least 
50 per cent of  the aid in order to obtain ECSC 
funds (see Section A2). In addition, the La-
bour Market Administration, whether organ-
ized along governmental or para-governmen-
tallines (see Section B 1  0), must be supported 
in its work of developing and implementing 
temporary solutions and training opportuni-
ties for people threatened by unemployment, 
the unemployed and, in particular, the long-
term unemployed.  It may be necessary for 
this purpose to  issue new regulations or to 
amend existing legislation. Finding majori-
ties in Parliament is not simply a matter for 
the political parties, but also for the govern-
ment. 
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Labour Market 
Administration 
In most countries, the Labour Market Adminis-
tration is the most important partner of  employ-
ees, businesses and municipalities in terms of 
social crisis management. In addition, because 
of  the way it is financed, it is the all-important 
solidarity fund for the management of individ-
ual predicaments: unemployment insurance. 
Not only does it pay unemployment benefit or, 
subsequently, unemployment assistance, it also 
frequently has a monopoly in respect of  place-
ment services, as well as the task of  organizing 
and financing in-service training and retrain-
ing for the unemployed or those threatened by 
unemployment. 
It also plays an  important role in avoiding 
unemployment by  making  short-time work-
ing benefit (see Section D24) possible without 
serious financial drawbacks.  Employees keep 
their jobs, and the business keeps high-quality 
employees; all in all, this is an important means 
of  enabling businesses to pause for breath, or at 
least of  giving a longer breathing space for the 
careful planning of  crisis management. 
In most countries, the regional labour mar-
ket administration is  also the most important 
partner and financial anchor for local authori-
ties, businesses and employment initiatives as 
regards  the  financing  and implementation of 
employment measures for the long-term un-
employed  (see  ABM in  Section  £16).  Such 
Social  crisis  management 
measures are frequently the sole bridges lead-
ing back into the regular labour market. Th!s is 
an instrument that can also be adapted to region-
al  situations. It is thus possible, depending on 
the level of long-term unemployment in a par-
ticular region, to lengthen or shorten the period 
of unemployment which gives entitlement to 
one of  these schemes. 
The fact that the Labour Market Adminis-
tration operates at national level enables it  in 
many respects to act as an important decision-
taking and coordination body. It is expected to 
ensure not only that those regions which are 
worst affected also receive the largest quotas. It 
is also able, by organizing exchanges of  experi-
ence and ideas, to help in eliciting an imagina-
tive response (in conjunction with identifying 
suitable areas for  the  implementation of em-
ployment projects). Important pointers to voca-
tional training policy can also be identified by 
observing and analysing longer-term trends in 
the national labour market. 
It is an indispensable partner in the concert 
oflocal or regional players whenever the ques-
tion arises of  organizing in-service training and 
retraining in harmony with the re-industrializa-
tion  process.  Such processes  do  not  always 
follow national  trends, especially in  terms of 
timing.  This  is  why considerable importance 
attaches  to  the  accurate  observation of the 
regional labour market by the Labour Market 
Administration. 
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Other institutions and 
organizations 
There are a considerable number of  institutions 
and organizations capable of playing a part in 
the social management of  a crisis. Only the most 
important ones will be mentioned here: political 
parties, Chambers of Industry and Commerce, 
churches,  charitable  institutions and associa-
tions. 
The  political  parties,  as  organs  for  the 
development  of political  objectives  and  the 
exercise of power, are in a position of special 
responsibility, whether in power in local, re-
gional  or  national  government  or "only''  in 
opposition in national parliaments or local or 
regional  councils.  They  are  rightly  held  ac-
countable for the  success or failure  of crisis 
management in the region by the voters. Their 
task is to make sure that people are content. This 
is the yardstick by which their performance and 
behaviour must be measured. Accordingly, they 
are all  expected to help elicit an  imaginative 
response, to  find  solutions and sources of fi-
nancing appropriate to the problem, to organize 
effective emergency structures, and to embark 
on promising development paths. 
The  Chambers of Industry and  Com-
merce  do not have the  same significance in 
every country as  they do  in  Germany, where 
membership by businesses is compulsory. As a 
result,  the official  functions  of the  chambers 
differ considerably from one country to anoth-
er.  A few notes on possible areas of involve-
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ment in times of crisis are nevertheless called 
for here. They serve an important function in the 
collection and preparation of  data of  relevance 
to the market and to business for existing com-
panies and budding entrepreneurs. In addition, 
they are required to provide a good range of 
management training courses. If it is true that 
people's capacity for work is a significant factor 
in  investment location decisions - something 
which the Chambers never grow tired of em-
phasizing- then the supply of entrepreneurial 
expertise is one of  their principal duties. Final-
ly, in a market economy an association of  busi-
nesses can reasonably be expected to contribute 
to structural change and to the way out of the 
crisis. One ofthe most common activities of  this 
kind is their involvement in the initiation and 
consolidation of  business and technology incu-
bators, which generate fresh impetus at local or 
regional level and open up development paths. 
The fact that they are extremely receptive to any 
official support, contrary to what they tend to 
preach, simply shows how realistic they can be. 
This enables them to be important partners for 
economic and structural advancement at local 
level,  and  to  act  as  a  central  pillar  for  any 
existing consensus-finding mechanisms. 
The  Christian  churches have  special  re-
sponsibility in times of crisis, because of  their 
self-appointed charitable/philanthropic mission. 
This they can discharge in many ways. In many 
places, this takes the form initially of involve-
ment in workers'  struggle against threatened 
plant closures  and  for  more  social  forms  of 
crisis management or for alternative jobs. Phil-
anthropic activity, which boils down to solidar-
ity, has frequently caused the churches to be-
come the most important originators of  employ-
Page 15 
Notes 
Political 
parties 
Churches 
Chambers 
of 
Industry and 
Commerce 
8 8  Pagel6 
Notes 
Charitable 
associations 
Associations 
ment initiatives and of employment measures 
for the long-term unemployed. Of  course, phil-
anthropic activity also has an important role to 
play in many areas in the form of  charity, i.e. the 
provision of individual aid. The ability of the 
church to ease the burden of  unemployment for 
some individuals through prayer may be men-
tioned here in passing. In all these functions, the 
churches can be major players in the context of 
consensus mechanisms, and an important par-
ticipant in local debate on crisis management. 
Charitable associations, like church char-
ities, have more to do at times of  crisis: when the 
badly-offtend to become even worse-off. Along-
side the aid that they provide for individuals, 
they are generally important sources of addi-
tional employment ofbenefit to the community. 
There are  associations  for  almost  every-
thing in most countries, and for everything in 
Germany. They represent one of  the most im-
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portant ways in which society can be organised 
along non-governmental lines.  Their strength 
lies in the fact that they follow only a single 
specific purpose, which all those involved in the 
association regard as common. Although their 
influence has declined, sports associations, for 
instance, are almost everywhere one of  the most 
important non-commercial, organized leisure 
structures.  This  form  of association  imparts 
stability to  social  structures and makes them 
relatively independent of commercial or gov-
ernment  facilities.  Although associations  are 
naturally also  subject to  change,  and cannot 
prevent social change - for example the strong 
trend towards individualization amongst well-
qualified  and  well-paid  employees  (the  real 
winners in the crisis?) - they are one aspect of 
continuity which can be of  great importance in 
times of  rapid change. 
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The European 
Communities 
The  European  Communities  became  an  ex-
tremely important agent of social crisis man-
agement during the 1980s. Whereas they were 
always important for coal and steel through the 
ECSC, they were able to build upon this impor-
tance quite significantly above all through the 
Structural Funds, the  Regional  and  Social 
Fund. The Structural Funds, now supplemented 
by the Cohesion Fund, have become socially 
and structurally the most important redistribu-
tion mechanism at European level. 
Without the support for structural change 
through the ERDF (European Regional De-
velopment Fund) and tailor  -made programmes 
for regions hit by industrial crises, it would not 
Notes 
Manua/Social  Crisis Management 
have been possible to  introduce many of the 
structural  innovations  which today represent 
promising points of  departure. 
The  extremely  large  number of employ-
ment initiatives, with their wealth of ideas se-
curing millions of jobs, at  least temporarily, 
would have been unthinkable in many places 
without  the  support of the  ESF (European 
Social Fund) and its action programmes target-
ed at problem groups; in their own way these 
achieve just as much for the social cohesion of 
Europe as trade does within the economy. Euro-
pean  Technological Support, with its strong 
orientation towards small and medium-sized 
businesses,  is  yet another highly  significant 
driving  force  for  technological  and  regional 
change. 
A rather more detailed presentation of  these 
activities can be found in Section A2. For this 
reason, we have dispensed with a more detailed 
description here. 
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People 
I almost forgot.  This Section dealing with the 
principal  social  actors  in  the  event of crisis 
cannot be concluded without naming the main 
actors. They are the employees and their fami-
lies  in  the  regions  concerned,  and  all  those 
people who are actively involved, in one way or 
another, in the management of  structural change, 
either by trying to  make the best of it,  or by 
giving a lead, through ideas and energy, for their 
fellows, for their personnel, for a company, or 
for the region as a whole. 
We are inclined to view society and social 
change in terms of  social structures and devel-
opments,  organizations  and  institutions,  and 
givers and receivers of  funds. This is legitimate, 
because it ·helps us understand and facilitates 
communication. What we frequently overlook, 
however, when considering the whole, is that it 
is people who really count. 
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It  is their lives that are affected by  job losses 
and plant closures, structural upheaval and struc-
tural change. People have to deal with their life 
crises themselves. And what else is it but a life 
crisis if  a 40 year-old has to learn a new trade or 
profession? If  you have to move without want-
ing to? If you have to retire at 50? If winding 
tower and blast furnace, which you have known 
for your entire life, are tom down? Worse still, 
if  you have to help tear them down? If  you lose 
your own roots? If  the new  job is not suitable for 
an old worker? If you have to  accept a "job 
creation measure''? It matters little how much 
help you get to learn to walk again. Crutches are 
useful,  but you still  have  to  do  the  walking 
yourself. 
The point here  is  not to complain, but to 
provide food for thought. Structural upheaval 
and structural change are things that affect peo-
ple - bones and brains. I almost forgot to say 
that. 
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Introduction: 
What needs to 
be done? 
Ways and means 
of shedding jobs 
in times of crisis 
No two crises are the same. Just as every enter-
prise, every business is  a  universe in  its own 
right,  so  must  the  instruments  used  in  each 
enteqxisc differ in crisis situations, and so will 
the  adopted planning process  vary  from  one 
business to the next. 
There are, ofcourse, a number of  fixed points 
which must be observed in such situations: for 
instance, legislation and collective agreements. 
These differ from country to country. In addition. 
steel and mining arc old industries vvhich  have 
acquired a culture of  their own over the genera-
tions, and from which obligations and also con-
straints result:  acquired rights and deep-rooted 
traditions, some ofwhich are unwritten and some 
embodied in company agreements. 
In other words, it is at a very individual level 
that decisions are taken on what can/must be 
done. how, at what cost and at what price,  in 
order to minimise the (direct and indirect) im-
pact on people and their environment. 
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Time limits and 
objectives 
Nevertheless, there are measures that can be 
adopted in one form or another in  all  serious 
crisis situations. These are set out in Sections C 
and D. Section D presents the individual meas-
ures and considers the advantages and disad-
vantages. The principal task for Section Cis to 
examine what can be done, and how quickly. 
A distinction is drawn between: 
•  short-term achievable measures, which can 
be taken immediately or, at any rate, with a 
few days' notice; 
•  medium-term achievable measures. capa-
ble of being introduced with a few weeks' 
notice: 
•  long-term achievable measures, which can 
only be realized after months of planning 
and preparation. 
The basic assumption made here is that we 
are dealing (see also Section A) with a structur-
al crisis. and that  far-reaching redundancy 
measures are unavoidable. In the absence of 
such an assumption, and depending on the grav-
ity of  the crisis, it would be necessary to intro-
duce an  appropriate range of measures in  ac-
cordance  with  objective  criteria,  in  order to 
clarify the effect of various measures. This is 
done  in  Section  D.  Such  objectives  can  be 
ranked as follows: 
•  Stabilization of  employment~ 
•  Temporary job cuts~ and 
•  Permanent job cuts. 
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Social crisis management as a planning process 
Despite the sad fact  that a structural crisis 
leads to the permanent loss of jobs, we must 
continue to bear the interests of  the firm and its 
staff in  mind and not concentrate on one set of 
measures to the detriment of  others. This rank-
ing of objecti\ es applies even if it is clear that 
thousands ofjobs must be lost. 
No matter how paradoxical it may seem: if 
job losses on a massive scale are in store, the 
first  priority must be to  try to  save them. 
Compliance with this principle should not only 
make  a  significant  contribution  to  avoiding 
conflict, but should also make it possible to gain 
time and space for careful planning. 
The measures which can be achieved in the 
short. medium and long term may well differ 
from country to country and from business to 
hu~iness, depending on  ho\v many rules and 
regulations have to he taken into consideration. 
A number of measures will thus appear under 
various headings. In many cases. the implemen-
tation time-scale also depends on the existence 
or otherwise of planning procedures (  contin-
gency  plans). Of course, it  is  not  a  matter of 
picking and choosing: only by deploying them 
in  concert can the desired effect be achieved. 
Criteria: 
Why me? 
Making people redundant during a  structural 
crisis always means the irrevocable destruction 
of'jobs in a company and in a region. Unlike the 
planning of temporary changes in  the  work-
force to meet short-term economic situations. 
there are often no universally "correct" selce-
tion criteria. The principle of last in, first out; 
first  in,  last  out  carefully  nurtured  by  trade 
unions everywhere cannot be applied in such a 
situation. 
The most compelling argument against this 
"'standard principle" is  its eft\:ct:  in  industries 
such as coal  and steel  \vith  very pronounced 
continuity  of service  (seniority),  this  would 
predominantly affect young employees - the 
very people whose skills in modern technology 
are vital to the future of the company and the 
region. Certainly. the loss of  experience associ-
ated \Vith the disappearance of  the "old hands" 
brings major problems for many companies and 
can actually represent a threat to their survival 
in certain cases. Nonetheless, there is no alter-
native (for the time being) to the "representative 
principle": the old have to go to make way for 
the young. 
This only holds good for as long as there arc 
any  "old  hands''  left.  In  the  coal  and  steel 
industries, however, there are hardly any of  the 
older generation left.  In  addition. the financial 
burdens associated with early retirement are so 
great that a further reduction in the early retire-
ment age might well jeopardise the future of  the 
company. 
The following list of  measures thus does not 
even attempt to test the  individual  impact of 
each and every measure. The principle is sim-
ply that what can be done must he done in order 
to save the largest possible number ofjohs, and 
the individual se\ erity of the measure must he 
alleviated as far as possible. 
Companies and unions must be equally keen 
to obsen e this social and moral principle, not 
only because of  the human dimension, but also 
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with an eye to the future. Anxiety is not a sound 
basis for the sun ivai of businesses in markets 
where the "quality ofv,:ork" plays a significant 
part in determining a company"s position in the 
market and thus the prt:'scrvation of  jobs. 
Planning procedure 
Nor shall \VC attempt here to construct anything 
appro:.1ching an ideal planning procedure. There 
arc too many imponderables: the communica-
tions climate within companies. the existence or 
otherwise ofplans. experience gained in similar 
situations and. last but not least, the resources 
available. 
T" o principles are vital to any "successful·· 
crisis management: 
Notes 
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•  Planning  redundancies  demands  the 
same kind of careful and systematic approach 
from Personnel Departments as they apply to 
the recruitment process; 
•  As in any comprehensive and far-reach-
ing set of changes within companies and busi-
nesses. the effectiveness of  almost all measures 
is reduced \Vithout early information for.  and 
understanding by.  the employees concerned. 
and without the active involvement coopera-
tion  and  patiicipation of their company  and 
union representatives. They tend to be applied 
less rapidly. less \videly and without their opti-
mal effect. forfev  .. 'erpeople. than when steps are 
taken to make people aware of  the situation and 
of  the firm· s predicament and their agreement is 
sought. 
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Measures 
achievable in 
the short term 
The following measures"  are achievable in 
the short term, i.e. immediately or within a 
few days: 
•  Transfers within a plant or a colliery (see 
D~); 
•  Creation of  task forces, where no such facil-
ity already exists (see D3); 
•  Bringing certain work forward: repairs, pro-
duction, (where possible) increasing stock 
levels, early implementation of  planned in-
vestment measures (se'e D4); 
•  In-house services instead of  outside servic-
es:  replacement of contracts a\varded out-
side (repairs, building work, services, pro-
duction), where possible in the short term, 
by having such work performed by the com-
pany'~ own workforce, for example by the 
*  Authors note: 
This list of  mea:o.urcs, although amended and e"\pandcd 
hy tnt' on numerous pomt~, dcri\ cs largely from a ~tudy 
hy the study group '"Engcrc ,\lirurhclfer der .·lrheitl'di-
rdtorl'/1 Ei.lenund Sruhl" (Close As~ociatt'~ oftht> Iron 
and Steel  Labour Directors) at  the  I  Ian~-Bockler-Sttf­
tung  or the  German  Tradt'S  Umon  Counctl.  It  \Va~ 
pub! ished under the title.'"Pcn( mu/fl!  J/tfl.l()/c Bcttrtci!tmg 
\'un  ;\lafinuhmcn  und .\!itte/n ::ur  Anpuswng w1  Bt·-
sc-lh.i/tigung.l.w1nmnkungm. Tet! I- Bnchti/iigungsriic/,-
gung". in: Studien ::ur !\lithc.lllmmung.lthcorie und Alit-
hesllllllllllllgspraYI.I Nr_  /3,  Di.isscldorf 19X5. 
Monuo/Social  Crisis Management 
task force, if  necessary with the appropriate 
training (see D5); 
•  Internal  work  creation  programmes,  e.g. 
bringing forward maintenance work, clear-
ance and cleaning, infrastructure improve-
ments, occupational safety measures, and 
implementation ofimprovement suggestions 
(set' Do); 
•  Temporary acceptance of contracts at less 
than cost (see D8): 
•  Reduction/elimination of extra work,  i.e. 
overtime, not strictly necessary additional 
hours worked on Sundays and holidays, and 
night \Vorking (see D/0); 
•  Supplyingworkerson contractto other busi-
nesses in the immediate vicinity (see D 11 ): 
•  Paid secondmcnt (.\'t't' D /7); 
•  Unpaid leave, especially "home leave" for 
foreign employees (see D~O); 
•  No futiher recruitment (partial or total), and 
utilization of natural wastage(see D~5): 
•  Early retirement, taking advantage of  statu-
tory possibilities (see D3l). 
Notes 
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Measures 
achievable in 
the medium 
term 
The following measures arc achirvahlr in the 
medium term, i.e. within a few weeks: 
•  Transfers within a plant or a colliery (  W'l' 
D:}): 
•  Redeployment to  other collieries or other 
steel works, ifthey are a reasonable distance 
a\vay (sec LJ:}() l: 
•  In-house placement centre (.'Ice IJ()): 
•  Group-\vick placement centre,  which abo 
dt:als with placements in group-mvned com-
panic::-,  in other sectors (sec D:YS); 
•  Accepting  \vork  from  outside  companies 
(sec D7): 
•  Reduct ion/elimination of extra work as far 
as possibk (.'Icc [) 1  (} ); 
•  Allowing limited-duration employment con-
tracts to e;,:pire  (SL'C [):}()): 
•  T  crmination of personnel leasing contracts 
(sec D1  :}); 
•  Bringing hoi iday shifts f(xward for particu-
lar age  groups or group'i  or persons  with 
continuous shift working or night working 
(sccD15): 
Monuo/Social  Crisis Management 
•  Bringing holidays forward (seeD  13 ); 
•  Short-duration block leave. i.e. the concen-
trated  taking or collectively-agreed  leave 
(SCl' [)1.1): 
•  Training leave, that  is  to  say  paid  release 
from work for vocationaL cultural and citi-
7enship training (until now an entitlement in 
only a few  European countries) (sec D 1  n  ): 
•  Extension  of existing  in-service  training 
measures to a wider range ofemployees (sec 
D21): 
•  Provi::-,ion  of additional  in-sen·ice training 
measures in respect of  general or job-speci-
fic  requirements (.'Icc [):}2); 
•  Contract  training  for  other companies  or 
public-sector training providers (sec D:Y3 ); 
•  Short-time working, 1.e.  the temporary re-
duction ofthe collccti\ dy agreed number of 
hours worked per \\·eek (.'let' D2-l  ); 
•  T  l'mporary discontinuation (suspension) of 
employment contracts (not  possible  in  all 
countries for reasons of employment legis-
lation) (see D18); 
e  Lay-offs  with  a  guarantee  or re-employ-
ment alter a fi\.ecl period (sec ])19): 
•  Voluntary redundancy with compensation 
(sec D30). 
Notes 
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Measures 
achievable in 
the long term 
The  following  measures  are  achievable  in 
the long term, i.e. within a few months: 
•  Group-wide placement centre (see D:l8); 
•  Non-employment of apprentices who have 
completed their training (in countries with 
apprentice training schemes) (SL'L'  D31 ); 
•  Early retirement in conjunction \Vith  other 
measures such as a  social plan or similar 
packages of  measures, which are negotiat-
ed as a general rule with the Works Council 
or union (see D33); 
•  Compulsory redundancies (seL'  D3..f.); 
•  Qualitative tle'\ibilization: comprehensive 
changes to work organization and training 
policy, with a vie\v to creating greater po-
tential for flexibility (sL'e also tlzcj(J//owing 
Chapter C5 on p!!rsonne/ dn·elopnzent and 
Chapter D35); 
•  Reduction  in  lifelong  working  time  for 
certain groups of  persons (for example those 
working under pm1icularly arduous condi-
tions) (seL' D3n): 
•  Reduction in  the number of hours \vorked 
per year for all  employees through sho11er 
daily or weekly working hours, or through 
other free time arrangements (sec D3 7): 
Monuo/Social Crisis Management 
•  Establishment of task forces (in-house la-
bour pool), where these do not already exist 
(sL'e D3 and D27); 
•  Support for  limited privatization,  i.e.  the 
creation of self-employment opportunities 
for specialized employees, mainly in main-
tenance and engineering functions, for ex-
ample by awarding specific contracts (see 
D38); 
•  Outside services in  place of in-house serv-
ices,  i.e.  the  increased  contracting-out of 
pm1icular jobs and  services,  where  com-
mercially justifiable (see D3Y); 
•  Support  for  job-creation  companies  (see 
D-10): 
•  Measures to  promote alternative employ-
ment opportunities, for example by provid-
ing buildings, machines, services and mon-
ey, etc (see D41): 
•  Involvement in  the  re-industrialization of 
the region (sec D-12). 
Notes 
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Personnel 
development 
planning 
Personnel  devt:>lopment  planning,  a  ~ynonym 
for  the  increasingly,  t~tshionabk e\pression 
l!umun Resources D(_TL'iopmen!,  i~  ~till by  no 
means a common practice. The mi~taken inter-
pretation of  personnel planning to mean redun-
dancy  planning  continues  to  predominate  in 
many  companie~ in  the  crisis-hit mining and 
steel  indu~tries.  This  long-lasting  crisis,  and 
tht:> drama a~sociatcd with theine\ itablc lo:-.s or 
jobs  art:"  still  regarded  in  many  places  as  an 
excuse for attempts (some mort:" successful than 
others)  to  manage  a  dcsperatt:>  situation,  in-
stead of  as an opportunity for a comprehensive 
nt:>w  start,  \vhich  is  what technological  mod-
ernization and changes  in  the  market  cry out 
for if sun ivai  is  to  be ensured. 
This  is  admittedly  easier  said  than  done, 
although there  art:>  more and more companies 
(sec ulso tlzt' c.wmples in  Clzapta t':l{}) where 
personnel de\elopment planning  is  no  longer 
regarded as a privilege l(w already mer-privi-
leged  management  but  rather as  an  integral 
task for the development of the individual 
and collective potential of all employl·es. 
Personnel  development planning  i~ an  as-
pect of pt'rsonnel planning which ranks equal 
to corporate planning (sec churf) in  achieving 
company  objectives:  personnel  development 
planning has  h' o fundamental functions: 
Corporate Planning 
Sales planning  Production planning  Investment plann1ng  Personnel plann1ng  Cost planning 
Sales: 
What (products) 
How much 
(quantity) 
When and Where 
(Markets) 
Production: 
What 
How much 
When and Where 
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Product1on facilities: 
buildings. plant. 
machmery, tools, 
usw. 
Workforce· 
How many 
Which Skills 
When and Where 
Costs: 
production, 
investment. 
personnel, cred1ts, 
marketing 
Volume 
When and Where 
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The  task: 
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Financial planning 
Funds 
Financing of 
produchon, 
Investment, 
personnel, 
marketing 
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Personnel Planning 
~ 
RecrUitment 
Personna! needs planning  resp. 
redundancy plann1ng 
Determination of quant1ty  Plann1ng of measures to 
and quality of future  cover recrUitment and 
workforce needs  redundancy 
•  on the nne hand. to ensure the availability 
in the long-term of a trained workforce. in 
order to meet the present and future tasks 
facing the business. and at the same time 
secure jobs; 
•  on the other. to increase internal and exter-
nal  mobility in  the interest of companies. 
employees and the region. 
A  modern  interpretation  of personnel 
development planning  i~ thus not restricted 
to  the  traditional  areas  of initial  and  ad-
vanced training. It is  seen much more as  a 
central  instrument for the development of a 
broadly defined  quality culture  in  compa-
nies and worh. and as such incorporates at 
least an extended form of personnel deploy-
ment planning (sec chart). 
This is indispensable if only for the fact 
that  personnel  development planning must 
not only take account of  the need for training 
~ 
Personnel development  Personnel deployment 
planning  plann1ng 
Determination of need for  Planning of jobs, working 
tram1ng, and plann1ng  structures and personnel 
measures to cover needs  deployment 
ansmg  from  technical  and  organiLational 
changes.  but  also  ensure  that  the  level  of 
skilling created within the organization finds 
its  appropriate  field  of application  if the 
investment in training is to generate a return. 
or course. such a  view of personnel de-
velopment planning is no substitute for busi-
ness  perspectives  and  strategies  within  a 
company. Where these are present. however. 
it  can  make  a  major  contribution  to  their 
development and to future security. Although 
a  company cannot be protected from  prob-
lems  or  slumps  in  a  shrinking  market.  the 
really  important thing  is  the  ability of the 
organization as a whole and of each indi\ id-
ual member to look upon change not fatalis-
tically. but rather as a  challenge. 
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General framework 
conditions 
Companies  in  practically  all  sectors  of the 
economy in the developed economics arc sub-
ject to  fundamental  structural change from  a 
quantity- to  quality-related thinking.  The age 
of  mass production, where large numbers, long 
product life cycles, a high degree of standard-
ization  and  low  pricc5.  were  dccisiv e  for  the 
organization or production and the  po~ition in 
the  market  is  being,  and  has  already  been, 
superseded by  a period or quality production 
(and services), fnr \\ hich wide ranges of prod-
ucts, small quantities (batches) and short prod-
uct life cycles are typicaL in combination with 
high overall production \·olumes, \Vith  quality 
and price (in that order) determining the posi-
tion  in  the  market.  The  same  is  true  of all 
service sectors. 
The reasons why qualitative characteristics 
arc  increasingly  determining  purchasing  and 
lifestyle decisions by  individuals and compa-
nies  in  the industrialized countries lie  mainly: 
•  in  the  relative  saturation of most markets 
(needs) or,  to  put  it  another way:  in  high 
standards of living; 
•  in  the  micro-electronics revolution, which 
permits  higher  product  quality  (or  lower 
fault tolerances),  manut~1cturing flexibility 
and product  differentiation,  thus  creating 
the  material  and  technical  basis  for  this 
change;  and 
•  in  the tendency fix individual and collec-
tive  values to  shift towards more quality-
related yardsticks for all areas of life. 
ManuaSocial Crisis Management 
To put it simply: most people are no longer 
concerned \ovith  acquiring things, but with 
acquiring better things. This applies not only 
to  leisure rather than work, but to  leisure and 
work. 
The  same  is  true  of companies:  it  is  no 
longer a question of doing something, hut of 
doing something better.  Whereas  low-skilled 
labour can be  used to  a very high  degree  for 
mass production,  broader and higher average 
skill  requirements are the  mark of the  age of 
quality, not only in terms of  ability and knmvl-
edge, but above all in respect of  constant devel-
opment in the face of  rapid change. Companies 
and  employees  arc  under  equal  pressure  to 
meet  these  challenges  and  to  subject  them-
selves  to  a  process of continuous improve-
,-.ment. Those who  t~1il or only partially succeed 
run the risk of being left behind. 
There is only one universal quality princi-
ple in  business life (and beyond), which is to 
produce or supply what thl': customer (or vvho-
cver) demands.  In  this sense a company must 
serve its  customers, just as  the personnel de-
partment must serve its customers (the person-
nel) and the personnc  I must serve its customer 
(the company). Internal and external customer 
orientation is consequently the watchword of 
all quality strategies which go beyond "simple" 
quality assurance- a form \vhich certainly falls 
shori of the  mark  in  the long term.  Personnel 
development which focuses unilaterally on the 
needs of the company and takes too  little ac-
count of the  material,  personaL  professional 
and family needs of employees will  thus en-
counter  problems  in  recruiting  or  retaining 
qualified personnel in  the longer term. 
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Such are the framework conditions for for-
\Yard-lonking.  quality-oriented  personnel 
development  with  the  guiding  objectives  of 
quality. fle"Xibility and integration, albeit in a 
'cry general form. 
Personnel planning and 
personnel development 
Of course. qualitative  per~onnel planning also 
depends  on  quantitative  pcr~onnel  planning, 
which  depends  in  turn  on  known  personnel 
needs. Such need~ must a! ways, and particular-
ly  during a phase of long dravv'n-out job-shed-
ding  (when  they  are  especially  difficult  to 
ju~tify  and  fulfil),  be  specified  not  only  in 
quantitative. but  abo in  qualitative terms. 
\Vc  kno\v  from  experience that  numcrou~ 
transfers  take  place  during  periods  of job-
cutting to ob\ iate the consequences above all of 
the  (in  quality  terms)  arbitrary  criterion  for 
redundancy:  reaching  a  certain  age  (taking 
early  retirement).  This  means,  for  one  thing 
that careful planning of training and retraining 
are necessary, especially in a crisis. For ~moth­
er, all organizational structures ha,,c to take the 
strain, and in the particular case of the mining 
and steel  industries these  han~ grovvn  up  over 
long  periods  rmd.  for  the  most  part have  tT-
maincd  unchanged.  This  is  all  the  more  ~n 
since every company that wishes to survive the 
crisis  also  has  to  cope  \vith  a modernization 
Cl"l~IS. 
Every  company  that  is  fonvard-looking 
during the crisis,  instead of adopting a dcfcn-
si\ c  attitude.  is  thus  well  advised.  precisely 
\\hen things appear to be (and arc) at their most 
diftlcult and it seems that all its energy needs to 
be  de,otcd to  ~ocially acceptable job cuts.  to 
take a particularly criticaL future-oriented look 
Gross personnel 
needs at the time 
of planning 
Workforce 
at the time of planning 
Personnel replacement 
needs 
at the time of planning 
Fluctu-
ation 
Age limit 
reached 
Transfers 
Requirement for 
additional or reduced 
personnel at the time of 
planning 
Create 
jobs 
Reduce 
jobs 
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at  its  management  structure,  \vork  organiza-
tion  and  training  department. 
In  addition to  the quantitative and qualita-
tive aspects of personnel needs and personnel 
development planning, the third dimension of 
planning (the time f:1ctor) prmes to be a major 
problem in time:-, of  crisis. Continuity is hard to 
achieve, because both the external conditions 
(e.g. fluctuation:-.  in  incoming orders and pub-
lic-sector aid) and the internal conditions (e.g. 
organizational change, financial  and technical 
resources, and technological change) arc influ-
enced increasingly by  imponderables. It often 
becomes \ ery diiTicult for this reason, to  ad-
here to  a basic principle of quality-oriented 
personnel  development:  transparency  and 
openness towards all  concerned. 
Systemic cooperation 
The  quintessence of all  the  models  of social 
cri~is management  proposed  in  Section  E  is 
that  the  decisi \ e  "recipe  for  success"  for  a 
socially acceptable way of managing the struc-
tural crisis in the coal and steel  industries is to 
seck the broadest and most objective-orient-
ed consensus possible between all concerned. 
and  thus for a broadly conceived  balance of 
interests  at  least  \Vithin  the  company  and. 
better stilL  in  the  region. 
A quality-oriented company has to tap and 
activate the individual and collective potential 
of  all its employees. This stated aim of  quality-
orientcd personnel development, \Vhich at  the 
same time is a statement of  the approach. calls 
for considerable effort  on  the part of all  con-
cerned  and  can  only  be  achieved  if it  is  es-
ManuaEocial Crisis Management 
poused willingly by  the employees and those 
who represent their interests.  Voluntari.ness-
or its  mirror image fl·om  a management point 
of  view: motivation- is particularly difficult to 
achieve at times of fear - and  structural crises 
are such times. A direct connection thus exists 
between the  manner of managing joh cuts on 
the one hand. and the method:-. and chances of 
success of managing the  modernization chal-
lenge on  the other hand. 
To take a concrete example: in most models 
of social crisis management there is  a simple 
but laborious method for achieving a relatively 
high  degree  or understanding  amongst  older 
people and  for overcoming the no-future ma-
laise  amongst  younger  people.  This  is  the 
personal,  individual,  ~tructured interview, 
which provides information on the capabilities 
and aims of each individual.  It was generally 
possible only on the strength of  such inkn iews 
to reach agreement on  future action and fund-
ing, such as further training or retraining for an 
improved position on the employment market. 
What  i~  good  l\_x  social  forms  of crisis 
management is indispensable for a 111L)tivation-
driven quality culture. A central clement of  any 
qualitative  personnel  dev·clopment  :-.cheme  is 
the  direct  interview  with  the  employee.  Ap-
plied systematically, it is the essential planning 
basis and the most important link between the 
firm's  skilb needs and  the  employee's skills 
aspirations. 
A company \vhich  embarks on the  never-
ending road  of quality  orientation must if it 
does not wish to  stray from  this  road.  seek a 
quality culture, the basis ofvvhich is voluntary 
and  repeated  agreement on  the aims of the 
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company.  Regardless of production  method. 
these can only be expressed in  terms of profit. 
performance, safety and  satist~lCtion of needs. 
The balance is a precarious one and needs to be 
restated  constantly  in  concrete terms.  This  is 
only possible if employees and their represent-
atives are involved not only in achining com-
pany objectives, but also in de!lning them and 
giving them concrete form.  In  relation to these 
overall company objectives, quality, flexihility 
and integration are functional  aims and meth-
ods of achieving objectives. 
The aim  is to create a '"performance part-
nership~'. an expression coined by the Labour 
Director ofHOESCH AG (a lllrmer steel com-
pany, no\v a technology company \vith a steel 
subsidiary).  It occupies a position beyond the 
Notes 
defensive concept of "social partnership" that 
originates tl·om  the days of class conflict. and 
espouses a nevv rea I  ity, \Vh i  c h in many instanc-
es  is  only just beginning to  emerge.  What  it 
boils dmvn to is that the ability of  a company to 
survive is largely dependent on whether repeat-
ed  efforts  are  made  to  find  the  precarious 
balance of consensus on  company objectives 
and to  confirm  it  through  results.  Companies 
which are wholeheartedly quality-oriented func-
tion  like this.  To  dL)  so,  they  need  "'systemic 
cooperation'~ at all  levels. in  the organization 
of work  and  of production  (from  receipt  of 
order  to  lln<.tl  deliYery)  as  a  whole  and,  of 
course. in the management structure. both hor-
i7lmtal  and vertical. within a company. 
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Introduction: 
What are 
social 
instruments 
of crisis 
management? 
A  very wide  range  of interpretations can be 
placed on what is social crisis management. Its 
broad aim is to alleviate as far as possible the 
drastic  effects of job losses  on people's and 
regions' employment situation and way oflife. 
But if one raises the question whether each of 
the  enumerated  instruments  of social  crisis 
management can  be  considered as  social,  at 
least from the viewpoint of  the affected people, 
the application of  the positively charged adjec-
tive "social" will be more precarious. 
Certainly, very few of  the instruments men-
tioned below can be claimed to be of  a "social" 
nature per se. They really need to be examined 
one-by-one. The various aspects of  this exam-
ination were discussed in Section C: 
•  Is  account taken of the principle that the 
persons responsible for managing mass re-
dundancies in a structural crisis must en-
ManuaBocioiCrisisMonogement 
deavour first and foremost to preserve jobs 
wherever this is possible (and makes eco-
nomic sense)? How this takes place, wheth-
er inside or outside the company, may re-
main  open.  The  persons  concerned  will 
judge it on the basis of  whether or not they 
have a job at the end of  the day. The quality 
aspect likewise remains here unmentioned. 
Furthermore, the question of what is eco-
nomically justifiable may well be evaluated 
very differently from the point of  view of  a 
company and of a region. 
•  Are the selection criteria comprehensible? 
This should not be difficult in the case of 
early retirement and other measures with 
clear criteria. It is more difficult, however, 
when selecting members of a task force or 
candidates for training. The following ques-
tions  must  accordingly be asked  in  each 
case: 
•  Was  care really taken with the planning, 
and  was  every  opportunity  exhausted  to 
preserve (also economically  justifiable  )jobs, 
temporary or permanent ones? 
•  Were the workers and their representatives 
informed at an early stage about the forth-
coming redundancies? And were they ac-
tively involved in the planning and imple-
mentation of the measures? 
Accompanying social 
measures 
Even if  it is difficult to classify the instruments 
as "social"per se, the manner in which they are 
applied can be evaluated entirely according to 
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social criteria. Apart from the aforementioned 
criteria, the accompanying measures also have 
a highly important role to play, irrespective of 
whether or not they were negotiated with the 
Works Council or union. 
Every measure, irrespective of its scope, is 
judged by the persons concerned according to 
whether they gain or lose from  it.  No matter 
what form such measures take, the yardstick by 
which they will be judged is whether the work-
er's status is better or worse. 
The leading principle for the fommlation of 
accompanying  social  measures must thus  be 
the  safeguarding and security of the social 
situation 
1 of  those who are affected by any of 
the redundancy instruments set out in  Section 
D.  In conjunction with this, account must be 
taken of two fundamental requirements when 
planning such measures. They must: 
enhance  the  geographical  and  vocational 
mobility of  employees; and 
respect the basic need for social  security, 
including when employees transfer to other 
compames. 
An inventory of accompanying measures, for 
which  the  financial  resources  must  also  be 
made available in a developed industrial soci-
ety, can be  derived from  these basic require-
ments.  Whether  these  resources  come  only 
from  companies, or from  a fund spanning all 
companies, or partly from the public sector at 
whatever level, or from national or European 
sources, is all a matter for social and political 
discussion. 
*  see Autorcngcmcinschaft, Sozialplanpolitik in der Eis-
en-und Stahlindustrie, Cologne 1979 
The basic elements are: 
•  Income security 
Where an employee is  required to transfer to 
another  job in the same or a different company, 
and where this is less well paid than his old  job, 
then his previous income must continue to be 
paid at least for a given period. I  f. at the end of 
this period, he has not regained his previous 
income level, adjustment to the new income 
level must take place in stages. 
•  Further training and retraining 
If an  employee is  transferred,  or even made 
redundant, steps must be taken to ensure that 
he  is  offered  further  training  or  retraining 
facilities enabling him to adapt successfully to 
his new job, wherever possible achieving great-
er contentment at work and with life in general. 
His  previous  income  level  must  be  assured 
during the period of training. 
•  Reimbursement of expenses in connec-
tion with transfers to other plants/com-
panies 
Additional expenses incurred by the employ-
ee  include the cost of travel and time spent 
travelling, the cost of  running a second home, 
or the removal costs, and in some cases the 
difference between the previous rent and the 
new  rent.  All  of this  can  only  apply  for  a 
certain period, of course. 
•  Retention of seniority 
Employees who transfer to  another company 
should not be classified as new starters, and any 
years of  service already earned should be cred-
ited to them. 
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•  Right of tenancy in tied homes 
Employees  leaving  a  crisis-hit company,  re-
gardless of  the redundancy/retirement arrange-
ments, should be granted a permanent right of 
tenancy in the tied house or flat in which they 
have been living. 
•  Maintenance of previous net income (for 
those taking early retirement) 
Depending on the  arrangements, the pension 
payments may be quite low compared with the 
previous net income. In the context of accom-
panying social measures, not only must the old 
level  be protected (at least approximately), it 
must also be indexed to income growth under 
collective agreements. 
•  Compensatory old  age  pension entitle-
ment for early retirers 
Employees who  have  taken early retirement 
must be compensated for lost contribution years 
to  ensure that, on reaching the statutory pen-
sion  age,  they  are  not,  or  not  significantly, 
worse off  than they would be if  they had worked. 
•  Anniversary bonuses for early retirers 
Many companies reward their employees for 
long service by marking special anniversaries 
and  paying  them gratuities.  Employees  who 
take early retirement should not be excluded 
from this. 
•  Termination-of-contract compensation 
Compensation under termination agreements 
or for redundancy in a crisis should, especially 
for older workers, be based on (a) age and (b) 
length of service. 
There can be  no  doubt that the  financial 
scope for protecting such - I would say - indis-
ManuaSocial  Crisis Management 
pensable rights of employees at all levels has 
become  narrower.  Coal  and steel  have  long 
been  favoured  sectors  with  their  special  aid 
fund (ECSC). Other sectors will find it difficult 
to meet the standards set by coal and steel. But, 
instead of simply revising rights downwards, 
consideration should also be given to creating 
crisis funds. The European Community will be 
judged by employees on whether it allows the 
ECSC's experience to disappear without trace 
in the year 2002, or whether it tries to make it 
into a principle of European industrial policy. 
Notes 
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Notes on methodology 
The list of instruments for social crisis man-
agement presented in this Section is structured 
as follows: 
•  The  instruments  are  numbered  consecu-
tively. Unlike Section C, however, they are 
grouped here  according  to  the  aims  pur-
sued:  . .  stabilization  of employ-
ment; 
::  temporary job reduction; 
::  permanent job reduction. 
We have assumed that we are dealing with 
a structural crisis, and accordingly with the 
permanent reduction ofjobs. 
•  Every instrument is first presented in tabu-
lar form and examined against a check-list. 
Comments are  added,  where appropriate, 
to give a personnel-policy assessment of  the 
instrument and hints on how it can be used 
in combination with other instruments. 
Once again it must be mentioned that the 
procedure and many of its evaluation aspects 
lean heavily on a study conducted by the Work-
ing Group "Engere Mitarbeiter der Arbeitsdi-
rektoren Eisen und Stahl" (close associates of 
Personnel Directors in the Iron  and Steel  In-
dustry)  and  published by  the  Hans-86ckler-
Stiftung of the German Trade Union Council 
(DGB)*. 
Numerous changes and detailed additions 
have been made, however, due on the one hand 
*  "Personalpolitische Beurteilung von Ma/3nahmen und 
Mitteln zur Anpassung von Beschiiftigungsschwankun-
gen, Teil 1: Beschiiftigungsriickgang", in: Studien zur 
Mitbestimmungstheorie und Mitbestimmungspraxis Nr. 
13, Dusseldorf 1985 
to the fact that this reference book deals with 
the  European scene  and includes framework 
conditions for other countries, and on the other 
hand to the fact that experience in other coun-
tries, for whatever reason, differs from German 
experience. Finally, regional aspects were tak-
en more into consideration, although this does 
not mean  that the  authors of the  study have 
ignored this aspect. 
The check-list 
•  Instrument: brief definition. 
•  Implementation, means, method: a brief 
description  of the  implementation aspect, 
taking into account company-related, legal 
and otherwise relevant aspects. 
•  Start and duration: necessary preparation 
time and possible duration. 
•  Costs: types of  cost, and any external grants 
available. 
•  Feasibility:  evaluation  of the  feasibility 
aspect, taking into account social, econom-
ic,  technical  and,  where  appropriate,  re-
gional  aspects. 
•  Reference to the models presented in Sec-
tion  E  in  which,  to  our knowledge,  this 
instrument has found application. No claim 
to exhaustiveness is made. 
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Stabilization of employment 
Instrument 
1 
Implementation 
2  Means 
Method 
Transfers 
within a works or a colliery 
Consultation/agreement with Works Council*/union** 
Information for the workforce (orally at meetings and/or in writing 
stating reasons, duration and conditions) 
Familiarization plans, systematic familiarization (with a 'safety mentor' 
where appropriate) 
Investigate whether aid is available via the Labour Market 
Administration 
1----11------------1  - -- --
3 
Start 
Duration 
4  Cost 
5  Feasibility 
6  Reference 
Short notice; if  agreement is necessary, medium term 
1-------- --
As required or according to need 
Security of income (according to collective agreement) 
f------
Possible continued payment of  workplace-related pay (e.g. bonuses) 
Ifpossible, reimbursement of costs (familiarization grants paid by the 
Labour Market Administration) 
--------------------------------
Good, provided that 
!---------------- -------------------------------
- familiarization periods are observed 
- social security is provided 
r- --------
-a time limit can be imposed on the measure 
Standard measure 
Works Council denotes any body representing the interests ofthe employees elected by the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions, depending on the country and the company. 
Notes 
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Comments 
This instrument is very suitable where tempo-
rary stabilization of employment is  sought in 
certain areas and/or for certain employees. for 
instance from the point of  view of  training and 
qualifications.  The  question  which  naturally 
arises concerns the jobs to which the measure 
is applied and in  conjunction with what other 
measures. 
Attention must be paid. not least for reasons 
of safety, to ensuring that those transferred are 
carefully  familiarized  with  their  new  work-
place. This will require enhanced supervision 
at the new place of work. 
Notes 
The initial phase can be considerably facil-
itated where an established form of systematic 
training and familiarization is  used.  The cost 
can be reduced if value is attached at all times 
to  appropriate training for all employees (see 
C5). 
Obstacles to the implementation of such a 
measure may arise through physical or other 
handicaps,  as  well  as  from  the  fact  that  the 
workplace  does  not  suit  the  employee,  e.g. 
because of a qualifications/requirements mis-
match, compounded by collective agreements 
or other arrangements. 
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Stabilization of employment 
Instrument  Task forces 
1  for temporary or special duties 
in a range of  locations 
Consultation/agreement with Works Council*/union** 
-
Implementation  Information for the workforce (orally at meetings and/or in writing 
2  Means  stating reasons, duration and conditions) 
Method 
----- -- -------------- -------- -------
Investigate whether aid is available via the Labour Market 
Administration (familiarization) 
- - -
Short notice; if  agreement is necessary, medium-term 
Start 
---
3 
Duration  As required or according to need, possibly permanently as a seperate 
trouble-shooting unit 
- ---
Security of income (according to collective agreement) 
---- ---
4  Cost 
Possibly appointment of a task force leader, if  there is not one already 
-- ---- -- --- -------- - - - --
If  possible, reimbursement of  costs (familiarization grants paid by the 
Labour Market Administration) 
Good, provided that 
-----
5  Feasibility  - clear definitions of  duties and organizational conditions exist 
f--- ----------------------
- social security is provided 
6  Reference  D27, ElO, E14, E16 
*  Works Council denotes any body representing the interests of  the employees elected by the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions, depending on the country and the company. 
Notes 
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Instruments of social crisis management 
Comments 
This measure is very suitable for dealing with 
surplus personnel on  a temporary basis.  Fur-
ther stabilizing effects on employment can be 
achieved in conjunction with instruments 04 
to  06.  However,  the  usability  of such  task 
forces also depends on the size and structure of 
the plant in which they are to be used. Clearly, 
the scheme will work best in large plants with 
many and varied tasks. Another possibility is 
Notes 
for them to be used as a temporary measure to 
deal with complicated transfers. 
In  the case of the longer-term use of such 
task forces, and if  they exceed a certain size, it 
is advisable to treat them as a separate unit for 
usc on special duties (set' D27: Labour pool) 
with the appropriate management structure. 
"Troubleshooting  units"  of this  kind  are 
permanent  features  of many companies  and 
works in the coal and steel industries. 
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Stabilization of employment 
1  Instrument 
Implementation 
2  Means 
Methods 
3 
Start 
Duration 
4  Cost 
5  Feasibility 
6  Reference 
Bringing forward certain work 
e.g. repairs, production, stockpiling, planned 
investment measures in production, social policy, 
transport 
Agreement with company and works sectors as to  which work can be 
brought forward 
Drawing up work plans, changes in production plans (where possible) 
Agreements with Works Council*/union** 
Following completion of the necessary preliminary work 
-----------------
Limited period 
--
Additional cost of  material for repairs 
Interest payable on earlier-than-planned investment; capital tied up in 
stockpiled production 
Good, provided that 
-
- technical and organizational conditions are created 
-no change in working hours (e.g. to shift working) results 
Standard measure 
Works Council denotes any  body representing the interests or the employees elected by the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions, depending on the country and the company. 
Notes 
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Comments 
This  instmment  frequently  has  only  limited 
effect. On the one hand this has to do with the 
aforementioned limitations in  respect of time 
and scope. Additional repair work and capital 
works require a limited number of  persons with 
the requisite levels of  skill and implementation 
is heavily dependent on existing planning pro-
cedures. 
Notes 
Bringing certain work forward usually af-
fects entire works or sectors and is only advi-
sable, if  at all, if  the customer is agreeable or if 
stock levels can soon be reduced again. Other-
wise, this kind of measure can only really be 
envisaged in conjunction with, say, imminent 
holidays (Block leave.  see D 14),  public holi-
days or preparations for works shut-downs. 
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Stabilization of employment 
1  Instrument 
Implementation 
2  Means 
Method 
3 
Start 
Duration 
4  Cost 
5  Feasibility 
6  Reference 
In-house services instead of outside services 
Replacement of  outside services and such work as 
repairs, investments, services and specific 
production tasks by the company's own workforce 
Information for Works Council*/union** 
1--------~~~~~-~~~------------~---~ 
Termination of contracts with outside companies 
Non-renewal of  expiring contracts 
Creation oftechnical and organizational conditions 
Short notice or medium-term, depending on duration of  contracts 
Unlimited 
Saving of outsourcing costs in  all sectors 
Good, provided that 
-the contract conditions permit such steps 
-the right people (skills) are available and the work can be organised 
Standard measure 
Works Council denotes an)  bod) representing the interests of  the employees elected hy the employees. 
**  llnion 111:1)'  denote seYeral unions, depending on the country and the company. 
Notes 
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Comments 
This instrument is frequently applied and can 
be readily used in many cases. It is nevertheless 
subject to the availability of workers with the 
necessary  special  qualifications,  and  to  the 
existence and suitability of  facilities, machines 
and equipment for the work. 
Although a measure of  this kind may stabi-
lize employment in the implementing compa-
Notes 
ny, it  reduces employment in the outsourcing 
companies. In  some cases. a longer-term lack 
of  orders for highly specialized companies may 
jeopardise the future of the company. What is 
of advantage to  security of employment in  a 
large company may even have a negative etTect 
on the regional employment balance. 
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Stabilization of employment 
t  Instrument 
Implementation 
2  Means 
Methods 
3 
Start 
Duration 
4  Cost 
5  Feasibility 
6  Reference 
Internal work creation programmes 
e.g. by bringing forward maintenance work, 
clearance and cleaning, improvement of  the 
infrastructure, occupational safety measures, and 
implementation of  suggested improvements 
Information for Works Council*/union** 
Create technical and organizational conditions 
Implementation, possibly by task forces (see 03) or the labour pool 
(see D27) 
------------ -------
Short notice or medium-term, depending on the necessary preparations 
Limited period 
Security of income (according to collective agreement) 
Earlier-than-expected or additional material costs 
Good, provided that 
----------------- --
- the work is reasonable 
-a time limit can be imposed on the measure 
Standard measure, D3, 027, E l 0, E 14, E 16, E20 
Works Council denotes any hndy representing the intcn:sts of  the employees elected by the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions, depending on the country and the company. 
Comments 
This  measure  is  very  suitable  for  bridging 
short-term employment shortfalls. If prepared 
Notes 
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and applied objectively, it can also be used in 
the preparation of comprehensive investment 
programmes. 
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Stabilization of employment 
1  Instrument 
Accepting work from outside companies 
with the aim of utilising available works capacity 
Implementation 
Consultation/agreement with Works Council*/union** 
----------- ----
2  Means  Establish kind of service the firm can offer (scope, timescale) 
Methods  Invite otTers, additional supply contracts 
Start  Medium-term 
3 
--------- - --
Duration  according to need, but in principle for a limited period 
Cost  None 
Good, provided that 
------------
5  Feasibility  -technical and organizational conditions exist 
-----
- a contribution is made to cover current costs 
6  Reference  D27, D37 
*  Works Council denotes any hody representing the interests of the employees elected by the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions, depending on the country and the company. 
Comments 
If, for example, consideration is being giv-
en  to  promoting self-employment (see  D37), 
the  execution  by  the  company of orders  re-
ceived from  outside companies, or indeed of 
any external orders, can serve to prepare em-
ployees for setting up in business on their own 
account. It would then be necessary, however, 
to link this with appropriate training measures 
(including of a commercial nature) (see £15). 
This instrument is  very suitable for  bridging 
employment shortfalls. It can also be used in 
preparation for more far-reaching measures for 
redundancies or temporary lay-offs. 
In  the  latter case the  measure  could,  de-
pending on the nature of  the incoming orders, 
even be planned and implemented as a prelim-
inary input by the company towards the crea-
tion of substitute jobs in the region. 
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Implementation 
2  Means 
Method 
3 
Start 
Duration 
4  Cost 
5  Feasibility 
6  Reference 
Accepting orders at less than cost 
The implementation of  the measure requires fundamental discussion by 
the Board or company management 
Information for Works Council*/union** 
Limited period 
No additional personnel costs 
Good, provided that 
-it is of limited duration 
-the employment problems are really only of  a short-term nature 
Works Council denotes any body representing the interests of  the employees elected by the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions, depending on the country and the company. 
Comments 
This instrument is very suitable for short-term 
use.  Clearly,  though,  longer-term  use  is  not 
Notes 
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possible without aggravating economic prob-
lems  or  increasing  rationalization  pressure; 
this would in tum create a host of  new problems 
- not just in terms of personnel policy 
D8 
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Stabilization of employment 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1  Instrument 
Implementation 
2  Means 
Method 
3 
Start 
Duration 
4  Cost 
5  Feasibility 
6  Reference 
lnternaljobplacennent 
(in-company) 
Consultation/agreement with Works Council*/union** 
Creation of technical and organizational conditions 
Provision of  appropriate familiarization training at the new workplace 
Short notice or, if agreement is necessary, medium-term 
--
As required or according to need 
No additional personnel costs (Personnel Department) 
Security of income (according to collective agreement) 
Possible reimbursement of  costs (familiarization grants paid by the 
Labour Market Administration 
Good, provided that 
- -----------------~ 
- familiarization periods are adequate 
- the various works or departments are not too far apart 
E2, E3, E8, E12, El, generally widespread 
Works Council denotes any hody  representing the interests ofthe employees elected hy the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions, depending on the country and the company. 
Comments 
This instrument is very suitable for the stabili-
zation of  employment as a supplementary meas-
ure  to transfers (D2) within the works,  since 
many steel and mining companies have several 
works in  a  given region,  with the result that 
employees do not have to travel any further to 
work. 
Notes 
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Temporary reduction of employment 
1  Instrument 
Implementation 
2  Means 
3 
Method 
Start 
Duration 
4  Cost 
5  Feasibility 
6  Reference 
Reduction of  extra work 
Restriction or withdrawal of  all forms of  extra 
work 
Consultation/agreement with Works Council*/union** 
By order of company management (restriction or withdrawal) 
Information for affected workforce (meetings) 
Possible termination of existing company agreements 
Short notice, unless notice must be given under company agreements, 
or ifthe Works Council*/union** will not agree to earlier termination 
------- --------- ------
As required or according to needs 
None 
Good, provided that 
----
- the measure remains limited in time and space 
- it is not associated with comprehensive transfers 
-a time limit can be imposed on the measure 
Standard measure 
Works Council denotes any body representing the interests of  the employees elected hy the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions, depending on the country and the company. 
Comments 
This instrument is  generally capable of being 
implemented rapidly and with good immediate 
effect. The form of  extra work, i.e. overtime or 
Sunday and public holiday working, which can 
be  reduced  most  easily  will  depend  on  the 
Manual Social Crisis Management 
nature of  production or activity of  the works of 
sector. 
Where technically possible, night working 
can also be reduced, in certain cases up to and 
including  the  suspension of entire  shifts  for 
limited periods (see Dll). 
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Temporary reduction of employment 
a  Instrument 
Implementation 
2  Means 
3 
Method 
Start 
Duration 
4  Cost 
5  Feasibility 
6  Reference 
Supplying workers on contract to other companies 
Consultation/agreement with Works Councils*/unions** in both 
companies 
Information for affected workforce (orally and in writing, stating 
reasons, duration and conditions) 
Medium-term, since agreement with the Works Councils*/unions** is 
necessary as a rule 
According to agreement and contractual requirements 
Personnel costs are reduced 
(Possibly) topping-up of  wages and/or continued payment of 
workplace-related pay (e.g. bonuses), additional costs (e.g. travel, 
subsistence) 
Good, provided that 
- all those involved are in agreement 
- social security is guaranteed 
- the travelling distances and working conditions are acceptable 
- there is a real need in other companies 
*  Works Council denotes any body representing the interests of the employees elected by the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions, depending on the country and the company. 
Comments 
This  instrument  is  cumbersome,  because  a 
wide range of interests have to be reconciled 
and  numerous  legal  requirements  taken  in 
account. In addition, it does not lend itself to 
widespread  use  and  can  thus  only  be  used 
alongside other measures. 
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Implementation 
2  Means 
Method 
3 
Start 
Duration 
4  Cost 
5  Feasibility 
6  Reference 
Termination of  personnel leasing contracts 
Information for Works Council*/union** 
Terminatin of  contracts with personnel leasing companies, observing 
the contractually agreed periods of  notice 
Non-extension of  expiring contracts 
Creation of  technical and organizational conditions in order to have the 
work done by in-house personnel, if  necessary 
Medium-term, depending on agreed periods of  notice and contract 
duration 
Unlimited 
Saving of  contract costs in the sectors concerned 
Good, provided that 
- the contract conditions permit 
-the right people (skills) and the work can be organised 
Standard measure 
*  Works Council denotes any body representing the interests of  the employees elected by the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions, depending on the country and the company. 
Comments 
The measure is directly related to the replace-
ment of outside services by in-house services 
(see  D5).  This measure, though, not only re-
quires the cancellation of a range of contracts 
with  third  parties,  but the  workforce  is  also 
effectively  reduced.  Because  such  personnel 
Manual Social Crisis Management 
leasing practices have frequently been in exist-
ence for many years, it may not be  easy, de-
pending on the area of application, to replace 
the outgoing persons with equivalently quali-
fied and experienced in-house personnel. As a 
general rule,  therefore,  training is  needed,  at 
least for some of  the activities. 
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Instruments of social crisis management 
Implementation 
2  Means  Consultation/agreement with Works Council* /union** 
Method 
3 
Start 
Duration 
Medium-term, as a rule dependent on a company agreement 
Limited, at most for the current calendar year 
4  Cost  Low, or none 
Difficult, since 
5  Feasibility 
1------------~---
- all existing holiday plans will have to be amended 
6  Reference  Standard measure 
*  Works Council denotes any body representing the interests of  the employee<; elected by  the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions. depending on the country and on the company. 
Comments 
This  measure  is  difficult  to  implement as  it 
involves  changing  company  and  individual 
holiday plans. In order to obtain the agreement 
of  the Works Council or the union, the situation 
must be  very serious.  Careful  information is 
Notes 
accordingly  indispensable  in  order to  obtain 
the workforce's acceptance. 
Such a measure, provided sufficient leave is 
still available (for exemple before the summer), 
can nevertheless be very helpful from a person-
nel policy point of  view, because difficult situ-
ations can be survived at low or no cost. 
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Implementation 
2  Means 
Consultation, normally agreement with Works Council*/union** 
Compliance with the statutory or collectively agreed requirements 
Method  Detailed information for the workforce 
3 
Start 
Medium-term, i.e. generally only as agreed with Works 
Council*/union** 
Duration 
In the context ofthe existing unused and unplanned leave entitlement 
4  Cost  None 
Good, provided that 
- the timing is right 
5  Feasibility 
- in conjunction with school holidays or public holidays 
- existing holiday plans are not too severely affected 
6  Reference  Standard measure, the rule in many works 
Works Council denotes any body representing the interests of  the employees elected by the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions, depending on the country and on the company. 
Comments 
This  instrument  can  be  used  effectively  in 
short-term situation. It cannot be used over and 
over again, at least not within a given year. 
There are works in which this instrument is 
a routine measure in the form of  regular works 
holidays. In such cases, it reduces the number 
of  workers who have to report for work to cover 
all  contingencies, and thus leads to  a perma-
nent reduction in personnel levels. 
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Notes 
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Instruments of social crisis management 
Temporary reduction of employment 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
1  Instrument 
Implementation 
2  Means 
Method 
3 
Start 
Duration 
4  Cost 
Bringing forward time off in lieu of  overtime 
- for senior workers 
- for regular shift and night working 
Consultation, generally agreement with Works Council*/union* is 
required 
Medium-term, since a formal agreement is normally required 
Limited, depending on agreement and planning timescale, as a rule not 
exceeding one year 
None 
~-4----------------~-
5  Feasibility 
6  Reference 
Good, since 
- it is normally in line with existing collective agreements 
- it is possible to take account of  personal preferences 
however, it is not always easy to implement, because the shift plan 
rhythm generally covers several weeks 
Standard measure 
Works Council denotes any body representing the interests of  the employees elected by the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions. depending on the country and on the company. 
Notes 
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Notes 
Temporary reduction of employment 
Training leave 
1  Instrument  Paid release for vocational, cultural or citizenship 
training 
If in the context of  planned vocational in-service training, 
consultation/agreement with Works Council*/union** 
- - - - - -- -- - --
Implementation  Granting oftraining leave in the context ofthe national statutory, 
2  Means 
contractual or company agreements, if  any exist 
Method  Motivation of employees to take in-service training 
- - - -
Planning of a targeted range of company-related internal and/or 
external in-service training courses 
Medium-term, since it has to be planned and organized and the whole 
3 
Start  point is to enhance worker motivation 
Duration 
- - - -
Unlimited, although individual duration will vary from case to case 
4  Cost 
Additional cost of  the trainee's absence, dependent on numbers 
involved, duration and organizational cost 
Not (always) easy, since 
-participation is only possible and reasonable on a voluntary basis 
---
5  Feasibility  - it can only be rapidly extended where in-service training plans 
already exist 
-
- acceptance can only be expected where in-service training experience 
already exists 
6  Reference  E12 
*  Works Council denotes any body representing the interests of  the employees elected by the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions, depending on the country and on the company. 
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Instruments of social crisis management 
Comments 
The  instrument  is  not  easy  to  manage,  as 
already indicated in the table. Continuous and 
well developed in-service training for parts of 
the workforce facilitates the use of the instru-
ment,  but the  conclusion has  to  be  that this 
instrument is only suitable in conjunction with 
other crisis management measures. 
Far from leading to a reduction in person-
nel  costs,  additional  effotis are  called for  in 
Notes 
tem1s of preparation and implementation. It is 
not suitable - or only marginally suitable  - as 
an  anti-cyclical  tool.  Another serious  disad-
vantage is  that it  cannot really be targeted at 
specific groups of individuals. 
Finally, it should be noted that only a few 
countries thus  far  have any statutory or con-
tractual atTangements for training leave. 
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Implementation  Consultation with Works Council*/union** 
2  Means 
-~- ~----~- --~-------------1 
Method  Regulation by individual contract is required as a rule 
1------11------------il---------- - --~-~-- --
Start  Possible in the short term 
3 
Duration  Limited 
4  Cost  Very high, since personnel costs continue to be incurred in full 
5  Feasibility  Easy, since the persons concerned do not generally raise any objection 
6  Reference  Ell, El2 
Works Council denotes any body representing the interests of  the employees elected by the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions, depending on the country and on the company. 
Comments 
This  instrument is  understandably used  only 
very  rarely  and  in  extreme  cases,  for  both 
psychological and cost reasons. Nevertheless, 
the effect is  immediate.  One possibility is  to 
Notes 
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combine it with a period ofleave (e.g. tacked on 
to  the  end of a  holiday),  where there  is  no 
chance of notifying  short-time  working  (see 
D24). 
017 
Notes D18 
Notes 
Instruments of social crisis management 
temporary reduction of employment 
Instrument  Suspension 
1 
(discontinuation) of  employment contracts 
Implementation 
Consultation/agreement with the Works Council*/union** 
2  Means  Detailed information for the workforce 
- ---------- - --------
Method 
Taking account of national statutory provisions 
- ------- --
Start  Possible at short notice 
3 
Duration  Limited 
- -- - - --------- -- - ---- ---
4  Cost  None, although severance payments possible 
--
Easy, provided that 
5  Feasibility  t---- - ----
- statutory provisions are met 
6  Reference  D19 
*  Works Council denotes any body representing the interests of  the employees elected by the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions, depending on the country and on the company. 
Comments 
The statutory possibility of leaving employ-
ment contracts in abeyance, so to speak, for a 
specific period during an acute crisis exists in 
only a small number ofEC Member States. It is 
in effect a final  desperate gamble which, if it 
does  not  succeed,  is  generally  followed  by 
closure. 
Not  surprisingly,  then,  it  may  generate 
considerable unrest. If  it is to be regarded as a 
''social" measure for crisis management, it may 
only be used in exceptional situations, and it 
must be linked with realistic discussions on the 
continuation of the business. 
This statutory regulation is comparable with 
lay-off  with a guarantee of  re-employment with-
in  a  specific  period  (see  D 19),  such  as  is 
available in  other EC countries, although the 
advantage for the company is that the employ-
ees  are  bound to  the  contractual  periods of 
notice if  they wish to accept offers of  employ-
ment elsewhere. 
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Lay-off with guaranteed re-employment 
Implementation 
Consultation/agreement with the Works Council*/union** 
2  Means  Detailed information for the workforce 
Method 
Compliance with national statutory provisions 
3 
Start 
Medium-term, i.e. only on expiry ofthe period of  notice, unless there 
are cancellation contracts 
Duration 
Limited 
4  Cost  None, although severance payments possible 
Easy, provided that 
5  Feasibility  - statutory provisions are met 
- there is a reliable material basis for the re-employment commitment 
6  Reference  D18, Ell~ E12, E14 
Works Council denotes any body representing the interests of  the employees elected by the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions, depending on the country and on the company. 
Comments 
As in the case of  the suspension of  contracts of 
employment  (see  D 18),  this  instrument  can 
only be used in  exceptional situations.  In la-
bour  law,  however,  this  clearly  amounts  to 
notice of  termination of  employment. As far as 
the  company is  concerned, depending on the 
situation in the regional employment market, 
there is a risk of  qualified employees no longer 
being  available  later  on  because  they  have 
found alternative employment. 
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It  has  also been known (see E 14)  for  the 
Labour  Market  Administration  to  refuse  to 
support  certain  measures  (for  example,  job 
creation) in such cases, on the grounds that the 
individuals  concerned,  for  whom alternative 
employment must be financed, are not "genu-
inely" unemployed. It is necessary, therefore, 
to  consider what  form  this  guarantee  of re-
employment takes. 
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Implementation 
2  Means 
Method 
3 
Start 
Duration 
4  Cost 
Instruments of social crisis management 
By individual contract following consultation with the Works 
Council*  /union** 
Short notice 
1------------------------------ ---------- -------- --
In principle unlimited, although a limit may be imposed depending on 
the terms and conditions of insurance (possibility of  voluntary 
insurance) 
Low, possibly including payment of voluntary insurance 
1---t----------;----------- ------- ----------- ------ -----------------------1 
Good, provided that 
5  Feasibility 
-individual employees arc agreeable (in particular foreign workers) 
-the possibility exists for combination with the main holidays(= home 
leave), during the school holidays, etc. 
6  Reference 
Works Council denotes any body representing the interests ofthe employees elected by the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions, depending on the country and on the company. 
Comments 
Apart  from  individual  cases,  this  instrument 
can only be used as a general rule where the 
workforce contains a high proportion of for-
eign  worker,  who  may  wish  to  extend  the 
several weeks' holiday in their home country by 
a further period at their own expense.  When 
combined with other instruments, the overall 
result may be quite significant. 
Notes 
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Implementation 
2  Means 
3 
Method 
Start 
Duration 
4  Cost 
5  Feasibility 
6  Reference 
Extension of scope of  in-service training schemes 
Identitication of  training needs,paying particular atttentiun to groups of 
employees who have previously had  little involvement in  in-service 
training, i.e. semi-skilled production vvorkers in the main 
Planning of a targeted range of company-related internal and/or 
e.\.ternal training for these groups 
Consultation/agreement with the Works Council*/union** 
Motivation ofthe employees to take in-service training 
Short notice, if contingency plans exist medium-term if a planning 
procedure must tirst be created and workers motivated 
Limited, until training needs are met 
Productive time sacrificed to  training 
Supplementary costs ofthe in-service training measure, depending on 
number of trainees, duration and organintional costs 
Public subsidies (e.g. Labour Market Administration) may be available 
Good, provided that 
-training needs arc identitiable and/or have already led to problems in 
the company 
I  oess good, if 
-training is "speculative" liustification of  costs, motivation problem) 
Only capable of rapid extension \Vhere plans already exist 
C5, 022, E4, E6, E7, E8, E9, ElO, Ell, El2, E13, E14, El5, E16, 
E17, E20 
Works Council denotes any  body representing the interests of  the employees elected by  the employees. 
**  Union m:1y denote several unions, depending on the country and on the company. 
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Instruments of social crisis management 
Comments 
In  most companies. the  bottom rungs  of the 
training ladder tend to  be occupied by those 
most  in  need  of training:  more  particularly 
unskilled and  semi-skilled production  opera-
tives. 
By trying to involve these groups increas-
ingly  in  in-service training,  we  can kill  two 
birds with one stone: 
the pressure will be taken off  production for 
a given period; and 
training will be made available for largely 
new groups, mostly unaccustomed to fur-
ther  training. 
This latter effect would be best achieved by 
planning and organising training in relation to 
the workplace and to requirements. In this way, 
it is easier to utilise the experience and knowl-
edge of employees, and to achieve direct im-
provements in terms of work and output. 
At  the  same  time,  it  creates  a  basis  for 
further  changes,  whether of a  technical  or 
organizational nature. This aspect is especially 
Notes 
important given that the crisis which led to the 
measures has also brought about the awareness 
that  continuing training  and  far-reaching  or-
ganizational  changes  can  help  bring  about 
economic recovery. 
This invalidates, at least in part, the argu-
ment that  it  is  hard to  apply  such  forms  of 
reaction to a temporary crisis in  an anti-cycli-
cal fashion. Admittedly, stepping up the train-
ing etTort  is  no way to  ease the employment 
problem  in  a  recession.  If,  however,  crisis 
situations can be put to good effect to enhance 
skills, the effect might be to tighten things up 
and introduce more flexibility in the context of 
a more comprehensive modernization concept, 
assuming of course,  that the  concept is  also 
taken seriously and persevered with in times of 
high capacity utilization (see  C5). 
This argument can be applied to a training 
drive designed to widen the scope of  potential 
trainees  and  to  extending  the  range  of in-
service training available, the latter being dealt 
with separately in  D22. 
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Implementation 
2  Means 
3 
Method 
Start 
Duration 
4  Cost 
5  Feasibility 
6  Reference 
Additional in-service training facilities 
Identification of  additional training needs, paying particular attention 
to weak points and/or planned investment and modernization projects 
Planning of a targeted range of company-related internal and/or 
external training for these aspects 
Consultation/agreement with the Works Council*/union** 
Motivation of employees to take in-service training 
Short notice, if contingency plans exist; medium-term if a planning 
procedure must first be created and workers motivated 
Limited, until training needs have been met 
Productive time sacrificed to training 
Supplementary costs of  the training measures. depending on numbers, 
duration and organizational costs 
Possible aid from public funds (e.g. Labour Market Administration) 
Good, provided that 
- training needs are identifiable and/or have already led to problems in 
the company 
Less good, if 
-training is to be "speculative" Uustification of  costs, motivation 
problems) 
Only capable of  rapid extension where plans already exist 
CS, D22, E4, E6, E7, E8, E9, ElO, Ell, Et2, El3, E14, ElS, E16, 
El7, E20 
Works Council denotes any body representing the interests ofthe employees elected by the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions, depending on the country and on the company. 
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Instruments of social crisis management 
Comments 
Most of what was said in the Notes to 021  is 
also applicable here.  Reference must also  be 
made here to  Chapter C5,  in  order to  avoid 
repetition. 
One  way of extending  the  range  of in-
service training could be to aim for  multiple 
skilling in certain areas, enabling persons to be 
employed at a number of  jobs or workplaces. 
Retraining can also improve internal mobility 
within the company. These are more tradition-
al fom1s,  however. 
It  is  worth making brief reference to  one 
possible extension of  what we mean by training 
and skilling, which is  quite unusual and goes 
far beyond the traditional way in  which train-
ing departments tend to define their brief. 
Even when crises arc of a cyclical  nature 
and, as such, have a less marked effect on our 
self-assuredness than existential ones, times of 
crisis arc nevertheless particularly suitable for 
asking oneself what could be done better and 
how we should go about it. 
When,  other than  in  a  crisis,  do  we have 
cause, time and, not least, a compelling duty to 
ask ourselves these questions? How can proce-
dures be organized more efficiently and more 
flexibly?  How can work organization be  im-
proved  - both  for  the  company  and  for  its 
Notes 
employees? How can the work be made more 
interesting?  How can  working conditions be 
improved? 
Asking ourselves these questions requires 
us to examine our own business and find the 
time and courage to question the kind of  things 
that tend to take a back seat in better times. 
One revelation  is  always that we  do  not 
know enough about particular points, particu-
lar  sources  of error,  or weak  points  in  the 
product or the business. Many companies know 
least  of all  about  their  customers  and their 
needs. 
All this can be lumped together under the 
concept of  self-skilling or reciprocal skilling. 
Of course,  it  is  not  simply  a  matter for  the 
personnel  department,  or  even  the  training 
department.  In  order to bring about improve-
ments systematically, all concerned must play 
a pati. The personnel department team is par-
ticularly important, though, because it  should 
have  access  to  the  methodological/didactical 
resources  required  to  initiate,  structure  and 
introduce such processes. 
It must also be allowed to do so, provided it 
has the requisite skills and resources. Manage-
ment  must  back  it  up.  If not,  the  personnel 
department will be too weak, as a general rule, 
even  to  propose  such  processes  in  the  first 
place. 
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Instruments of social crisis management 
,  tempoltill¥ 1eiuclion ol employment 
t  Instrument 
Implementation 
2  Means 
3 
Method 
Start 
Duration 
Contract training 
Training for external public or private-sector 
clients 
Carry out a cost-benefit analysis 
---
Inform outside agencies: Labour Market Administration: Chambers of 
Industry and Commerce; Trade Associations; other companies, 
especiall small and medium-sized businesses: vocational training 
t~1cilities, etc., about available free capacity in the training sector 
Consultation/agreement with the Works Council*/union** 
Short notice, ifthe training department is prepared and there are 
potential customers 
-----------------------------------
Depends on the measure 
1--+------------t----- ----- -~--------------------------
4  Cost 
5  Feasibility 
6  Reference 
Reimbursement of  costs, including material costs 
Good, provided that 
-the organizational conditions e.'-ist 
-all concerned have been informed and feel sure that the measure will 
have the desired effect 
A common measure in countries with a well-developed in-company 
vocational training system, E 17 
Works Council denotes any body representing the interests of  the employees elected by the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions, depending on the country and on the company. 
Notes 
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Instruments of social crisis management 
Comments 
This instrument can be seen as a reaction to a 
temporary  fall  in  employment,  which  often 
means that training activities are affected too. 
By securing training contracts, excess capacity 
can be filled, and qualified training personnel 
can be retained. Care should be taken in  con-
junction with this measure, however, to verify 
that the contracts actually relate to the areas in 
which  free  capacity  is  available.  Otherwise, 
additional structures would be required which 
could themselves cause problems. 
Notes 
If, in the course of  the crisis, it emerges that 
it  is  not likely to  be as temporary as  initially 
envisaged, very careful consideration must be 
given  to  whether and in  what fonn  training 
should continue to  be provided on a contract 
basis to  third parties, how large the regional 
market  is,  and for  how  long  it  will  fill  the 
available capacity. One possible consequence 
might be  to transfom1 the  entire training de-
partment into an independent service provider 
(see also Ell). 
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Implementation 
2  Means 
3 
Method 
Start 
Duration 
4  Cost 
5  Feasibility 
6  Reference 
Examine the regulations on short-time working and the entitlement to 
short-time working benefit vvith the Labour Market Administration 
Selection of persons concerned, and determination ofthe scope, 
duration and timing of short-time working, and on the level of  any 
compensation payments 
Supplementary activities (e.g. in-service training) 
Consultation/agreement with the Works Council*/union** 
Short notice or long-term, depending on the national regulations 
Depends on the period for which short-time working allovvances are 
paid; the maximum period depends on natinal regulations 
Reduction of personnel costs by the cessation of wage and salary 
payments for the duration of the short-time working 
As a general rule, contributions to health insurance and pension 
insurance schemes to short-time working allowances 
Good. because 
-wage and salary shortfalls (as a rule. net) are reimbursed by the 
Labour Market Administration 
Standard measure, E20 
Works Council denotes an)  body representing the interests of the employees elected by the employees. 
**  Union may denote scwral unions, depending on the country and on the company. 
Notes 
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Instruments of social crisis management 
Comments 
Short-time working is one of  the most common 
instruments used for  bridging temporary cri-
ses. Dismissals can be avoided and the compa-
ny is  able to reduce its costs without the em-
ployees suffering financial  net  losses,  and at 
the end of  the period of  short-time working all 
employees  are  once  again  available  for  the 
regular workforce. 
The  manner  in  which  this  instrument  is 
handled individually depends not least on the 
relevant national regulations. We are aware of 
Notes 
cases  which  are  not presented in  the  model 
descriptions in Section E, but where sho1i-time 
working was combined very effectively with 
intensive training measures, at times including 
the employees' time otT.  A  similar scheme is 
described  in  Chapter  E20.  which  illustrate~ 
crisis management by the Badische Stahlwerke 
AG using in-house resources. 
These examples are particularly notable in 
that shmier crises  are  being used almost "in 
preparation" for more prolonged crises, with a 
skilled "tlexibility reserve" being built up. 
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Implementation 
2  Means  Consultation/agreement with the Works council*/union** 
Method 
1--1----------+--~~- -~---~~~-~~  ~~--~----~~ 
3 
Start 
Duration 
4  Cost 
5  Feasibility 
6  Reference 
Immediate 
Unlimited 
Possibly on the basis of  transfers within a plant or colliery and training 
necessitated hy natural fluctuation 
Good, provided that 
- redundancies are to take place in the longer term 
- staiT departures are (can be) offset by transfers 
-staff departures arc (can be) offset by equally  well qualified workers 
or cushioned by  training 
- exemptions can be allowed for very specialized workers 
Standard measure 
Works Council denotes any body representing the interests of the employees elected hy the emplo)ees, 
**  Union may denote several unions. depending on the country and on the company. 
Notes 
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Instruments of social crisis management 
Comments 
This is  a standard measure used  in  structural 
crises. It is simple to adopt and implement. The 
Works Council or union will not usually object, 
because it secures jobs. A number of  comments 
should be made here, however, with particular 
reference to the associated risks. 
In  a  good  many  steel  companies,  semi-
skilled workers frequently are (have been) the 
poor relation when it comes to in-service train-
ing. This often comes to light when all recruit-
ment is halted and staff transfers become nec-
essary, with the attendant training needs. Many 
steelworkers find adapting to entirely new jobs 
difficult, and there may be an attendant safety 
Notes 
risk. Training measures thus need to be geared 
to such situations, if they are to do more than 
merely establish what skills are lacking. 
Halts  in  recruitment are  particularly seri-
ous in companies which do not provide train-
ing and are accordingly not under any pressure 
to recruit younger workers. In the longer tenn, 
this will inevitably lead to  a rapid process of 
over-ageing  amongst  the  workforce  and  to 
high  rates  of (youth)  unemployment  in  the 
region concerned. 
It is  thus advisable, in  spite of the halt in 
recruitment, to keep an eye on the situation in 
the  regional  employment  market,  and  to  an 
extent apply the "representative principle" (see 
E 13 ),  as with early retirement. 
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Permanent  red~.Jction of employment 
1  Instrument 
External transfers 
to other plants or colleries at a reasonable distance 
Consultation/agreement with the Works Council*/union** 
- -- -- - -----
Information for the workforce (orally at meetings and/or in writing 
stating reasons, durations and conditions) 
Implementation 
- - ---
2  Means  Familiarization plans, systematic familiarization (with a "safety 
Method  mentor", \vhere appropriate) 
- --- -- --- -- --
Investigate whether aid is available from the Labour Market 
Administration, and if funding is possible unter Article 56 ofthe ECSC 
Treaty (familiarization, geographical mobilitiy) 
- ---- ---- ----- -- ---- ------------ ----- -------
Start  Medium-term to long-term 
3 
--
Duration  Mainly for good, due to closure of  original place of  work 
Security of income (according to collective agreement or social plan 
agreed with Works council*/union**) 
--~-----~ - ----- -- - - -- ----- ---------
4  Cost  If possible, reimbursement of costs( familiarization subsidies from the 
Labour Market Administration and funding under Article 56 of  the 
ECSC Treaty) 
Good, provided that 
-plant or colliery closure cannot be prevented 
5  Feasibility 
- social security is provided 
-familiarization periods are observed 
6  Reference  Standard measure 
*  Works Council denotes any body representing the interests of the employees elected by the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions, depending on the country and on the company. 
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Instruments of social crisis management 
Comments 
The  transfer  of employees  to  neighbouring 
collieries and plants is a widespread and prov-
en instrument, which basically serves to stabi-
lize employment, but is used predominantly in 
conjunction  with  closures  of pits  or  plants. 
Employees who do not leave under one of the 
Notes 
other measures (mainly early retirement) are 
"reallocated"  following  the  closure,  with  or 
without an  intermediate training phase.  Spe-
cial allowances are provided in the context of 
ECSC  support  in  view  of the  considerable 
difticulties:  longer  distance  to  the  place  of 
work,  and the  possible  need to  move home, 
etc.). 
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Permanent reduction of employment 
t  Instrument 
Implementation 
2  Means 
3 
Method 
Start 
Duration 
4  Cost 
5  Feasibility 
6  Reference 
Labour pool 
Task force for temporary or special duties in 
various locations 
Consultation/agreement with the Works Council*/union** 
Information for the worktorce (orally at meeting and/or in writing 
~tating reasons, duration and conditions) 
1----- -----------------------------1 
Investigate whether aid is available fi·om the Labour Market 
Administration (familiarization) 
---------------------------------
Short notice; if agreement is required, medium-term 
---
---------------------------1 
As required or according to need 
Security of income (according to collective agreement) 
Possible appointment or a task force leader, if there is not one already 
If possible, reimbursement of costs (familiarization subsidies from the 
Labour Market Admininstration ); income may be generated, depending 
on the nature of  activities 
Good, provided that 
-a clear delinition of duties and organizational conditions exist 
- social security is guaranteed 
02, ElO, El4, El5, El6 
Works Council denote~ any body representing the interests of  the employees elected by the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions. depending on the country and on the company. 
Notes 
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Instruments of social crisis management 
Comments 
Unlike a task force (D3), a labour pool can be 
used both as  a temporary facility  for various 
duties and as a permanent facility (i.e. a sepa-
rate unit) to offset fluctuations in employment. 
The  labour pool  is  dealt  with  separately 
here  because  of the  manner  in  which  this 
instrument was applied in the models to which 
reference  is  made.  Such  groups  were  used 
there: 
Notes 
to carry out remedial operations in connec-
tion with the closure of parts of plants; 
in  the  development of old industrial sites 
for investment; 
for new ventures following plant closures; 
as  a  business  carrying  out  contracts  for 
third parties, although basically only exist-
ing in order to prolong the process of per-
sonnel reduction and to soften the blow. 
Manual Social Crisis Management Instruments of social crisis management 
2 
3 
Implementation 
Means 
Method 
Start 
Duration 
4  Cost 
5  Feasibility 
6  Reference 
Consultation/agreement with the Works Council*/union** 
Creation oftechnical and organizational conditions 
Provision of appropriate training for the new job 
Medium-term 
As required or according to need 
No additional personnel costs as a general rule in companies, possibly 
a new stafl position in the group 
Security of income (according to collective agreement) 
If possible, reimbursement of  costs (subsidies from the Labour Market 
Admininstration for training and retraining; assistance with removal 
costs) 
Not easy, because 
- it is frequently linked with quite lengthy training or retraining 
- it is frequently associated with a move, where there are no other 
group companies in the immediate vicinity 
E2, E3, E8, Ell, El2, E13, and generally widespread 
Works council denotes any body representing the interests of  the employees elected by the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions, depending on the country and on the company. 
Notes 
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Instruments of social crisis management 
Comments 
The major difference between company-wide 
and group-wide job placement is that a change 
of jobs  within  the  company  can  take  place 
without changing trade or profession, whereas 
a change to another group company frequently 
involves wholesale change for  the  employee 
concerned: a change of  trade or profession, not 
infrequently involving years of retraining, or 
Notes 
moving to another region, with all that implies 
for a family. 
Nevertheless, all the major steel groups in 
France, the UK, Italy and Spain (and possibly 
elsewhere too) have set up internal group func-
tions of  this kind. And in spite of  the problems, 
there are plenty of  people who, given the threat 
to  their livelihood, arc prepared to undertake 
such an  interruption and fresh  start. 
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Pelm~a~Rent 1educlion ol employmenl  . , 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
1  Instrument 
Non-renewal of  limited-duration employment 
contracts 
Implementation 
Consultation with the Works Council*/union** 
2  Means  Information in good time for those concerned 
Method 
----- ~  ----- ----------
Observance of  contractually agreed periods of notice 
----- ----------
3 
Start 
Immediate 
Duration 
- - --
4  Cost  None, apart from any necessary transters 
5  Feasibility  Good 
6  Reference  Standard measure 
*  Works council denotes any body repre:o,enting the interests of  the employees elected by the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions, depending on the country and the company. 
Comments 
The number of limited-duration employment 
contracts  compared with  the  workforce  as  a 
whole varies from country to country because 
Notes 
Manual Social Crisis Management 
of different statutory provisions.  In addition, 
the practice differs from company to company, 
depending on the prevailing management phi-
losophy.  The effect thus  has to  be  evaluated 
from case to case. 
D29 
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Notes 
Implementation 
2  Means 
Method 
3 
Start 
Duration 
Instruments of social crisis management 
Voluntary redundance with compensation 
Consultation/agreement with the Works Council*/union** 
As a rule, agreement with the Works Council*/union** on the method 
of calculating compensation: years of service, age, family status, 
maximum amount, etc. 
Formal contracts of  termination of the labour contracts with the 
interested employees 
As a rule. after conclusion of an agreement 
Until the planned workforce level is reached 
~~~----------------+--
Compensation proper 
4  Cost 
Cost of internal transfers and associated familiarization training 
5  Feasibility  Good, provided that the compensation offered is attractive 
6  Reference  Standard measure 
Works Council denotes any body representing the interests of  the employees elected by the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions. depending on the country and on the company. 
Comments 
This  instrument is  only applied as  a  general 
rule for drastic schemes ofjob reduction up to 
an  including the closure of parts of plants or 
entire  plants,  and in  conjunction  with  other 
Notes 
instruments  such  as  early  retirement  (D32). 
resulting in an irrevocable loss of  jobs. 
The instrument is relatively expensive and 
normally results  in  qualified employees who 
feel  that they have a good chance on the em-
ployment market leaving the company. 
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Implementation 
2  Means 
Methods 
3 
Start 
Duration 
4  Cost 
5  Feasibility 
6  Reference 
Consultation/agreement with the Works Council*/union** and, if 
possible, with the representatives ofthe trainees 
Give notice of  non-employment in  good time (several months before 
the end oftraining) 
Introduction of measures to facilitate the quest for work by trained 
apprentices (contact with Labour Market Administration; sec also 09, 
028) 
On completion of  training 
Loss of investment in training 
Simple, because training contracts are generally for a limited period, 
and normally give no entitlement to subsequent employment. 
El3, El7, El9 
Works Council denotes any body representing the interests of the employees elected hy the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions, depending on the country and the company. 
Notes 
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Instruments of social crisis management 
Comments 
The  fact  that this  instrument  is  easy  to  use 
should not tempt people to use it irresponsibly. 
A company which opts out of  pressure to inte-
grate a young, well-trained workforce runs the 
risk of encountering major problems with its 
age structure and advancement planning with-
in a few years. This is patiicularly true if, at the 
same time, staff aged 55  and above are given 
early rdirement, resulting in  a  major loss of 
workforce experience. 
In the course of  my many years of  involve-
ment with job-shedding and modernization in 
the  European steel  industry,  nowhere have  I 
encountered such intractable personnel situa-
tions as  in those countries which have aban-
doned  all  initial  in-company  training:  low-
skilled workforces with an average age of  45 to 
50 years and an age structure resembling not so 
much a tree as a hot-air balloon ("trust no one 
under 30"). 
Because mining and  steel  companies are 
frequently of  relatively great significance to the 
regional  labour market,  the  upshot  is  youth 
unemployment  and  a  tendency  to  leave  the 
Notes 
region, causing such damage to the region  in 
the  long  term that  no  adequate  potential re-
mains even for any new industrial  or service 
ventures. 
A further chain of  events is set in motion by 
the  non-employment of young workers.  Be-
cause training generates costs, the next step is 
for  less  training  to  be  given,  followed  by  a 
reduction in the training capacity. Then comes 
the switch from  capacity-orientation to need-
orientation, i.e. the policy will no longer be to 
recruit as  many trainees as  there are training 
places, but only as many as the company itself 
needs, or believes that it needs in the face of  cost 
pressure.  In  a  sector in  crisis,  this  can  very 
rapidly lead to  a  situation in  which the  only 
young people who wish to be trained there are 
those who would receive little or no training 
elsewhere. 
One possible  way out of this  downward 
spiral is presented in this reference book in two 
stages - the acceptance of  training contracts for 
third parties, and the establishment of region-
ally oriented skill acquisition centres (D23 and 
Ell). 
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Permanent reduction of employment 
1  Instrument 
2 
3 
Implementation 
Means 
Method 
Start 
Duration 
4  Cost 
5  Feasibility 
6  Reference 
Early retirement, 
taking advantage of  statutory possibilities 
Investigate statutory conditions and those entitled to claim, and 
consultation in  respect of  financial requirements 
Consultation with the Works Council*/union** 
--------------------------------
Enter into formal individual agreements (in respect of pensions 
entitlement and early qualification arrangements, etc.) after 
consultations with the employees concerned, and after gaining their 
consent 
- --------------------
Short notice to medium-term 
Possible transitional payments 
Company pension payments may commence earlier 
----- ------------------ -------
Compensation for actuarial deduction in calculating the pesnion 
Possibl_y through internal company transfers as a result of  retirement 
Good, provided that 
-the employees concerned are informed in  detail about the effects on 
them personnally: and 
~------------------
- ifnecessary, any adverse consequences (see 4) are compensated 
Standard measure 
Wnrks Council denotes ;.my body representing the interests ofthe employees elected by  the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions, depending on the country and on the company. 
Comments 
This instrument is relatively straight forward, 
presenting few problems for those affected by it 
Manual Social Crisis Management 
and associated with comparatively low costs 
for the company. It is thus frequently consid-
ered as one of the first measures 
D32 
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Notes 
Instruments of social crisis management 
Permanent reduction of employment 
1  Instrument 
Implementation 
2  Means 
3 
Method 
Start 
Duration 
Early retirement, in conjunction with 
accompanying packages of  social measures 
Negotiation of  an accomodation of  cont1icti ng interests with the Works 
Council*/union** and formal agreement of a social package, taking 
statutory requirements into account 
Application for funding untcr Article 56 of the ECSC Treaty from the 
national government, provided that the employees concerned are 
members of companies in accordance with the ECSC detinition 
At any time, taking into account periods of  notice 
Depends on the planned adaptation periods 
1--+----------t---------------- ----- ---- -- -----
4  Cost 
5  Feasibility 
6  Reference 
Substantial costs (depending on the nature ofthe social package) 
1---------------------------------
- severance pay 
- compensation payments for restricted statutory services 
- extensive internal transfers, with corresponding training costs 
----- ----------------------1 
Refunds in accordance with Article 56 ofthe ECSC Treaty, and 
possibly familiarization training subsidies from the Labour Market 
Administration 
Good, provided that 
--- ------ -------------------1 
-the standard ofliving of  the employees concerned is largely preserved 
through the negotiated social package; as a rule, supplementary 
payments to top up unemployment assistance and unemployment 
benefit, and top-up payment for lost pension qualifying years 
- careful planning is required, because the effect of  the instrument is 
not workplace-related and calls for extensive transfers 
Standard measure 
Works Council denotes any body representing the interests ofthe employees elected by the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions, depending on the country and on the company. 
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Permanent reduction of employment 
1  Instrument 
Dismissal 
notice of  termination of  working relationship 
Consultation with the Works council*/union** on the reasons for the 
measure and the necessary personnel consequences 
~-~~--- ~-- --~~ ~---- -~~  -~-~-~- ~  ~-
Negotiation of an accomodation of conflicting interests with the Works 
Council*/union** and agreement of  an accompanying social package 
Implementation  Early and detailed information for the employees concerned 
---~~~-- -------- -- ----- --
2  Means  Decision on target workforce and supernumerary staff 
Method 
~ ~ 
Notification in good time to the Labour Market Administration 
responsible 
~-
Application for funding under Article 56 of  the ECSC Treaty from the 
national government, provided that the employees concerned are 
members of  companies in accordance with the ECSC definition 
3 
Start  At any time, taking into account periods of notice and, as a general 
Duration  rule, after reaching agreement on the social package 
---- ----
Compensation payments; level dependent on the content of  the social 
package 
4  Cost 
Refunds possible from ECSC funds, and possibly also funds from the 
Labour Market Administration 
5  Feasibility 
May be difficult as workers and management may disagree on how the 
criss should be tackled and what the compensation payments should be 
6  Reference  ----
*  Works Council denotes any body representing the interests of  the employees elected bby the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions, depending on the country and on the company. 
Notes 
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Comments 
Mass  dismissals  (i.e.  redundancies)  are  per-
missible in the employment legislation of  most 
European countries only in the event of  serious 
crisis situations. They arc thus the last resort. 
Even then, dismissal cannot be regarded as  a 
"social instrument of crisis management". 
The  fact  that  dismissals  are  nevertheless 
regarded under this heading can be attributed 
to the fact that there may exist situations where 
only  the  accompanying  conditions  can  be 
dubbed "social". Mention may be made of  three 
conceivable cases, which are not mutually ex-
clusive: 
1.  This  crisis  is  not the  first,  but rather the 
latest in a long series, or the latest stage of 
a long-running crisis, in the course of  which 
all  other  instruments  have  already  been 
used.  What is  to  be done, however, when 
even 50-year-olds have already been given 
early retirement, as is the case in a number 
of countries? Is it really acceptable to send 
even younger people home'? And who will 
pay for it'? 
2.  The plant cannot continue without putting 
the  company itself at jeopardy.  although 
Notes 
alternative  employment  is  not  or  is  not 
immediately, available. It is then a case of 
negotiating an accommodation of interests 
so that both sides arc able to safeguard their 
own economic interests. 
3.  The Works Council or the union(s) may not 
be prepared. for ideological or other funda-
mental motives, to accept that a company or 
a plant has reached the end of  the line, and 
wish to  distance themselves from  any in-
volvement in the closure of  a works and its 
unpleasant side-etJects.  It then becomes a 
matter for management alone to determine 
how jobs  should  be  cut  and  what  side-
effects must be regarded as "social". 
Whether  or  not  this  amounts  to  "social 
crisis management" will depend on the result. 
hTespecti ve ofw  hether agreement is reached 
on a social package: the aim of  any accompany-
ing social packages must be to safeguard the 
standard of living of the employees. Even a 
social package cannot provide them with a new 
job. In view of  this, Chapters 038-042 discuss 
the question of the responsibility of the major 
steel and mining businesses for the region as a 
whole. 
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Pe1manent 1eduction of employment 
1  Instrument 
Implementation 
2  Means 
Method 
Qualitative Oexibilization 
Organizational and training measures for: 
job enlargement, 
job enrichment and 
job rotation 
Consultation/agreement with the Works Council*/union** concerning 
the aims o[ and the framework conditions for, the measures 
-----~--- -----------------
Early and detailed information for the employees concerned about the 
aims and framework conditions for the measures, in order to motivate 
them to active involvement 
f-----
Call in outside consultation/arbitrators (to de-personalise conflicts) 
1--t------------t------------
3 
Start 
Duration 
4  Cost 
Short notice. provided that plans exist and the persons concerned are 
known to be in agreement, or at least to be interested 
-------------
Unlimited 
For more training and external consultancy 
As a rule a rapid improvement in  earnings on the basis of quality 
imporvements, e.g., less waste, more efficient processes, and personnel 
rationalization effects 
Good, provided that 
-
f--- ----
5  Feasibility 
6  Reference 
-the employees concerned were well informed and motivated, i.e. they 
were able to perceive advantanges for themselves in the new 
organization, in spite ofthe changes and the rationalization effect 
-the Works Council*/union** are at least not working against it 
CS, E2, E20 
Works Council denotes any body representing the interests of  the employees elected by the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions, depending on the country and on the company  .. 
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Instruments of social crisis management 
Comments 
Chapter C5  already sets out certain observa-
tions on the aims of such measures, and only a 
few clarifications are required here. These qual-
itative flexibilization measures should not, of 
course, be regarded primarily as instruments of 
job-cutting  rationalization.  Anyone  who  at-
tempts this will fail miserably. It is, of course, 
legitimate to keep this aspect of  a more ration-
al, i.e. more economic, form of  organization in 
Notes 
mind.  Conflicts cannot be avoided, however, 
unless such aims as making work more inter-
esting, more humane, and more efficient (and 
thus easier) are pursued with the same intensi-
ty. Without the active involvement of the em-
ployees concerned, such measures are destined 
to achieve only limited success. 
The use of such measures obviously only 
makes sense if  the business has a future. Qual-
itative flexibilization is an input for the future. 
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Permanent reduction of employment 
1  Instrument 
Implementation 
2  Means 
Method 
3 
Start 
Duration 
4  Cost 
Reduction in life-long working time 
by lowering the pension age for employees with 
particularly arduous working conditions 
Possible through chages in the law or collective agreements. Numerous 
examples already exist, including the French steel industry 
--- - -------------------------------------i 
Only after a change in legislation or after the indtroduction of 
appropriate collective agreements 
Not quantifiable 
1-----il-----------t--------------------------- -----------------------
Depends on the political situation and on the financial situation of  the 
social security schemes 
--------------------------------- 5  Feasibility 
Acceptance is good, as a rule, if  compensation is paid for lower 
pension entitlements because of  the smaller number of  qualifying years 
6  Reference 
Works council denotes any body representing the interests of  the employees elected by the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions, depending on the country and on the company. 
Comments 
It is difficult to give a definition of  particularly 
arduous working conditions that is universally 
applicable in other areas (to ensure equal treat-
ment).  Work  which  is  characterized  by  an 
above-average physical load, mental stress or 
equally  serious  environmental  conditions  is 
generally regarded as being particularly ardu-
ous. 
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A  further  measure,  which  can  be  linked 
directly to a reduction in the working life, could 
take the form of  the introduction of a progres-
sive  withdrawal  from  working  life  through 
options  for  the  phased reduction of working 
hours.  Such  models  already  exist  in  a  few 
countries. 
036 
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Instruments of  social crisis management 
Permanent reduction of employment 
1  Instrument 
2 
3 
Implementation 
Means 
Method 
Start 
Duration 
4  Cost 
5  Feasibility 
6  Reference 
Reduction in the number of hours worked per year 
through 
- shorter daily working hours 
- shorter weekly working hours 
-higher leisure time demands 
Legislation 
Collective agreements 
1----~------------ --- --------
Plant-level agreement with Works Council*/union** 
Changed stafling schedules and shift plans; consultation/agreement 
with Works Council*/union** 
Only after entry into effect of legislation, collective agreement or 
plant-level agreement 
Unlimited 
Not quantifiable, depends on concrete regulations 
Reducing daily and weekly v'>orking hours is complicated in the case of 
multi-shift working schedules; associated with far-reaching planning 
and organizational changes 
To implement higher leisure time demands (more leave, additional 
days oft~ etc.) is easy, if  the funding is clear 
Standard measure, E  12 
Works Council denotes any body representing the interests of  the employees elected hy the employees. 
*  *  Union may denote several unions, depending on the country and on the company. 
Comments 
For workplaces which need permanent manning, 
this  measure  leads  to  greater employment as  a 
general rule; otherwise, experience indicates that a 
reduction m workmg t1me 1s compensated for by 
higher working intensity. 
The higher leisure time demands can also be 
restricted to specific brroups, such as older employ-
ees or those with a particularly heavy workload. 
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Implementation 
2  Means 
3 
Method 
Start 
Duration 
4  Cost 
Through cheap rental, sale or creation of land and buildings 
Through the cheap (or even free) transtcr, rental or sale of  plant, 
machinery, equipment and furniture, etc.; possibility of sale at token or 
scrap prices 
Through letting contracts to firms established be former members of 
the workforce 
Through the provision of management know-how cheap or free of 
charge (  consultancy, training) 
Short notice or medium-term, depending on whether there are any 
members ofthe workforce who have already gone self-employed, or 
wish to do so 
Unlimited 
Low, or none at all, in the case of  written-down buildings, machinery 
and furniture, etc.; may be some savings through the avoidance of 
transport costs 
In the case of investments dependent on capital payback through rental, 
leasing and sale 
l---1----------+--------------------------~--------------l 
5  Feasibility 
6  Reference 
Good, provided that 
- new entrepreneurs are not permanently dependent on orders from the 
company 
-such activities are consistent with regional plans for the development 
of  sites and business structures 
D38,E6,E8,ElO,E15,El6,El7 
*  Works Council denotes any body representing the interests of  the employees elected by the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions, depending on the country ~nd on the company. 
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2 
3 
Implementation 
Means 
Method 
Start 
Duration 
4  Cost 
5  Feasibility 
6  Reference 
Instruments of social crisis management 
Outside services in place of in-house services 
Fundamental decision required from the company board 
Consultation/agreement with the Works Council*/union** 
Ifpossibk, such measures should be combined \vith help for 
self-employment ventures by placing contracts vvith  firms established 
by former members of the workforce (see 038) 
Short notice or medium-term, depending on whether there are any 
members of the workforce who have already gone self-employed, or 
wish to do so 
Unlimited 
No direct costs; more likely to be savings 
Possible indirect costs through internal transfers and familiarization 
----------------- ----------t 
Good, provided that 
- new entrepreneurs are not permanently dependent on orders from the 
company 
D38,E6,E8,El0,El2,El5,El6,El7 
Works Council denotes any body  repre~enting the interests of  the employees elected hy the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions, depending on the countr) and on the company. 
Comments 
This instrument can only come under "social 
crisis  management"  with  reservations.  The 
hiving off of services can make an indispensa-
ble contribution to restoring financial viability. 
Smaller firms can frequently be cheaper, even 
where wages are the same, because they have to 
pay far  lower overheads. It is  entirely in the 
interests of the region if a contribution to cost 
reduction can be made in this way in  order to 
keep a company going at a particular site, being 
a contribution to diversification of  the econom-
ic structure. If, into the bargain, the instrument 
is linked to the encouragement of  self-employ-
ment ventures (see  D38), the benefit will ac-
cme to fanner employees. 
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Implementation 
2  Means 
Method 
3 
Start 
Duration 
4  Cost 
5  Feasibility 
6  Reference 
Possible establishment of  own employment company (i.e. external 
labour pool made up of former employees) 
Through free or low-cost rental, sale or creation of land and buildings 
Through free or low-cost rental or sale of  plant, machinery, equipment 
and furniture, etc.; possibility of  sale at token or scrap prices 
Through the letting of  contracts 
Through the provision of  management know-how free of  charge or at 
low cost (planning, consultancy, training) 
Medium-term, depending on contract and approval time-lags 
For as long as necessary: limited, due to dependence on public funding 
Low, or none at all (e.g. written-down buildings, machinery and 
furniture, etc.) 
------------------1 
Good, provided that such activities are compatible with regional plans 
for the development of  sites and economic structures 
D38, ElO, E14, E16 
Works Council denotes any body representing the interests of  the employees elected by the employees. 
**  Union may  denote several unions, depending on the country and on the company. 
Comments 
"Employment companies" only have a realistic 
chance of fulfilling  their function  as  an  em-
ployment and  skilling  bridge  to  early retire-
ment or to  new  regular employment if they 
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receive start-up  and survival  assistance from 
the companies whose  job-cutting activities have 
made them necessary in the first place. This is 
a part of  the responsibility which such compa-
nies have for the region as a general rule. 
D40 
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Instruments of social crisis management 
PeEmaneniEeduelion ol emgloyrnenl 
'  "  . 
1  Instrument 
Implementation 
2  Means 
Method 
3 
Start 
Duration 
4  Cost 
5  Feasibility 
6  Reference 
Measures to promote alternative employment 
opportunities (vgl. D42) 
Through capital involvement in promising new business ventures in the 
region 
-~- -- -~ ~-~----
Through involvement in regional risk capital funds 
--------- -~ ---~---~--------~----------------
Through the cheap rental, sale or creation of land and buildings 
Through the letting of  contracts 
f  - - - ---
Through the provision of  management know-how free of  charge or at 
low cost (planning, consultancy, training) 
At any time, and wherever worthwhile opportunities present 
themselves 
For as long as necessary 
Not quantifiable 
-~- - - -- ~~---
Good, as a general rule, provided that such activities are compatible 
with regional plans for the development of  sites and economic 
structures 
E2, E3, Ell, E12, E16 
Works Council denotes any body representing the interests of  the emplo;ees elected by the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions, depending on the country and on the company. 
Comments 
Old-established  regions  are  often  attractive 
locations  for  other,  promising  industrial  and 
service  sectors,  for  a  variety of reasons.  In-
volvement in the economic development of  the 
region can be economically attractive if  prom-
ising development activities by the old indus-
tries can be successfully combined with new 
enterprises, especially if the very different di-
versification interests of  the groups concerned 
can be successfully integrated. However, this is 
conditional upon the old industry retaining a 
future in the region, in spite of  all the problems, 
or making progress in new areas (e.g. environ-
mental protection). 
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Pe1manenl1educlion ol emQioymenl 
~~~~~----~--------~~-~------~--~------~~------~---------------
1  Instrument 
Implementation 
2  Means 
Method 
Involvement in the re-industrialization of  the 
region 
Through capital involvement in promising new business ventures in the 
region 
~-----
Through involvement in regional risk capital funds 
Through the rehabilitation of old industrial sites, possibly as a new 
sector of  business activity 
Through own development or sale to regional bodies, with the aim of 
creating new industrial and business land and buildings 
1-----11-----------r--~---------
3 
Start 
Duration 
4  Cost 
5  Feasibility 
6  Reference 
Immediate 
For as long as necessary 
Not quantifiable 
Good, as a general rule, provided that such activities are compatible 
with regional plans for the development of  sites and economic 
structures 
E2, E3, E8, Ell, El2, El6 
Works Council denotes any hody representing the interests of  the employees elected by  the employees. 
**  Union may denote several unions, Jcpending on the country and on the company. 
Notes 
Manual Social Crisis Management 
Pagel 042 
Notes D42  Page 2 
Notes 
Instruments of social crisis management 
Comments 
041 and 042 have been separated for a number 
of  reasons which may not be immediately obvi-
ous.  While  041  concentrates  on  altemative 
jobs  in  the  region,  042  is  concemed  with 
creating a new, future-oriented economic struc-
ture in the region. One important point is that, 
as far as possible, due regard should be given to 
industrial activities, bearing in  mind that the 
widespread practice of concentrating on serv-
ice-sector companies to the virtual exclusion of 
any other disregards the fact that only very few 
regions can, in the long run, hope to exist on the 
basis of such a one-sided economic structure. 
Without an  adequate manufacturing industry 
base, many of  the service industries will not be 
viable. 
Another equally important argument is that 
most of  the workers who used to find employ-
ment in industry will find it easier to adapt to 
an  industrial  structure,  whether  or not  they 
have to go in for further training or retraining. 
It is easier and individuals and for the region as 
a whole to cope with the change - and the social 
costs  and  individual  problems  are  certainly 
likely to be much less - if  the change from old 
to new is not too abrupt. 
If a region is to make systematic use of its 
local potential and make optimum use  of its 
strengths and advantages, it must be in a posi-
tion to deploy its resources to maximum advan-
tage. One of  the most important such resources 
is  land suitable for new industrial and service 
companies.  As  it  is  virtually  impossible  in 
traditional  industrial regions  to  develop  new 
industrial  estates  without  making  further  in-
roads  into  limited  environmental  resources, 
one  of the  obligations  (an  immensely costly 
one) resting on crisis-hit regions is to carry out 
remedial and  restorative work on established 
industrial  sites. 
Generally speaking, then, mining and steel 
companies (which are still a force to be reck-
oned with, even after the crisis) have a social 
duty and rcsponsibil ity to either do such work 
themselves or at least make such sites readily 
accessible to the regions, regardless of  whether 
or not there is money to be made. The fact is that 
the expert rehabilitation of old industrial sites 
has now become a profitable business, one in 
which the former coal and steel companies are 
active too. 
In the better times before the crisis, the coal 
and steel companies were never very good at 
facilitating access to  the enormous sites they 
normally  have  available  or  simply  keep  in 
reserve for future contingencies (which of  course 
will  never be  needed now).  They were con-
stantly concemed that other industries might 
tempt their workers away with better working 
conditions and more attractive pay structures. 
The coal and steel industries have frequently 
(not solely)  been responsible for  the kind of 
industrial monostructure which has in the past 
dominated many of the traditional  industrial 
regions. As a result, they cannot now ignore the 
duty they have to help create a new, more viable 
future for the people in such regions. 
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Introduction: 
Models are 
not patent 
remedies 
Models are  not patent remedies.  Among the 
models of social crisis management set out in 
this section, no-one is going to find precisely 
the  right model to  fit  a given situation.  The 
conditions  differ  too  much  from  country  to 
country and from case to case in terms of  laws, 
institutions  and  associations,  funding  availa-
bility and, last but not least, people; those who 
have to decide what should be done and those 
who have to do what they are told. So what can 
we expect to gain from such models? Essential-
ly,  they  serve  as  examples,  as  case-specific 
compendia  and  combinations  of instruments 
which  have  been  used in  the  coal  and  steel 
industries in the Member States of  the Europe-
an Community, and which have been analyse-
droorm the point of  methodology for use in this 
manual.. 
In  other words, the intention is  indeed to 
put forward suggestions, proposals and points 
of departure for practitioners, and not just in 
the  coal  and  steel  industries.  They  do  not, 
however, claim to be directly applicable. Mak-
ing  the  right  selection,  hitting  on  the  right 
combination of instruments and even of  mod-
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els - all this is part and parcel of an adaptive 
process which has to take place at a local level. 
Indeed, in view ofthe persistent crisis in the 
coal  and  steel  sectors  - and  in  other major 
industries - it  is  quite possible  that we  shall 
have  to  design  entirely new instruments  for 
social crisis management. 
•  Who is  there left to  take early retirement 
when  the  workforce  has  already  been 
stripped of  virtually all possible candidates 
of the right age? 
•  Can society still afford to pension off (in 
one form or another) people from the age of 
50, or even, in some cases, 45? 
•  Quite apart from the cost to  society,  is  it 
reasonable  or  desirable  to  dispense  with 
such people's knowledge and know-how, 
experience and productivity?ten? 
This section - indeed, this manual - contains no 
answers to questions like these. 
Models 
What we wanted was for Section E to present 
realistic solutions in as standardised a form as 
possible, prompted by questions like:  Who? 
Where? How many? What  conditions? How? 
What? At what cost? With what result?. 
We  failed.  For one thing, the data were-
ceived varied too widely. Although the ques-
tions we asked were closely structured, the way 
they were analysed and processed in the case 
studies we received from all over Europe was 
very different. For another, it became clear that 
the individual models simply differed too much 
in themselves to follow a common pattern. We 
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Models of social crisis management 
cannot, therefore, unfortunately provide a sys-
tematised series of  conclusions after each chap-
ter. 
Nonetheless,  I  have  tried,  in  describing 
the various models, to accommodate all this 
information, without resorting to excessively 
schematic treatment. It will be up to the reader 
to decide whether I have succeeded in that, at 
least. 
Nor was  it  a primary interest of mine  to 
draw up a kind of  performance ranking or even 
a  full-scale  evaluation  of achievement.  The 
main aim of  this section on the various models 
is to show what kind of  instruments can be used 
to  deal with a particular problem. In no case 
have  I attempted to  assess  whether or not  a 
particular solution has or has not been success-
ful. All I have done is to reproduce the opinions 
of persons concerned and persons affected. 
The most important reason for this is that 
I am convinced that a model which has proved 
its worth at a particular place under particular 
conditions is not automatically bound to suc-
ceed at a different place and under different 
conditions -nothing like it in fact. The reverse 
is also true, in that something that has failed 
at one place may prove perfectly suitable in 
another. 
Likewise,  while  there  are  in  almost  all 
cases  details  of the  funding  of the  various 
models or instruments, I have deliberately not 
concentrated on the financial aspect. 
The fact is that, if  we concentrate too much 
on the financial limitations to which we are all 
subject,  we  tend to  restrict our imagination 
and our aspirations. And that is not good news 
for the people we are supposed to be helping. 
Nor does it help those who have either volun-
teered or been conscripted to help. We will all 
get brought back to earth soon enough. 
The scope of  this section is wide, ranging: 
•  from nationalisation as a form of sociali-
zation, and as a means of making change 
a full-scale social obligation, 
•  via the various means of  constructing sound 
bridges from employment to a new kind of 
lifestyle, of whatever form, 
•  to  companies'  attempts  to  grapple  with 
crisis situations on their own. 
An enduring consideration has been wheth-
er and how crisis-hit firms have or have not 
taken account of the crisis in the region. 
Experience 
The original intention was to produce a sep-
arate  section (F)  detailing people's experi-
ence with the models set out in this section. 
To  do  so,  though,  would have meant dou-
bling the description of the framework con-
ditions. The details of "experiences" prom-
ised in the manual's subtitle have therefore 
been  incorporated  into  the  various  model 
chapters wherever the case studies produced 
useful experience. 
These details are of a very differing na-
ture, ranging from a brief description of the 
way the crisis proceeded and how fictitious 
workers viewed or experienced or coped with 
the crisis, to resumes ofthe views of  manage-
ment  and works  councils,  unions  and  em-
ployers'  associations,  local  authorities  and 
regions. 
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N  ationalisation 
as a form of 
socialisation 
Of the  various  premises  of "social  cns1s 
management" covered in this manual, na-
tionalisation, as one of the most widespread 
forms of  socialisation, represents an attempt 
to effect change in industries which are of 
fundamental national interest over a longer 
timescale and under improved financial and 
social conditions by creating a broader basis 
of  economic, social and political responsibil-
ity  in  the  form  of direct  ownership  and 
participation on the part of central or re-
gional government agencies. 
Setting up nationalisation as  a model  for 
social crisis management at a time of  wholesale 
privatisation and the Single European Market 
requires some explanation. 
What we will not be discussing 
1.  There will be no ideological discussion. It is 
not up to us to decide whether socialisation, 
in  any  form,  might  be  a  viable  political 
option for society. 
2.  Nor will there be any international compar-
ison of  whether nationalisation is or is not, 
has or has not been, a better or worse form 
of social crisis management than private-
sector measures. 
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What we shall be discussing 
There are two main reasons why it is essential 
to discuss this topic here. 
1.  There are nationalised coal  and  steel  in-
dustries in Europe. To be more precise: In 
all the Member States the coal industry is 
or has been organised as a state or quasi-
state (i.e.  as  a single national enterprise) 
industry - unless, of course,  it  ceased to 
exist beforehand. There is only one coun-
try in the European Community - Germa-
ny - in which the  steel industry is  not a 
state-run, or a quasi-state-run, business -
or at least was until recently (British Steel). 
Generally speaking, the enacting legisla-
tion states that the aim of nationalisation 
is to guarantee supplies of  whatever is the 
raw material and to secure the industry's 
competitive position. In other words, na-
tionalisation always was,  and still  is,  an 
authentic  model  of crisis  management. 
Whether  it  has  always  been  '"social"  in 
nature  is  another  matter.  At  any  rate,  I 
would think it ill-advised to  present any 
particular variant as  the "model of social 
crisis  management". 
2.  Looking at eastern Europe, where the cri-
sis in the coal and steel industries is just 
one aspect of  the wider social crisis, delay-
ing the privatisation process might in it-
self be a genuine option. 
The aim of this  chapter is  therefore  to 
describe the frame of reference within which 
nationalisation has been or might be an aspect 
of crisis  management,  ignoring  for  the  time 
being the fact that the same aims can often be 
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achieved by other means - and,  indeed, may 
well have been so. 
Nationalisation: Why? 
Looking beyond the ideological aspect of  many 
of  the debates and decisions on the nationalisa-
tion issue, there are a range of  situations which 
have typically led to a decision to  nationalise 
coal or steel in some form or other. These fall 
basically into two types: (a) coal and steel as a 
national duty, (b) coal and steel as  a national 
problem. 
The first type was typical of  the expansion 
phase of  Europe's immediate post-war econo-
my,  leading  in  1952  to  the  creation  of the 
ECSC. The second type is more typical of  the 
problem phase which set in in the coal industry 
in the late 1950s and in the steel industry in the 
second half of  the 1960s and again in the mid-
1970s. The two types can often only be differ-
entiated on analytical grounds. 
Coal and steel as a national duty 
•  Coal and steel are primary industries, the 
efficiency of which was always regarded 
as  vital to the prosperity of the  national 
economy  and  to  national  self-reliance. 
Whether the  logic  is  just as  compelling 
now at a time of  ever closer links in Europe 
- at least in western Europe - is  another 
matter. 
•  In order to maintain the competitive status 
of these  national primary industries,  the 
enormous scale of investment occasioned 
by the sheer size of production facilities 
Nationalisation/socialisation 
was defined as  a national duty.  In  other 
words,  nationalisation  seemed to  be  the 
only way of  making the task economically 
manageable or feasible. 
•  The need to maintain a competitive posi-
tion is closely associated with the need for 
managing technical change. Here too, the 
sheer scale of  the investment requirement 
is a central issue. 
•  All these points lead to the argument that 
the  task is  unmanageable without exten-
sive  state  funding,  and  that  if the  state 
becomes so heavily involved, it must also 
exert proprietary influence - not least with 
a view to achieving structural policy aims 
which go beyond the purely competitive 
aspect. 
Coal and steel as a national 
problem 
The initial situation and arguments here can be 
condensed into the following two main points: 
•  Large sections of the two industries - or, 
indeed, the industries as a whole - are no 
longer competitive. The important thing is 
to  avoid closures and the  resultant mass 
redundancies, because of the  dire conse-
quences for workers and their families and 
the likely social unrest. 
•  Job-shedding on a massive scale is inevita-
ble. The important thing here is to avoid the 
economic decline, not to say the ruination, 
of entire  regions  which  are  structurally 
dependent on coal and/or steeL 
In the following articles, we are concerned 
generally only with coal and steel as a national 
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problem, the solution of  which is deemed to be 
a national duty. This, of  course, entails formu-
lating  positive  objectives  which  go  beyond 
mere crisis management; crisis management, 
after all, is not sufficient justification in itself 
for direct state intervention. 
This is  particularly true  where  it  is  un-
likely  to  be  a  matter  of sealing  an  entire 
industry down to zero in as socially accepta-
ble a manner as possible. But that was pre-
cisely what state or quasi-state coal compa-
nies found themselves having to do sooner or 
later in  a number of countries, even where 
they had resisted the final  exit option for a 
very long time. 
Nationalisation: Aims 
What is  important is  of course how we  can 
formulate positive objectives againstthis prob-
lem-strewn  background.  Clearly,  the  argu-
ments  advanced  by  the  pro-nationalisation 
lobby are going to carry a good deal of  weight. 
However debatable they may be,  the  fact  is 
that  they  tended  to  be  in  the  forefront  of 
discussions. 
The aims of nationalisation are: 
•  to preserve the international competitive-
ness of  an industry of  national importance; 
and hence: 
•  a  thoroughgoing restructuring of the in-
dustry, as a part of  preserving the interna-
tional  competitiveness  - something of 
which competing private companies may 
not be or are not capable; 
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•  technological renewal of  the entire indus-
try,  this  going  hand  in hand  with  the 
restructuring drive, and which is beyond 
the capital funding of private companies. 
One of  the economic aims of  such adapta-
tion processes- regardless of  whether they are 
essentially expansive,  consolidatory or con-
tractive - is to bring about a major increase in 
productivity through the synergy effect result-
ing from corporate restructuring and rational-
isation.  Achieving these  aims  is  vital  if the 
industry is  to  be internationally competitive 
and avoid becoming permanently dependent 
on public-sector subsidies. 
Consolidation or contraction measures are 
bound to generate mass redundancies and the 
loss of industrial sites, with all the attendant 
consequences for the regions concerned. Be-
cause the coal and steel industries have always 
tended  to  be  concentrated  in  particular  re-
gions and to dominate those regions' industri-
al  structures, the social dynamite inherent in 
works closures and workforce redundancies is 
something that cannot be handled by individ-
ual companies, by conglomerates or even by 
the region alone. It is essential for the state to 
become involved as the authentic representa-
tive of the nation and of society as a whole. 
At this juncture, the proponents of  nation-
alisation tend to  put the  case for  the  direct 
involvement of the state as owner. 
•  The scale of the requisite investment, the 
pay-back period and the attendant risks 
are way beyond the means of  private cap-
italists. The indispensable state subsidies 
must be used in such a way that the state is 
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not just a provider, but can also intervene 
on  specific  structural  options.  This  re-
gards just the  corporate  and  industrial 
restructuring process - not the social and 
regional consequences. 
•  In tackling the social ramifications in a way 
which is  not inimical to  the workers and 
their families,  recourse  has  to  be  had to 
social, state or para-governmental funding 
mechanisms.  Again,  direct state  involve-
ment is the logical conclusion. 
•  The same is true of  the regional restructur-
ing process which is inevitably associated 
with the die-back of major industries like 
coal and steel. The most compelling argu-
ment for nationalisation here is that, if the 
companies  concerned  are  still  owned by 
private shareholders, it might be difficult to 
impose on them the moral responsibility for 
a region which they have greatly influenced 
- if  not dominated - for decades. 
•  The main  social and regional-policy ar-
gument advanced  by  the  proponents  of 
nationalisation incorporates all these indi-
vidual aspects. It is, according to them, only 
nationalisation  which  can  realise  the  in-
Notes 
Nafionalisation/socialisafion 
dustry 's full synergy potential and prevent 
wasteful parallel investment projects. This 
would in tum enable social resources to be 
used more purposively for economic ends 
and would release the kind of  funding which 
would enable the restructuring process to 
be  spread  over  a  longer  period  and  the 
social and regional follow-up investment to 
be applied in a more orderly manner. 
In this respect, the nationalisation option 
can indeed be regarded as a model of social 
crisis management. 
I  have  deliberately  refrained  from  going 
into more detail on the various nationalisation 
models.  This  would not  be  possible  without 
making a value judgement, and I simply do not 
have enough information to do that. Nor is this 
the right place to make an assessment. Instead, 
I would refer the reader to the various chapters 
of Section  E  describing  the  forms  of social 
crisis management applied by state and para-
governmental coal and steel companies. Here 
again, the descriptions may be incomplete, so 
any assessment will be dependent on obtaining 
more detailed information. 
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Model: 
Ruhrkohle 
AG 
Ruhrkohle AG, one of Germany's largest 
industrial undertakings, is  a specific com-
pany model of crisis  management in the 
coal mining industry, with the aim of man-
aging industrial modernization and mass 
redundancies in an economic and socially 
acceptable fashion. 
The coal mining 
industry in post-war 
Germany 
The West German coal mining industry was 
one of the main employers in the  first  two 
post-war decades. It still had 600 000 employ-
ees in the mid-50s. By the end of  the 1950s, 70 
per cent of the primary energy consumption 
used coal as the cheapest energy raw material. 
Today, the figure  is  only 20 per cent.  From 
1957 onwards, the German energy economy 
increasingly preferred cheap imported oil and 
other energy sources. 
Because of the continuing high demand 
for labour in other sectors, the resulting loss of 
jobs in the mining industry did not initially 
produce  any  dramatic  consequences,  even 
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though the 55-60 year-olds, with their special 
vocational skills, proved difficult to integrate 
into  other  sectors  of industry.  The  instru-
ments of  early retirement and financial bridg-
ing aid were used during this first adaptation 
phase. 
The number of  employees in the coal min-
ing industry had fallen to  115  000 by 1992. 
Adverse geological conditions required enor-
mous technical expenditure. This made Ger-
man  coal  uncompetitive,  with  its  price  of 
approximately DM 260 per tonne (compared 
with DM 100 per tonne for imported coal), in 
spite of all  the efforts at rationalization and 
high productivity.  It required subsidies and 
restrictive import quotas in order to survive. 
Sales  of domestic  coal  are  guaranteed 
through  the  Jahrlwndertvertrag  (=  century 
agreement) and the  Hiittenvertrag (iron and 
steel  agreement).  The  Century  Agreement, 
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entered into in 1980, gives precedence to coal 
over other sources of energy and replaced the 
subsidies from public funds by a surcharge on 
the  price  of electricity  (known  as  the  "coal 
charge") paid by the consumer. The Iron and 
Steel Agreement provides for the supply of  20 
million tonnes of  coking coal to the steel indus-
try up to the year 2000, with the public author-
ities making good any difference between the 
world market price and the price of domestic 
coal. Neither agreement has gone without crit-
icism, either in a European context or in Ger-
many itself. 
Aktivities of 
Ruhrkohle AG  1992 
Ruhrkohle  AG 
"Ruhrkohle AG" 
Reform of  the 
corporate structure 
The "Act for the adaptation and rehabilitation 
of the German coal industry and German coal 
mining  areas"  (Kohleanpassungsgesetz)  was 
passed  in  1968,  against  the  background  of 
crisis in the industry. The aims of  the Act were: 
•  to create a balance between coal mined and 
coal sold; 
•  to create companies of optimum size; 
•  to encourage and secure a market-oriented 
sales policy; 
•  to provide social security for employees in 
the mining industry; and 
•  to improve the economic structure in min-
ing areas. 
The total reform of  the corporate structure 
of the Ruhr mining industry was to occupy a 
central role  within this process.  In the  same 
year  in  which  the  Coal  Adaptation  Act was 
introduced, the old-established companies, the 
unions,  the  Federal  Land of North  Rhine-
Westphalia and the  Federal Minister of Eco-
nomics reached agreement, after several nego-
tiation  rounds,  on  the  establishment  of an 
umbrella company, known as Ruhrkohle AG 
(RAG). 
On 1 January 1970, RAG commenced its 
commercial activities with seven regional man-
agement  companies  and  a  total  of 187  000 
employees distributed over a number of  admin-
istrative units,  52  pits,  29  coking plants and 
five briquette factories. 
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Aims of  Ruhrkohle AG: 
Modernization and socially 
responsible job-shedding 
Ruhrkohle AG is  not only one of the largest 
German industrial groups, but also acts as the 
institutional  framework  without  which  the 
German coal mining industry, which has been 
affected by crises for decades, might not have 
survived. Without any reservation, we can say 
at least that the critical structural change, with 
the associated processes of  economic and social 
adaptation  in  the  coal  mining  sector,  would 
have taken a much less favourable course. Not 
until Ruhrkohle AG was set up, practically as 
an institutionalized crisis management pro-
gramme, did the national coal economy devel-
op into a highly efficient (at least in part) sector 
of  the economy, enabling the unavoidable job-
shedding to be organized in an economically 
acceptable and socially responsible manner. It 
was  only  in  this  way,  finally,  that the  Ruhr 
region,  with  some  6 million inhabitants,  has 
survived as  an extremely important working 
and living area from an economic, social and 
cultural point of view. 
The RAG was established with the aim of 
adapting production to sales at the lowest 
possible cost to the public sector. Neverthe-
less, more than DM 27 thousand million were 
spent by the public sector between 1981  and 
1991  on  maintaining  the  RAG,  quite  apart 
from the revenue from the "coal charge". The 
result was comprehensive, yet socially respon-
sible redundancies. In the financial year 1991 
alone,  expenditure amounting to  almost DM 
1. 9 thousand million was incurred by the group 
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as a result of closures and redundancy-related 
measures. 
In addition, output had to be concentrated 
on the most favourable profitable pits and had 
to be tailored to the optimal size, irrespective of 
ownership, which led to the creation of  consol-
idated pits.  These  are  groups  of mines  and 
their coal seams linked underground to form a 
new, more efficient operating unit. This gives 
access to workable reserves and preserves jobs. 
Mining, processing and infrastructure are con-
centrated in a single unit and can be organised 
in a more rational fashion. 
One important element of the RAG struc-
ture is the appointment to each works manage-
ment committee of a  director for personnel 
and  social questions ("Labour Director"), based 
on the union-sponsored principle of  codetermi-
nation, who is nominated by the mining union, 
the I  GBE, and elected by the Supervisory Board. 
He is responsible for, amongst other things, the 
social aspect of the requisite restructuring. 
The multi-stage process of  adaptation is not 
yet complete. The structure of  the RAG is still 
being  streamlined  at  the  present  time.  The 
management  companies,  initially  seven  in 
number,  were  amalgamated in  1990 to  form 
two  administrative units,  and in  future  there 
will be only a single company with its head 
office in Essen. 
Overcoming the crisis by getting 
out of coal 
Alongside traditional crisis management and 
the social measures to cushion adaptation, the 
German coal mining industry has concentrated 
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increasingly since the start of  the 1980s on the 
strategy of  moderated structural change through 
a continuous process of  innovative diversifica-
tion. Instead of  just managing the decline of  the 
mining industry,  Ruhrkohle wishes to  utilize 
the  development  potential  of its  associated 
companies outside the coal sector and to em-
bark upon a process of overcoming the crisis 
by getting out of coal. By the year 2000, the 
intention is for the non-coal business, with its 
current level of  approximately 22 000 employ-
ees, to have achieved approximately the same 
size as the coal mining sector.  In addition to 
coal-based chemicals, the new commercial ac-
tivities  include  environmental  technology, 
transport and logistics, information and com-
munications  technology,  electrical  and  con-
ductor technology, and mechanical and plant 
engineering. 
The establishment of  a holding company is 
envisaged  to  combine  all  participations  and 
activities outside mining. In 1991, 36 per cent 
of RAG turnover came from outside the core 
business. In developing the non-coal business, 
the German mining sector can utilise its "tra-
ditional competitive advantages": young, skilled 
workers, outstanding training capability, know-
how  in  different  technical  fields  and  in  the 
application  of the  latest  technologies,  and 
knowledge and experience in the management 
of large-scale  projects,  in  supply  and waste 
disposal and in logistics. 
The example of environmental 
technology 
The  end of the  1980s  saw  the  formation  of 
Ruhrkohle  Umwelt  GmbH, with  its  head-
Ruhrkohle  AG 
quarters in Bottrop, for the purpose of coordi-
nating  and  extending  RAG  activities  in  the 
environmental sector. After three years' exist-
ence, the company now comprises around 30 
specialist  businesses  with  more  than  3000 
employees and a turnover in excess ofDM 970 
million, which has thus more than doubled in 
only  three  years.  The  business  activities  of 
Ruhrkohle Umwelt GmbH are concentrated in 
four areas:  disposal of hazardous waste;  land 
decontamination/waste  water  treatment;  dis-
posal logistics; and recovery of  residual mate-
rials.  The disposal of hazardous waste is  the 
most  important  area  of the  business  at  the 
present time,  with  a turnover of around DM 
400 million. Ruhrkohle Umwelt GmbH is now 
the  largest  such waste  disposal  company  in 
Baden-Wiirttemberg. Major contracts are also 
being carried out increasingly in foreign coun-
tries, such as the cleaning of  a major refinery in 
Russia, or the planned bacteriological clean-up 
oft  he oil-contaminated desert in Kuwait. Strict-
er  environmental  legislation  and  the  under-
developed  disposal  industry  in  the  EC  will 
open  up  enormous  market  opportunities  for 
this branch of  the business in the years to come. 
Annual rates of growth of between 10 and 15 
per cent are being forecast for the other areas of 
the business too in the 90s. 
Ruhrkohle, with its colliery infrastructure, 
enjoys an enormous competitive advantage in 
disposal logistics. The worked-out pits contain 
sufficient  underground final  storage facili-
ties for hazardous waste, only a very small 
proportion  of which has  been used up until 
now. Around 250 000 tonnes per year of  power 
station ash and filter dust containing a consid-
erable proportion of  heavy metals are disposed 
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of in the available cavities. Around 500 spe-
cialized vehicles are available for the transport 
of  these substances. The two transport compa-
nies in the disposal logistics division have in 
the meantime achieved a turnover of  more than 
OM 220 million. Even though development of 
the  environmental  area  of Ruhrkohle  repre-
sents a major step towards structural change, 
the immediate effects on employment and the 
contribution to  solving the employment prob-
lem in the coal mining industry are small. Only 
a few hundred ex-miners have found employ-
ment in the environmental protection area of 
the RAG. So although structural change in the 
coal  mining industry associated with RAG's 
new commercial activities cannot replace the 
more traditional flanking measures, it can sup-
plement and improve them (see also the pres-
entation of  the social planfor the "Emil Mayr-
isch" mine; £13). 
The new form of 
crisis management: 
"Joint Venture 
Company for the 
Aachen Region'' (BGA) 
This new variant of  crisis management is being 
implemented wholeheartedly by the Eschweil-
er Bergwerks-Verein (EBV), now a Ruhrkohle 
company,  which had  to  cease mining  in  the 
Aachen district at the end of 1992 because of 
the  exhaustion  of commercially  exploitable 
reserves. TheBetei  ligungsgesellschaft  Aachen-
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er Region (BGA) (Joint Venture Company for 
the Aachen Region), a wholly-owned subsidi-
ary ofEBV, was established for the purpose of 
consolidating and developing the non-mining 
sector, concentrating on metals, plastics, build-
ing materials, real estate and services. With its 
approximately  1 720  employees,  the  BGA 
achieved a total turnover ofDM 330 million in 
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Beteiligungsgesellschaft 
Aachener Region mbH 
Turnover: DM 330 million  •  Employees: 1 720 
Metals 
division 
1992 
Turnover: 169.2 million 
Employees:  1 202 
Building  Turnover: 99.7 million 
materials division  Employees:237 
Plastics 
division 
Real 
estate 
Other 
areas 
Turnover: 24.8 million 
Employees:  160 
Turnover: 23.8 million 
Employees:  71 
Turnover: 12.5 million 
Employees: 48 
•District heating 
•Services 
•Timber merchants 
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weiler Bergwerks-Verein in creating the BGA 
were: 
•  systematic expansion of its existing prom-
ising business  sectors,  especially in  the 
Aachen region; 
•  involvement in high-growth companies and 
cooperation with technology-oriented busi-
nesses centred inter alia on the University 
of Technology  in  Aachen  and  the  other 
research  facilities  in  the  Aachen  region; 
and 
•  support for  new  industries,  utilizing  re-
sources available in the region such as land 
earmarked for commercial purposes, pro-
duction facilities, and economic and tech-
nical know-how. 
Notes 
Ruhrkohle  AG 
The "Joint Venture Company for the Aachen 
Region" model might thus point the way for the 
coal mining industry in Germany, illustrating 
how to make an economically meaningful and 
socially acceptable transition from a tradition-
al coal mining company to a very modem and 
diversified  complex  of companies,  utilizing 
the local potential of the Aachen region, in 
particular the qualified and highly motivated 
labour force potential, the scientific infrastruc-
ture  of the  region  and  the  institutionalized 
transfer between scientific research and prod-
uct  development.  The  close  association  be-
tween  research and  practical  application  de-
sired by the BGA is also reflected in the com-
pany's fields of activity (see chart). 
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Model: 
RICONVERSIDER 
RICONVERSIDER is an agency for the pro-
motion of  employment and industrial develop-
ment in the Italian region of  Lombardy. It  also 
acts as  a link between the demand for jobs 
created by the steel crisis and the available 
vacancies. 
The steel industry  in  the  Lombardy region is 
characterized by small and medium-sized business-
es which make steel predominantly from scrap in 
electric  furnaces  and  manufacture  long products. 
There is a particularly high concentration of  these 
businesses in the province of  Brescia, where, since 
the mid-80s, a drastic process of  concentration has 
been under way, in the course of  which the number 
of  companies has been reduced to almost half 
RICONVERSIDER- Societa per Ia ricon-
versione siderurgica nella Regione Lombar-
dia (company for the restructuring of the steel 
industry in the Lombardy region)- was formed 
in May 1984 at the initiative of the Lombardy 
region by companies, institutions and trade as-
sociations in Lombardy: 
•  Finlombarda  (an  association  of companies 
with State participation in Lombardy); 
•  Mediocredito Lombardo (a credit institution in 
the Lombardy region); 
•  National steel associations; 
•  Federazione Regionale degli Industriali Lom-
bardi (association of industrial employers in 
the Lombardy region); 
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Aims ofRICONVERSIDER 
•  Creation of  a single body to bring together all 
economic operators likely to be affected by 
the problems of  the steel industry. 
•  Creation of an interface for the supply and 
demand of  employment for difficult-to-place 
(i.e. older and  low~skilled) workers. 
•  Financial incentives for the employment of 
such workers without the usual red-tape. 
•  Low-cost advice and support for companies 
by experts (financial or marketing analyses, 
advice on training measures, etc.). 
•  the  provmces  of Milan,  Bergamo  and 
Brescia; 
•  Associazione delle Piccole e Medie Indus-
trie  (association  of small  and  medium-
sized businesses); 
•  Craft associations; and 
•  Cooperative associations. 
RICONVERSIDER advises and supports 
companies throughout Lombardy which need 
help for investment measures in order to em-
ploy former steelworkers. Special considera-
tion is given to the towns and areas of Lom-
bardy that are particularly badly affected by 
the  steel  crisis.  They  were  selected by the 
Regional Parliament. Since the end of  the 80s, 
the  scope  of RICONVERSIDER  has  been 
extended to include other steel-producing re-
gions in Italy. 
In order to ensure efficient and dynamic 
organization, the decision-taking and opera-
tional levels were directly  linked. 
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Financial  support  comes  from  ECSC  funds, 
from the RESIDER programme, from the EC 
Available services 
The agency operates at two levels. On the one 
hand  it  is  involved  in  paving the way  and 
preparing for measures and projects, and on 
the  other hand  it is  directly  involved  in the 
implementation of measures and projects. 
Finlombardia and Mediocredito Lombardo in 
particular provide  professional  support  ser-
vices for financing and the submission of  appli-
cations. 
Standard services 
The following standard services are offered 
by RICONVERSIDER to all interested par-
ties: 
•  systematic  information relating to the econo-
mic  and  structural  development  of the  steel 
industry; 
•  analysis of  employment opportunities (  occupa-
tional profiles and retraining, etc.); 
•  permanent contact with European and national 
authorities (in particular the  Ministry of Em-
ployment and Industry) where the relevant in-
dustrial  and social  policy decisions  affecting 
the steel industry are taken, in order to repre-
sent the interests of the Lombardy steel indu-
stry; 
•  formulation  of restructuring programmes and 
support for their implementation; 
•  information and advice on technological in-
novations (above all with regard to the profi-
RICONVERSIDER 
Structural  Fund (see  A2), and from  national 
and regional funds in the context of  an integrat-
ed special programme for Lombardy. 
table use of  electric furnaces and continuous 
casting), environmental problems, coopera-
tion between companies, analysis of  possible 
new areas of intervention; 
•  in cooperation with the  Lombardy  region: 
social  intervention in company crises,  and 
advice  on  new  forms  of industrial  relati-
onships. 
Project-specific services 
In relation to a "normal" project, the range 
of services offered by RICONVERSIDER is 
more or less as follows: 
•  analysis of  the personnel structure of  a com-
pany  and  quantification  of the  personnel 
surplus; 
•  inventory of  available instruments for "soci-
ally responsible" job reductions; 
•  analysis of the  local  business environment 
and the employment market up to and inclu-
ding the designation of  alternative job oppor-
tunities in other firms;  · 
•  recommended training and retraining mea-
sures; 
•  implementation of training measures (tuto-
ring); 
•  care of employees up to the point at which 
they obtain a permanent contract of  employ-
ment in another company; 
•  advice with regard to  indirect support mea-
sures  (choice  of technology,  organization, 
etc.). 
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Examples 
Example 1: 
"Deltasider" in Sesto San Giovanni 
A "typical" case of how RICONVERSIDER 
works is that of Deltasider in Sesto San Gio-
vanni. Application was made for  Cassa Inte-
grazione  Guadagni  Straordinaria  (see  E4) 
funding on behalf  of  120 employees affected by 
various  restructuring  measures.  The  reason 
was the final closure of  the last hot broad strip 
mill in September 1989. 
RICONVERSIDER compiled an analysis 
of vocational qualifications and an individual 
profile of every employee involved. The de-
mand for workers in the region was then exam-
ined, discussions were held with the potential 
new employers, and a training programme was 
drawn up.  The 120 employees then received _ 
retraining or further training in line with their 
intended new employment. 
_RISlJil:_R  _____ 
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The retraining consisted of two parts. The 
first part essentially provided theoretical knowl-
edge for the new employment and took place in 
a regional vocational training centre. The sec-
ond part was devoted to practical experience at 
various  workplaces,  including  a  hospital,  a 
cooperative  and  a  private  company  making 
lifts. 
The whole process was welcomed by the 
unions. 
Example 2: "Dalmine" 
This integrated steelworks had to undergo dras-
tic job-shedding, with the aim of achieving a 
better cost structure and improved productivi-
ty. This involved a reduction of  around 20 per 
cent in the workforce, i.e. approximately 1 500 
persons. 
RICONVERSIDER  took  over the  plan-
ning of the entire measure in this case: 
selecting the employees concerned; 
selecting mobility instruments, such as out-
placement, termination of  contracts of  em-
ployment, etc.; 
examining opportunities for involving lo-
cal businesses and other economic opera-
tors; 
proposing alternative approaches to voca-
tional development through in-service train-
mg; 
proposing ways of  implementing the meas-
ures (internal/external,  etc.). 
A  detailed  study of the  capacity  of the 
employment market in and around Bergamo 
was  then  undertaken  on the  basis  of these 
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ment market and all companies with more than 
200  employees were then investigated in re-
spect  of their  development  potential.  It was 
then possible to accurately target the placement 
and training of  jobseekers. 
Notes 
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An  internal  transfer  measure  was  also 
planned and implemented at the same time, in 
the  form  of an  "environmental  task  force" 
within  "Dalmine". 
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Model: 
Cas sa 
lntegrazione 
Guadagni 
Straordinaria 
The Cassa Integrazione Guadagni is a gov-
ernment fund for compensating employees 
for disadvantages suffered when a company 
finds itself in economic difficulties. The spe-
cial measures (straordinaria)  provided un-
der this fund permit employees affected by 
economic  crises  to  be  put  for  a  specific 
period on short-time working (ranging as 
far as  short-time zero).  Their contract of 
employment remains in  force  during this 
period and they receive around 80 per cent 
of their last income. The cost is  met by the 
Department of Social  Security  (Instituto 
Naziona/e della Previdenza Sociale, INPS). 
The Cassa Integrazione Guadagni was cre-
ated in  1941  (at a time when the country was 
still under fascism) and has since been regular-
ly updated. The cassa integrazione ordinaria -
the  ordinary compensation fund - was subse-
quently  extended  to  include  the  cassa  inte-
grazione straordinaria-theextraordinm)l com-
pensation fund- and was expanded to take in 
practically all branches of  industry. The exten-
sion of these special measures to  include the 
steel industry was by way of  a Statutory Regu-
lation (No.  120  of 1 April  1989),  which has 
been updated in each of  the following years. 
In this case the application of the  special 
measure in support of  the efforts at reorganiza-
tion in  the  steel  industry involved fixing  the 
duration of short-time zero working at two to 
three years. The wage costs, of  the order of  80 
per cent of the latest income, are  met by the 
national  social  security system.  In  Italy,  this 
covers pension and unemployment insurance, 
. the special pension fund for the self-employed, 
child benefit and the  Cassa Integrazione. 
Around  1  0  000  employees  in  the  public 
steel sector have been affected by this measure 
since  1989.  No accurate details are  available 
for  the  private  sector.  The  companies  them-
selves determine which persons are  covered. 
The unions decline all involvement. 
Anyone who has not found other employ-
ment by  the  end of the  period of short-time 
working must either retire, accept early retire-
ment,  or register as  unemployed.  The  Cassa 
Integrazione Guadagni Straordinaria (  CIGS) 
thus acts as a buffer between the notification of 
crisis  measures  and  the  final  termination  of 
employment.  Other measures  for  improving 
the individual situation of persons concerned 
can be introduced and implemented during this 
period. 
The CIGS thus has to be looked at in close 
conjunction with other measures for attenuat-
ing  the  social  effects  of company  or sector 
crises.  These  include  reindustrialization pro-
grammes  for  the  various  regions  concerned 
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Casso lntegrazione Guadagni  Straordinaria 
and requalification programmes with support 
via  the  European  Social  Fund (ESP)  and/or 
national  financing.  RICONVERSIDER  (see 
E3) provides a specific example of  both. 
One major difference from the situation in 
most other countries is the fact that, although 
the CIGS is  a form of "unemployment insur-
ance", it does not take effect only where there 
is  no contract of employment. The employee 
remains formally employed by his or her old 
company. It is thus a form of"unemployment 
with a contract of employment". 
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Unemployment with a 
contract of  employment 
and a guaranteed wage 
•  Article 3 of Statutory Regulation 120/ 
89 accordingly provides for steelwork-
ers to register at regional level in spe-
cial lists of  jobseekers. Where an em-
ployee  finds  alternative employment, 
his old contract of  employment contin-
ues to  apply until such time as a new 
open-ended  contract  of employment 
has come into force, as a general rule at 
the end of the probationary period, if 
any. 
•  The employee also receives a guaran-
teed wage for a period of 18 months. 
The Cassa meets the difference during 
this period if  the wage paid by the new 
employer is lower. 
•  Employees who reach pensionable age 
or early  retirement  age  during  their 
period with the Cassa will be credited 
with normal contributions and compa-
ny service for this period. 
•  Employees who become self-employed 
during their period with the Cassa will 
continue to receive CIGS payments for 
up to 36 months as a transitional pay-
ment. 
•  Finally, companies which engage em-
ployees affected by these crisis regula-
tions will receive a series ofbenefits, in 
particular in terms of taxes and social 
security contributions. 
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Cassa Integrazione Guadagni Straordinaria 
At a glance 
Who is eiigible? 
Ordinaria: Manual workers who are tempora-
rily excluded from the working process, or who 
are placed on short-time working. 
Straordinaria: Manual workers who are tem-
porarily excluded from the working process, or 
who are  placed on  short-time  working.  Em~ 
ployees who are temporarily excluded from the 
working process. 
Recognized grounds 
Ordinaria: Temporary company crises, which 
cannot be blamed on either the employer or the 
employee, but rather on the market situation. 
Straordinaria: A company, sector or regional 
cri1:.is, which is recognized as such by Law 675 
and makes restructuring or conversions neces-
sary. 
Payment 
Ordinaria:  80 per cent of the total remunera-
tion  per working  hour not worked,  up  to  a 
maximum of  40 working hours per week. 
Straordinaria:  as  for  ordinaria. 
Time limit 
Ordinaria:  Three consecutive months, which 
may be extended to twelve months in exceptio-
nal circumstances. A new application is  only 
possible after a normal working cycle of 52 
weeks. 
Straordinaria: One year, in the case of  regio-
nal or sector crises. No time limits are set for 
company crises.  In the  case of restructuring, 
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applications  for  extension may be submitted 
after the first year, in each case for a period of 
no more than six months. There is no limit on 
the number of extensions. 
Responsibility 
Ordinaria: Applications for not more than 13 
weeks are handled by the Provincial Commis-
sion ofthe Employment Inspectorate. Applica· 
tions  for  longer  periods  are  handled  by the 
Comitato speciale del Lavoro (special commit-
tee for employment), which is an agency of  the 
Italian government. 
Straordinaria:  Acknowledgement of a com-
pany, sector or regional crisis and of the need 
for restructuring and conversion is by the Comi-
tato interministeriale per la programmazione 
industriale,  CIPI (interministerial  committee 
for industrial planning), which reports directly 
to the government. Any extensions are determi-
ned through decrees issued by the Minister for 
Employment. 
Financing 
Ordinaria:  Basic levy payable by companies 
at a rate of  1.30 per cent of  the gross wages bill, 
and  1 per cent in the case of companies with 
fewer  than  50  employees.  A  supplementary 
levy is payable at a rate of 8 per cent of the 
compensatory payment sum. 
Straordinaria:  Basic  government  levy.  No 
supplementary levy payable by the companies 
is  envisaged in the case of restructuring and 
conversion. 
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Model: 
Fondo de 
PromociOn de 
Empleo 
The Fondo de Promocion de Empleo (Em-
ployment Promotion Fund) is  a  tripartite 
model  applied  in  all  crisis-hit  sectors  in 
Spain  with  a  view  to  creating  improved 
conditions for early retirement, unemploy-
ment,  reemployment  and vocational  trai-
ning in order to improve opportunities in the 
employment market. It is closely associated 
with reindustrialization measures in the af-
fected regions. 
Framework conditions 
The Fonda de Promoci6n de Empleo (FPE) is 
the  Spanish  model  of social  crisis  manage-
ment. It was adopted by Parliament in 1984 in 
the form of  the Ley 2 7/84 sobre Reconversion 
y  Reindustrializaci6n  (Law  on  restructuring 
and reindustrialization) and  is  applicable not 
only to the steel sector, but also to other crisis-
hit sectors (textiles, shipyards) or those in need 
of fundamental reorganization ("white" elec-
trical appliances) in conjunction with Spain's 
imminent accession to the European Commu-
nities. 
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The necessary impetus had already come 
from the unions and from companies and asso-
ciations at the end of  the 70s. The final version 
of the Law and its various accompanying de-
crees, some of  which appeared before and some 
after, failed to meet with the agreement of the 
unions.  And the agreement of the employers 
was by no means unanimous. 
The Law, together with its accompanying 
decrees, creates general framework conditions 
for  the  restructuring  of complete  industrial 
sectors; coal was not declared to be a crisis-hit 
sector  until  the  90s  and  is  accordingly  not 
considered in this Chapter (see, however, E 14). 
The Law also lays down the basic criteria for 
reindustrialization  measures  in  the  regions 
concerned. It stipulates: 
•  who determines, and under what conditi-
ons, which sector is to undergo restructu-
ring  (in  the  final  analysis,  the  national 
government); 
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•  how the restructuring plan is  developed~  located  in  the  northern  Spanish  province  of 
and  Cantabria. 
•  what measures can be used to tackle the 
problems in the sector concerned. 
These measures include: 
•  fiscal measures, such as sales tax relief; 
•  financial measures, such as access to sources 
of government finance; 
•  general restructuring measures; 
•  employee-related measures; and, finally 
•  the designation of  zones in which there is 
an urgent need to introduce reindustrializa-
tion measures (Zonas de Urgente Reindu-
strializaci6n, ZUR), because restructuring 
there is leading to heavy job losses. 
The latter two measures, in  particular the 
employee-related  measures,  are  those  which 
essentially interest us here. The ZUR Program-
mes amounted to  little more than  the classic 
business development activities, and are accor-
dingly  not  described  in  any  greater  detail. 
Everyone in Spain is in unanimous agreement 
that the reindustrialization measures have fai-
led by a wide margin to  produce the desired 
results and have created only a very inadequate 
number of substitute jobs. 
The model is described below in relation to 
two employment promotion funds. One of  the-
se is theFondo de Prmnoci6n de Empleo (FPE) 
for the integrated steelworks sector, taking as 
an  example  ENSIDESA,  the  national  steel 
company whose works are  situated predomi-
nantly  in  the  northern  Spanish  province  of 
Asturias; the other is the FPE for special steels; 
in this case the example is FOARSA, similarly 
Company and region 
ENSIDESA in Asturias 
Heavy industry in Spain is concentrated in the 
north of the country (Asturias, Cantabria and 
the  Basque  Country).  The  major part of the 
steel industry is  nationalized in the fom1  of a 
holding company (ENSIDESA), which in tum 
belongs to  the  government holding company 
INI (lnstituto Nacional de Industria). Faced by 
the steel crisis and impending EC membership, 
the  need  arose  to  restructure  and  modernize 
this  only partially competitive  sector,  which 
was accustomed to receiving export subsidies. 
This  was  not  possible  without  massive  job 
losses. 
ENSIDESA, with its two principal locati-
ons of  Aviles and Verina (  Gij 6n ), is situated on 
the northern coast of Asturias.  In  addition to 
the steel industry, the province of Asturias has 
two  other crisis-hit  sectors:  coal  mining and 
shipyards. This very mountainous region, with 
rather more than one million people, is crossed 
by  deep  valleys  and  has  only  inadequately 
developed transport communication 1  inks, apart 
from the coast itself and the two major ports. It 
is dominated by the aforementioned crisis in-
dustries, and the fact that all three main sectors, 
providing jobs for about half of the gainfully 
employed population before the crisis, required 
simultaneous restructuring made  the  restruc-
turing  process  central  to  the  future  of the 
region. 
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FOARSA in Cantabria 
Forjas y Aceros de Reinosa SA  (FOARSA) is 
an undertaking which produced both forgings 
and rolled products, and was obliged to embark 
on restructuring in  1986.  Serious doubts sur-
rounded the continuing economic viability, at 
least of  the rolled products division. The con-
tinued existence ofFOARSA quickly became a 
political hot potato, because the whole region 
had been exposed to a process of  de-industria-
lization  since the  1960s, and  increasingly so 
since the mid-70s. Between 1976 and 1988 the 
number of people  employed  in  industry had 
fallen by a quarter, with no noticeable increase 
in employment in any other sector. Unemploy-
ment accordingly grew from  3 to  20 per cent 
during  the  same  period,  with  young  people 
being affected particularly badly. 
Fondos de Promocion 
deEmpleo 
According to Royal Decree 335/84, theFondos 
de  Promoci6n  de  Empleo  (FPE)  are  "non-
profit-making associations with their own 
legal  personality and with  the status of a 
corporation which cooperates with the Na-
tional Employment Institute''. 
Their management lies in the hands of a 
tripartite body (the so-called Junta Directiva; 
see  the  organization  chart  on  the  following 
page) consisting of six representatives, each 
appointed for a period of two years, of: 
•  the respective business federation and the 
companies concerned; 
•  the unions; and 
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•  central government and the administration 
of the autonomous region. 
As  is  evident from  the aims of the  fund, 
every "superfluous" employee can be admitted 
to the fund, but is not under any obligation to do 
so.  Admission is  voluntary. The contract of 
employment  with  the  previous  company  is 
simply suspended. It is only terminated when 
the employee leaves the fund. 
The period spent in the fund is restricted 
to three years, or to five  years for employees 
who were already aged 55 years at the time of 
entry and who take early retirement. 
Admission  to  the  fund  is  linked  to  the 
payment into the fund of  any severance pay due 
to the employee, or of  an equivalent amount by 
the  previous  company.  In  the  case  of early 
departure from the fund and non-entry into the 
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Aims of the FPE 
(taken from the Charter of  the Special Steels Fund) 
E6 
1. Improvement of  the protection offered in  the case of  unemployment and early 
retirement to employees affected by restructuring in the special steels area, 
who are admitted to the Fund, by increasing the benefits and extending the 
period of validity of  such benefits. 
2.  Redeployment of employees  affected  by restructuring  in  this  sector  by 
arranging for vocational training which provides the employee with access to 
a new job. 
3. Help towards the reemployment of  the employees concerned. 
4.  Coordination of  the procedure with the bodies appointed to manage the zones 
designated for urgent reindustrialization. 
5. Any other type of action or measure to promote social crisis management, 
vocational  training  and/or the  reemployment  of employees  affected  by 
restructuring in the special steels sector. E6 
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fund, the severance pay becomes payable top-
ped up by an amount equivalent to the capita-
lization of  the sums which the employee would 
have received if he had remained in the fund. 
The measures and benefits provided by the 
fund can be subdivided into  three groups of 
individuals, depending on the age of entry: 
•  Employees aged under  55 years, who may 
remain in the fund for up to three years; 
•  Employees aged between 55 and 60 years, 
who normally remain in the fund for up to 
five years ("pre-retirement") and then take 
early retirement and remain in the fund as 
early retirers; 
Organizational chart 
for an FPE 
Junta Directiva 
Management 
Sekretariot 
I 
Employment  Benefits  Administration 
Division  Division  Division 
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•  Employees aged between 60 and 65 years, 
who are in the fund as early retirers. 
Employees aged under 55 years 
Aim: reemployment 
Benefits: The Labour Market Administration 
(Instituto Nacional de Empleo, INEM) pays 80 
per cent of the applicable rate, depending on 
the level of contributions paid during the pre-
vious six months. The FPE pays allowances to 
top up  payments to  up  to  80  per cent of the 
average gross income during the previous six 
months. 
Social security: The INEM pays  100 per 
cent of  the contributions based on the applica-
ble rate. The FPE tops up, as necessary, taking 
as  its  basis the contributions paid during the 
last six  months of employment.  The level of 
contributions remains unchanged for the peri-
od spent in the fund. 
Income tax:  The  FPE  is  responsible  for 
paying the income tax due. 
If an  employee  aged  52  years  enters  the 
fund and remains there until reaching his 55th 
birthday, because he has failed to find alterna-
tive employment, the conditions applicable to 
the  55-60  age  group  apply.  In  the  case  of 
FOARSA, 23 ofthe 209 employees aged under 
52 years taken on by the fund were able to find 
alternative  employment.  The  majority,  152, 
opted for redundancy with severance pay, and 
34 left the fund for other reasons. There were 
only two employees aged below 55 and above 
52,  both of whom accepted redundancy with 
severance pay. No one under the age of  55 years 
was made redundant at ENSIDESA. 
Manual Social Crisis Management Fondo de Promoci6n de Empleo 
Employees aged from 55 to 60 years 
Aim: Pre-retirement 
Benefits: The INEM pays benefits for the first 
two years, as for the previous group. From the 
third to the fifth year, the INEM pays 75  per 
cent of the minimum wage. The FPE guaran-
tees up to  80  per cent of the  gross monthly 
salary,  index-linked to  collective  pay agree-
ments in the fourth and fifth years. 
Social security: The fund makes payments 
in accordance with standard rates, based on the 
notional  gross  salary  over the  period of six 
months before reaching the sixtieth birthday. 
Income tax: Paid by the fund. 
What normally happens  in  both funds  is 
that the  employees remain  in  the  fund  until 
reaching their 65th birthday and pensionable 
age, unless they leave the fund through invali-
dity or death. 
Employees aged from 60 to 65 years 
Aim: Early retirement 
Benefits: In this case, the social security pays 
60 per cent of the gross remuneration for the 
previous six months  in  employment.  This  is 
topped-up by the FPE to up to 75 per cent of  the 
notional gross remuneration prior to reaching 
the  60th birthday. 
Social security: as for the previous group. 
Income tax: as for the previous group. 
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Reemployment 
The preceding description and the data from 
the funds used as examples here may give the 
impression that the FPEs are primarily pension 
funds.  This  has  to  do  essentially  with  the 
groups of persons leaving the  steel  industry. 
The "employment promotion funds" were ori-
ginally conceived and structured with the prin-
cipal aim of  providing reemployment and pre-
paring employees for it. 
This takes the form initially of individual 
interviews  to  clarify  the  qualifications  and 
interests of each individual.  Wherever possi-
ble,  former  junior  and  middle  management 
executives, who are familiar with the working 
conditions in steel companies, were recruited 
for this purpose. FPE managers are also requi-
red to consult regularly with the management 
of the reindustrialization programme (ZUR). 
There  are  also  incentives  for  companies 
and employees to encourage them to (re-)enter 
the employment market: 
•  a fixed premium per employee for the re-
cruiting company; 
•  payment of  a wage and salary allowance, if 
the new remuneration is lower; up to 92 per 
cent of the previous  annual salary,  for a 
period of  three years; 
•  the recruiting company receives a training 
or familiarization grant for new recruits; 
•  the  FPE itself organizes  further  training 
and retraining, which it conducts itself or 
has conducted by companies or specialized 
institutes, concentrating on mechanical and 
electrical  engineering,  electronics,  infor-
mation technology and welding. 
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A Fonda de Promoci6n de Emp/eo (FPE) can 
have access to the following sources of finan-
cmg: 
•  contributions  paid by the  companies  for 
each employee  entering  the  fund,  at the 
level of  the severance pay due to the em-
ployees; 
•  voluntary contributions from those compa-
nies which are involved in the restructuring 
(as regulated in each case by the Charter of 
the FPE); 
•  yield from the management of  the resources 
available to the fund; 
•  public subsidies from national and EC bud-
gets; in the case of  the special steels FPE, 
the Spanish government pays 91  per cent; 
•  other public contributions, and solidarity 
contributions paid by employees who remain 
employed by the companies involved. 
Summary 
The  Fondos  de  Promoci6n  de  Empleo  have 
emerged as the sole functioning element of  the 
programme in the context of  industrial restruc-
turing  (which  does  not  mean  that  the  FPEs 
have achieved all their aims).  One highly si-
gnificant factor for this relatively positive eva-
luation of  the fund by all the parties involved is 
the fact that government, business and unions 
have  all  cooperated  successfully,  whereas 
this  consensus  was  largely  absent  from  the 
restructuring operation in  general. 
The "profit and loss" account is in balance: 
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•  The  Fondos cover all the employees of a 
company that is subject to restructuring and 
ensure their future material well-being un-
til they receive a pension. 
•  This security is purchased at a very high 
price, however, considering that numerous 
inactive "employees" continue to  receive 
virtually full pay, financed predominantly 
from tax and social security revenue, for up 
to  13  years (still 80% from age 55 to 65), 
and that the same applies to former execu-
tives of the company; this has given, and 
continues to give, rise to many bitter obser-
vations. 
•  Everything  depends  on the  government. 
The model would be unworkable without 
the State administration (in Spain, this also 
includes the employment and social securi-
ty departments) to act as a "safety net" for 
the  social  commitments  that  have  been 
entered into. Remember: 91 per cent of  the 
financing for the Special Steels FPE derive 
from government sources. 
•  The  companies,  on the  other hand,  find 
themselves in a comparatively "comforta-
ble" position. If their restructuring plan is 
accepted, they then remit the severance pay 
for those employees who enter the fund: this 
is a mere 3 percent in  the case of  the Special 
Steels FPE. Everything else is  de facto  a 
matter for the fund. 
•  One serious shortcoming is the failure of 
the  supplementary measures for  regional 
reindustrialization (ZUR), which tended to 
reduce the impact of  the FPEs' reemploy-
ment measures. 
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•  Only  very few FPE employees were actually 
brought back into employment: a mere 11 
per cent in the case of the Special Steels 
FPE. 
•  It is also difficult to plan and implement 
vocational  training  measures  without 
employment prospects. In spite of  the fact 
thattrainingwasgivenpriorityinthecontext 
of  the "FPE philosophy", it tended to be of 
little  importance  and  not  very  practice-
oriented. 
The overall conclusion is that while the Fan-
do de Promoci6n de Empleo model has solved the 
problem which it specifically addressed, in that it 
has coped with job losses in companies in various 
crisis-hit industrial sectors under acceptable soci-
al conditions for companies and employees, from 
a regional point of view there  are  serious de-
ficiencies  which must be attributed  to  the  re-
structuring process as a whole. 
"Altos Hornos del 
Mediterraneo" in 
Sa gun to 
The fact that this need not be the case can be 
illustrated  (very  briefly)  by  the  example  of 
another  restructuring  programme,  known  as 
"reconversion", for the AHM integrated steel-
works in Sagunto, located on the Mediterrane-
an near Valencia. The whole of  the liquid phase 
at  Sagunto  was  closed down,  the  plant was 
merged with the state steel company, and was 
then operated under the name SIDMED as  a 
"re-roller", i.e. simply as a rolling mill for sheet 
and thin sheet. 
Manual Social Crisis Management 
Of the 4000 or so  employees, only  1250 
remained in  the  cold-rolling mill,  and a few 
more  in  administration  and  maintenance 
functions,  etc.  Around  2500  employees  lost 
their  jobs. Almost half  ofthese were aged under 
55 years and thus needed a new job. 
The  Fonda de Promoci6n de Empleo, which 
was established in  April  1984,  basically had 
the  same  aim as  those  described above,  and 
there  was  scarcely  any  difference  in  their 
function.  The  comments  relating  directly  to 
those funds also apply in this case, including in 
the 'Summary' section. It is nevertheless worthy 
of note that the 500 or so employees of firms 
which were dependent on the existence of  the 
smelting  plant  were  admitted  into  the  fund 
from the end of  the same year at the initiative 
of  the unions, which initially adopted a highly 
confrontational approach in Sagunto. 
A start had already been made, before the 
liquid phase at Sagunto was closed down, on the 
acquisition of new businesses and on the rapid 
redevelopment of  the old industrial sites. By the 
end of  1983, at a time when "ZUR" did not even 
exist, Sagunto was already operating a reindu-
strialization programme  worthy of the  name. 
Only two  years  later,  77  new businesses had 
moved onto the site previously occupied by the 
steelworks and the adjacent land, or had entered 
into occupancy contracts.  The two largest,  an 
Italian glass manufacturer and a Spanish ferti-
lizer factory,  employed 432  and  250  persons 
respectively. A total of2216 people found work, 
including  all  the  1152  ex-steelworkers  from 
AHM for whom new jobs were needed. 
Not only the numbers are impressive. Just 
as remarkable is the fact that  companies with 
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process production were attracted to the area in 
the form of  the two largest of  the new compa-
nies,  with the result that the ex-steelworkers, 
who tended to  be unskilled and semi-skilled 
workers difficult to integrate into other busi-
nesses, did not prove to be such a problem after 
all. 
This brief report on a successful restructu-
ring operation would be incomplete if it were 
not to mention that one of  the outcomes in the 
surviving SIDMED rolling mill was the phe-
nomenon  "Crisis management from  own re-
Notes 
Fondo de Promoci6n de Empleo 
sources" (£20), which was of  relevance to later 
phases of  the steel crisis. With the active invol-
vement of both unions,  a comprehensive re-
form of the work organization and pay struc-
tures was initiated, extending to less differen-
tiated,  integrated  working  systems  and  the 
more strongly quality-oriented forms of work 
and  training,  which created a solid basis  for 
SIDMED's ability to compete and survive. 
For a further interesting example of  a Spa-
nish restructuring process, please refer to  the 
case of CARBONES DE BERGA (£15). 
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Model: 
Begeleidings-
dienst 
Lim  burgs 
Mijngebied 
The Support Service for the Limburg min-
ing  area provides  particular help  for  the 
problem groups amongst the former miners 
in the province - workers with poor qualifi-
cations  and without Belgian  nationality -
from  the time  they leave  the coal  mining 
sector to the time they accept a new job, or 
through  unemployment. It offers  advice, 
makes contact with potential new employ-
ers, and provides training for new jobs. 
The Province of 
Limburg 
The province of  Limburg is in the northeast of 
Belgium and borders on the Dutch province of 
the same name. It has around 750 000 inhabit-
ants today, three times the population of the 
province before mining commenced after the 
First World War.  Large numbers of workers 
were  attracted  here  from  other  countries  in 
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several waves: from Eastern Europe before the 
Second World War, and from Southern Europe 
after  the  war,  and  later  still  workers  from 
Turkey and Morocco. Apart from mining, the 
predominant branches of industry (  construc-
tion, automobiles, chemicals, metals) are typi-
cally male.  There are  also  many jobs in the 
service sector, of  course, although these fall far 
short of the demand. 
As a result, the province struggled during 
the eighties with unemployment of  16 per cent, 
which particularly affected women and young 
people from large immigrant families. 
Briefly, then, this was the situation in 1984, 
the year in which the Belgian Parliament de-
cided that it was not the national government, 
but rather the regional governments, that had 
to make good the major losses incurred by the 
mining  sector that  had  been  nationalized  in 
1967. The Flemish government had no choice 
but to close the remaining five pits with their 
workforce  of 19  000  (1960:  38  000)  and to 
embark on a fundamental restructuring of the 
coalfield. 
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Closure of all pits 
In order to avoid serious social conflicts, such 
as those which had arisen during the pit clo-
sures of  the 1960s - when the army was sent in 
and two people lost their lives -the government 
took two fundamental decisions: 
1  .  No one should be dismissed. 
2.  Job  reductions  should  be  handled  by  an 
experienced private-sector manager. 
A sum of  BFR 100 billion was made avail-
able to this manager, who recommended clo-
sure of  the pits in two phases. This covered the 
operating losses of all the pits during the clo-
sure process, the job reductions and the social 
support and restructuring measures. 
The  first  phase  involved the  eastern pits 
from 1987 onwards. Miners were able to take 
early retirement or invalidity pension, where 
appropriate, to accept a generous redundancy 
payment and look for alternative employment, 
or to work at the remaining pits. The same offer 
was made to the miners in the western pits from 
1989 onwards, although transfers were then no 
longer possible.  7 250 miners (approx.  43%) 
opted for one of  the forms of  pension, and 8 800 
(approx. 52%) accepted a "golden handshake" 
and  made  themselves  available  for  employ-
ment. The remaining five per cent left the pits 
through natural  fluctuation. 
Restructuring the region 
Alongside this process of massive job reduc-
tions  in the  coal  mining sector,  the  decision 
was also taken to embark on a programme of 
restructuring and expanding the  economy of 
the region, which was signed and sealed in the 
spring of 198 7 in the form of  the "Contract for 
the Future" between the Flemish government, 
the national government, the local authorities 
in the province of Limburg and the European 
Communities. All parties to the contract gave 
an undertaking, but without making any finan-
cial commitment, to work towards the creation 
of economic and employment market condi-
tions in  Limburg comparable to  those in  the 
other  parts  of Flanders  within  a  maximum 
period of ten years, through: 
•  Promotion of  employment in both the pri-
vate and the public sector; 
•  Reduction in unemployment to the average 
Flemish level; 
•  Improvement of training and educational 
facilities  to  reach a  broad section of the 
population, withparticularreferenceto those 
affected directly or indirectly by pit clo-
sures, in order to achieve the average Flem-
ish level in this area too; 
•  Introduction of  wide-ranging restructuring 
measures, with particular reference to the 
former mining communities. 
Coordination of all  measures under the Con-
tract for the Future was the responsibility of a 
Standing Limburg Committee within the Flem-
ish government. 
Support Service for 
problem groups 
The Support Service for the Limburg Mining 
Area (BLM) was established towards the end of 
1988  during  the  first  closure  phase  at  the 
request of the ECSC  Support Committee,  in 
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order to  help  all  those  miners  who  had not 
found new jobs. The Committee had observed 
that, whereas most miners found new employ-
ment relatively quickly, with or without train-
ing, a comparatively large minority of poorly 
qualified and non-Belgian ex-miners were ex-
periencing major reintegration problems. 
This observation was confirmed in 1990 in 
a study conducted by the Catholic University of 
Louvain, according to which 70 per cent of  the 
former miners who were looking for work were 
able  to  find  regular  employment  within  the 
region,  half of them  after further training or 
retraining.  Whoever  had  participated  in  an 
internal or external training course (more than 
three  quarters)  found  it  easier to  find  work. 
Attempts  to  facilitate  the  reemployment  of 
Turkish ex-miners, on the other hand, were not 
at all successful. More than half did not partic-
ipate in the training programmes. Fewer than 
20 per cent found work again, and more than 
half  of  these were in short-termjobs. Italian ex-
miners,  on the  other hand,  were able  to  find 
work  with  more  or  less  the  same  degree  of 
success as their Belgian counterparts, although 
limited-duration jobs were more common here. 
Although the BLM was  initially required 
only to provide assistance in association with 
the Labour  Market  Administration, the scope 
of  its responsibilities was extended at the end of 
1989 to include training and employment meas-
ures for specific problem groups. This was not 
only a reaction to the situation of  the predom-
inantly non-Belgian ex-miners, but an answer 
also had to be found to the problem of  relatively 
high  unemployment  predominantly  amongst 
non-Belgian young people who would proba-
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bly have gone into mining under normal cir-
cumstances. 
There are three top-priority target groups 
for the Support Service: 
•  Children  of immigrant  workers,  mainly 
Turks and Moroccans, often with a prob-
lematical  educational  or training  back-
ground or integration problems. 
•  Persons with no claim to benefits under the 
unemployment  insurance  system  (a  sur-
prising 30 pere cent of  all those helped by 
the BLM), mainly immigrant workers who, 
under family  reunification  arrangements, 
have arrived in Belgium only a short time 
before and often do not yet speak Dutch or 
have only an inadequate command of the 
language. 
•  Former miners, generally with low voca-
tional  qualifications,  who  may have,  on 
occasions repeatedly, participated in train-
ing schemes arranged by their company as 
a part of the redundancy process, and yet 
still belong to the hard core of  the long-term 
unemployed. 
By the end of  1992, 1 321 persons had been 
registered  with  and  advised by the  BLM (a 
further 1 428 persons had participated in train-
ing programmes; see below). Of these, 55 per 
cent were former miners who originated pre-
dominantly (80%) from one ofthe five former 
mining communities.  60  per cent of the  ex-
miners were immigrants, and 40 per cent were 
of Belgian origin.  Turkish workers  form  the 
strongest group,  at  32  per cent,  followed by 
Italians ( 15% ),  Moroccans (9% ),  and a small 
group (4%) of  workers from various other EC 
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Member  States.  18  per  cent  of participants 
were aged below 25  years, almost half (  48%) 
were aged between 25 and 3  5, and 34 per cent 
were older than 35. 
Tailor-made support 
The  Limburg  Support  Service  undertakes  to 
provide each person with a tailor-made set of 
measures enabling that person to  find  stable 
employment. Three aspects are to the forefront: 
1.  Consideration in each case for the specific 
personal  circumstances  of those  seeking 
employment, but also for the highly varied 
needs of  potential employers; 
2.  Development of  a trusting relationship with 
the person receiving support and with the 
prospective employer; 
3.  Collection of  detailed employment data on 
applicants, where such data are available 
from social security and other departments, 
and data relating to companies which may 
be considered as future employers. 
Closer examination reveals seven separate 
approaches which make these high demands 
practical. 
•  Analysis of target group 
An analysis of  the former miners and young 
people for whom a job appropriate to their 
particular situation has  to  be  found.  The 
situation in each case is assessed in relation 
to a fixed set of criteria containing factors 
such as  physical or psychological impair-
ment, special problems associated with par-
ticular nationalities or age groups, lack of 
varied  work  experience  or training,  etc. 
Target groups can be defined more precise-
ly in this way. Colour-coding of  the collect-
ed data also permits geographical clusters 
of problems to  be  identified in  terms  of 
districts and villages, etc., enabling advice 
to  be given with reference to local social 
facilities (e.g.  schools, vocational training 
centres,  and initiatives for ethnic minori-
ties). 
•  Personal approach to the unemployed 
In  order to  be  able  to  provide individual 
advice, all the necessary data are collected 
in  the  course of a personal  interview.  In 
addition  to  data  relating  to  general  and 
vocational  qualifications,  this  extends  to 
the financial situation, language skills, cul-
tural  differences  and  individual  interests, 
etc. 
•  Diagnosis of the individual's problem 
These data are then taken as the basis for an 
individual  diagnosis  according  to  social 
and productivity  criteria,  followed  by an 
interview  with  the  person  concerned,  at 
which a strategy is formulated. Depending 
on the diagnosis, the recommendation may 
be for direct placement or prior training or 
a general or job-related "period of initia-
tion'' to a company. 
•  Training as an initial step and a  "foot in 
the door" 
If a  placement  is  feasible,  the  practical 
arrangements will depend on whether ac-
count needs  to  be  taken of social  and/or 
productivity considerations. The approach 
should be geared to overcoming or avoiding 
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problems.  Any  necessary  training  is  ac-
cordingly identified, and advice given. 
•  Contact with the subsequent employer 
Firms which may be able to offer jobs are 
approached. It is not unusual for "hidden" 
employment opportunities to be discovered 
in the  course of such initially explorative 
discussions  about the  business (products, 
services, possible assistance, business cli-
mate and working conditions, etc.). At the 
same time, the nature of  the support servic-
es that could be provided by the BLM, and 
the  available  training  facilities,  are  ex-
plained to a potential employer, with whom 
constant personal contact is  maintained. 
•  Placement and settlement 
Data of  this kind are utilized in discussions 
with jobseekers as  the basis for  selecting 
and approaching an employer (sector, firm, 
kind of activity), and for arranging an  ini-
tial placement interview. The personal con-
sultant attends this interview as an interme-
diary/adviser.  If an  offer of employment 
results, any necessary support measures (of 
a professional or private nature) are planned 
and agreed jointly. 
•  Follow-up investigations 
This agreement then serves as the basis for 
follow-up investigations, designed initially 
to verify mutual compliance with the con-
tract. Further data relating to the company 
and to experience gained from  the  induc-
tion process may be collected, so that more 
data are accumulated with time and place-
ment success becomes more likely. 
Manual Social Crisis Management 
Tailor-made training 
Here too, an integrated "tailor-made" concept 
developed by the Support Service is adhered to, 
which combines person- and employer-specif-
ic  course  content with a  varied and  flexible 
approach to  teaching methods. 
The BLM training centres provide mainly 
preparatory and introductory courses  for  the 
metalworking and construction trades. Experi-
ence  with  former  miners  has  revealed  that 
metalworking  companies  in  the  province  of 
Limburg still have considerable employment 
reserves. The courses have also been well re-
ceived by the target groups. Those with techni-
cal building trade skills have a good chance of 
placement, because miners'  housing in  Lim-
burg requires  modernization as  a part of the 
restructuring of  the region, and extensive new 
construction projects are  imminent.  As  a re-
sult,  construction  firms  have  a  considerable 
additional need for labour. 
The BLM also organizes special courses for 
recruiting companies geared to their needs and 
circumstances. Project-oriented forms of  place-
ment are used here, as elsewhere. 
Although the support and advisory service 
was  only  envisaged  in  the  stricter  sense  as 
offering help for men, the training programmes 
(for 1990-92) also took in a number of  women 
(  6%,  out  of 1 428).  Only  20  per cent  were 
former miners. Most participants were young 
people aged under 30 (73%) with a relatively 
low level of  general education, and almost one 
third  had  no  school  leaving  certificate.  The 
bulk  of participants  (  68%)  were  immigrant 
workers from non-EC countries (51% Turks), 
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and just less than a quarter (23%) were Bel-
gians.  The  majority  (70%)  had  been unem-
ployed for less than a year. 
the training and educational organizations 
appropriate  to  their  needs.  The  Support 
Service  has  accordingly  developed  a  re-
cruitment and "catchment" strategy, where-
by the liaison officers play a major role with 
a bridging function.  These persons enjoy 
the confidence of the target group and are 
able to visit them and contact them and, to 
a  certain  degree,  to  ''catch"  them  in  the 
In  terms  of training too,  there  are  seven 
separate aspects: 
•  Recruitment and '"catchment" 
r---
r-
Experience  shows  that  the  target  groups 
often find it difficult to find and approach 
The BLM Training Concept 
Vocational 
guidance 
Practical 
Technical  training in the 
training  employing 
Training  Language 
company 
Workshop  training 
+  Vocational training 
+ 
+ 
r- Advice 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Tailor-made training in line 
Language  with the needs of  the 
Workshop  employing company 
and 
employment in this company 
I 
Placement in 
- stable 
employment 
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surroundings with which they are familiar:  • Practical training phases 
allotments,  sports  clubs,  neighbourhood  It is necessary for part of  the training to be  Notes 
initiatives and recreational activities, etc.  provided  in  the  future  company  and,  if 
• Advice and guidance  possible, at the future workplace, precisely 
Advice and guidance are seen as a contin- because  of the  importance  of motivation 
uous  process  of matching  the  needs  and  and attitude and because of any necessary 
opportunities of  the employment market on  changes to the organization of  work. These 
the one hand and of  the trainee on the other.  are based on a trilateral agreement between 
• Programme development 
the trainee, the firm and the BLM, and on 
three  criteria: 
The training programmes  are  modular in  They should alternate with periods of 
design and were developed according to the  classroom  learning; 
principle of  integrated quality control. Tai-
loring them  individually to  the  trainee  in  The  principle  should  not  be  that  of 
this way is regarded as essential for gaining  learning by doing but that of  working while 
the interest and commitment of  the trainee,  learning, i.e.  work as  a part of a learning 
for strengthening his sense of personal re- process and not vice versa; and 
sponsibility, and for monitoring the success  There should be an initial commitment 
or otherwise of the learning process.  on the part of the future employer. 
• Language as a working language  • Subsequent investigations 
The learning of  the Dutch language and the  The recruitment and "catchment" network 
appropriate technical terminology by im- continues to  function after the course has 
migrants is preceded by a survey of  general  ended.  The  status  of each person  on  the 
and  company-specific  language  require- employment market  and the  employment 
ments. Language courses are based on NT2  situation within each company continue to 
principles (Dutch as  a second language),  be monitored. In the event of  further unem-
incorporating self-evaluation methods.  ployment or a weakening of  the job market 
• Attitudes to work  situation, new "paths" are mapped out by 
the  Support Service  on the  basis of con-
The possession of appropriate attitudes to  stantly updated databases with a view to 
work  is  a  crucial  factor  in  finding  and  finding an improved position, new qualifi-
keeping a job. Trainees are actively coun- cations and alternative employers. 
selled to this end, therefore, both on train-
ing courses and during practical  learning 
phases. This has been found to be very time-
consuming and staff-intensive. 
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Financing 
European, national, regional and local author-
ity funding were used to finance these activi-
ties. 
European funding (see A2) came on the one 
hand from the ECSC, since former miners were 
amongst the  recipients;  it  was  also  provided 
under the RECHAR programme, whose  aim 
was to promote the restructuring of  former coal 
mining  areas.  The  fact  that  the  province  of 
Limburg was classified as an Objective 2 area 
entitled  the  BLM  to  apply  for  and  receive 
funding  from  the  EC  Social  Fund  and  the 
Framework Promotion Programme for the vo-
cational training measures. 
Co-financing of the  EC  funds  came from 
the national budget and from the budget of  the 
Flemish government. An association for social 
investment by the  province of Limburg also 
contributed to the BLM's range of  resources. In 
addition, the local authorities provided consid-
erable support, which is  a prior condition for 
the application of  European and national funds. 
Results 
The Support Service model is characterized by 
a  very  high  degree  of individual  care  and 
attention. It is thus natural to ask whether this 
is reflected in the results. The only truly measur-
Employment market situation after support,  in % 
Vdlzeit  T  eilz eit  FuU  Aroots los  Soostiges 
•  nur B  egeitung  rrit FuU 
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able results are those which are strictly rele-
vant  to  the  employment  market.  They  are 
presented here in a highly summarized form. 
The  various  framework  conditions  in  each 
regional employment market make any com-
parison very difficult. It is nevertheless possi-
ble to say that the BLM has been successful, 
albeit without making a direct numerical com-
parison. It has brought about a considerable 
improvement in the chances of individuals 
on the employment market. The job place-
ment  rate,  especially  following  appropriate 
training, is above average, matched only, as a 
general  rule,  by  equally  intensive  support 
models. This is particularly true given that the 
proportion of immigrant workers from non-
EC countries is very high. 
Nevertheless,  almost  57  per cent of the 
persons advised by the BLM were helped to 
find full-time or  part-time employment (47.1% 
and 9.7% respectively). A further 4.8 per cent 
opted for full-time  training.  34 per cent re-
mained unemployed 
The post-training figures are slightly more 
positive: 60 per cent of participants obtained 
full-time  or part-time  employment  (56.2% 
and 9.2% respectively). Further training was 
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taken  by  4.4  per  cent.  Precisely  one  third  S 
remained unemployed.  ummary 
The training measures have been supple-
mented increasingly since 1992 by periods of 
practical experience and, in part, by full-scale 
apprenticeship schemes. In the case of  trainees 
who had taken part in a practical scheme, both 
the overall rates of  placement and placement in 
full-time  employment rose  significantly,  and 
considerably  fewer  people  subsequently  re-
mained unemployed (see chart on page 9). 
Looking at a breakdown of  the employment 
market  situation  by nationalities  after  help 
from the Support Service is also informative. 
Belgians and Italians had relatively good chanc-
es  of finding  full-time  or part-time  employ-
ment (almost  60%).  Around 30 per cent re-
mained  unemployed.  Almost  half the  Turks 
and Moroccans remained unemployed, on the 
other hand, and employment (full-time or part-
time) was found by between 40 per cent (  Mo-
roccans) and 45  per cent (Turks). 
The  situation  was  much  more  positive, 
however,  after a  training  course.  The  place-
ment rate was ten per cent higher on average. 
Here again, Belgian workers were well ahead 
with a placement rate of  more than 70 per cent. 
Nevertheless,  the  chances  for  Turkish  and 
Moroccan workers of  finding full-time or part-
time employment rose to  above 50 per cent, 
with corresponding falls in the unemployment 
rates.  This  is  explained by the  low  level  of 
qualification of most participants, but it also 
tells us something of  the quality of  the help and 
training provided by the BLM. 
All providers of social services in the region 
were in agreement that the situation resulting 
from  the  pit  closures  required  considerable 
effort to alleviate the social consequences for 
the workers and for the region as a whole. The 
Support  Service  was  able  to  perform  tasks 
which the regular Labour Market Administra-
tion would have been unable to perform, or at 
least not with the same funds and with the same 
social-policy expertise. This is particularly true 
of  the highly individualized approach and sup-
port,  and  of the  intensive  methods  used  in 
conjunction with the training measures. 
No consensus was reached, at least initial-
ly, on who should receive help from the Sup-
port Service: should this be exclusively miners, 
and possibly only the poorly qualified miners, 
or should  it  also  include  the  predominantly 
young immigrants? Only in  retrospect has  it 
become apparent that the broad definition was 
what was needed to soften the blow. 
The  demarcation  line  between  the  BLM 
and the Labour Market Administration seems 
to have been a constant cause of  friction. In the 
course of BLM's work, though, there has evi-
dently been a growing feeling that valuable and 
useful work was being done here, which would 
benefit from  expansion.  The restructuring of 
the region can in no way be said to be complete. 
There are financial problems, however. The 
dependence on a large number of sources of 
finance is not just a structural problem, but will 
gradually become a matter of survival as sup-
port funds  dry up  or the aims of the  support 
work change. 
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Model: 
British Coal 
Enterprise 
British Coal Enterprise was established in 
1984, exclusively for the purpose of  creating 
new jobs in coal mining areas. 
Production and employment in the British 
Coal Mining industry have been in decline for 
almost 80 years. Annual production peaked in 
1913, at 292 million tonnes. Lower consump-
tion,  increased  imports  of cheaper  coal  and 
competition from alternative sources of ener-
gy,  in particular gas,  have led to  drastic cut-
backs in conjunction with major gains in pro-
ductivity through the increased use of  advanced 
technology.  Since 1979/80 alone, the number 
of pits  has  fallen  from  219  to  44,  and  the 
number of  employees from 232 000 to 50 000 
(in 1992). At the same time, productivity (i.e. 
output per man-shift) increased almost three-
fold.  The privatisation of coal is the declared 
objective ofthe Conservative government. Fur-
ther closures are planned. 
Social cushioning 
Social  cushioning to  cope with the  dramatic 
decline in employment in the mining industry 
has  taken various  forms  of the  kind already 
familiar  with  other  countries  (see  E II) and 
sectors (£12 and E9). 
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RMPS for redundant miners 
For many years, miners  enjoyed redundancy 
terms under the Redundant Mineworkers' Pay-
ment Scheme (RMPS) which were  generous 
compared to what was available in other indus-
tries. The terms were, however, revised at the 
end of the  1980s,  and  since  1 January  1990 
three weeks' pay per year of  service is offered, 
up to a maximum of  £300 for a week's pay and 
30 years' service. These terms (which include 
any statutory entitlement) provide a maximum 
payment of  £27 000. In addition there is a lu_mp 
sum which is related to  age, ranging from £2 
500 from age 21 years to£  10 000 for those over 
30 years. There are also entitlements to conces-
sionary fuel  (or the  option of taking a lump 
sum) for those over 50 years. 
Voluntary early retirement scheme 
A scheme has operated to provide a lump sum 
and benefits for employees over 60 who retire 
early.  The  scheme has,  however, had limited 
use because the provisions have generally been 
inferior to the redundancy terms and it is now 
being phased out. 
Transfer payments and allowances 
Assistance is given to mineworkers transferred 
to another colliery in the form of a lump sum 
payment on taking up employment and subse-
quent  payments  paid  after  six  months,  12 
months and 24 months. The maximum payable 
in total is £5  000. 
Further  payments  can be  made  to  assist 
with such costs as household removal, house 
sale, rent increases, and lodging. 
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These  forms  of financial  assistance  have 
played an important role in securing the coop-
eration  of mineworkers  in  the  restructuring 
exercise. For those who have taken redundancy 
rather than transfer - and this is the majority -
the measures have softened the impact of re-
dundancy though they do nothing to  provide 
alternative  employment.  That  is  the  role  of 
British Coal  Enterprise. 
British Coal Enterprise 
(BCE) 
Background 
BCE was set up in 1984 to assist in the creation 
of  alternative job opportunities in coal mining 
areas. It was an initiative taken by British Coal 
and  central  government  (the  Department  of 
Energy at  that  time),  without  any  union  in-
volvement. Indeed, it was set up at a time when 
relations between the unions and the coal in-
FOR BUSINESS SUPPORT 
AND JOB CREATION 
British  Coal Enterprise 
Objectives 
•  The prime objective of  British Coal Enterpri-
se is  to support the economic regeneration 
and diversification of the UK coalfields.  It 
aims to create jobs outside the coal indu· 
stry but within the coalfield areas. 
•  The emphasis is on the economic prosperity 
of the local community as a whole and alt-
hough  there  is  a  concern  to  help  former 
British Coal workers this is not an exclusive 
concern.  Support may be given to a wider 
range  of enterprises  which  generate jobs, 
regardless of  whether those involved in set-
ting up the business have had any connection 
with the coal industry, or whether the jobs 
would be suitable for ex-miners. 
•  Some of  the concern, initially at least, was to 
target young people who grew up in mining 
communities believing that their future  lay 
directly or indirectly with coal, and who then 
discovered that their employment opportuni-
ties were reduced following the changes in 
the industry. A priority concern was to find 
them work and keep them in the region. 
•  To begin with, BCE set itself  an extraordina-
rily ambitious target: to replace all of  the jobs 
lost  in  the  mining  industry  by  alternative 
opportunities within five  or six  years.  The 
target was later changed to helping to create 
10 000 jobs in 10 years from October 1984. 
dustry were particularly difficult-the timing of 
the announcement of the proposed creation of 
BCE,  August 1984,  was  in  the  middle  of a 
dispute over pit closures between British Coal 
and the National Union ofMineworkers, which 
was one of  the most significant in the whole of 
Manual Social Crisis Management British Coal Enterprise 
British industrial relations history. This was a 
sensitive time and there was a sceptical view 
held by some mineworkers that the formation 
of BCE was simply a symbolic gesture which 
was designed to  weaken the  strike  and take 
some heat out of the dispute. 
It began on a modest scale with a limited 
budget of five million pounds. It has however 
survived and grown considerably in the scale of 
its operations as well as extending the range of 
its  activities.  The  nature  and  results  of the 
BCE's activities have shown that longer-term 
efforts should indeed be made to create jobs to 
replace those lost in mining. 
Instruments 
BCE aims to generate jobs by attracting new 
business to coalfield areas and by supporting 
businesses starting up, relocating or expanding 
there. This it does as follows: 
•  financial support in the form of  loans and 
equity finance; 
•  letting of business facilities for small and 
medium-sized  units,  advice  and  central-
ised  facUlties; 
•  support for local enterprise agencies; 
•  outplacement: assistance to find a job and 
•  training. 
Financial support 
Financial support is  available to any business 
starting up, expanding or moving into a coal 
field  area which  will  create  permanent jobs 
which do not displace jobs already in place with 
Manual Social Crisis Management 
other businesses in the area. The businesses do 
not have to be started up or run by ex-miners 
and the jobs created do not necessarily have to 
be suitable for ex-miners. Although emphasis 
is  given to manufacturing enterprises, service 
industries are also eligible. The following op-
tions are available: 
Loans 
- between £1000 and £ 1 million 
- normally for a period of  up to five years 
- low rates of  interest, especially in the early 
years 
loans up to £25 000 do not normally require 
security 
Equity 
between £20 000 and £250 000 
- various types of  preference shares 
- ordinary shares where appropriate 
The offer of  support is conditional on jobs 
being created and the size ofthe loan is directly 
related to this- up to £5000 for each projected 
new  job can be provided by BCE. Applications for 
assistance are subjected to careful scrutiny of  the 
business plans. BCE will provide up to 25 per cent 
of the funding requirement, but it is prepared to 
support projects which it deems financially viable 
which cannot get support from  elsewhere.  The 
BCE finance is intended to serve as a catalyst to 
attract other funds. 
Managed workspace 
BCE is involved in the creation and support of 
managed workshops and small business units. 
BCE has access to  an enormous fund of ex-
colliery buildings, and in some cases, existing 
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buildings belonging to other firms can also be 
used. These are converted into small business 
units. BCE has also been involved, often with 
other  agencies,  in  the  construction  of new 
property. 
BCE can also offercounselling and service 
facilities: 
- shared basic  facilities  such as  reception, 
fax, telephones and security; 
- realistic  rents  on  an  "easy-in,  easy-out" 
basis (i.e. rapid access to the premises and 
leases  which  can be cancelled  on  one 
month's notice); 
frequently, a manager to give advice. 
These features mean that  new businesses 
are not faced with high capital outlays and 
basic office services do  not get committed to 
long leases. 
BCE will also help companies to find ac-
commodation outside its management but with-
in coalfield areas. 
Support for Local Enterprise 
Agencies 
As part of  the concern with the overall state of 
the local economy and the desire to promote the 
creation of new jobs generally,  BCE fosters 
links with various other agencies which seek to 
stimulate the regeneration of coal mining are-
as.  These include local government, regional 
offices  of national  government  departments, 
Chambers of Commerce, Training and Enter-
prise Councils and others. 
The most important from  BCE's point of 
view are the Local Enterprise Agencies. These 
British  Coal Enterprise 
are  not-for-profit  partnerships  in  which,  to-
gether with banks, large firms in  the locality, 
and others, BCE plays a direct part and gives 
financial  support. The agencies give business 
advice to firms which are considering starting 
up  or expanding in coal mining areas. 
Outplacement 
In addition to  the  support for  business, BCE 
also operates a scheme to help individual former 
British Coal employees. BCE operates the Job 
and Career Change Scheme (JACCS) on be-
half of British Coal. Whenever a pit closure or 
reduction in the number of  jobs is announced, 
BCE sets up a counselling and outplacement 
service known as a Jobshop. Each British Coal 
employee who receives notice of  redundancy is 
invited to  attend the 1  obshop where they are 
offered advice on how to come to terms with 
redundancy and how to search for jobs and how 
to present themselves well. (This involves such 
things  as  letter  writing  skills  and  interview 
techniques.) 
The principle aim of JACCS is to get em-
ployees into new jobs which are commensurate 
with their existing skills. This involves analys-
ing the skills a worker already has and survey-
ing the local labour market which seek jobs to 
match  them.  Where  there  is  a  mismatch  of 
skills and opportunities, training is provided. 
Some  former British Coal  employees are 
encouraged  to  move  into  self-employment. 
Advice  on preparing business plans  and ob-
taining finance is given. In some cases, appli-
cation  is  made  to  BCE  itself for  financial 
support. Other clients are offered places on pre-
retirement courses. 
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Training 
Where  training  is  provided this  may  be  the 
adaptation of existing  skills  to  new  circum-
stances of the  acquisition of new skills.  The 
training can be with the new employer or with 
a  training  establishment.  Assistance  through 
Jobshops or New Career Centres needs to  be 
taken  up  within  six  months  of the  date  of 
redundancy. 
The emphasis is on short periods oftraining 
provided in whatever manner the Jobshop coun-
sellor deems  to  be  the  most  appropriate  and 
cost-effective. No maximum level of  funding is 
specified, but the normal level does not exceed 
£5000. 
Manual Social Crisis Management 
BCE has set up its own training centres for 
welding and electrical skills. These skills were 
identified by BCE as being in short supply and 
there  has  been  close  collaboration  between 
these  training  centres  and  industrial  training 
organisations. Further training courses are now 
being developed in skills such as  engineering 
maintenance and security system installation. 
In  order to  gain experience  and  develop 
products,  the  outplacement services  are  now 
being  sold  on  a  commercial  basis  to  other 
employers who are contracting their workforc-
es or who are  involved in career counselling 
and  training. 
Organisation 
BCE is a wholly owned subsidiary of British 
Coal.  It  is  a  national  organisation  but is 
operated on a regional basis. The organisa-
tion chart shows some 60  posts centrally and 
some 275  in the regions (though many of the 
latter are temporary and self-employed coun-
sellors/consultants). The strong regional struc-
ture reflects the fact that the problems of eco-
nomic regeneration arising from the run-down 
of  the coal industry are concentrated in partic-
ular areas and local knowledge is valuable as 
the particular labour market circumstances 
may differ from one area to another. 
The  Board  comprises  the  Chairman,  the 
Chief Executive, two executive directors and 
seven non-executive directors. The non-execu-
tive directors in practice have virtually all been 
people with a close direct association with the 
coal  industry,  either  in  British  Coal  or the 
mining unions. It should be noted, however, 
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that relations between the National Union of 
Mineworkers  and  British  Coal  have  been 
strained  since  the  1984/85  dispute  and  the 
national  union has  not had any formal  links 
with BCE. At local level, however, some coop-
eration has taken place. 
Achievements* 
British Coal  Enterprise claims impressive re-
sults.  The figures  given here describe BCE's 
achievements over the period since its forma-
tion in the Autumn of 1984 until March 1992. 
Expenditure  in£ 
Business funding  38757 
Managed workspace  11228 
Outplacement  26362 
Total  76347 
Financial support in £ 
Percentage of 
assisted projects 
Less than 5.000  32 
5.001  - 10.000  23 
10.001- 15.000  17 
15.001 - 50.000  21 
50.001  - 100.000  4 
100.001  - 250.000  2 
more than 250.000  less than 1 
British  Coal Enterprise 
Business funding 
The business funding programme is expected 
to  generate about 39  000 jobs. Some 32 000 
have already been created and about a further 
7 000 are expected from the present funding. 
Business funding 
British Coal Enterprise 
(as at March 1992) 
Number of  projects  3331 
Jobs  in place  31  969 
expected with no further funding  6 788 
Total expected (a)  38 757 
Loans (b)  £70 million 
Investment cost per expected job  £ 1.806 
Investment cost per actual job  £ 1.986 
Revenue cost (c)  £45,7 Mio 
Revenue cost per expected job  £ 1.180 
Revenue cost per actual job  £ 1.430 
(a) fndudes £922 from equity participation 
(b) £63.6 million advanced. and £6.4 million committed (including£ 1.6 
million equity participation) 
(c) Includes support for Local Enterprise Agencies 
*  No other mode/features results to this degree 
of  detail.  The reason for this is not just that 
this manual is  concerned more with methods 
than with success stories; it would also indi-
rectly suggest that the results of  the various 
models can  be  compared with  one another. 
Nor is  this  manual the right place to  assess 
whether such  data  are  or are  not realistic. 
Nevertheless, it should be shown what is pos-
sible to  do.  HWF 
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Managed workspace 
Maaaged workspaee  Sites  Units  Jobs 
on some 3 300 projects. These are mainly for  BPitlsh 
new businesses starting up (51%) and for ex- @@B[1  pansions of existing business (  45%  ).  A very 
enlerpnse  small proportion of projects (  4%) come from 
In operation  100  2774  9633  outside the area. About 51% of  the projects are  Helping Create Jobs 
Under construction  6  71  428 
in  manufacturing  industry,  and  the  rest  in  a 
variety of industries. 
Planned/agreed  3  3  60  The financial support is mainly in the form 
~· 
Subtotal  109  2848  10121  of  business loans- only £1.6 million has been 
used for  equity participation as  this is  still  a 
+jobs from businesses which 
1107 
have moved on 
very  new  initiative.  Assistance has  predomi-
nantly been given to small and medium-sized 
Total  109  2848  11228  enterprises. The average size of loan has been 
about £21  000. 
Investment  £million 
The  investment  cost  per job expected  is 
Gross investment  174  about£  1 800. This is considerably less than the 
less grants  15  guideline figure of £5  000 which is  a critical 
factor in determining whether to make a loan. 
Subtotal  159  Administrative costs amount to £45.7 mil-
Committed  3,8  lion, or £1  180 per job expected. 
Not yet approved  0,8  The  central  government  provides  a  loan 
facility via British Coal for business and work-
Total  20,5  space funding. Net revenue operating expend-
Investment wst 
£  per job 
iture is reimbursed by British Coal. 
The  loans  that  are  made  to  business  are 
repaid, and £31. 4 million had been repaid by 
Investment cost  I 959(a) 
per expected job  the end of March 1992. 
Investment cost  I 620(b) 
per actual job  Managed workspace 
Investment cost 
per expected job net  519 
The  managed  workspace  programme  is  ex-
pected to  generate about  11  200 jobs:  about 
I 
'' \ 
of  rental income and grants  10 700 have already been created and a further 
(a) Gross investment plus committed expenditure plus not yet approved  500  or  so  are  expected.  One  hundred  sites 
/!  .. 
r  •  J.~ 
grants divided by II 228 jobs 
(b) Gross investment divided by 10 740 jobs (i.e. 9 633 in operation plus 
1 107 in business which has moved on) 
comprising almost 2 800 units (with 3.5 jobs  'l 
per unit) are currently in operation. This is the  ... ·.¥'t 
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Workers resettled:  Number 
Into self-employment without training  1502 
Into employment without training  12966 
Into employment after training  11894 
Total  26362 
of  which JACCS  24664 
external  1 698 
Cost  £ 
Cost of  JACCS  24 million 
Cost per resettled worker under JACCS  I .006 
·Notes 
British  Coal Ent~rprise 
product of gross investment of £17.4 million 
which gives a cost per expected  job of  almost £2 
000,  though net of rental  income and grants 
this reduces to £519. 
Outplacement and training 
Over 26 000 workers have been resettled under 
the job search  and  training  schemes.  About 
94% of  these were resettled under the internal 
outplacement scheme (JACCS) for former Brit-
ish Coal Employees and about 6% under the 
newer commercially operated external outplace-
ment  schemes  for  other  organisations.  The 
total costs of the  JACCS  scheme have  been 
£24.8 million, which gives a cost per head of 
resettling  former British  Coal  Employees of 
about £ 1 000 per head. 
Manual Social Crisis Management /SERBS scheme  for steelworkers 
Model: 
ISERBS 
Scheme for 
steelworkers 
ISERBS is  a package of social adjustment 
measures for steelworkers, featuring the clas-
sic instruments from the ECSC tool kit, such 
as early retirement, compensatory payments, 
training and tide-over allowances until oth-
er employment is found or until the worker 
can set up in business on his own. 
In terms of  social repercussions, the British 
steel industry has  undergone by far the most 
radical structural change of any national steel 
industry in the  European Community.  In the 
last boom year (1991 ), crude steel production 
capacity was 20 per cent  down on the boom 
year of  1974, with actual crude steel production 
down 27 per cent and employment reduced to 
less than a quarter. 
/ron and Steel Employees 
Readaptation Benefits Scheme 
The  first  ISERBS  statutory  instrument  was 
promulgated in  1974  (a year after the  UK's 
accession  to  the  European  Community)  as 
ECSC delegated legislation (see A2, p.2) and 
has  been periodically updated in  accordance 
Manual Social Crisis Management 
with the bilateral agreements between the Com-
mission  and  the  national  governments  (see 
A2). The European Community initially made 
a contribution ofbetween 40 and 50 per cent of 
ECSC funds, but since the end of the eighties 
the UK government has had to come up with at 
least 80 per cent of  the funds itself. The scheme 
is run by the Department of  Trade and Industry 
(DTI). 
I.S.E.R.B.S. 
Objectives 
are to provide: 
•  the greatest possible incentive to re-
dundant steel workers (men under 55 
in particular) to seek alternative em-
ployment; 
•  the further training  and retraining to 
help redundant workers acquire new 
skills; 
•  assistance for the older workers (i.e. 
particularly  men  over  55)  who, 
through no fault of  their own, find it 
impossible to obtain alternative work. 
The scheme, with its emphasis on training 
and weekly payments, has essentially remained 
unchanged  since  the  mid-1970s  and  has  af-
forded  a large number of redundant workers 
from  the steel industry social protection in a 
difficult  phase  of restructuring.  It has  often 
been supplemented by quite substantial sever-
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ISERBS benefits? 
There are essentially four requirements in 
relation to whether an individual  worker 
qualifies for ISERBS benefits. 
•  The worker must have been wholly or 
mainly  engaged in  the  production  of 
ECSC steel products, i.e. those listed in 
the ECSC Treaty (of Paris). 
•  The worker must either have been decla-
red redundant or transferred to another 
employment within the same steel com-
pany (or an associated employer). 
•  The worker must have been employed 
with the same steel company (for at least 
16 hours per week) for 52 weeks before 
being declared redundant or being trans-
ferred. 
•  Male workers must have been aged un-
der 65  and female workers under 60 at 
the date of  redundancy or transfer. 
ance payments by steel employers to encourage 
shake-outs in addition, and by training meas-
ures in order to complete and extend the meas-
ures offered by  ISERBS. 
The basic principle of  the scheme is that the 
type of  benefit received by the worker depends 
on  his/her situation and his/her age. 
Male workers from  the age  of 55  and 
women workers from the age of  50 can apply 
for early retirement (Situation I). 
/SERBS scheme  for steelworkers 
There are three basic types ofbenefit instru-
ment depending upon the worker's situation, 
i.e.  whether 
II) unemployed; 
III) employed 
either 
(a) with a new employer; or 
(b) through an internal transfer; or 
(c) by becoming self-employed. 
IV)  attending a DTI  -approved training course 
shortly before or post-redundancy or trans-
fer. 
Situation 1: 
Early retirement 
This option is an alternative for men aged 55 or 
over and women aged 50 and over to  unem-
ployment.  The worker opts to have a capital 
sum paid into his/her company pension scheme 
or to  purchase an annuity with an  insurance 
company. 
The following three procedures  have to be 
strictly followed: the worker must: 
- request pension option details within four 
weeks of  becoming eligible; 
- determine whether to take this option with-
in four weeks of  receipt of  the details; 
- be unemployed and be available for  em-
ployment  when making  the  choice  and 
have been unemployed since the date of 
redundancy,  i.e.  he/she  must sign on for 
state unemployment benefit or be certified 
as incapable of  work due to sickness. 
Manual Social Crisis Management /SERBS scheme  for steelworkers 
It should be emphasised that workers tak-
ing the pension option are ineligible for other 
benefits under !SERBS. 
Situation II: 
Unemployment 
The basic rule for all unemployed, and other-
wise ISERBS-qualifying redundant steel work-
ers,  is that they must sign on as unemployed 
and continue to sign on after the entitlement to 
the 52 weeks' state unemployment benefit has 
been  exhausted,  in  order  to  receive  weekly 
!SERBS benefit. The details set out below are 
simply age-related. 
Unemployed redundant men under 
55 and unemployed redundant 
women under 50 
Unemployed redundant men under 55  years 
and unemployed women under 50 can receive 
I  SERBS unemployment benefit of£  16 per  week 
for up to a maximum of 52 weeks. Receipt of 
!SERBS unemployment benefit does not have 
to  be continuous provided that the  payments 
are made within 78 weeks of  the date of  redun-
dancy, subject to this maximum of  52 weeks of 
actual payments. 
Unemployed redundant men 55 or 
over and women 50 or over 
These individuals may receive I  SERBS unem-
ployment benefit of£  16 per week for up to 26 
weeks, normally as a top-up to State unemploy-
ment  benefit.  Then  instead  from  their  27th 
Manual Social Crisis Management 
week of  unemployment, they can receive 90% 
of their  previous  earnings  for  a  further  52 
weeks; and then 80% of such earnings for a 
further 26 weeks; in each ofthese two cases any 
State benefits or income from their old compa-
ny (e.g. company pension) must be taken into 
account in the calculation. Previous earnings 
for this calculation purpose cannot exceed £41 0 
per week, at which point they are capped. 
Here too, I  SERBS does not require weeks of 
unemployment to be continuous as long as they 
come within a total time limit of 104 weeks for 
men aged between 55  and 59 and for women 
between 50 and 54 from the date of  redundan-
cy.  For  men  redundant  at  60  or more  and 
women at 55 or more, the overall time limit is 
130 weeks. 
Individuals  working  under  16  hours  per 
week are treated as unemployed, i.e. they can 
receive I  SERBS benefit only for those days on 
which they are unemployed and available for 
work. 
The  ISERBS  payments  structure thus 
explicitly recognises that men redundant at 55 
and over will have the most difficulty in obtain-
ing a new job and that any job obtained may 
very well just be a short-term opportunity. The 
contrast here in the I  SERBS position with men 
redundant at under 55  is very clear; the latter 
are strongly encouraged by the !SERBS pay-
ments  structure  to  go  into  training  or come 
back into employment, albeit at a lower wage. 
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In employment again: 
with a new employer, 
through an internal 
transfer or 
by becoming self-
employed 
New employer 
Where a displaced worker obtains a  new job 
outside the steel industry (working 16 hours 
or more per week) and his current earnings are 
under 90% of  his previous weekly steel indus-
try earnings, he is  entitled to a make-up pay-
ment under !SERBS to bring his new income 
up  to  90%  (but  no  higher)  of his  previous 
earnings. Also here the maximum is taken to be 
£41 0 per week. 
The previous earnings for this calculation 
are the average of  the worker's former normal 
earnings, but excluding non-contractual over-
time  and  payments  for  particular  abnormal 
working  conditions,  for  the  13-week period 
ending four weeks immediately preceding the 
date  of redundancy  or  transfer.  In  order  to 
calculate the new earnings to be topped up to 90 
per cent, four weeks are taken as  a reference 
base. 
Where the ex-steelworker works for more 
than one employer or receives a steel company 
pension or other compensation payments, the 
gross amount of these payments is  normally 
/SERBS scheme  for steelworkers 
taken into account when comparing with the 
previous earnings. 
Internal transfer 
If  the worker obtains a new job in the company 
or in  the  steel  industry  in general,  the  same 
principles apply, i.e., the workers receive com-
pensation payments from the I  SERBS fund. In 
this  case,  though,  his  current  earnings  are 
assessed over 13-week periods on the basis that 
earnings patterns in this instance are likely to 
be  more predictable  and  so  require  less  fre-
quent assessment periods. For calculation pur-
poses, current earnings are the average of the 
worker's new normal earnings for the previous 
four  to  13  weeks  (as  appropriate)  of normal 
working, but excluding non-contractual over-
time  and  payments  for  particular  abnormal 
working conditions. 
A transferee to a new job within the same 
steel company beyond daily travelling distance 
may  be  eligible  under !SERBS for  removal, 
resettlement and travelling allowances. 
The average weekly make-up payment in 
1991  was  £86.50,  with  ah  average  previous 
gross steel wage of £34 7.42 per week. 
Individuals  with  a part-time  employment 
working under 16 hours per week are treated as 
unemployed, i.e. they can receive ISERBS ben-
efit, but only for those days on which they are 
unemployed and available for work. 
A  practical difficulty  with  this  specific 
instrument is that it encourages non-steel em-
ployers taking on ex-steelworkers to pay them 
a low wage in the knowledge that in the short 
term they will be relying upon ISERBS make-
Manual Social Crisis Management /SERBS scheme  for steelworkers 
up. Nevertheless the reality is that otherwise in 
many  cases  these  workers  would  be  unem-
ployed, so that in this sense this ISERBS in-
strument can be regarded as an effective meas-
ure for cushioning and assisting the workers 
concerned, since it helps significantly in get-
ting them back to work. 
The self-employed 
Provided that the self-employed ex-steelwork-
er's work represents gainful full-time employ-
ment (and he can prove this by providing the 
necessary accounts every six months), he may be 
entitled to ISERBS make-up payment bringing 
him to  90%  of his  previous  earnings.  While 
certified accounts covering a six-month period 
need to  be  assessed before  the  first  make-up 
benefit can be paid, during the interim period a 
£16 per week payment can be made to the wholly 
self-employed.  The  sum  paid  on  this  basis, 
however,  is  recovered by  ISERBS  when  full 
entitlement to make-up payments is determined 
or it is ascertained that the self-employed person 
is  not  entitled.  The  DTI,  which  administers 
I  SERBS particularly through its Agency Office, 
Maximum 
Age:  Age:  length of 
Men  Women  benefit period 
in weeks 
under 55  under 50  778 
55-59  50-54  104 
60-64  55-59  130 
Manual Social Crisis Management 
has declared that it will not compensate the self-
employed for losses made, though it may pro-
vide a make-up payment of up to  90% of the 
person's earnings in such circumstances. 
Situation IV: 
In training 
The individual needs to find and then apply to 
attend a training course to improve his employ-
ment prospects and then have his application 
approved by the DTI (via his  (ex-) steel em-
ployer generally). Once on the approved course, 
the trainee receives a tax-free allowance week-
ly, which approximates to his previous weekly 
net pay as  a steel worker (because a notional 
amount of tax is deducted). Thus the amount 
received  is  directly based upon the  trainee's 
previous steel industry earnings. 
Travel and accommodation allowances may 
be paid as additional training benefits. Travel is 
calculated by applying the most economical mode 
of  travel from the trainee's home to the training 
premises,  while accommodation expenses only 
apply where the trainee's journey stretches be-
yond reasonable daily travel distance. 
The payments structure in relation to train-
ing shows the considerable importance which 
!SERBS pays  to  training as  a policy instru-
ment, with maintenance payments made dur-
ing training being higher than (ISERBS-boost-
ed) unemployment benefit. 
The maximum length regardless of age is 
52 weeks, beginning before the date of  redun-
dancy, provided the worker is made redundant 
no  longer than 26 weeks after the end of the 
course. 
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/SERBS scheme  for steelworkers 
Given the lower age provision of  workers 
in the steel industry in the  1990s compared 
with the 1980s, 1990s redundancies have led 
to  a rise  in the practical significance of the 
training benefits and a comparative reduction 
in the take-up of  the early pension option. At 
the most recent Ravenscraig closure, for ex-
ample, workers overwhelmingly opted to en-
ter training in  subjects such as  welding and 
pipe-fitting,  electronics,  building  services, 
driving  skills  (Heavy  Goods  Vehicles  and 
public  transport)  and,  primarily  for  white-
collar workers,  computing.  Others  opted to 
enter colleges of further education or univer-
sities. 
Training  is  relatively expensive as  com-
pared to other instruments utilised to  cushion 
or improve the workers situation. The average 
/SERBS example 
Howard Jones 
Ex-steelworker,  redundant,  45  years,  married,  with  no  children 
(Figures as at Apri/1992) 
Situation II  For the first six weeks after date of redundancy: 
unemployed 
Receives: 
- ISERBS unemployment benefit (£16 pw) + 
-State unemployment benefit (£43.10 pw) + 
£26.60 pw for spouse) 
Situation IV  For the next 44 weeks (average course length): on 
full-time DTI-approved training course on 
electronics: 
Receives: 
allowance approximating to his previous net 
earnings for these 44 weeks 
Situation III  Obtains full-time employment in the electronics 
industry immediately at the end of the course: 
Receives: 
Two thirds of the wage previously earned in the 
steel industry; therefore, ISERBS make-up 
payment bringing his new income up to 90 per 
cent of his previous steel earnings 
running period: 
= 6 weeks 
+ 44 weeks 
=50 weeks 
+ 28 weeks 
=  78 weeks 
maximum 
Manual Social Crisis Management /SERBS scheme  for steelworkers 
course fees (for an average course length of  44 
weeks) have been running at just under £7 000 
(to  which  the  EC  Commission  contributes, 
but not as an ISERB item), whilst the average 
ISERBS training benefit is running at almost 
£275 per week and travel allowance at £8 per 
week. 
The individual's 
changing situation 
ISERBS takes in account that the situation of 
an individual who is dependent on aid might 
Notes 
Manual Social Crisis Management 
change from  employment to  unemployment, 
from self-employment to retraining periods or 
other situations.  Therefore,  it  is  important to 
confirm that each individual may  move be-
tween different situations, subject to  the total 
period of eligibility. 
The easiest way to visualise a "crisis career" 
is to take a look at a specific example (see the 
table on  the previous page). 
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Model: 
Anti-crisis 
Division 
at ARBED Steel 
Employees who would otherwise be made 
redundant are assigned to the most varied 
jobs, both inside and outside the compa-
ny,  without  any  loss  of income,  in  the 
Anti-crisis Division  of the Luxembourg 
steel company, ARBED.  They can subse-
quently either return to the regular area 
of activity of the business, find alterna-
tive  employment,  or take  early  retire-
ment. 
ARBED (Acieries Reunies de Burbach-
Eich-Dudelange), which has existed under 
this name since  1911, is  the largest indus-
trial concern in the Grand Duchy of  Luxem-
bourg.  Even  today,  the  steel  industry  re-
mains one of the cornerstones of the coun-
try's  economy.  In  1975,  the  first  year of 
crisis after the steel boom of 1974, around 
30  000 people were  still  employed in  the 
steel  industry,  including  foreign  compa-
nies. A further 7 000 or so were employed in 
the  country's  ore  mines,  which  also  be-
longed to  ARBED.  A good 28  per cent of 
Luxembourg's 130 000 or so gainfully-em-
ployed persons  were  thus  working  in  the 
iron and steel industry. 
Manual Social Crisis Management 
By 1992 all the ore mines had been closed, 
and the steel industry provided employment 
for only 9 000 or so people: the workforce had 
been reduced by two thirds, and production 
had been halved. 
The  steel  crisis thus  imposed a kind of 
national state of emergency on Luxembourg 
between 197 5 and the end of the 1980s. We 
need, then, to take a look at the "Luxembourg 
Model" of  a social policy for economic growth 
and full  employment before turning our at-
tention to the Anti-crisis Division at ARB ED. 
The Luxembourg 
Model 
Once it had become clear that the steel crisis 
was in fact a structural crisis, management at 
ARBED  initially planned extensive  redun-
dancies. The unions' counter-arguments were 
characterized by  three central features: 
•  no  outright redundancies; 
•  no loss of income for those leaving the 
steel industry; 
•  all  employees affected by the  crisis  to 
remain in employment; work to be com-
mercially or at least socially worthwhile, 
i.e.  no  marking-time  as  in  most  short-
time employment models. 
This model met  initially with not a few 
reservations - not least within ARBED itself. 
Nonetheless, it came to form the basis of  the 
"Luxembourg  Model",  which  found  broad 
social acceptance. 
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The initiative came largely from the Ona-
fhiingege  Gewerkschaftsbond  Letzebuerg 
(OGBL, Luxembourg Federation oflndepend-
ent Unions).  The  active  involvement of the 
union in the implementation of this model is 
an  essential  element, just as  consensus  is  a 
basic element of  the Luxembourg Model. Tri-
partite  negotiations  took place  between  the 
government,  the  company  and  the  unions 
before all  important  decisions.  A  "National 
Employment Market Committee" was formed 
specifically for  the  purpose,  chaired by  the 
Minister for Employment and Social Securi-
ty, with representatives ofboth sides of  indus-
try  and  of ministerial  departments.  The 
strength of the  model  derived from  the  fact 
that decisions received broad social  accept-
ance, in spite of  all the differences on point of 
detail. 
In addition to the ARB ED Anti-crisis Divi-
sion (a truly Luxembourg invention), the stand-
ard instruments of  the European Coal and Steel 
Community  were  also  applied:  early  retire-
ment, transfer, retraining, reemployment. These 
date largely from legislation in the second half 
oft  he seventies. Despite the country-wide meas-
ures, the social partners still have an obligation 
to preserve and create jobs at company level. 
The government-sponsored plans incorporate 
an ARBED investment plan, with the aim of 
ensuring that the crisis was also used for tech-
nical  modernization. 
The central financing instrument for all 
social policy measures is a special fund cre-
ated specifically for the purpose, theN  ational 
Unemployment Fund, which now also finds 
application in other sectors. 
Anti-crisis Division at  ARBED Steel 
Financing 
The principal instrument, i.e. the Unem-
ployment Fund, is financed through: 
•  aid from the European Coal and Steel 
Community; 
•  special  contributions  payable  by  the 
employers (with the exception of  pub-
lic-sector employers) at a rate of 0.25 
per  cent  of pay  declared  to old-age 
pension funds and invalidity insurance 
schemes; 
•  a special tax at a rate of2.5 per cent, on 
top of personal income tax, and a spe-
cial tax at a rate of I  per cent of the 
income tax on corporations; and final-
ly 
•  a special tax at a rate of2.5 per cent, on 
top of  personal income tax, and a spe-
cial tax at a rate of 1 per cent of the 
income tax on corporations; and final-
ly 
•  a contribution payable by local author-
ities at a rate of2 per cent oflocal trade 
and business tax. 
A National Loan and Investment Com-
pany was also established to further economic 
growth, one of its tasks being to formulate a 
series of  economic objectives. 
Both instruments were incorporated into a 
phased plan, based on  varying  degrees  of 
unemployment brought about by the restruc-
turing of  heavy industry; these would trigger 
increasingly  extensive  economic  and  social 
policy measures. 
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In  return  for  these  considerable  national 
efforts, the Luxembourg government received 
42 per cent of  ARBED's equity capital. 
Work in the public 
interest 
Here, as elsewhere, the 1975 slump was not 
initially perceived as the start of  a structural 
crisis.  In  order to  avoid redundancies and 
short-time working, and in  order to  retain 
staff who, it was assumed, would be needed 
again at the end of  the crisis, a "labour pool" 
was created for performing certain tasks. A 
special agreement was entered into between 
the company and the unions in  July  1975. 
Transfers to  these jobs were initially on  a 
voluntary basis, although the special agree-
ment  also  provided  for  the  possibility of 
compulsory assignment. 
Because  the  company itself,  including 
its various subsidiaries, did not have enough 
work, considerable recourse was had to "ex-
ceptional  work of general  interest  (  emer-
gency work)", which the Luxembourg gov-
ernment offered to organize and pay for.  A 
corresponding law was passed shortly be-
forehand. 
All those involved were initially happy 
with this solution. It was no longer tenable, 
however, by 1977, when it had become clear 
that the crisis was of a fundamental nature 
and  would  affect  far  more  people  over  a 
longer  period  than  was  originally  envis-
aged. 
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The Anti-crisis Division 
For this reason, the Anti-crisis Division (Di-
vision  anticrise,  DAC)  was  established  in 
June 1977 under a new, open-ended "special 
agreement"  (see  the  documentation)  based 
on the  positive experience of the  first  two 
years. 
In some cases, complete workforces (i.e. 
intact, proven units) from other Divisions or 
other operating units which had been closed 
were transferred to  this  Division.  The  first 
major plant closure, for example, which af-
fected 870 persons, involved a complete blast 
furnace plant with four blast furnaces and a 
power station.  This was  followed by com-
plete rolling mills. 
The Anti-crisis Division was at times the 
second-largest Division of ARBED.  In  the 
early  eighties  it  employed  twice  as  many 
people (3  000), as were registered as unem-
ployed and  looking for  work on the entire 
Luxembourg employment market. 
The employees retained their original job 
until they were given another permanent job 
or left the company -a very important entitle-
ment from the point of view of the unions, 
since it guaranteed the level of  income of  the 
employees concerned. 
The employees working in the Anti-crisis 
Division were engaged either inside or out-
side the company, in a subsidiary of  ARBED 
or even in an  entirely separate company. 
However, the task of  the Anti-crisis Divi-
sion was not simply to assign employees to 
new areas of work. It was also required, in 
practice, to train and organise individuals or 
Page(~  ElO 
Notes ElO  Page 4 
Dokumentation 
SONOERABfU1MEN 
OER 
EISStJ- UI'l[l  STAHLIN[ITJ3TPIE  lTJ:m  TM 
EISEtJF:f/,F.F.PGRAD  LIJXF'.MBTJR,~3 
Accord ..,recwl 
en \'UC de ..,urmontLr Ia  LTJ<..,L lk l't..>mplm  dan..,  Ia 
...,1Je-rurg1e  d  le~ nune~ de fer Ju Luxembourg 
Special agreement to 
overcome the employment 
crisis in the iron and steel 
industry and the iron ore 
mining industry in  Luxembourg 
(extracts) 
l . The parties to  the Agreement  ore agreed 
that the unconditional aim must be to ensure 
employment for those members of the work-
force who have become surplus  to require-
ments through the structural  and economic 
crisis in the steel industry. 
An Anti-crisis Division shall be  formed for this 
purpose. 
The winding-up of this Division shall be sub-
ject  to negotiations between the parties to the 
Agreement ... 
Any disputes arising, and  all important  meas-
ures,  shall  be the subject of negotiation be-
tween the parties to the Agreement. 
2. Members of the workforce who have 
become surplus to requirements for the above 
reasons shall be assigned to the Anti-crisis Divi-
sion.  They shall nevertheless remain registered 
in their former appointment until such time as 
they have been transferred permanently to a 
new appointment. 
The members of the workforce assigned to 
the Anti-crisis  Division  shall  be deployed  as 
follows: 
a) on work within the company; 
b) outside the company, on work carried 
out by the company on its own account; 
c) outside the company and temporarily 
with subsidiaries or third companies. Wherever 
possible, complete teams with their direct su-
pervisors should be kept intact. 
Anti-crisis Division at  ARBED Steel 
If the distance between the place of resi-
dence and the place of work is so great that 
the employee cannot reasonably be expect-
ed to travel this distance each day, a tempo-
rary transfer may be made on a voluntary basis 
only. 
Consideration may also be given to a vol-
untary transfer to other sectors of activity and 
to early retirement (  ... ) 
4. The  contracting  companies shall  form 
links with other companies and shalL  if neces-
sary,  take the initiative to find new areas of 
activity and, by  so doing, make productive use 
of the surplus workforce. 
5. It may occur that members of the work-
force from the steel industry are utilized in sec-
tors of activity and in companies which have 
their own collective agreements, with special 
wage settlements and specific contracts of 
employment. 
6. In the event of the use of  members of  the 
workforce from the steel industry in such com-
panies, for example in the construction indus-
try,  in  steelworks and in  mines,  the following 
regulation shall apply, which shall be effective 
either in addition to the applicable collective 
agreement or in amendment of it: 
a) Any instructions given by the supervisors 
designated by the company shall be followed 
without question, and any safety regulations 
applicable to the site shall be observed. 
b) Transport to and from the place of work 
shall take place in accordance with the rele-
vant practice of the company concerned. 
c) In order to ensure compliance with nor-
mal operating procedures, and in order not to 
disrupt the working climate of the company in 
question, all employees shall be subject to the 
same daily  working hours and attendance  hours 
and to the same rest periods that ore custom-
ary throughout the sector. (  ... ) 
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d) The customary rules for the steel industry 
shall continue to apply to the calculation and 
payment of daily and weekly overtime hours, 
although these  must  remain the exception. 
Any time off  in lieu arising in this context  shall be 
granted within a period of  four weeks in agree-
ment with the site manager. 
e)The new supervisor shall be responsible 
for granting rest days and holidays. 
f) In  the event of shifts  being lost due to 
adverse weather  conditions, the hours lost may 
be made up in full or in part. 
g)  The rules laid down in the Special Agree-
ment of  31  July 1975 on the practical arrange-
ments for extraordinary emergency work and 
short-time  work shall  apply to remuneration 
and to other matters of  the kind referred to in a) 
to f) above. Any resulting additional expendi-
ture for any supplements not secured through 
collective agreements by comparison with in-
ternal transfers shall  be met from the wage 
guarantee fund established by the collective 
agreement of 29 September. 
7. Those  members of the workforce who, 
with the agreement of  their supervisor, declare 
themselves ready to accept employment in 
another  company  shall be  paid a one-off  com-
pensatory amount as provided for under Sec-
tion 9.13 of the collective agreement i.e. they 
shall  be equal in  status with the employees 
specified therein. 
8. The following rule shall apply, in place of 
the above point to subsidiaries of the con-
tracting companies: 
a) As  in  the case of internal transfers for 
economic and structural reasons, the compa-
ny shall undertake to guarantee the previous 
income, excluding supplements for night, Sun-
day and holiday working, and any overtime. 
b) The length of service of the employee 
shall be credited to him by the new employer 
Manual Social Crisis Management 
for the purpose of social benefits dependent 
on the length of service. 
9. The companies shall undertake, for the 
duration of the probationary period with their 
new employer, to reemploy those members of 
the workforce who leave their employment in 
accordance with  the two aforementioned 
points, should they prove to be unsuitable for 
their new employment. Any rights and entitle-
ment acquired shall be retained in this event. 
An employee found guilty of gross miscon-
duct at his new workplace shall forfeit his right 
to reemployment by his former employer. The 
procedure to be adopted in this case shall be 
the same as for termination of the contract at 
the end of the probationary period, depend-
ing on the length of service, or as for dismissals 
with immediate effect. 
1  0. The provisions listed under Point 6. shall 
apply to the members of the workforce con-
tracted out to subsidiary companies and third 
companies.(  ... ) 
12. The present Agreement shall enter into 
force retrospectively with effect from  1 April 
1977. 
Luxembourg, 1 June 1977 
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entire groups for their new work, which they 
were generally expected to perform in entirely 
new surroundings. This also included prepara-
tion (retraining) for entirely new occupational 
environments, which was not infrequently the 
basis for  a subsequent change of occupation 
and employer. 
Areas of  employment 
Three main areas of employment can be iden-
tified: 
•  A  significant  proportion  was  work  at 
ARBED  itself.  Demolition  or new  con-
struction work in conjunction with the clo-
sure of divisions and companies and new 
capital investments were the main element 
here.  Transfers to ARBED subsidiaries 
should also be included in  this category (see 
Items 1-4 in the above Table). In these cases 
the companies paid the wages over to the 
Anti-crisis Division. This wage was gener-
ally at a level below that of  the old regular 
job, because bonuses typical  of the  steel 
industry (such  as  for  night~  Sunday  and 
holiday working) were not taken into ac-
count. Any differences in wages were made 
good from the unemployment fund. In or-
der to facilitate  the process, ARBED re-
ceived a lump sum of 15  per cent of the 
personnel costs for each employee who was 
thus not made redundant. 
•  Work in the public sector, for which no 
regular government funding was available, 
was of  almost equal importance. One exam-
ple  of this  is  the  restoration  of historic 
buildings (castles, etc.), to help boost the 
Anti-crisis Division at  ARBED Steel 
Places of employment 
of the 3 041 employees  in 
of the Anti-crisis Division 
0/o 
in June 1982* 
Demolition/site clearance (within ARBED)  10 
New construction/Investment (within ARBED)  14 
Transfers (within ARBED)  10 
Employment in subsidiaries  7 
Employment in outside firms  15 
Public work  35 
Casual or no work  9 
Total  100 
Source: Die Mitbestimmung 11/1982 
tourist trade~ a most important industry in 
the Grand Duchy. Wages and salaries were  -
met in full from the unemployment fund in 
this case. 
•  Employment in outside firms was also of 
considerable importance. Government con-
tracts also had a major part to play here. In 
this case, too, differences in wages were met 
from  the  unemployment fund.  The Anti-
crisis Division acted to a certain extent as a 
temporary employment agency, and gov-
ernment organizations  (e.g.  the  Post Of-
fice) were not infrequently the client. This 
approach also made it possible to circum-
vent age restrictions when making appoint-
ments to civil service jobs (statutory age 
limit: 35 years). 
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"Crisis careers" 
The following four "crisis careers" are, 
each in its own way,  typical: 
Jean Montagnard 
is one of  the small group of  employees 
who registered voluntarily with the Anti-
crisis Division.  A trained jitter,  he be-
gan  work  in  the  maintenance  depart-
ment of  a rolling mill and then  worked 
his  way  up  to  the  level of  production 
foreman. For many years, he was a mem-
ber of  the small core team  that formed 
the  basic  workforce  of the  Anti-crisis 
Division. He led various working groups 
there and also performed management 
functions.  He  subsequently returned to 
the company, where he was seconded as 
a  safety  representative for  the  white-
collar staff,  since  his  old job  in  the 
rolling mill was no longer available. 
Herbert Ravenfeld 
was approaching the age of  56 when the 
Anti~crisis Division was set up.  He,  like 
many of  his semi-skilled  production col-
leagues,  knew that he would take early 
retirement at the age of  57 after almost 
forty years  with  ARBED.  He  was  an 
active member of  a demolition gang and 
later  worked  on  a  new construction 
project during  his year with  the  Anti-
crisis Division. 
Manual Social Crisis Management 
Marco Grirardelli 
3  8,  a  trained electrician,  was  initially 
shocked to  learn that his own  Division 
was to close, and that he would be trans-
ferred to the Anti-crisis Division. How-
ever,  after  completing  an  electronics 
retraining course and a series ofjobs, he 
was one of  those who were offered a well-
paid  job in another company. He accept-
ed this  in  spite of  the fact that he,  like 
many of  his qualified colleagues, could 
have  found work in one of  the new ARB  ED 
plants;  as  he said,  "the  steel industry 
has no real future". 
Robert Lenz 
now aged 42, is a trained sand moulder. 
He belongs to the small group for whom 
the  Anti-crisis  Division  has,  to  some 
extent,  become a new home.  The  world 
he had known  collapsed when  the old 
foundry closed - he was aged 32 at the 
time - and he found himself transferred 
to public relief work.  He  was  soon  to 
enjoy working in the open air, however, 
doing a wide range ofjobs, and applying 
his new training as a bricklayer to good 
effect.  He  likes  the  responsibility  that 
devolves to  him and his group,  and re-
gards the prospect of  soon returning to 
work in  the  modernized foundry  with 
mixed feelings. 
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The feared competition with existing com-
panies,  above  all  those  in  the  craft  sector, 
appears, in the latter two categories at least, not 
to have led to major conflicts, and certainly not 
to the break-up of"national solidarity". Poten-
tial conflicts were defused by inviting the craft 
sector to send its representatives to the Nation-
al  Employment  Market  Commission  and  to 
voice any fears at an early stage. 
Because these measures could not take in 
all  "surplus"  employees,  and because redun-
dancies were not an available option, ARBED 
on the  one hand offered  additional pay ar-
rangements for those employees who left the 
company in  order to  take alternative employ-
ment, and on the other made use of  the arrange-
Notes 
Anti-crisis Division at  ARBED Steel 
ments for taking early retirement at the age 
of 57 years, with a  tideover allowance until 
statutory pensionable age. This allowance was 
subject to all social security and tax deductions 
and amounted to: 
•  for the first 12 months: 85 per cent of the 
gross wage over the last three months; 
•  for the next 12 months: 80 per cent of the 
gross wage over the last three months; and 
•  for a final period of  12 months: 75 per cent 
of  the gross wage over the last three months. 
It was  subject to  a ceiling of four times the 
statutory minimum wage. Increases in the tide-
over allowance were also linked to the cost of 
living index. 
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Model: 
Charbonnages 
de France 
Charbonnages  de  France,  the  national 
French coal mining undertaking, adopts a 
very broad  approach to social crisis man-
agement, using not only traditional instru-
ments such as  early retirement and social 
plans but also trying to guarantee job secu-
rity to all ex-mineworkers  without excep-
tion, for which purpose it uses a very exten-
sive range of instruments, the aim of which 
is  to ensure individual job security and to 
create substitute employment and make a 
specific contribution to the restructuring of 
the region. 
The crisis in the coal 
mining industry 
The decline in coal production since the end of 
1950s was accompanied by a steady reduction 
in the workforce. Output of coal was reduced 
progressively, and finally ceased completely in 
most regions of  France, due, as in other coun-
tries,  to  oil  and  natural  gas  and  increasing 
imports of cheaper coal,  whilst the  price  of 
domestic coal rose steeply in spite of  modern-
ization  and rationalization.  The  French coal 
industry was only able to survive and gradually 
scale  down  its  output  thanks  to  a  national 
Manual Social Crisis Management 
energy policy, which repeatedly gave new pur-
chase guarantees for coal for electricity gener-
ation and industry. 
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In France, too, the slow and steady decline in 
coal  output has  led to  a comprehensive and 
varied range  of instruments  for  social  crisis 
management. 
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A distinction can be drawn between three 
groups of employees: 
Group  A:  The  oldest  employees,  who  can 
either retire  or take  early retirement or will 
shortly reach the necessary age. 
Group B: Younger employees, for whom min-
ing is no longer able to provide a normal career 
up to the age limit. 
Group C: All other employees: those with im-
paired performance and the disabled, those es-
tablishing new businesses and those who wish, 
if  at all possible, to remain in mining in order not 
to forfeit any pension entitlements and who, like 
the employees in Group B, must be found places 
in other pits or in other companies. 
The list of measures differs depending on 
whether a pit is to be closed, or whether it might 
survive, at least for a time. 
The following presentation of the instru-
ments is based on the scenario of  the closure of 
entire mining companies, with all the attend-
ant consequences for the employees and the 
region. The other case is thus dealt with only 
briefly. 
Job losses, but pits saved 
The following set of instruments might apply 
to job losses in conjunction with pit moderniza-
tion: 
•  Early retirement; 
•  External placement with another employ-
er, e.g. Electricite de France; 
•  New business start-up aid; 
•  Further training  or retraining in conjunc-
tion with  a  transfer to another pit  or a 
Charbonnages de France 
placement in another undertaking or an-
other company in the same group; 
•  Repatriation assistance for immigrant work-
ers who wish to return to their homeland; 
•  Versetzungen  innerhalb  des  Zechenbe-
triebes  oder  Verlegungen  zu  anderen 
ZechenTransfers within the colliery or  trans-
fers to other collieries  .. 
Should further measures prove necessary, 
consideration could be given to all the instru-
ments which would additionally be brought to 
bear in the event of a closure. These are de-
scribed in detail on the following pages. 
"Social plan" 
The  crucial  instrument  is  the  "social plan''. 
This  approach  involves  respecting  existing 
employment agreements (accords sur  l 'emploi), 
entered into at national level between the un-
ions and the employers' federations, and exist-
ing collective agreements. 
A  social  plan  can  be  negotiated  at  two 
levels: 
•  within the company between the unions 
-as a rule the most representative unions 
in the company - and company manage-
ment; 
•  at  sector level  between  the  employers' 
federation and the most representative un-
ions in the sector. 
The social plan sets out the measures to be 
adopted and the procedure for their implemen-
tation and verification in each company. It is 
entered into for a period of  two years prior  to the 
closure of  the pit(s) concerned. 
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The  following  crisis  management instru-
ments to some extent represent the content of  a 
social plan. 
Transfers 
The company undertakes to  find  alternative 
employment  for  employees  who  have  not 
reached pensionable age or the age limit for 
early retirement within the shut-down period. 
This may be  in other companies within the 
undertaking in the same coalfield, although it 
may also  be  in  other regions  or companies 
within  the  Charbonnages  de  France  (CdF) 
Group, including units in other countries. 
This commitment applies only to employ-
ees aged at least 40 years and with a minimum 
of 20 years'  service, for  which purpose the 
years of service are based on the number of 
years' membership of  the miners' social secu-
rity insurance fund (Group C;  seep. 2). 
The new job must correspond to the qual-
ifications of  the person concerned (with train-
ing  provided if necessary).  Conversely, the 
employing company or works may insist that 
the employee concerned satisfy the qualitative 
requirements  of the  new  workplace,  and  it 
cannot be forced to  take on more employees 
than it needs. 
Holiday as pre-early 
retirement 
1he  conge  charbonnier  de  fin  de  carriere 
(miners' end-of-career holiday entitlement) is 
an instrument which exists in this form only in 
Manual Social Crisis Management 
France and within the Charbonnages de France 
(CdF)  organization.  This  basically takes  the 
form of  a paid leave of  absence or release from 
duties for a maximum period often years prior 
to reaching pensionable age or early retirement 
age. A "pre-early retirer'' remains an employee 
of CdF with all rights and obligations includ-
ing  social  insurance  and  tax,  although  the 
individual concerned is relieved of all activi-
ties. All entitlements remain in force,  includ-
ing the right to receive benefits in kind (domes-
tic fuel and reduced rent, etc.). 
Also of  interest is the fact that the "pre-early 
retirer"  has  access  to  retraining  and,  if he 
wishes, is free to return to work. 
Who qualifies? 
Employees are entitled to take such "pre-early 
retirement" under the following circumstances: 
•  aged 45 years or younger, with at least 25 
years' service (miners' benefit fund); 
•  registered industrial disability pensioners 
or employees with capacity for work re-
duced by at least 30 per cent through an 
industrial accident or an occupational dis-
ease, and with at least 20 years'  service 
(miners' benefit fund); 
•  aged over 50 years, and not belonging to 
either of  the groups mentioned above. This 
means: "pre-early retirement" up to age 55, 
provided  that  15  years'  miners'  benefit 
contributions have been paid by that time, 
or until the latter condition is met, although 
in no circumstances beyond the age of  60. 
To put it more simply: up to early pension 
age or retirement age. 
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This "pre-early retirement" scheme never 
comes into force earlier than six months after 
the start of  the social plan, so that the individ-
uals concerned have the opportunity to famil-
iarize themselves with the alternatives offered 
under the social plan, especially transfers and 
part-time working, because the financial con-
ditions  do  not correspond to  those  actually 
enjoyed by people in work. The company is 
accordingly required to draw up a list of  jobs 
suitable for part-time work. 
"Pre-early retirement benefit" 
The company guarantees the "pre-early retir-
er" an income equivalent to 75 per cent ofhis/ 
her previous net annual earnings. If the early 
pension plus  any compensatory benefits  an 
individual would receive if  he were entitled to 
take early retirement on the basis of  his years 
of service is  higher, then this is  the amount 
paid. A similar settlement is made in respect 
of claims  by those  with impaired perform-
ance. 
From the time a "pre-early retirer'' reaches 
early retirement age, he also receives a settle-
ment, although not beyond the time at which 
he reaches pensionable age, for each year of 
early retirement. This settlement is calculated 
on the basis of half a "pre-early retirement" 
annual wage (see above). In  addition, a fur-
ther settlement amounting to  three  months' 
pay for each year of service is also payable. 
There are also special settlement schemes 
for  the  various  groups  of workers:  manual 
workers,  salaried employees and engineers, 
and those with impaired performance. 
Charbonnages de France 
Transfers or 
alternative employment 
Charbonnages de France undertakes to provide 
younger employees (Group B,see page 2) with 
alternative  employment  in  other  companies 
inside or outside the Group. The declared ob-
jective is to avoid any dismissals and to offer all 
employee_s  at least an acceptable opportunity 
for reemployment.  , 
During a familiarization phase, employees 
are  given the  chance to  choose between the 
various  opportunities which may be  open to 
them: 
e  Employment by the energy group "Elec-
tricite de France"; 
•  Self-employment; 
•  Retraining; 
•  Repatriation of  immigrant workers to their 
country of  origin; 
•  Transfers, if necessary involving moving 
house. 
Each of  these is associated with a series of 
guarantees and support benefits that may be 
claimed as  soon as  the employee has left the 
company.  He  can  remain  employed  by  the 
company, however, until the new job is avail-
able, or during preparatory periods due to any 
necessary training or retraining. In the event of 
employment in another company being inter-
rupted or withdrawn within a specific period 
for  reasons  for  which· the  employee  is  not 
responsible, he may return to  CdF.  There he 
will receive a new offer of employment or, if 
necessary, further training. 
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Placement, advice and 
guidance office 
Charbonnages  de  France  has  opened a 
staff office reporting directly to the Chief 
Executive. This coordinates the work of 
the local advisory offices, whose function 
is to provide concrete assistance and guid-
ance. Their duties involve both planning 
and the provision of  individual aid to min-
ers. In detail: 
•  Information in respect of opportunities 
for and conditions of  early retirement; 
•  Information in  respect of opportunities . 
for and conditions of  repatriation to the 
country of origin; 
•  Information in respect of opportunities 
for  and conditions of transfers  to  the 
energy company, Electricite de France, 
with which an agreement was in  force 
between 1984 and 198 8 for the assimila-
tion of around 1 000 miners each year; 
•  Identification of  acceptable vacancies in 
the group and in the surrounding areas 
with the highest employment intensity; 
•  Preparation of  a quantitative and quali-
tative summary of  vacancies, in order to 
improve the planning of training pro-
grammes; 
•  Examination,  activation and provision 
of  the available training resources, with 
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a view to arranging appropriate training 
courses; 
•  advice and guidance in individual inter-
views for all employees affected, taking 
into account their skills, knowledge, pre-
ferences and limitations; 
•  After these  individual  interviews,  the 
preparation  of an  individual  proposal 
geared as closely as possible to the qua-
lifications and preferences ofthe indivi-
dual; 
•  Advice for the individual employee con-
cerning suitable measures and opportu-
nities  for  achieving the  set objectives, 
focusing  on the provision of intensive 
advice for young, low-skilled employees. 
A vacancy on offer is considered accept-
able: 
• if  it corresponds to the qualifications of 
the employee concerned; 
•  if it is  associated with  an  open-ended 
contract of employment in a company 
that is not at risk; 
• if  the pay corresponds to at least 7  5 per 
cent of  the level that the individual con-
cerned would have received at CdF in a 
surface job (fixed elements and benefits 
in kind). 
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Employees to  whom the alternative jobs of-
fered do not appeal, and who wish to take a look 
at the employment market for themselves, are 
granted "adaptation leave" (conge individuel 
d'adaptation professionnelle) for a maximum 
period of  one year. 
During this phase, which may also be used 
for  longer training  courses,  the  employee  is 
released from all  activities for the  company, 
although he otherwise retains all rights deriv-
ing from  the  continuing contract of employ-
ment. The period of leave ends on the day on 
which alternative employment is accepted. 
The monthly pay during this period is equiv-
alent to 65 per cent of  the previous net annual 
income  and  is  pay-linked.  Benefits  in  kind 
remain unaffected. 
If  this offer of  special leave is not accepted, 
the company is free to serve notice of  termina-
tion, having due regard for statutory require-
ments, unless the employee leaves the company 
voluntarily. In this case he can claim payment 
of any compensation due to him in respect of 
the adaptation leave not taken, at the level of 
the forfeited "leave pay". 
All the conditions relating to the termina-
tion of the contract of employment apply in 
addition. There is a maximum sum, however, 
which  may  not  be  exceeded  for  reasons  of 
equality of treatment. 
Charbonnages de France 
Further training and 
retraining 
Training is, as a general rule, an indispensable 
part  of the  transition  from  working  in  the 
mining  industry  to  alternative  employment. 
This further training or retraining is taken with 
a view to a concrete job with an existing new 
employer.  It  is  the  subject of an  agreement 
between  the  mining  company  and  the  new 
employer. 
The training is undertaken at Charbonnag-
es de France or in an institute nominated by the 
future employer (or his federation) either be-
fore  or after the transfer to  the new place of 
work. 
In both cases CdF assumes the wage costs in 
the same way as for the "adaptation leave" (see 
above).  An  additional  premium,  graduated 
according to  skilled workers and technicians 
and depending on the duration of the transi-
tional phase (with a minimum and maximum 
sum), is paid to anyone who has successfully 
completed a qualification course or has defin-
itively completed a transfer to a new employer. 
Finally,  the  additional  costs  (travel,  second 
home, meals and daily allowances, etc.) arising 
from the change to a new employer or from the 
course are met. 
In order to facilitate any necessary remov-
als, CdF has entered into agreements with the 
appropriate  authorities,  social  services  and 
housing associations in the target region. 
A major factor in  facilitating mobility in 
every respect (geographical, psychological and 
vocational) proved to  be the  involvement of 
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miners' wives and, where appropriate, the whole 
family  and their problems in the  advice and 
guidance programme. 
Diversification and 
reindustrialization 
CdF has followed a policy of  internal diversifi-
cation in order to open up options for the future 
for the  Charbonnages de France undertaking 
or group, but also for the regions affected by 
"Crisis careers" 
Joseph Dupuis 
Aged 45,  with 25 years' service,  wanted to 
take early retirement. Since the earliest date 
at which this is possible is 50,  he opted for 
"pre-early retirement leave". In so doing, he 
remained an  employee of CdF with  all the 
associated rights and obligations,  although 
he  was  not  required  to  do  any  work.  He 
received  75  per cent  of his  previous  net 
income. He has been an early pensioner since 
the age of  50 and receives 75 per cent of  his 
previous net wage,  plus any compensatory 
amounts due to him. He will receive his full 
pension on reaching the age of  60, provided 
that he had paid his full contributions to the 
pensions  insurance fund for the  stipulated 
150 three-month periods by the time he left 
the  company  (at  the  age  of 50).  He  also 
receives a supplementary pension equivalent 
to the entitlement earned during his period of 
service. 
restructuring.  This  extends  largely  to  areas 
outside the mining and processing of coal. 
A financing company for the reindustri-
alization of the mining regions (SOFIREM) 
was created in order to support this policy of 
diversification both internally and externally. 
Since its formation in  196 7, this organization 
has supported around one thousand companies 
in  respect of formation,  relocation or expan-
sion, and in this way has created around 80 000 
jobs. As the crisis in the mining industry deep-
ened in  the  mid-80s,  the  nominal  capital  of 
Maurice Deschamps 
Aged 50, with 26 years' service, opted  for "pre-
early retirement" at the age of  50 with  7  5 per 
cent of  his previous net income. However, since 
he was already entitled to take early pension, 
he  is  placed on  an  equal financial footing 
through  appropriate compensat01y payments 
with  those  who  opted for ear(v pension.  On 
reaching the age of  60,  he,  like Maurice Des-
champs,  will receive his full pension and any 
supplementary pension due to him. 
Charles Dane/ 
Aged 60,  with  25 years' service, he has not 
yet paid pensions contributions for the full 
150 three-month periods. He thus took early 
retirement at the age of  60 and now receives 
7  5 per cent of  his previous net income plus 
the compensatory payments due to him.  He 
will not retire until the age of  65,  by which 
time he will have paid the stipulated total of 
150 three-monthly  contributions  and will 
receive  a full pension,  including  the  ac-
quired entitlement to an additional pension. 
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SOFIREM was doubled in 1984, and a subsid-
iary company (FINORP  A) was formed specif-
ically for the Pas de Calais coalfield. 
Also  established in  the  same  year was  a 
fund  for  the  industrialization  of the  coal-
fields  (FIBM), with an annual budget of 100 
million francs.  Its aims are: 
•  to play a part in the financing of  additional 
training  programmes; 
Notes 
Charbonnages de France 
•  to  support the construction of technology 
and research centres; 
•  to be used in the redevelopment and plan-
ning of  industrial zones, including the con-
struction of premises. 
In addition, CdF has gone over to a system 
of  offering low-interest loans for investors in 
the  coalfields  in  association  with  national, 
regional and local authorities. 
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Convention 
Generale de 
Protection 
Sociale 
The  Conventions Generales de  Protection 
Socia/e  (CGPS),  general  social  security 
agreements, are agreements reached for 
the French steel industry as a  whole be-
tween the employers' federation and the 
unions. To some extent they are sectoral 
social plans, partly with regional scope, 
which,  used alongside such standard in-
struments as early retirement, release ar-
rangements and termination agreements 
with severance pay, etc., have been partic-
ularly effective in regulating and imple-
menting the combination of  reemployment 
and training. This latter aspect is  dealt 
with as a central topic in the following. 
The mixture of  measures in the five agree-
ments reached since the first steel crisis in 
the  mid-60s  has  changed  considerably. 
Whereas the modernization of the steel in-
dustry was the primary concern during the 
60s (CGPS  1:  1966-70), and was accompa-
nied by massive conflicts, the foreground has 
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been occupied increasingly by social cush-
ioning and support measures since the end of 
the 70s (CGPS 2+3:  1977 and 1979). Under 
the  effect of the  structural crisis, the  1984 
and 1987 agreements switched to very far-
reaching regulation of the reemployment of 
former steelworkers in other companies, ac-
companied by comprehensive training meas-
ures. 
The 1984 agreement provided for shorter 
working hours for the first time and created 
a new instrument, the "Contrat Formation-
Conversion"  (CFC  - Further Training  and 
Retraining  Contract)  (see p.  2 Jf.).  In  the 
1987 agreement, finally, the training compo-
nent was spelled out in more detail and was 
supplemented  by  accompanying  measures 
for the extensive internal transfers (COFIS) 
needed in response to the massive reduction 
in the workforce in the steel industry. 
France 
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E 12 is based on a case 
study  by  CEDRES 
(Paris)  and  on  my 
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CGPS 1987-1990 
The  Convention  Gem?rale  de  Protection  So-
ciale  agreed  on  16  July  1987  between  the 
GESIM (Federation of  Steel and Mining Com-
panies) and the unions (in particular the CFDT 
and the FO, but not the CGT) provides for the 
following packages of  social measures to deal 
with  the  crisis-induced  restructuring  of the 
steel industry and the resultant workforce sur-
plus: 
•  early retirement from the age of 55 years 
and  paid release from the age of  50 (see also 
the similar regulations for the French coal 
mining industry; Ell); 
•  accelerated implementation of  agreements 
in  respect of shorter working  hours  and 
changes in work organization (shifts, etc.); 
•  internal transfers; 
•  transfers to  other companies in the same 
undertaking in the same area; 
•  transfers to companies in the same under-
taking, but in other areas; 
•  transfers to companies in other undertak-
ings in the same area; 
•  transfers to companies in other undertak-
ings, but in other areas; 
•  support for transfers within the steel indus-
try through comprehensive training meas-
ures regulated by an "'internal steel industry 
training contract" (Contrat de Formation 
Interne a  Ia Siderurgie, COFIS); this con-
tract marked the start of  a vocational train-
ing drive in the French steel industry, which 
was continued in 1990 in the form of an 
"employment agreement" (convention sur 
l'emploi) and what was regarded as a rev-
olutionary "personnel development agree-
ment" at  USINOR  SACILOR (A.  CAP 
2000);  this aspect is taken up  under the 
heading "Crisis Management in the Com-
pany" in Chapter E20; 
•  Support for transfers to other undertakings 
through extensive training measures regu-
lated via a training contract (  contrat  forma-
tion-conversion, CFC  ). 
Since we are interested here predominantly 
in how to deal with permanent redundancy, we 
shall  concentrate  on  this  contrat formation-
conversion. 
Further training and 
retraining contract 
(CFC) 
The CFC in the context of the COPS of 1987 
required each company concerned to offer those 
of its employees whose jobs disappeared, and 
who could not be released under age-related 
measures,  a  further  training  and  retraining 
contract in  conjunction  with placement in a 
new job. 
Duration 
As a general rule, this offer applies to a "train-
ing leave" for a duration of  12 months. It may 
be extended to 24 months: 
•  if employees  aged 45  years  or older  on 
completion of  the CFC wish to take advan-
tage of  a longer course; although not if  the 
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Procedure 
Contrat Formation-Conversion 
Capitalization 
10,92 months of 
previous net wage 
+ 
compensation 
amounts 
+ 
any bonuses 
(CFC) 
CFC 
offers the person 
concerned an 
individual interview 
30 days to consider 
? 
• 
Further 
training 
and 
retraining 
of two 
vacancies 
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Further training and 
retraining measure 
Procedure, location, 
teaching methods, 
employment 
o  ortunities 
Placement, 
Advice 
and 
Support 
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individual concerned, by embarking on this 
measure, reaches the age limit for a "pre-
early  retirement"  settlement  (dispense 
d 'activite, a form of  paid release from work); 
•  if  lower and middle supervisory staff, who 
have been promoted on trial, wish to take an 
examination  corresponding  to  this  posi-
tion, and if the requisite training lasts for 
more than a year, or if  more than one year 
is necessary because the course starts on a 
fixed date. 
Making a hard choice 
Training leave under a CFC is an offer that can 
also  be  converted into money.  The  decision 
must be taken within 30 days following notifi-
cation of  the offer, each per~on  being informed 
in detail at an  individual interview with the 
placement and advice centre (see below) of  the 
various training opportunities and their con-
tent,  location,  nature  and  teaching methods, 
prospects  (employment},  but  also  about  the 
other conditions, for example in the event of  a 
move proving necessary, etc. 
If  the employer receives no notification of  a 
decision within the 30-day time limit, this will 
be regarded as an infringement of the contract 
of employment.  In order to  avoid dismissaL 
this infringement is  officially registered only 
after  the  issue  of an  invitation  to  attend  a 
further  interview  in  the  presence  of a  third 
party (who may or may not be a union repre-
sentative). 
If an employee decides to avail himself of 
the offer oftraining leave, he will receive on the 
day on which his contract of  employment ends 
a compensatory amount corresponding to  his 
earnings in the context of  a 12-month period of 
CFC training leave: the maximum entitlement 
is equivalent to 10.92 monthly salaries prior to 
the entry into effect of the CFC.  This corre-
sponds to about 70 per cent ofthe gross income. 
Social security contributions are deducted. The 
above clause in respect of  employees aged over 
45 years finds application. This capitalization 
option is  without prejudice to entitlement to 
other settlements or premiums. 
Even if he accepts this capitalization op-
tion, the employee can still take advantage of 
the advice and support facilities available un-
der the  CGPS  implementation  structure,  for 
instance in order to familiarize himself  with in-
service training options or employment oppor-
tunities. 
Reemployment 
On the other hand,  anyone who opts for the 
training phase will be offered, as a general rule 
before  or during  the  course,  two  vacancies 
which correspond to his qualifications on com-
pletion of  the training. One of  these should be 
in the same region, and thus within reasonable 
travelling distance of  home. The new job must 
be permanent and in a  stable company.  The 
employee concerned will have the opportunity, 
if he wishes, to inspect the new workplace. 
If  the company fails to honour this obliga-
tion to offer two vacancies, the employee re-
mains employed by the company. 
Only when all these conditions have been 
met, and if  the employee has not accepted any 
of the options offered, is the company free to 
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For the purposes of  implementing the contract, 
an  office  must be  set  up  in  each  works  or 
undertaking,  depending on  its  size,  with re-
sponsibility for liaising with the other depart-
ments concerned (personnel department, Joint 
Committee;  see below) on the detailed plan-
ning, preparation and implementation of  train-
ing and placement in alternative employment, 
a~d on the provision of support for those on 
''training leave". Its brief is as follows: 
•  Preparation of figures  on  the  probable 
number of employees on "training leave" 
and the expected employment opportuni-
ties; 
•  Gathering  of information  on  training  as 
needed for placement purposes; 
•  Identification of  the most important growth 
sectors  in  the  region,  and  stipulation  of 
training  requirements; 
•  Conducting individual interviews with each 
employee, both initially and at a later stage, 
and, at the latest if  no concrete prospect of 
placement has emerged after two thirds of 
the programme is over; 
•  Constant monitoring of opportunities for 
employment in the region, as well as oppor-
tunities  for  providing additional employ-
ment,  for instance by expanding existing 
businesses or through the relocation of  new 
companies; 
•  Individual support measures during train-
ing, in particular for employees whose ex-
isting qualifications are  considered diffi-
cult to place, or whose placement appears 
difficult in spite of  their qualifications; 
•  Utilization or development of  the most ap-
propriate methods of teaching and learn-
ing; 
Monitoring of all employment opportuni-
ties, in particular in the area; 
Circulation of  job vacancies. 
•  Information for employees on all questions  • 
of interest to them concerning the conver-
sion process, in particular job opportuni- • 
ties, qualification options and certificates, 
The placement and advice office (see exam-
ple on p.  6) reports directly to the Joint Com-
mittee  for  the  monitoring of the  agreement, 
which  is  made  up  of repr~sentatives of the 
union, the employers' association and the re-
gional Labour Market Administration. 
etc.; 
•  Development of  a training support mecha-
nism and of means of evaluating progress 
made; 
•  Compilation of personal profiles,  on  the 
basis of  an individual interview, to provide 
an indication of  the employee's capabilities 
and wishes; 
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Joint  Committee 
Unimetal 
Further  training 
and retraining 
Unimetal 
Services 
Social services 
and workshops 
Organization of  Job  Job  Manage- Social services 
further training  search  search  ment  and 
and retraining  exter- inter- ofCFC  workshops 
measures  nal 
terminate the contract of employment subject 
to observing the agreed periods of  notice. 
Further training and retraining 
The training should take place, wherever pos-
sible, at the proposed new workplace, or at least 
in the new area of  work. Should this not prove 
possible, then the in-service training should be 
as varied as possible. It  must become more job-
oriented as soon as a job is in prospect. 
Periods of practical experience should be 
provided as a fixed element of  training, in order 
nal  finances 
to facilitate rapid and painless integration into 
the new job. 
Status and security 
The employee remains employed by the com-
pany during the "training leave". His contract 
of  employment remains in force, the only dif-
ference being that he is not required to do his 
work, but simply to follow the course. French 
employment legislation (the Code du  Travai[) 
provides for a "situation of  partial unemploy-
ment"  (situation  de  privation  partielle 
d'emploi). 
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The employee receives a payment equiva-
lent to  70  per cent of his  gross  income, less 
contributions  to  unemployment  and  pension 
insurance funds. All insurances (accident and 
sickness insurance) remain in force. The peri-
od of  training is credited in full to the anticipat-
ed pension entitlement. The employee's holi-
day entitlement also continues. Also retained 
in  full  are  the  active  and  passive  in-house 
voting rights. 
In the  event of the  new job providing an 
income ofless than 90 per cent of  the previous 
income,  a  bonus  of 20  000  francs  will  be 
payable. 
Employees who, in the course of the first 
year of  their reemployment in another compa-
ny, once more lose their job for no fault oftheir 
own are entitled to be offered new employment 
opportunities  and  to  take  advantage  of the 
other services provided by the CFC placement 
and advice office. 
The Joint Committee 
Committees (as a general rule tripartite) were 
set up at regional level, and to some extent also 
at company and group level, to provide backup 
for the application of  the CGPS in general and 
the  CFC  in  particular.  They  were  made  up 
equally of representatives of the  contracting 
parties (unions, employers' associations) and, 
at regional level, representatives of  the Labour 
Market Administration. Of particular interest 
is the regional committee, because coordina-
tion at regional level is  frequently neglected. 
The task of the Joint Committee at regional 
level was: 
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•  to ensure transparency of  information at all 
levels; 
•  to draw up and monitor a uniform regional 
strategy for the  application of the agree-
ment; 
•  to place job cuts and the related support 
measures  in  a  more  detailed  context  of 
reindustrialization  and reemployment  in 
the region. 
Reindustrialization 
As  in the coal mining industry, the national-
ized French steel industry has also set out to 
create new jobs to compensate for the massive 
redundancies in the areas dominated by it.  In 
1982-83, "industrialization companies for the 
steel industry" (Socil?tes d 'Industrialisation de 
Ia Siderurgie, SOD IS) were established. Under 
the  overall  financial  and  organizational  re-
sponsibility ofthe Board ofUSINO  R SACILO R, 
but enjoying a high degree of autonomy, they 
take on responsibilities for the promotion of 
business  and  employment  in  the  area,  in 
conjunction with the local chambers of trade 
and industry: 
•  developing local industrialization projects; 
•  collection  and supply of information  in 
respect of  companies prepared to relocate; 
•  attracting interested companies to the re-
gion; 
•  creating  optimum conditions  to  promote 
employment for ex-steelworkers; 
•  provision of support and help  for  young 
companies and new businesses which have 
received start-up help, by providing access 
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to management skills  or the  appropriate 
training; 
•  organizing financial support for new busi-
ness start-ups. 
In addition, the Board of the steel group runs 
major projects at places outside the regions, but 
in their vicinity. 
According to  details supplied by the four 
regional SOD  IS, around 26 800 new jobs were 
created through their activities  in the  period 
from  1983 to  1989. 
Persons setting up new businesses 
Special emphasis was given for a time to sup-
port for ex-steelworkers setting up new busi-
nesses or taking over existing businesses. Be-
cause of the money available under the CFC 
alternative scheme, though, the following pre-
Notes 
cautions were incorporated to head off exces-
sively risky ventures (see the graph on page 4): 
•  a course on the fundamentals of business 
administration and company management; 
•  warnings against embarking on financial 
adventures; 
•  check on contractually agreed securities, 
for example in conjunction with sub-con-
tracts or contracts with sales and marketing 
companies; 
•  establishment of an advice centre for per-
sons setting up new businesses; 
•  ~elp in obtaining back-up funding; 
•  h~  in obtaining suitable premises or  build-
ings. 
A total of  1 523 businesses were established or 
taken over in the period 1983-89. 
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Social plan 
A social plan is the sum of all arrangements 
which must be agreed in writing and imple-
mented between an employer and a Works 
Council, in order to minimise the economic 
effects on the workforce of  a major change in 
the business. 
Social plans play a central role in German 
industrial relations.  Because a social plan is 
required by law  only in those  companies or 
works with a regularly elected Works Council, 
such  plans  are  a  very  important  reason  for 
electing a Works Council. The Works Council 
is a body that is elected directly and by secret 
ballot by all  the employees of a company to 
represent  their  interests.  In  company  crises, 
social  plans  are  the  essential  instrument for 
protecting employees from harm. The "Social 
Plan" dates as a legal institution in its present 
form from the amendment of the Betriebsver-
fassungsgesetz,  BetrVG (Works Constitution 
Act) in 1972. 
According  to  §  111  of the  BetrVG,  the 
employer is required to notify the Works Coun-
cil, in good time and in detail, of any planned 
changes in the business which will have major 
economic repercussions for a significant pro-
portion of  the workforce. 
Changes in the business include the reduc-
tion in size and closure or transfer of  plants or 
major  parts,  including  mergers  with  other 
plants; they also include fundamental changes 
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in  the  organization  of the  business  or  the 
introduction of totally new working methods 
and production processes. 
Notification oft  he Works Council in good 
time means that the Works Council must be 
given an opportunity to form an opinion within 
a  reasonable  period  and  to  submit  counter-
proposals or alternatives. For this purpose, it 
may  consult  experts  (including  external  ex-
perts)  at  the  expense  of the  company.  This 
entitlement can be claimed before an industrial 
tribunal and a ruling given in  chambers. 
Notification in detail means that the em-
ployer must disclose details of the economic 
reasons and objectives of  the planned changes 
and the social and personal consequences asso-
ciated with them,  and that he  must make all 
necessary documents available (i.e. hand them 
out). The risk to company or business secrets is 
not accepted as a reason for withholding such 
information from the W  ork.s  Council. 
In the event of  a change in the business, the 
parties to the ''industrial constitution" (manage-
ment and Works Council) can reach an accom-
modation of conflicting interests in respect of 
the purely economic modalities ofthis change in 
the business and can,  in  addition, formulate a 
social plan in respect of the "reconciliation or 
reduction of  the economic repercussions for the 
employees resultingfimn a planned change in 
the business"(§ 112). Where these agreements 
cannot be reached voluntarily, a decision will be 
taken by the conciliation board, a joint body with 
an impartial chairman, at  which the employer 
and the Works Council must reach agreement, 
failing which the matter will be decided by an 
industrial tribunal. The social plan has the status 
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of  a plant-level agreement, i.e. it is immediate-
ly binding and mandatory. 
These provisions of  the German Works Con-
stitution Act in its version of 1972 were at least 
inspired by, if  not derived directly from, a policy 
already well established in the mining and steel 
industry, which was initially applied and further 
developed in the coal mining sector (from 1956) 
and subsequently (from 1962) in the steel indus-
try.  A  standard set of social planning instru-
ments was developed on the basis ofthis practice 
in the German coal and steel industries. 
A typical mix of  measures in a social plan 
for the steel industry, and another for the coal 
industry,  are  presented below,  together with 
examples. 
A social plan for the 
steel industry 
Early retirement is  the focal  point of current 
social  plan practice,  which  is  why  it  is  de-
scribed here in greater detail.  Granting early 
retirement is an alternative to dismissing work-
ers affected by changes in  the  company and 
awarding  them  compensatory  payments  for 
any resulting disadvantages. It is open to em-
ployees in a certain age group, irrespective of 
whether they are directly affected by the change. 
Another difference is the replacement princi-
ple, whereby (see  the  box on page  7)  older 
workers leave so as to increase the chances for 
the employment of younger people. They re-
ceive  compensatory payments aimed at pre-
serving their standard ofliving and at avoiding 
unreasonable  hardship. 
Social plan 
What does a social plan cover? 
1. Transfers 
- within the company 
- to another site 
- in another company 
- wage guarantees and training 
2. Dismissal/termination of  contract of  employ-
ment 
- severance payments/compensations 
- leave of  absence 
- other benefits (e.g. anniversary payments, 
works pension) 
3. Retraining 
4. Early retirement 
- compensatory payments until commence 
ment of  the pension 
- compensatory  payment for  pension  re 
ductions 
- holidays and other entitlements 
5. Right to live in tied housing 
When it was first used in 1963, early retire-
ment was applied to those aged over 63 years. 
The age limit was then reduced progressively 
to the level of  55 years in the steel industry and 
50  years  in  the  mining  industry  (as  applied 
during the crisis in the 80s). 
A  social  plan  normally  also  features  ar-
rangements  intended  to  avoid the  erosion  of 
living standards and economic hardship (at least 
for a limited period) and to open up new oppor-
tunities on the internal or external employment 
market. These are applied in the event of  trans-
fers within the company or to other sites and to 
other companies, in the case of  dismissal, or in 
the  case  of retraining  for  another activity.  A 
Manual Social Crisis Management Social plan 
number of  these measures are supported by the 
companies  with  funding  provided  under  the 
ECSC Treaty (as a rule 50%), which the employ-
ees entitled to receive the benefit take with them 
to the new company. The other half  is met by the 
state (Federal Government) and the company. 
Arrangements for early 
retirement 
Early  retirement  and  its  various  forms  are 
dependent on the  social policy framework of 
the Federal Republic of  Germany, in particular 
the statutory pensions insurance fund (GRV), 
unemployment insurance and the Works Con-
stitution  Act.  These  regulations  are  supple-
mented by the directives of the Treaty on the 
European Coal and Steel Community. 
In the interests of clarity, the social policy 
framework in the Federal Republic of  Germany 
and the directives of  the ECSC Treaty are first 
outlined below, and are then explained in rela-
tion to four typical cases. 
Social policy framework in the 
Federal Republic of Germany 
The social policy framework in the FRG con-
sists largely of  the statutory pensions insurance 
fund, theArbeitsforderungsgesetz (Labour Pro-
motion Law) and the Works Constitution Act. 
The arrangements in question (as they are valid 
in  1991)  are outlined only roughly here, be-
cause  they  have  been constantly updated in 
recent years, and because the scope available 
for regulation was thus different in the past. 
1. Statutory pensions insurance fund (GRV) 
The  beneficiary  receives  from  the  statutory 
pensions  insurance  fund  (GRV)  an  old-age 
pension (retirement pension), the level of  which 
is  in principle dependent on personal factors 
(number of  years worked and additional years 
credited, and level of income) and on general 
factors (annual increase on the basis of  federal 
legislation). 
According to the provisions of the  Social 
Security  Code  (So:::ialgesetzbuch,  SGB),  the 
following are the age limits for claiming: 
la. 65 years  for the statutory old-age pen-
sion (§35 SGB VI). This is subject to satisfying 
the general qualifying period (§50 I SGB VI). 
The qualifying period of  five years (§34 I SGB 
VI) is the stipulated minimum insurance peri-
od in each case. 
1  b. 63 years  for the early old-age pension 
for the long-term insured (§36 SGB VI). The 
qualifying period in this case is 35 years. (This 
old-age pension is less than 1  a, because of  the 
missing two years of  service). 
lc. 60 years for the severely handicapped 
and those who are incapable of  working in an 
occupation or profession (§37 SGB VI). The 
qualifying period is 35  years. Registration as 
severely handicapped or incapable of  working 
in an occupation or profession is necessary. 
ld. 60 years for the  old-age pension for 
women (§39 SGB VI). The qualification period 
in this case is 15  years or, after reaching the 
40th birthday, more than l 0 years' compulsory 
insurance contributions. 
le. 60  years for the  old-age pension on 
grounds of  unemployment (§38 SGB VI). The 
Manual Social Crisis Management 
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Examples 
•  •  •  • 
Typical individual examples on the basis of  the statutory regulations  • 
•  (GVR), the Labour Promotion Law (AFG) and the Works Constitu- • 
ion Act (BetrVG) and the ECSC directives, §13 Severance a;nd §14  • 
Transitional  Aid are  (no  account  is  taken of changes  in  income  : 
brought about by collective agreements or statutory regulatiqns):  • 
•  Example 1:  • 
•  Retirement at the age of 65 for men  • 
The employee is employed in the company up to the age of 65 and  •  •  then receives his old-age pension via the GRV (statutory pensions  • 
insurance fund).  • 
• 
Example 2: 
Early retirement at the age of 63 
•  •  •  •  The employee is employed in the company up to the age of 63  and  • 
then receives his old-age pension via the GR  V (statutory pensions  • 
insurance fund).  : 
Example 3: 
Early retirement at the age of 59 for men 
•  •  •  •  The company serves notice on the employee at the end of his 59th  • 
year. The employee cannot be placed in a new job, and he receives  •  •  unemployment benefit (ALG) for a period of  one year. Then, from his  • 
60th birthday, he receives unemployment benefit via the GRV. For  •  •  the first year, i.e. the period of  unemployment, the following monthly  • 
payments are made (in DM) to provide an income guaranteed by the  •  •  social plan (in the example: DM 2 170.63) at an assumed 90 per cent  • 
of  the net income:  • 
•  • 
Month  ALG  MUV  Compensatory  Guaranteed  • 
payments by  income  •  • 
the company  •  • 
1-12  1479.40  0  691.23  2.170.63  •  •  •  •  • 
Social plan 
conditions here are unemployment for 52 weeks 
within the last 1.5 years prior to drawing the 
pension and 8 years' contributions out of  the 10 
years preceding the pension, and a qualifying 
period of 15 years  . 
1  f.  60  years for  the  old-age pension for 
miners employed underground (§40 SGB VI). 
The qualifying period in this case is 25 years. 
2. Unemployment insurance in accordance 
with the Labour Promotion Law (AFG) 
The level of  unemployment benefit (ALG) is up 
to 63 per cent of  the previous net income ( 11  I 
No.  12,  1 AFG),  or 68  per cent if there are 
children living at home who are maintained by 
the beneficiary, for  a maximum period of 32 
months. Thereafter, the unemployment benefit 
is paid at a rate of  up to 53 per cent (58% where 
there are dependent children), although this is 
means-tested in addition  . 
The period for which full unemployment 
benefit is paid is graduated as follows, depend-
mg on age: 
up to 42 years: max. 12 months; 
above 42  years: max.  18  months (in em-
ployment for 36 months in the last 7 years); 
above 44  years: max. 22 months (in em-
ployment for 44 months in the last 7 years); 
above 49 years: max. 26 months (in em-
ployment for 52 months in the last 7 years); 
above 54 years: max. 32  months (in em-
ployment for 64 months in the last 7 years); 
Regulation 1  e was applied to the steel in-
dustry as  the basis for  early retirement.  This 
required the person concerned to remain un-
Manual Social Crisis Management Social plan 
employed, and was thus a  tacit arrangement 
with  the  employment office to  dispense  with 
attempts at placement for this group of  people. 
3. Works Constitution Act (BetrVG) 
In  addition  to  the  security  provided  for  the 
individual  through  the  pensions  and  unem-
ployment insurance funds, the German Works 
Constitution Act (BetrVG § 112) also provides 
for an accommodation of conflicting interests 
to  be reached in  the event of changes in the 
company with considerable repercussions for 
the employees, for instance in the case of  mass 
redundancies. If no agreement can be reached 
voluntarily between the employer and the Works 
Council,§ 112 BetrVGregulatespoliticalagree-
ment  between  the  two  sides  with  regard to 
social security in the event of  a planned change 
in the business under the "social plan". Under 
the  social  plan,  arrangements  to  cushion the 
consequences of a planned change in the busi-
ness are agreed. It can serve as  the basis for 
individual claims on the company by employ-
ees. 
In addition to  dealing with questions con-
cerning transfers, terminations with severance 
pay and training measures, a social plan can 
also address the "early pension" option.  The 
aim here is to regulate compensatory payments 
in  addition  to  the  general  statutory  entitle-
ments such as unemployment benefit. In addi-
tion to regular payments to top up the unem-
ployment support, compensatory payments can 
often be agreed in respect of  unpaid contribu-
tions, such as to the health insurance, pension 
insurance and accident insurance funds.  The 
level  of the  compensatory  payments  is  the 
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:  Early retirement at the age of 55 for men 
•  The company serves notice on the employee at the end of his 55th 
:  year. The employee is unemployed for five years and is not placed in 
•  a new job.  He  receives  full  unemployment benefit (ALG)  for  a 
:  maximum  period  of 32  months,  followed  by  the  lower  rate  of 
•  unemployment benefit. Then, from the age of  60, he receives an old-
:  age pension via the GR  V. The period of  unemployment is as follows, 
•  for the same data as in Example 3, and with supplementary payments 
:  in accordance with§ 13 VII MUV-RL (severance pay, payable as a 
•  lump sum following dismissal for the period of 12 months) as a one-
:  off  payment ofDM 6000 in the first year (payment is extended over 
•  4 months in the example), and in accordance with § 14  MUV-RL 
•  amounting to 50 per cent of the payments by the company in the  •  •  following years: 
•  •  •  • 
•  Month  ALG  MUV 
•  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
1~
1  year 
1  1479.40  4167.23 
2  1479.40  691.33 
3  1479.40  691.33 
4  1479.40  450.31 
5-12  1479.40  0 
2nd year 
1-6  1479.40  0 
6-12  1350.60  427.52 
3rd-Sth year 
1-12  1350.60  427.52 
Compensatory 
payments by 
the company 
0 
0 
0 
240.92 
691.23 
691.23 
427.52 
427.52 
Guaranteed 
income 
5646.63 
2170.63 
2170.63 
2170.63 
2170.63 
2170.63 
2170.63 
2170.63 
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result of  political settlements between the em-
ployer and the Works Council. They havefixed 
targets, such as about 85 per cent of  the last net 
annual wage, 90 per cent of  the last net month-
tv wage, or are set out in tables which vary the 
~mounts according to the length of  service or 
the level of  earnings. 
Notes 
Beispiel5: 
Saar Steel Foundation 
(Stahlstiftung Saar) 
Social plan 
The  Saar Steel Foundation is  a special case, 
because it is more detailed than normal social 
plans. Although it serves as  an  example of a 
social plan, it is nevertheless presented sepa-
rately (see £14). 
Manual Social Crisis Management Social plan 
A social plan in the coal 
mining industry 
Social plans in the German coal mining sector 
differ in  a number of respects  from  those in 
steel or in other sectors. This concerns not only 
the specific mix of  measures, but also has to do 
with a series of special conditions, for which 
equivalents exist to some degree in other coun-
tries. 
•  On  the  one  hand,  colliery  closures  have 
been managed in a socially acceptable man-
ner for almost 40 years now, resulting in a 
major fund of experience. 
•  In  addition,  codetermination  in  the  coal 
and steel industry in conjunction with the 
practical application of the Works Consti-
tution Act (seep. if  and 5.f) has created a 
special climate  for  crisis management by 
consensus. 
•  Finally, the pension and health insurance 
conditions in the mining sector differ from 
those in other sectors. 
Instruments of  crisis 
management 
Summary of  instruments 
In addition to the "replacement arrangement" 
(whereby older employees make way for their 
younger counterparts), it is above all else the 
comprehensive  financial  aid  offered  to  em-
ployees which makes  the  process  of change 
socially acceptable and largely avoids social 
Manual Social Crisis Management 
The replacement principle 
The "replacement principle" is  an im-
portant factor for the practical imple-
mentation of  the adjustment  programmes 
in the  German  coal mining industry. Old-
er  workers are able, from the age of  50, to, 
claim an adjustment allowance enabling 
them to take early retirement, so  as to 
bridge the  period until  they  meet the 
conditions entitling them to receive the 
compensatory  payment (KAL)  and to 
allow a younger colleague to remain in 
the mining industry. Only by resorting to 
this principle is  it possible to recruit a 
strictly  limited number of new  young 
people to the workforce each year. It is 
becoming increasingly difficult to find 
older miners to take early retirement, 
however, since the average age of those 
employed underground is  already less 
than  34 years. The  replacement principle 
was also extended by agreement to the 
brown coal (lignite) mining industry. 
hardship. The most important financial instru-
ments in this respect are adjustment assistance 
and themineworkers' compensatory payment. 
In  addition to  this  range of instruments, the 
process  of socially  acceptable  crisis manage-
ment in the German coal mining industry was 
backed by: 
•  individual company strategies for  new  busi-
ness starts and the retention of  jobs; 
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Strategies and instruments 
for crisis management 
in the German coal mining industry 
Steady reduction in output and 
in numbers employed 
Economic 
instruments 
•  Establishment  of 
consolidated pits 
(see f3) 
• Strategies  for  re-
taining and creat-
ing  jobs  through 
new business starts 
and diversification 
(see f3) 
• Cooperation  be-
tween pit  and min-
ing companies 
Social 
instruments 
• Application ofthe
11re-
placementprinciple11 
• Transfers to  other pits 
•Financial assistance 
for redundant  mine-
workers 
• Training programmes 
• Social  assistance  for 
those  affected,  in 
particular the reten-
tion/procurement of 
housing 
Codetermination in the coal and steel industry and 
the Works Constitution Act as the bases for 
consensus-oriented crisis management 
•  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  ......  ~~--....  ~  ..  ~  ....  --~~--....  ~  ..... · 
Social plan 
•  broader cooperation strategies, such as be-
tweenRheinbraun and  theEsclzweiler Berg-
werks-Verein (EBV); 
•  training programmes and measures for the 
placement of  employees in other sectors; 
•  comprehensive company support services 
on housing  . 
An example of  the practical and successful 
application of  such a package of  strategies and 
measures is the Aachen Model (seep. 14 and 
£3. Rulzrkohle AG) under the management of 
the  Eschweiler Bergwerks-Verein.  Important 
accompanying framework  conditions are  the 
long periods (almost four decades)  available 
for managing the crisis, and the cooperation of 
all major players in the context of  a "concerted 
action" for crisis management. Joint codeter-
mination was a fundamental condition for this . 
Financial measures 
Article  56  of the  Treaty establishing  the 
European Coal and Steel Community (see 
A2),dating from 1958, is an important basis for 
financial aid. The Treaty initially provided for 
aid to  made available  to  redundant or trans-
ferred employees in the form oftideover allow-
ances, resettlement allowances, temporary lay-
off allowances,  assistance  with  removal  ex-
penses and the refunding of  travel costs only in 
conjunction with  closure  and partial  closure 
measures. This was subsequently extended to 
instances of rationalization. 
One  important  innovation  for  the  older 
employees, who are difficult to  place on the 
employment market, was the  introduction of 
the miners' compensatorypayment(KAL) in 
Manual Social Crisis Management Social plan 
1963 through §98a of  the Reichsknappschafts-
gesetz  (National  Miners'  Act).  The  KAL  is 
purely a special payment for underground work-
ers with many years' service. Where the appro-
priate  conditions  exist,  miners  are  able,  on 
completing the period of entitlement for their 
miners' pension, to draw the KAL (for a max-
imum period of 60  months).  The  KAL  thus 
bridges the period up to the start of  payment of 
benefits  from  the  miners'  pension  insurance 
fund.  It thus corresponds closely to an "early 
pension", although it is not defined as  a pen-
sion. More than 21  000 miners were receiving 
such payments in  the  mid-80s,  although the 
numbers receiving KAL have fallen year by 
year since then. 
Finally, a further important instrument is 
the  severance pay directives dating from 1967, 
under which younger employees also receive 
severance  pay from  the  public  purse  in  the 
event of  redundancy due to closure. 
The  adjustment allowance  scheme  was 
introduced in 1972 on the basis of the Treaty 
establishing the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity with,  in  combination with the  KAL, 
extremely wide-ranging social security for old-
er employees in the event of  job losses due to 
rationalization. Where the conditions are met, 
underground workers reaching the age of 50, 
and surface workers reaching the age of  55, are 
entitled to  receive  this  pension-like  benefit. 
The adjustment allowance continues to be paid 
for as long as the entitlement either to the KAL 
or to the miners' pension remains in force. The 
Federal Office for Economic Affairs is respon-
sible for the payment of  adjustment allowance 
benefits. 
Manual Social Crisis Management 
These benefits are supplemented by consid-
erably improved support payments by com-
panies  embodied  in  the  social  plan,  which 
provide  inter alia  for  the  topping-up  of the 
adjustment allowance. Even after two decades, 
the adjustment allowance in conjunction with 
the KAL or the old-age pension is still the most 
important form of rationalization benefit and, 
as  such,  is  the most effective instrument for 
crisis management in the German coal mining 
sector. Tideover allowances, on the other hand, 
have declined in significance over the years. 
Social aid 
Natural turnover resulting from voluntary resig-
nations  is  a  particularly  important  factor  for 
workforce reductions in the coal mining industry. 
Because ofthe precarious situation, many miners 
leave the pits at their own risk, as a general rule 
with  severance pay.  Because of the very good 
training in the  mining sector and the  training 
programmes aimed specifically at the regional 
employment market,  skilled workers from  the 
coal  mining  industry  represent  an  interesting 
source of  labour for other sectors. For example, 
the builders' association in North Rhine-West-
phalia is prepared to engage around 2 500 new 
workers each year, with preference being given to 
ex-mineworkers. There are also likely to be mod-
els  whereby  employees  from  the  coal  mining 
industry  who  take  advantage  of the  offers  of 
employment by the building industry are "sup-
ported" in their new jobs. Ruhrkohle AG and the 
Industriegewerkschaft  Bergbau  und  Energie 
(IGBE)(miningandenergyindustryunion)make 
a particular point of  the need for wage adjustment 
during the period of retraining. 
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Social plan 
Pit-level agreement on the "Minister Stein" social plan 
With  a  view  to  the  socially  acceptable 
closure of"Minister Stein", a social plan to 
take effect on 31.5.1986 was agreed be-
tweenRuhrkohle AG and the Works Coun-
cil at Minister Stein and the overall works 
council  of Bergbau AG  Westfalen.  The 
benefits stipulated therein include adjust-
ment allowances provided by the Federal 
Government and the Commission of the 
European Communities, as well as compa-
ny  benefits  and  other  measures.  Mine-
workers were granted: 
l.Adjustment allowances from the pu-
blic purse 
•  allowances to safeguard the livelihood: 
wage subsidy on reemployment. tideo-
ver/transitional allowance in the event 
of  unemployment; 
•  allowances for those taking up external 
employment in the form of travel cost 
refunds (for a maximum of one year), 
reimbursement of  removal costs and help 
with furniture and fittings costs, as well 
as severance pay and refunds of visits 
home to the family; 
•  a one-off  payment ofDM 2 000 or DM 4 
000,  depending  on  circumstances,  in 
place of  a wage subsidy or tideover allo-
wance; and 
•  a one-off domestic fuel payment of  DM 
240(DM 120forminerswithoutahouse-
hold of  their own). 
2. Company benefits for transferred em-
ployees 
•  company wage  subsidies and removal 
allowance~ 
•  an "introductory shift" on full pay; 
•  reimbursement of  travel costs and rem-
oval costs, and a furniture and fittings 
allowance; 
• rent allowance. 
3.Company benefits  for  redundant 
workers 
•  wage  subsidies  or supplements  to  the 
tideover allowance; 
•  a company settlement of  not more than 2.5 
monthly  gross  salaries  and  a  minimum 
payment ofDM 3 000 (for more than 20 
years' service in the coal mining industry); 
•  the right of  abode in housing owned by 
the  company,  even  in  the  event of a 
change in ownership, and continued rent 
reductions for a period of  three years; 
•  domestic fuel at a reduced price; 
•  the granting or payment in lieu of  holi-
daywithpay,collectivelyagreedholiday 
allowances, Christmas bonus and other 
payments. 
The individual benefits under the  social 
plan are partly set off  against one another. 
The accounting models correspond to so-
cial  plan practice in the steel industry (see 
E13, pp. 4+5). 
Manual Social Crisis Management Social plan 
A further social aid takes the form of  secu-
rity of  tenure offered to those miners who live 
in one of the many apartments owned by the 
company (see examples of  "crisis careers''). 
Examples 
Max Dressler 
Born  1931,  married,  with  one  daughter.  A 
trained fitter,  he started work in  1952 at the 
"Tremonia"  coking plant operated by  the 
Gelsenkirchener Bergwerk AG. He was trans-
ferred to the  "Minister Stein" coking plant in 
1953.  Following  a  successful  course  at  the 
Technical Evening School, he was appointed to 
the salaried staff He was promoted to second 
foreman in 1961, and to first foreman in  1963 
at the coking plant. He left on 31.10.1987 as a 
part of the  closure  of the  "Minister  Stein " 
coking plant, under the provisions of  the social 
plan.  His  last monthly salary (including pro 
rata holiday pay  and  Christmas bonus) amount-
ed to a gross DM 6 750 (net: DM 4 010). 
Dressler receives an  adjustment allow-
ance of  DM 3 267 net,  which is adjusted each 
year on 1 July to take account of  the general 
increase in pensions. Responsibility for contri-
butions to the health insurance  fund and higher 
pensions insurance for salaried staff  lies with 
the Federal Office for Economic Affairs. When 
he left, he received a tax-free payment of  around 
DM 13 330 and a bonus of  around DM 8 800 
(for 40 years' service). Since his 60th birthday, 
he has received an old-age pension of  DM 4 
079 gross; this leaves him with a net amount of 
Manual Social Crisis Management 
Example 1: 
"Minister Stein" Mine 
The closure of  the renowned "Minister Stein" 
mine in 1987 not only marked the end of 112 
years' production, but also the end of more 
than  700  years  of mining  in  the  city  of 
Dortmund. The "Minister Stein" and "Furst 
Harden  berg" mines had already been merged 
Alois Markscheider 
Born 1939, started work in 1960 as a brick-
layer at the "Han sa"  pit. In order to improve 
his earning potential,  he trained as  a face 
worker. passing his face worker examination 
in  1966. Following the closure of "Hansa ", 
he remained employed there  on  a project, 
and was transferred in 1980 to the "Minister 
Stein " mine.  He  worked here as an  under-
ground instructor.  He  received a  transfer 
payment ofDM  4 500 and was entitled to use 
the free works bus for travelling to and  from 
work.  When  the  underground  training at 
"Minister Stein" was discontinued, Marksc-
heider was transferred to the  "Haus Aden " 
pit as an instructor, and received a monthly 
travel allowance of DM 150  (although  no 
further transfer payment was made). 
In  1989, he left at the age of  50,  when 
his final gross wage was around DM 3 800. 
In  addition  to the adjustment allowance of 
DM  2 100 net and a company supplementary 
payment of  DM 380, he also received a one-
of!  tax-free payment ofDM  9 250. On reach-
ing the age of  55, the adjustment allowance is 
replaced by the miner's compensatory pen-
sion (KAL). From the age of60, he is entitled 
to draw a regular miner's pension. 
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in 1960 as a part of the regional adaptation 
measures. Total production from the "Minis-
ter Stein/Fiirst Harden  berg" combine between 
re-commissioning after the war until its clo-
sure  was approximately 94 million tonnes. 
The total workforce of  the combined pit was 
3765 in 1985. Finally, at the end of 1987, 331 
persons were  still  employed there,  though 
exclusively in the "Environmental Engineer-
ing" division. 
As early as the late 1960s, "Minister Stein" 
was developing into one of  the least profitable 
pits operated by RAG.  Profitability calcula-
tions in early 1986 ultimately led to its clo-
sure. The run-down of production then took 
place on a phased basis. The central element 
of  the negotiations was the agreement to draw 
up a social plan (see chart next page). 
The two examples (the names are ficti-
tious) illustrate the effect of the social plan 
on the people concerned (seep. 11). 
Example2: 
"Consolidation/N  ordstern" 
consolidated mine 
The "Consolidation/Nordstem" mine is situat-
ed in the municipal area of Gelsenkirchen in 
the north-west of  the Ruhr region. The number 
of persons employed there at the end of 1990 
was 4 268 (of whom 434 junior staff in train-
ing), who achieved an average daily produc-
tion volume of  almost 9 800 tonnes. A decision 
was  taken  by the  supervisory  board  in  the 
middle of 1988 to merge the "Consolidation" 
and "Nordstem" pits into a single combined 
mine,  the  intention  being  to  reduce  annual 
Social plan 
production to around two thirds of the initial 
production volume. A further merger between 
the "Consolidation" pit and the "Hugo" pit is 
envisaged. 
The  primary aim of crisis  management 
was and is to avoid conflicts between compa-
nies and their workforce, such as arose prior to 
the closure of  the "Zollverein" mine. The Works 
Council was included in the planning from the 
start  for  this  reason.  The job reduction  pro-
gramme also involved weekly discussions with 
the  employees' representatives. The new ad-
justment concept provides for employees to be 
given early retirement first, and only then for 
transfers to be made or offered. 
The idea is to keep the number of  transfers 
as low as possible, since the burdens associated 
with a transfer (loss of  social environment and 
greater distances to the place of work) bring 
with them a large number of additional prob-
lems,  e.g.  an  increase  in  sickness  rates.  All 
merger plans  are  coordinated in  a "neutral" 
committee, made up of  the personnel direc-
tors, the chairman ofthe Works Council and 
his deputy, and the establishment officers of 
the "Consol" and "Hugo" mines. 
Continuous and transparent  information 
and personnel policies have emerged as  im-
portant  factors  in  successful  crisis  manage-
ment in conjunction with the  creation of the 
"Consolidation/Nordstem" pit, as have wide-
ranging aid measures in connection with the 
search for and provision of  housing. 
Nevertheless, there are still a few  serious 
problems: 
•  The  entire  management team  is  too  old, 
with  the  result  that  exceptions  must  be 
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DM 2 400 net and a company supplement of 
Karl-Heinz Schneider  DM 198 until his 55th birthday.  The  adjust-
ment years  in  this  case  count towards  his 
50,  married, with two children. A face worker,  pension  contributions;  contributions  to  the 
his last net earnings (incentive pay for piece- health insurance fund are paid by the Federal 
work) at the "Zollverein" mine were DM  2 670.  Office for Economic Affairs. He also receives 
When  the  "Zollverein " mine was closed down,  severance pay amounting to  DM 27 000 after 
he was transferred to the "Nordstern "mine and  35 years' service in  the mining indust1y.  Be-
received a transfer allowance ofDM  4 500. After  cause he worked underground, he receives an 
the  closure of "Nordstern ",  he was first em- additional  special adjustment  allowance 
ployed at the  new~v created  "Consolidation/  amounting to DM 300 month(v. which, attract-
Nordstern .,  combined mine,  but subsequently  ing interest at 7 per cent,  is due for payment 
had to retire at the age of  50 in conjunction with  after the age of  55.  Upon  reaching the age of 
the fiLrther reduction in the worliforce.  55, Schneider will also receive a miners' com-
pensatorypayment ofDM 2 530 net. From the 
age of 60,  he is  entitled to  draw  a  regular 
made for management in the rules govern- miner's pension of  approximately DM 3 300. 
ing early retirement. It is important for such 
exceptions to be accepted by all sides. 
• A further problem is  substantially lower  Mehmet Ozgal 
productivity under ground as experienced  Turkish  mineworker Mehmet Ozgal is  con-
teams are broken up. The inescapable con- siderably worse off  than  his colleagues,  a!-
sequence is a decrease in daily output.  though the situation is ostensibly the same. 
Because of  his shorter period of insurance 
contributions (23.25 years), he will initially 
Notes 
receive an adjustment allowance of  only DM 
1 600,  although this will be topped-up by a 
higher company supplementar_v payment of 
DM  998. O:::gal will accordingly also receive 
a total of  DM 2 598.  He will suffer greater 
losses than his German  colleague fi'O!n  the 
age of 55,  however.  Because of his  much 
shorter period ofinsurance contributions in 
Germany, he will receive a net miners' com-
pensatory pension of only DM I  780.  On 
reaching the  age of  60 years,  he will then 
receive an old-age pension of  DM 2 200. 
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•  One particular problem associated with the 
transfer of  workers to other mines concerns 
the  high proportion of foreign workers 
(  41.8% of the  underground workforce  at 
"Consol"), and in  particular Turkish min-
ers. Transfers are often hindered by a high-
er rate of  sickness and problems relating to 
the integration of this particular group of 
employees. 
Example 3: 
The "Emil Mayrisch" mine 
The "Aachen Model" 
The closure of  the "Emil Mayrisch" mine oper-
ated by theEschweiler Bergwerks-Verein (EBV) 
was and is associated with a range of  measures 
aimed at making the process of change in the 
Aachen mining industry as socially acceptable 
as possible and at promoting business and jobs 
in the Aachen region. 
This crisis concept, which is also known as 
the "Aachen Model" (see also E3), was devel-
oped by the EBV with the  involvement and 
guidance  of "Rheinbraun"  (a  lignite  mining 
company on the Lower Rhine), the Chamber of 
Trade  and  Industry  (IHK)  and  the  Aachen 
Industrial  Development  Board,  when  it  be-
came clear that the closure of"Emil Mayrisch" 
could no longer be avoided. 
The approach  adopted for  employees  af-
fected by the closure provides for the following 
measures: 
1.  Transition to adjustment (early retirement 
from the age of 50 at the earliest); 
2.  Transfer to the "Rheinbraun" lignite min-
ing company; 
Social plan 
3.  Transfer to other pits operated by Ruhrkoh-
le AG, which has taken a majority interest 
in the EBV; 
4.  Move to  another company in the Aachen 
region, for which purpose special support is 
provided for the hiving  -off  of  business ven-
tures  under the  "Beteiligungsgesellschaft 
Aachener Region" Uoint venture company 
for the Aachen region). 
The  recruitment  of EBV  employees  by 
"Rheinbraun", i.e.  a  joint solution between 
the hard coal and brown coal sectors, is an 
important alternative to the process of  normal 
adjustment and natural wastage. Going on for 
800 employees had been recruited by "Rhein-
braun"  by  the  end  of 1992.  A  further  300 
employees have been offered employment, and 
applications for transfer by some 200 others are 
being considered at this time. 
The advantages for employees of  the "Emil 
Mayrisch" mine ofbeing employed by "Rhein-
braun", unlike a transfer to other coal mines, 
are clear: 
•  They do not have to travel as far to work. 
The daily journey to work is shorter. 
•  The need to move house can be avoided. 
Many employees can continue to  live in 
company housing. 
•  Working  conditions in  the open-cast  min-
ing sector are  better than  those  under-
ground. 
•  Earning opportunities tend to be better. 
•  The agreement with "Rheinbraun" offered 
the workforce of"  Emil Mayrisch" the  pros-
pect of  secure employment, even after the 
closure decision, so that many highly qual-
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ified employees, who might othenvise have 
left of  their own accord, were retained (by 
the middle of 1992, around 1 500 employ-
ees had resigned of  their own accord). 
The advantages of  this "joint solution" for 
"Rheinbraun" are: 
•  Inclusion ofthe  "Rheinbraun" workforce in 
the "replacement concept'',  enabling the 
average  age of  the  workforce  to be  brought 
down. 
•  Older "Rheinbraun" employees can leave 
with the entitlements to benefits agreed for 
the hard coal mining sector, to make way 
for the recruitment of younger EBV em-
ployees. 
•  The availability of  well-trained and  highly-
qualified skilled workers. One problem 
group is made up of  severely under-quali-
fied and/or severely handicapped persons, 
for whom replacement  jobs  are hard to find. 
In order to facilitate transfers of EBV em-
ployees  to  other  companies  in  the  Aachen 
region, the "Beteiligungsgesellschaji Aachen-
er Region (BGA)" (Joint Venture Company for 
the Aachen Region) (see £3) was established, 
at  present comprising around  20  companies 
from non-mining sectors. On the other hand, 
encouragement is being given to the hiving-off 
of  individual EBV functional areas. One exam-
ple of this is the "Industrietechnik" company, 
which was formed from the  former (mainte-
nance) workshops of  the "Emil Mayrisch" mine 
with around 150 employees. 
In  addition  to  these  alternatives  in  the 
Aachen region, the workforce of  "Emil Mayr-
isch" also had the  opportunity to transfer to 
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other pits operated by Ruhrkohle AG, such as 
those on the left bank of  the Lower Rhine. This 
opportunity was accepted by around 300 mem-
bers of  the workforce, who were transferred to 
the "Sophia Jacoba" mine at Hiickelhoven, and 
who will reach the age of 50 by no later than 
1997, so that they can then take adjustment. A 
further  600  miners  have  agreed  to  accept  a 
move  to  various  other pits  operated  by  the 
RAG.  Surface workers were  offered jobs in 
Dortmund, Essen and Herne. 
Success factors in crisis 
management 
The successful management of the  long-term 
and deep-rooted crisis in the German coal min-
ing industry can be attributed to the correct mix 
of  a number of  factors. A situation like this will 
never occur again, which means that the "coal 
crisis management model" can never be applied 
lock, stock and barrel to any other situation. 
Important framework conditions at com-
pany level and above - and at the same time 
central success factors - certainly include the 
following: 
•  extensive financial support for the compa-
ny and its employees; 
•  the long period available for crisis manage-
ment; 
•  the application of  the "replacement princi-
ple"; 
•  massive political pressure; 
•  the  systematic training policy pursued in 
particular by the IGBE (mining and energy 
industry union); and 
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Crisis careers 
Robert Knorz 
Born  1966,  employed underground at  the 
"Emil Mayrisch "mine since 1984 after train-
ing  as  a fitter.  Following  the  closure  an-
nouncement, he was not prepared to accept a 
transfer to  the Ruhr for private reasons.  He 
decided instead to accept an offerfi'om Rhein-
braun.  He  moved at the  end of 1990 to  the 
Tagebau Gruppe West opencast mine at Ham-
bach. and the journeyfrom home to the place 
of  work on(v increased fi·om  7 km  to :!0  km. 
Knorz  receives  company  severance pay of 
DM 3 000. He started work at Rheinbraun at 
a basic wage of  DM 2 580 gross, and contin-
ued to pay miners· pension and sickness con-
tribllfions. In  1991 he took a job as driver of 
a  large-capacity loader.  His  monthly earn-
ings increased to about DM 2 700 net, includ-
ing alternate shift-working bonuses and over-
time.  Knor::  is receiving training as a large-
capaci(v loader driver at tlze  present time. 
Once he has successfully completed his train-
ing. he will be employed as a loader driver on 
the second largest bucket wheel excavator at 
the Hambach opencast mine, when he willfall 
into Wage  Group  7.  which willfitrther boost 
his earning potential. 
Gerhard b;ensee 
Born in 1949. married with one child. He was 
employed as  a face worker until the  end of 
1983,  and then  as  a  gang foreman  at  the 
''Anna" mine. Following its closure, he  found 
employment as a gang foreman at the  ''Emil 
Mayrisch" mine.  His most recent wage on a 
Social plan 
piece-work basis was DM 3 480 gross. After 
the closure of  "Emil Mayrisch ", he was trans-
ferred  at  the  start of 1993  to  the  RAG's 
"Niederberg "mine at  Neunkirchen-Vlyn (Mo-
ers). There he was given a contract of  employ-
ment as a face gang  foreman. He is entitled to 
receive various compensatory payments un-
der the social plan: reimbursement of  daily 
travel  costs,  removal  costs.  separation  al-
lowance and trips home to be with his family. 
The benefits set out in the company part of  the 
social plan provide for the payment of  com-
pany wage subsidies. an introductory shift on 
the day ol  the transfer,  travel costs.  a furni-
ture andfittings allowance and a rent allow-
ance. 
Matthias Prosterchen 
Aged  4:!,  employed at  EB V following  an 
electrician 's  apprenticeship.  initially as an 
underground  electrician.  and  later,  c~fter 
completing a course at the mining training 
college.  as  a foreman  electrician.  He  has 
been  unable,  for  reasons  of health,  to  be 
employed on  underground  work  in  recent 
years,  and he  became  a  commercial stqff 
employee on  completion of an  administra-
tive training course. In conjunction with the 
closure of "Emil Mavrisch ",  he was offered 
a positio~ as a member of  the administrative 
stL~[f at  the  Bundesknappschaft  (Federal 
Miners' Insurance Fund) in Aachen. His last 
net salary at the EBV was around DM 3 200, 
and his starting salary at the Federal Min-
ers· Insurance Fund was about DM 1  000 
less. On the basis of  the social plan, howev-
er,  he receives a monthly supplement of  DM 
800 for a period of  four years. 
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•  cooperation between all the major players-
RAG  board  members,  labour  directors, 
workforce, IGBE, and the Federal Govern-
ment, etc.  - with regard to  crisis manage-
ment. 
These structural success factors are supple-
mented  by  company-specific  strategies.  The 
most important guidelines  for  successful  local 
crisis management include, above all,  a  trans-
parent information policy and a continuous, 
confidence-building personnel  policy  in  the 
context of  codetermination in the coal and  steel 
industry. This is important in achieving consen-
sus and forms the basis for constructive coopera-
tion between management, employee representa-
tion and external interest groups. In addition, the 
comprehensive aid measures provided for em-
ployees  "after  adjustment",  for  instance  with 
regard to retraining measures or when looking for 
housing  at  the  new  place  of work,  are  major 
factors  in crisis management. In the context of 
codetermination in the coal and steel industry, 
it is above all the labour relations directors who 
play a major role in successful crisis management 
programme based on consensus. 
Company-specific  conflict  management 
accordingly takes place on two levels. These 
are: 
Notes 
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•  the negotiation of  company-specific adjust-
ment strategies; and 
•  the individual implementation and expla-
nation of these adjustment measures, tak-
ing into account the personal situation of 
the employee concerned, at individual in-
terviews. 
Particularly crucial factors in the company-
specific adjustment process are found time and 
again to be the negotiation of "fair" selection 
criteria and the  consistent compliance with 
these priorities when selecting members of  the 
workforce for a particular measure. Only then 
can the necessary "information and persuasion 
work" take place in individual interviews. 
Adequate time is accordingly also an im-
portant  framework  condition  for  successful 
crisis management locally. Careful and early 
personnel and redundancy planning, in close 
consultation with all the players involved, and 
the provision of  early and detailed information 
for those concerned, contribute towards mak-
ing the implementation phase relatively con-
flict-free.  Resistance and concern for the fu-
ture, as  a consequence of misunderstandings 
and a lack of  information, can then be dispelled 
in the early stages and the acceptance of  adjust-
ment measures considerably enhanced. 
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Model: 
Stahlstiftung 
Saarland 
The  Stahlstiftung Saarland (Saarland  Steel 
Foundation) was established for the purpose 
of providing a  financially  secure tideover 
prior to early retirement for those employ-
ees who cannot, or are not yet ready to take 
early retirement, or  for whom no other meas-
ures are suitable, in the form of reemploy-
ment, training or some other employment. 
The steel industry in 
the Saar region 
The steel industry in the Saarland has a range 
of  characteristic features compared with oth-
er coal and steel regions: 
•  Regional aspects played a special role in view 
of  the rural structure and the peripheral loca-
tion of  the Saarland. There were scarcely any 
other industries to which steel industry em-
ployees could have transferred.  One job in 
every two was dependent on steel or coal, and 
the region was already suffering from above-
average unemployment. The massive process 
of  contraction of  the steel industry from more 
than  30  000  employees  in  the  mid-70s  to 
fewer than 1  0 000 by the end of  the 80s played 
a major part in this respect. 
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•  The Saarland steel industry was hit earlier 
than other regions by the steel crisis. The 
fact that the "early retirement'' instrument 
was applied earlier meant that, by the mid-
80s, there were relatively few employees 
who were eligible for early retirement. 
•  A "restructuring contract" had been in force 
since 1978 between, on the one hand, the 
then  Roehling-Burbach and Neunkirchen 
Eisenwerke  steel  companies  and,  on  the 
other, the  JG  Metal! union and the  Deut-
scher Gewerkschaftsbund (German TUC). 
Embodied in this  contract was  an  agree-
ment to the effect that the companies would 
not actually make workers redundant. 
Three major criteria, of a kind only en-
countered in the Saarland, had thus been laid 
down for the socially acceptable management 
of  the crisis: 
1.  The steel industry should be preserved as 
far as possible in the region. 
2.  Early  retirement,  the  most  important  in-
strument in the context of all other social 
plans  (see  E13),  could  only be used  in 
comparatively few cases. 
3.  Termination of  employment by the compa-
ny was excluded. 
This meant that a special solution had to be 
found for approximately 2 100 employees who 
could not be transferred to another company, 
retrained, or given early retirement. 
The  "steel  foundation"  solution  was  the 
only  viable  alternative  to  bankruptcy.  The 
employee representatives were thus left with no 
choice but to acquiesce and to  search for the 
most socially acceptable formula - especially 
Pagel  El4 
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••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••  since they were faced by the immediate closure 
of  a blast-furnace plant which had already been 
operating for ages on a short-time basis. 
• 
The merger process in the Saarland 
steel industry leading to 
DillingerHiitte Saarstahl AG 
Dillinger 
Hiitte 
1720-1989 
Neunkircher 
Eisenwerke 
(NEW) 
seit 1846 
From 1978 
ARB  ED 
1982 
Burbacher 
Hiitte 
since 1856 
owned by the 
Belgian! 
Luxembourg 
ARB  ED 
Rochlingsche 
Eisen- und 
Stahlwerke 
GmbH 
owned by the family 
Rochlini! 
1971 merged to form 
Stahlwerke 
Roehling-
Burbach 
GmbH (SRB) 
50% Roehling 
50% Burbach 
.. JJ. 
ARBED Saarstahl GmbH 
May 1986: Land andBund acquire 76% of  the shares 
for OM 1;  1.7.1986: change of  name to 
Saarstahl  VOlklingen GmbH 
30.1.88 
Stahlstiftun2 Saarland 
1.7.1989 
Dillinger Hiitte Saarstahl AG 
Head Office in Dillingen 
70% U sinor-Saci1or Group (France) 
2,5% ARBED (Luxembourg) 
27,5% Saarland 
Securing the future of the steel 
industry on the Saar 
The steel industry in the Saarland was highly 
fragmented up to 1987, i.e. almost up to the end 
of the crisis in the 1980s. In order to save the 
industry,  a massive redevelopment and con-
centration process was set in motion; only one 
company remained in existence at the end. The 
principal role here is played by the most stable 
factor in the Saarland steel industry, the Dill-
inger  Hiitte  company,  which belongs  to  the 
French Usinor-Sacilor steel  group.  This was 
preceded by a series of  attempts by the Luxem-
bourg ARBED group and the regional govern-
ment of Saarland to find a viable approach to 
the steel industry in this region (see chart). 
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The 
Stahlstiftung Saarland 
(Saarland Steel Foundation) 
The Stahlstiftung Saarland is only the last stage 
in a comprehensive phased model for socially 
acceptable job reductions (see the chart). It  was 
formed as a limited foundation under a company 
agreement based on the social plan (see £13), 
initially  for  the  period  from  1.1.1987  to 
31.12.1989, with an option for extension for two 
years  at  a  time.  Its  initial  capital  of DM 74 
million was the assets of  the house-building and 
property  management  company  of Saarstahl 
AG. The regional government promised supple-
mentary payments amounting to DM 78.5 mil-
lion for a maximum period of 5 years. 
One major problem was the agreement not 
to  make  anyone  redundant.  Faced with  this 
condition, the State unemployment office re-
fused to pay unemployment benefit or unem-
ployment assistance, on the grounds that the 
individuals  concerned  were  only  apparently 
unemployed and were not available for work. 
The unemployment office also considered that 
issuing a ''return ticket" to employment in the 
company went too far. The only response forth-
coming from the companies was that they had 
a "moral obligation" towards  the  employees 
concerned. 
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The road to the Stahlstiftung Saar 
I 
Agreement 
between IGM/DGB 
and Saarstahl GmbH, Techno Saarstahl,  Dillinger Hutte 
1986 
Saarstahl  1- Dillinger Hutte 
Task forces 
an den Standorten V61klingen-Burbach, Neunkirchen, Homburg, Dillingen 
Internal company measures 
•Early retirement  •Replacement for natural turnover 
•Personnel reserve for illness,  holidays and overtime 
•Organization of short-time working  •Advice and 
selection for further training and retraining 
Inter-company measures 
Early retirement at Dillingen according to the 
replacement principle (see E73) 
Further training and retraining with subsistence 
allowance 
Stahlstiftung and "employment company" 
Return to vacancies  Early retirement 
in the Saarland steel industry  1-•  under the 
or  social plan  placement in other companies 
• 
0 
•  •  •  •  •  •  • 
Because no dismissal notices could be issued 
under the terms of  the agreement, termination of 
the contract of  employment was mutually agreed 
with the majority ofthose concerned (95% ). The 
remaining five per cent went to court insisting 
on the legal termination terms.  ..  ..........  ~  ....................  ~  ......... . 
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Duties  •  Benefits 
•  Limited company pension. The Stahl-
stiftung  accepts  responsibility  for  the 
partial compensation oflosses of  income 
by granting a limited-duration company 
pension. Benefits received from the La-
bour Market Administration and other 
sources, as well as earned income from 
other employments, are  taken into ac-
count. Depending on their level of  inco-
me, the persons helped by the Stahlstif-
tung thus receive between 95 and 50 p~r 
cent of  their previous net income. 
•  Reemployment. The  Stahlstiftung en-
sures that priority in filling any vacant 
and newly created jobs in the member 
companies goes to people whose interests 
are being looked after by the Foundation. 
•  Further training and retraining. Ac-
ting  in  conjunction  with  the  Labour 
Market  Administration,  the  Stahlstif-
tung advises on  available vocational trai-
ning measures. 
•  Promotion of  employment initiatives. 
The Stahlstiftung promotes social insti-
tutions which are concerned with em-
ployment and support services. 
•  Employment company. The  Stahlstif-
tung  sets  up or takes  a  part  in  other 
companies, primarily through the agen-
cy of  its own non profit-making employ-
ment company. 
Stahlstiftung  Saarland 
Organization of the Stahlstiftung 
The  Stahlstifiung  is  an  institution  without 
employees. Its executive board is made up of 
the Labour DirectorofTechno Saarstahl GmbH 
and the Manager of  Training at Dillinger Hiitte 
Saarstahl AG, who are honorary postholders. 
Administration (payroll, etc.)  is  a matter for 
the company. 
The 
employment company 
This may be described more accurately as "a 
non profit-making company for  employment 
and training''.  In  forming  this  company, the 
Stahlst(ftung  has  created  an  instrument  for 
supporting the employees affected by the steel 
crisis through the promotion of  individual train-
ing and the creation of  employment opportuni-
ties. The duties of  this company are: 
•  Ensuring  an adequate  range  of training  for 
former steelworkers, as a complement to exist-
ing training institutions and other providers. 
•  Securing and extending the existing capac-
ity  for  initial  training,  where  this  is  not 
provided by the companies concerned. 
•  Creation of  replacement jobs through em-
ployment initiatives supported from public 
funds, as a complement to the efforts of  the 
companies concerned or other public em-
ployment programmes  (e.g.  job creation 
measures (ABM)). 
•  Support for and creation of replacement 
jobs through  innovation  in  the  form  of 
objective technology advice and the promo-
tion of  research (e.g. for new businesses). 
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The nature and structure of  the work, and of 
training within the company, were character-
ized to a very considerable degree by the fact 
that 75%  of the  Foundation's staff were un-
skilled and semi-skilled. Job creation measures 
(ABM) had the following content: 
•  Decontamination of polluted land; 
•  Work of  the Stahlstiflung itself; 
•  Formulation of  ideas for the use of  derelict 
land; 
•  Maintenance ofthe blast-furnace plant and 
conversion into a museum; 
•  Investigation  of contaminated  land,  e.g. 
beneath the coking plants. 
Regional support 
activities 
It would seem worthwhile too to describe activ-
ities which may not have been implemented, or 
only to a limited degree, but which complement 
the model. This includes the idea of  the Works 
Council and the union to adopt a "job creation 
initiative", to include representatives of  the IG 
Metall  union,  the  Works  Council,  company 
management,  technical departments,  person-
nel departments, the local authorities, the re-
gional  government,  the  regional  unemploy-
ment office and the association of small busi-
nesses. 
In  addition to activities aimed at creating 
jobs, the Saarland regional government stepped 
up  training provision in the region and intro-
duced a special "training programme for the 
Saar 
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Model: 
CARBONES 
DEBERGA 
This is not a self-contained model. It  merits 
special treatment here because it shows how 
open and skilled interaction between all the 
relevant players, even in a relatively remote 
region, can  mobilize money, imagination 
and initiative. In this way, the closure of a 
brown coal (lignite) mine became the start-
ing point for dealing with a regional crisis 
through cushioning measures, training, new 
businesses and carefully supported own ini-
tiatives. 
Framework conditions 
The CARBONES DE BERGA company pro-
duced brown coal (lignite) until 1991. Togeth-
er with the power station immediately adjacent 
to  it,  the  company  was  amongst  the  major 
employers in the  district of Bergueda in  the 
province of  Barcelona on the southern edge of 
the Pyrenees, although by 1986 it was employ-
ing only 718 of  the former workforce of  3 600 
persons. 
Since the Spanish government defined it as 
being in the national interest to have an inde-
pendent coal and energy policy, in view of its 
high  dependence  on  costly  oil  imports,  the 
domestic brown coal (lignite) sector was able to 
survive for a long time, with the result that no 
one believed the mine would actually close, in 
spite of low calorific values, poor extraction 
conditions (water intrusions, great depth, great 
distances) and increasing imports of coal, oil 
and natural gas. The days of  the company were 
numbered, with the entry of Spain into the EC 
and its recognition of  the ECSC Treaty, which 
outlaws government subsidies. 
The closure of the mine was a severe set-
back to the district of  Bergueda, in view of  the 
steady loss of  industrial jobs and the failure to 
attract new firms. 
Instruments 
Unlike the steel industry, no attempt was made 
initially in  Spain at national restructuring of 
the mining industry. There was thus no central 
point capable of  coordinating the conditions of 
such a process locally. Given this situation, the 
concrete  solutions  had to  be  developed and 
negotiated by the people concerned in the re-
gion. 
Three different packages of  measures, which 
together form a unit, can be identified as com-
ponents of the "model": 
•  social cushioning for older employees and 
those whose jobs are at risk; 
•  training  and  reemployment of younger 
employees, including new business starts; 
•  reindustrialization of the region. 
Because the second and third packages of 
measures were implemented in close conjunc-
tion  with  one  another,  they  are  described 
jointly below.  Financing is  provided in  the 
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form of  ECSC funding and national funding 
viaENJSA: Empresa Nacional de Jnnovaci6n 
(National Innovation Company).  A  certain 
proportion of this  fund  was  earmarked for 
the creation of replacement jobs in  the re-
gion. 
Measures 
for older employees 
Older  employees  (i.e.  utilising  all  statutory 
provisions, those aged over 4 7 years) received 
a specific offer, depending on their age, which 
was taken up by 360 of  the 740. 
Retirement 
This  option  was  taken  by  those  who  had 
already  reached  pensionable  age  (65)  and 
who, through natural or job-related physical 
disability, had been certified as suffering from 
an invalidity. 
Early retirement 
Early retirement was offered to all employees 
aged over 58 years. For persons aged over 60, 
the  forfeiture of 40 per cent of the  old-age 
pension was moderated by compensatory pay-
ments  ("ayudas  equivalentes")  from  crisis 
funds for companies which have submitted a 
"strategic business plan" for restructuring 
or closure. 
CARBONES DE BERGA 
The following rules were applied: 
From age 58: 
Unemployment for a maximum of  24 months, 
i.e.  until the age  of 60 years, financed from 
funds provided by the Labour Market Admin-
istration (  40%) and the company (  60%  ).  This 
period was then followed by early retirement, 
during which the entitlement to a normal pen-
sion was acquired via the "compensatory pay-
ments". 
From age 60: 
as described above. 
From age 63: 
Unemployment with a normal entitlement to 
unemployment benefit, including social insur-
ance  contributions  and  supplementary  pay-
ments by the company. On reaching the age of 
65  years: pension with standard benefits. 
"Pre-early retirement" 
A special early retirement programme, com-
prising a succession of  guaranteed incomes up 
to pensionable age, was developed specifically 
for employees aged between 47 and 58 years 
and those with impaired performance or per-
sons with particular vocational rehabilitation 
problems. This involved the payment not only 
of unemployment  benefit,  but also  of other 
public allowances from tax revenues, and the 
payment of social insurance contributions by 
the  company  under  the  terms  of a  special 
agreement. 
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Training, 
reemployment, 
new business starts, 
reindustrialization 
Plan to attract industrial projects 
In  1987,  at  a  time  when  CARBONES  DE 
BERGA was already developing its  strategic 
business plan for the closure of  the mine, it also 
drew  up  a  reindustrialization  plan  (Plan  de 
Attracci6n de Proytecos Industriales) with the 
aim of attracting new industrial employment 
into  the  region  and,  in  so  doing,  not  only 
creating employment for ex-mineworkers and 
young people entering the  employment mar-
ket, but also creating a new industrial fabric for 
the region. 
This plan involved three stages: 
1.  A study of the industrial structure of the 
district,  in order to provide opportunities 
for  expansion  and  activities  that  are not 
affected hy the crisis; 
2.  An analysis of  the potential and the mar-
ket, in order to identify previously unde-
veloped capacity in the district and market 
niches; 
3.  The drawing-up of  a plan to attract indus-
trial activities from outside. 
The implementation of this plan involved 
investment amounting to 5.5 hill ion pesetas up 
to 1991 and the creation of  more than 300 new 
jobs, about 100 ofwhich were filled by former 
mineworkers. 
~ 
n  n 
C.  F.l -
CERCS-BERGUEDA 
Training and entrepreneurs 
consortium 
After  initially  adhering  to  the  normal  pro-
grammes (training and vocational rehabilita-
tion) ofthe INEM, the National Labour Market 
Administration, the region created its own set 
of  instruments in 1989 to further the restructur-
ing  process  in  the  region,  including  in  the 
employment market;  this  was  known  as  the 
Concord  de F ormacio  i d 'Iniciatives de Cercs-
Bergueda. 
At the initiative ofthe mining company and 
with the support of  the Provincial Labour Mar-
ket Administration in Barcelona, a consortium 
was established comprising CARBONES DE 
BERGA and the following organizations rep-
resenting  the  public  sector:  the  INEM,  the 
Catalan government (  Generalitat de Catalun-
ya  ), the provincial administration in Barcelona 
and  the  local  authority  in  Ceres,  the  most 
severely affected place in the district of Ber-
gueda.  This  consortium  is  organised  along 
private business lines, hut has social ohj ectives: 
training and the creation of replacement jobs. 
The advisory board (Junta) includes represent-
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atives of all the institutions involved, and its 
work is carried out by a managing director with 
an administrative staff. 
The work of  the consortium is a very well 
thought-out combination of  an extremely wide 
range of  activities and can be sub-divided into 
three areas: 
•  Training.  Further  training  and  retraining 
courses are  organized and offered.  Along-
side these activities, numerous partnerships 
were entered into based on EC programmes 
such as NOW, EUROFORM, FORCE and 
SPRINT (see Section A2). On the one hand, 
these enabled a strong Pyrenean cooperation 
axis to be built up into neighbouring areas of 
France  (and also  with local  authorities  in 
other countries), and on the other permitted 
the  wide-ranging  involvement  of special-
ized training and scientific institutes. 
•  New entrepreneurs centre. The consorti-
um maintains a centre (Centro de Empre-
sas) that  was  set  up  predominantly with 
funding from the Regional Structural Fund 
of  the EC (see A2), with 14 companies and 
around 200 jobs. The centre does not only 
assist its  "own" companies, however, but 
supports and advises around 45 other entre-
preneurs who have established businesses 
outside the centre. 
•  Vocational rehabilitation. The  consorti-
um  endeavours,  with  the  support  of the 
Labour Market Administration,  to  match 
training  supply  to  the  perceived need.  It 
prepares employment market analyses and 
concerns itself  with the placement of  course 
participants  in  a job appropriate  to  their 
qualifications. 
CARBONES DE BERGA 
Employee-run limited companies 
In addition to these activities, companies were 
also established and business training activi-
ties provided for former employees of  the min-
ing  sector,  with  the  support  of the  Catalan 
Association (FESALC) oftheSociedades An6n-
imas  Laborales  (SAL).  These  employee-run 
limited companies are  peculiar to  Spain and 
merit separate treatment here. 
The  SALs  are  the  result  of a  series  of 
studies,  and  essentially  constitute  a  balance 
between the market (market niches) and the 
qualifications  structure  of the  former  mine-
workers. The aim was to put employees from 
the  maintenance  department  in  particular 
through a brief  but intensive training to enable 
them to operate independently in the industrial 
services sector. 
The process of establishing the employee-
run limited companies was as follows: Project 
FESALC 
FEDERAC16 DE SOCIETATS ANclNIMES 
l.ABORALS DE CATALUNYA 
UNA REALITAT INNOVADORA 
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What is an SAL ? 
•  An SAL (Sociedad An6nima Laboral) is a 
self-governing company, a fundamental require-
ment of  which is that 51 per cent of  the shares 
must remain in the ownership of the employ-
ees. 
•  All the employees of the company with a 
permanent full-time contract of employment, 
who work directly and personally in return for 
payment, are shareholders. 
•  Any natural or legal person can become a 
shareholder of  an SAL, subject to the limitation 
that the shareholding may not exceed 25  per 
cent. Public bodies, on the other hand, may hold 
up to 49 per cent of the share capital. 
•  At least four shareholders are required for the 
formation of  an SAL. 
•  The share capital of  the company must be 
at least 10 million pesetas, at least 25 per cent 
of  which must be paid in in cash at the time of 
forming the company. 
e  10  per cent of the  liquid profits  in  each 
financial year must be transferred to a reserve 
fund, i.e. they are not available for distribution. 
How does it work? 
•  The supreme decision-taking body and the 
forum for expressing the shareholders' wishes 
is the Shareholders' Meeting. The administra-
Manual Social Crisis Management 
tive board is the representative and manage-
ment body of  the company. Its numerical com-
position must be consistent with the number of 
shareholders. 
•  The company is a normal business which 
operates according to the principle of  codeter-
mination and self-government. 
Taxation  peculi~rities 
•  SALs benefit from the following tax benefits 
in conjunction with transfers of property and 
notarial acts: 
a) Relief of 99 per cent of the fees payable in 
line  with the  scale of charges  in connection 
with the formation of  a company, with increas-
es in share capital and with all necessary doc-
uments and contracts for transforming an exist-
ing company into an SAL. 
b) Relief at a similar level in conjunction with 
the  raising  of loans  up  to the  level  of the 
commitments that have been entered into, pro-
vided that said amount is applied as an invest-
ment in fixed capital. 
c) Relief at a similar level in conjunction with 
the acquisition of  goods from the company from 
which the majority of  the employee sharehold-
ers of  the SAL originate. 
•  Free amortization of  the paid-in capital for 
the first five years, starting in the first financial 
year. 
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groups of around  15  persons were formed 
with  the  task  of completing  an  intensive 
theoretical and practical training programme. 
Two other local companies were involved in 
the training alongside the company of ori-
gin;  these  were the  FECSA power station 
company, which  was  at  the  same time the 
parent  company  of the  mine,  and  TELE-
FONICA, the national telecommunications 
administration. This group, which was made 
up of 55  persons in total, then worked as  a 
department  with the  status  of an  autono-
mous  unit  within  its  old  company,  CAR-
BONES  DE  BERGA,  as  a  contractor  for 
third parties. One engineer and two techni-
cians were seconded to this department by 
the company. Only when it appeared certain 
that the viability and stability of  this depart-
ment would permit its independent existence 
were the following four employee-run com-
panies formed: 
LIMET  SAL:  assembly of electrical  in-
stallations; 
INTEBE SAL: assembly of  telecommuni-
cations systems; 
OSEBE SAL: civil engineering and blast-
ing;  and 
TOPBER SAL: landscaping and planning. 
Finally, in order to merge these four SALs 
and to create a professional administration, a 
limited company was formed to take respon-
sibility for management and financial con-
trol. 
A total of 150 persons work in these com-
panies,  48  of whom  are  from  the  mining 
industry. 
CARBONES DE BERGA 
Summary 
The restructuring process is  highly rated by 
those actively involved, in terms of  results and 
procedure. It is seen as having been difficult, 
very tough and, not least, costly, and yet far 
less costly and more effective than the statuto-
ry restructuring process for the other sectors 
(see E6). 
In particular the Chairman of the Works 
Council  of the  CC.OO.  union  (Comisiones 
Obreras), which was initially critical, now has 
a thoroughly positive view: following initial 
strong resistance on the part of  the company, 
a planned and carefully supported restructur-
ing  process  for  the  region  as  a  whole  was 
eventually  arrived  at,  more  particularly 
through the involvement of  public bodies and 
the FECSA parent company. The mining busi-
ness is felt, finally, to have become a highly 
effective dynamic factor. 
It is  also  generally  recognised  that  the 
constructive  approach  of the  CC.OO.  and 
UGT unions was of  very considerable impor-
tance,  since  without  the  pressure  that  they 
brought  to  bear on the  company  and their 
advocacy among the employees, it would have 
been extremely difficult to generate a sympa-
thetic and optimistic response to the difficult 
process. In this respect the individual case-by-
case approach was crucial.  No one was left 
dangling in mid-air. 
Finally,  a  consultancy  company  which 
specializes in restructuring processes of  this 
kind occupied a  central role  in this  entire 
process. 
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Crisis careers 
Manuel Girona 
Aged 41,  he was employed at CARBONES DE 
BERGA as a maintenance technician, although 
he had no formal training. He was also secretary 
of the  Works  Council  on  behalf of the  UGT 
union.  he  was  offered the  opportunity,  after 
taking an  appropriate further training course, 
of  becoming involved in one of  the employee-run 
limited companies.  The  idea  appealed to  him, 
and he became the promoter of  this idea, encour-
aging his  colleagues  to  become  involved too. 
LIMET was formed first. followed by INTEBE. 
Like his colleagues,  he remained employed in 
the  company initially until the final go-ahead 
was given.  The  mining company is meeting the 
cost of  his training and of  the infrastructure of 
the new businesses. In the meantime, Girona has 
assumed a leading position in  the  administra-
tion. where he is responsible for, amongst other 
things, purchasing and personnel matters. 
Joan Estrada 
Aged 43, married, with two children. he worked 
at CARBONES DE BERGA  as an  installation 
fitter. He too was a member of  the Works Coun-
cil. After a highly detailed analysis of  his skills 
and experience, he was advised to retrain for an 
administrative position. After appropriate train-
ing.  he  was  given  an  administrative job  (in 
personnel) in  one of  the newly arrived compa-
nies from the food industry. He describes as  "a 
major shock" the change of  job and company, 
where both his  father and grandfather had worked 
before him, and where he himself  had worked  for 
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2 7 years. Nevertheless, he sees the situation as 
positive for himself  and on the whole. He main-
tains that he always knew that the pit would not 
survive, but that it had still been hard to take. 
The fact that the company had always put its 
cards on the table encouraged great confidence 
in  the  radical change.  He attributes the rela-
tively smooth change-over, and the readiness of 
new companies to  relocate in  the area,  to  the 
absence of  serious conflict. 
Jose Antonio Ferraz 
Aged 39. married, with two children. He was an 
electrician, working at the coal  face. His father 
had worked down the pit for 22 years.  He too 
was a member of  the  Works  Council,  and had 
been  its  Chairman  during  the  last years  of 
upheaval.  When  the  closure of the  mine was 
finally announced, he says no one was prepared 
to  believe  it.  He  himself believed that  there 
would  simp~v  be a dip in the economy. He is now 
employed as  shift foreman  in  the  aforemen-
tioned food company, following a number of 
training courses which, he maintains, provided 
an excellent preparation for his new job. His is 
an exceptional case,  because he registered for 
a parMi  me political science course at the uni-
versity.  The constructive attitude of  the FECSA 
parent company, and especially its firm under-
taking to  the effect that all who failed to find 
employment would be taken on, was, he says, of 
central importance,  as were the training and 
qualifications analyses, especial~v  in their high-
ly individuali::ed form.  However,  no  solution 
presented itself  in  the mining supply and serv-
ices companies, which was the downside of  the 
crisis management process. 
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Model: 
Employment 
company 
Employment  companies (Beschiiftigungsgesells-
chaften) are a specific German model, although 
notonlytypicaloftheminingorsteelindustry,for 
socially acceptable adaptation to  the employ-
ment market with its different characteristics in 
West and East Germany. As formally autono-
mous companies and businesses, they serve to 
provide employment, and usually training, for 
people who have been made redundant, until 
they can take early retirement, find reemploy-
ment, generally in another company, or until 
they establish a business of  their own. They are 
operated as a general rule by companies and/or 
local  authorities, and they  are financed  by a 
combination of all available means of support. 
These employment companies assumed special 
significance through the enormous employment 
problems caused in the new federal Lander in 
connection with the monetary, economic and 
social aspects of  the reunification of  Germany. 
The situation in the new Lander is new in 
many respects, not just in terms of  the scale, but 
also of the  quality of the  changes.  It is  not 
simply  a  structural  upheaval  that  is  taking 
place there in one or two sectors; what we are 
witnessing is  the transformation of an entire 
economy into a wholly new economic system. 
These  conditions  are  presented in  relatively 
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great detail for that reason, especially since the 
situation  in  the  Eastern  European  countries 
could well require similar approaches and in-
struments. 
The  Anti-crisis  Division of the  ARBED 
steel company (see E  1  0) may  be regarded as the 
original form of  employment company. Other 
precursors were the Saarland Steel Foundation 
(Stahlstiftung Saarland) and its own employ-
ment  company  (see  E14)  and  certain  other 
early forms in West Germany, of  which one is 
described briefly in this Section. 
Reasons for operational 
autonomy 
The  most  important  reason  for  granting 
autonomy to what were originally internal or, 
at least, company-dependent tideover schemes 
is that the course of  the structural crisis in the 
mining and steel sectors or the restructuring of 
the East German economy in most cases left no 
opportunities for returning to the company of 
origin. This meant that the various models of 
short-time working (right down to short-time 
zero) and holding schemes with a guarantee of 
reemployment  were  being  implemented  ad 
absurdum. 
The formal reason for granting autonomy 
in respect of the transition in the form of an 
employment company-usually a limited liabil-
ity  company  (GmbH)  - is  that  the  Federal 
Employment Agency  adopts an approach 
which is geared strictly to the external em-
ployment market and  largely  excludes  in-
house measures to prevent unemployment. In 
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provisions of  the Labour Promotion Law (  AFG  ), 
according to which funding from the Federal 
Employment Agency in  support of employ-
ment creation measures (ABM) is only availa-
ble to individuals under certain conditions of 
unemployment. A further formal reason is the 
frequently strict interpretation of  §44, Subpar-
agraph 2 of  the Labour Promotion Law by local 
unemployment  offices.  This  paragraph  pro-
vides funding for further training and retrain-
ing (FuU) only in the event of  individuals who 
are "directly threatened by unemployment". A 
broad  interpretation  is  considered  to  apply 
where such funding is already approved at the 
time when mass (i.e. not individual) redundan-
cies are  announced.  The  strict interpretation 
requires the existence of an individual redun-
dancy as a condition for the payment of  the full 
maintenance allowance in conjunction with a 
course of training. 
The reasons for local authorities wishing 
to become involved in such employment com-
panies are the burden imposed by the "subsist-
ence allowance" (social assistance) for persons 
who, mainly due to the length of their unem-
ployment, no longer have any claim to unem-
ployment benefit or unemployment assistance. 
"Help to work" under the "Work in place of 
Social Assistance" programme thus frequently 
offers the only chance,  at  an insignificantly 
higher cost, of  getting people back in employ-
ment.  Because employment and training in a 
normal company or in an administration are 
generally hard to  combine,  and because the 
long-term unemployed as  a  general  rule  re-
quire a high degree of  individual help, it makes 
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sense  to  organize  this  form  of employment 
separately. 
"Companies for work promotion, employ-
ment and structural development", as they are 
frequently known, are in most cases the result 
of  the involvement of  the unions in the compa-
nies  and/or  in  the  region.  It  is  not  purely 
coincidence that the first forms of  such activi-
ties came about in the (co-determined) iron and 
steel industry, and the influence of the unions 
had a  crucial part to play in the  conception, 
introduction and continuation of  such employ-
ment and training activities. (see E19 Union 
Initiatives). 
Forerunner 
Dortmund 
Development Centre 
The Entwicklungszentrum Dortmund- Modell 
ostliches Ruhrgebiet (EWZ) (Dortmund De-
velopment Centre) is in many respects an ex-
perimental forerunner, although in terms of  its 
size it was and is scarcely comparable with the 
present-day employment companies in the new 
federal Lander. At the time when the EWZ was 
formed in 1985 in the Ruhr city of  Dortmund 
(unemployment rate  at the  time:  19%) by a 
"local coalition" (DGB and individual unions, 
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the City ofDortmund, companies, research and 
development facilities, and individuals), it was: 
•  an  employment market policy innova-
tion, because it is  the first facility of this 
type to combine work and training on the 
one hand and development and optimiza-
tion of  ecological products and procedures 
on the other hand in the form of  measures 
(ABM and FuU) financed under the Labour 
Promotion Law, in so doing going beyond 
the current "employment measures"  and 
offering  meaningful  work  and  learning 
concepts to the unemployed; 
•  a promotional policy innovation, because 
it  systematically propagated for  the  first 
time and put into practice a combination of 
all  available  promotional  opportunities 
(ABM, FuU, Work in place of Social As-
sistance, ESF, regional funding,  local au-
thority funding, private funding and invest-
ment promotion means, etc.), but inciden-
ta11y brought out the weaknesses and prob-
lems of  such a method of  financing; 
•  an environmental/economic innovation, 
because environmentally friendly products, 
processes and services were to be developed 
and tested, although as it turned out, this 
was considerably more difficult than ex-
pected and than is possible under the con-
ditions  relating  to  employment  creation 
measures  for  niche  markets  in the  craft 
sector; 
•  a  participative innovation,  because  the 
management and the forms of  cooperation 
and learning in the company-like develop-
ment  centre  facility  was  intended  to  be 
"democratic"; this was unsuccessful, at  least 
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in part, because neither the management 
side nor the  employees were adequately 
prepared for such an organization; 
•  a  structural policy innovation, because 
the EWZ saw itself  as a necessary employ-
ment market policy complement to the high 
technology-oriented economic and struc-
tural development undertaken by the city; 
because of  its "size", it was naturally unable 
to impart any decisive structural impulses, 
although  it  was  able  to  keep  discussion 
going on this aspect of  development. 
A  "cooperative business park model", 
known as the "UNION-Gewerbeho.f', with 
around  100  employees  in  15  small  busi-
nesses,  has  since  grown  up  around  the 
EWZ on the HOESCH Stahl "Union" site. 
With a placement rate of 70 per cent (with-
in  3  months)  subsequent to  employment 
creation  measures  or  training,  the  EWZ 
lies  far  above the federal  average of ap-
proximately 40 per cent. The most success-
ful achievement of the EWZ as a company 
was in training schemes aimed at provid-
ing environmentally relevant skills, which 
it now also offers on a commercial basis. 
Apart  from  the  Dortmund  Development 
Centre, local authority employment facilities 
of this kind have been set up in other cities 
(including  Cologne  and  Saarbriicken).  Em-
ployment companies on a grander scale with 
government and local authority support were 
first set up during the second half  of  the eighties 
in the North German city-states ofBremen and 
Hamburg,  where  the  structural  crisis  in  the 
shipyards in particular had led to high unem-
ployment levels. 
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Employment companies 
in Eastern Germany 
In order to understand the specific constitution 
and the significance of  the employment compa-
nies in the new federal Lander of the Federal 
Republic of  Germany, it is essential to explain 
the  framework  conditions  under which  they 
came to be used as  an employment market, 
social  and structural policy  model.  In  the 
interests  of simplicity,  the  acronym  ABS  is 
used below·for the Gesellschaftenfiir A_rbeits-
forderung,fl_eschaftigung undS.trukturennvick-
lung (companies for work promotion, employ-
ment and structural development). 
The monetary, economic and social union 
resulted in  overnight  confrontation  in  1990 
brought East German companies into  contac~ 
overnight with western competition and, at the 
same time, cut them off from East European 
markets. As a result of this, the employment 
situation that has arisen in the new Lander can 
only be adequately described as catastrophic. 
Restructuring and adaptation to  a higher 
level of production take a long time.  Redun-
dancies always happen more rapidly than new 
jobs can be created or safeguarded on a new 
basis. What is more, the number of  9. 7 million 
in gainful employment in the former GDR is a 
figure unlikely to be seen again. Bridging the 
period up to the point at which investment and 
infrastructure programmes take effect is only 
possible with the  help of "crutches" such as 
e~ployment  and training companies. This ap-
plies all the more if one considers that small 
and medium-sized businesses were practically 
unknown in the economy of  the GDR, so that 
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there is practically no cushioning structure for 
the defunct industrial concerns with their nu-
merous  economic  and  social  functions.  The 
collapse of whole regions increased the pres-
sure to identify and create alternative employ-
ment opportunities. 
Together with the persons who find them-
selves  in  employment  creation  measures 
(ABM_), in training, or on short-time working, 
and w1th the recipients of old-age transitional 
allowance and early retirement allowance  al-
most every second person of working a~e is 
unemployed. According to details provided by 
the Federal Statistical Office, 1 342 000 indus-
trial jobs out of 2 287 000 in the new Lander 
were lost between the reunification of  Germany 
(fourth quarter of 1990)  and June  1992,  i.e. 
almost 60 per cent of  the jobs in the key sector 
of a modem industrial society. 
The ABS  are  intended to  function  as  the 
seedcorn for economic  renewal in  the re-
gion.  This  is  conditional,  though,  on  their 
involvement in economic policy, and not pri-
marily their role as an institution of  the second-
a~y employment market. The ABS play a sig-
mficant role as a social cushioning instrument 
and structural policy aid,  and as  providers of 
employment policy measures with the aim of 
ensuring that workers are ready and willing to 
accept jobs, of making a contribution to  the 
development of  the region, and of  ensuring the 
influence of the employees concerned on the 
conversion process and their codetermination 
in training and product innovation. 
The high level of  skills of  employees in the 
new Lander offers excellent potential, calling 
for a different approach to the problem and, at 
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the same time, meaning that the ABS were able 
to greatly extend their radius of  action. Exces-
sively high demands are often imposed on the 
companies as a result, however, especially in 
terms of innovative projects.  Levels of per-
formance  are  expected  which  are  scarcely 
achievable by existing businesses, namely the 
development of new products and the captur-
ing of a new market or at least niches in the 
market. 
One major problem facing the ABS in 
East Germany is their lack of  knowledge of 
the  direction  in  which  the  employment 
market  and  the  economic  structure  are 
moving and, in consequence, the areas in 
which training is called for. There is virtu-
ally no investment in the industrial sector. 
It is almost impossible to find a full-time 
job  on  the  regular  employment  market. 
There is also uncertainty as to the number 
of measures that still qualify for support 
under the East Germany Labour Promotion 
Law.  This  means  that  the  stability  and 
durability of  the ABS are highly uncertain. 
Example: 
The Riesa region 
The Riesa region, which has around 250 per-
sons/km2, is one of  the most densely populated 
areas of the district of Dresden. Riesa is in a 
good position from the point of  view of  commu-
nications - at the intersection of two railway 
lines and on the river Elbe shipping route - and 
this has contributed significantly in the past to 
its industrial development. 
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The economic structure of the region was 
characterized essentially by the steel industry 
(Stahl- und WalzwerkRiesa, StahlwerkGroditz, 
Rohrwerk Zeithain ). Other structurally impor-
tant industrial companies in the  region were 
the  chemicals  plant  at  Niinchritz,  the  tyre 
manufacturing plant and the Elektronik GmbH 
company in Riesa. 
At  30  403  persons  in  November  1990, 
approximately 62 per cent of  all those in gain-
ful employment in the administrative district of 
Riesa  were  employed  in  the  manufacturing 
sector. 
Because of massive structural change, the 
rate of  employment in manufacturing industry 
fell to approximately 32 per cent between No-
vember  1990  and  August  1992.  Unemploy-
ment in Riesa district of the  Unemployment 
Office stood at 15.7 per cent in January 1993. 
If  account is taken of  the relief  measures avail-
able under employment market policy, then the 
underemployment rate is of the order of 45.5 
per cent at the present time. 
Riesa as a steel location 
In conjunction with economic and monetary 
unification, the parent plant of  the VEB Rohr-
kombinat Riesa (Riesa tube group), which pre-
viously had an annual steel production of ap-
proximately  1.2  million  t,  was  transformed 
into  the  Stahl- und Walzwerk Riesa  AG 
(SWR AG) and reported to the  Treuhandan-
stalt Berlin, the central administrative body for 
the assets of the former German Democratic 
Republic. 
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After the transformation, SWR AG found 
itself with two sites situated very close to one 
another in the  region:  the  old plant in  Riesa 
itself, with a liquid phase, steel casting, steel 
rolling mill and plant and equipment, and the 
plant at Zeithain with a tube rolling mill.  In 
1989,  12  253  persons were employed at the 
Stahl- und Walzwerk Riesa: i.e. 22.5 per cent of 
all employees in the Riesa district, and 38.3 per 
cent of  employees in the industrial sector. This 
clearly illustrates the outstanding importance 
of SWR AG to the economy and employment 
policy of the region as a whole. 
SWR AG was not equipped to survive, for 
the  following  reasons:  outdated technology, 
obsolete production methods, collapse of  former 
markets, environmental pollution, excessively 
high manning levels and extremely high main-
tenance, energy and repair requirement, and a 
production profile oriented towards mass steel 
production.  Following privatization, only the 
Zeithain tube plant, with most of  its equipment 
and a workforce of 1 500, was taken over by 
Mannesmann AG. 
The management of SWR AG adopted the 
following steps with a a view to the structural 
transformation of the  Riesa steel  site  into  a 
modem steel plant: 
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•  privatization of sub-areas: closure of sub-
areas not suitable for privatization; 
•  transfer of  responsibility for creches, nurs-
eries and works  fire  brigade to  the  local 
authority; 
•  privatization of sectors following redevel-
opment of old industrial sites (0.72 km2); 
•  preparations for and promotion of  the relo-
cation  process  amongst  new  investors 
through training for members of  the SWR 
AG workforce. 
The result of  the concept agreed between 
the Treuhandanstalt, the supervisory board, 
the executive board, the IG Metal! union, the 
City Council and the Rural District Admin-
istrative Office was the liquidation of SWR 
AG. 
A central idea behind this  concept is  the 
redevelopment of derelict former industrial 
sites, in order to prevent the creation of  indus-
trial  wastelands and to restrict encroachment 
onto  greenfield  sites.  The  intention  was  to 
employ redundant workers on the  associated 
development work.  The following operations 
were  and  are  being  carried  out  in  order  to 
prepare and adapt the old industrial site to the 
requirements of privatized or newly relocated 
companies: 
•  dismantling of  old production facilities and 
partial demolition of buildings; 
•  individual  provision of infrastructure: 
electricity,  heat,  water,  sewerage,  and 
removal of large  quantities  of railway 
track; 
•  decontamination and covering-over of  pol-
luted ground; 
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•  conservation  of buildings  and  facilities 
which can and should continue to be used 
by new investors; 
•  construction of  new streets and roads. 
For the purpose of  coordinating these tasks 
and facilitating a flexible  response to  the re-
quirements of  investors, a planning office was 
charged with  drawing  up  development  con-
cepts,  including site preparation and restruc-
turing of the  area,  coordination with policy-
makers in the public sector and submission of 
applications for financial support. 
Instruments 
Two  different  organisational  structures  with 
different legal status were used at Riesa, be-
cause of the specific situation of individuals, 
the corporate conditions imposed by the Treu-
handanstalt, and the changing support condi-
tions (change of AFG ). 
On the one hand, the steel company itself 
functioned to  a certain extent as  an employ-
ment  company,  deploying  all  available  em-
ployment market policy instruments: 
•  old-age transitional allowance (AliiG); 
•  early retirement allowance (VoG); 
•  short-time working allowance (KUG); 
•  further training and retraining (FuU); 
•  employment creation measures (ABMs  ). 
On the other hand, a special, autonomous 
sponsoring  company,  known  as  the  Gesel/-
schaft fiir Arbeits.fijrderung,  Beschiiftigung 
und Strukturentwicklung mbH Stahl (ABS 
Stahl) (company for job promotion, employ-
Manual Social Crisis Management 
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ment and structural development in the  steel 
industry) was formed in order to take on short-
time workers, to formulate employment crea-
tion measures,  and to  initiate training meas-
ures. 
The work involved in the restructuring 
of  the steel site is not achievable with funds 
provided by the SWR AG alone. This relates 
both to the social cushioning of the effects 
of redundancy, and to the work necessary 
for the redevelopment of derelict sites and 
preparations in readiness for relocating busi-
nesses. In order to provide social cushion-
ing, the following funds were applied with 
the support of the Labour Promotion Law 
(AFG): 
•  short-time  working  until  working  hours 
have  been  reduced  to  zero  in  the  great 
majority of  cases (KUG/KUG 0); E16  Page 8 
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•  further training and retraining (FuU); 
•  employment creation measures (ABMs). 
A population shift towards the old Lander 
took  place  at  the  same  time  as  the  active 
measures  for  crisis  management.  Although 
this had the effect of reducing the tension in 
the regional employment policy situation, it 
was  not  viewed  in  a  positive  light  by  the 
region because most of the migrants were 
likely to be important members of the new 
workforce. 
ABM 
The instrument: 
employment creation measures 
Employment creation measures are an instru-
ment of labour market policies  deployed by 
the Bundesanstaltfiir Arbeit (Federal Office of 
Labour ) to provide direct and targeted sup-
port for demand for labour. §§ 91-96  of the 
Labour Promotion Law (AFG) apply here. 
According to §91, support should be provided for 
activities which: 
I) "are in the public interest"; 
2)  "would  otherwise  not  be  implemented,  or 
would only be implemented at a later date"; 
3) "are suitable:" 
a) "for creating conditions for the employment of 
unemployed persons in  permanent jobs and, in 
particular, for compensating for the consequences 
of  structural change or  technical development"; or 
b) "for preparing for, enabling or supplementing 
measures to improve the structure"; or 
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Measures taken by 
SWRAG 
One special feature  of plant-level agreement 
002/1991, "Social plan for the termination of 
contracts of employment against payment of 
severance pay", between the company manage-
ment and the Works Council is an implemen-
tation clause which stipulates that the agreed 
severance pay should be paid in instalments 
over a period of 12  months.  Payment of the 
c) "for creating employment opportunities for the 
long-term unemployed"; or 
d)  "for  improving  the  social  infrastructure  or 
maintaining or improving the environment". 
Measures may be organised and run by public, 
non profit-making private, or private companies 
and  organizations,  although  in  the  latter  case 
there must be some likelihood that "the support 
provided will stimulate the employment market 
in the manner desired in  accordance with eco-
nomic or social policy". 
"Support is  only made available for employees 
who have  been referred by the  unemployment 
office", who are unemployed, and who have been 
unemployed for a period of  at least six months in 
the  last year.  Persons engaged on employment 
creation measures remain available for work, i.e. 
they are free to give immediate notice in the event 
of  their finding permanent employment or a place 
on a vocational training course. 
Depending  on  the  individual  and  the  general 
situation on the employment market, the subsidy 
paid by the unemployment office may cover be-
tween 50 and 100 per cent of  the costs involved. 
Under certain circumstances, some contribution 
towards material costs may also be paid. 
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monthly instalments ceases in the event of a 
new  contract  of employment  being  entered 
into, but recommences in the event of  the new 
contract of  employment being terminated within 
the  following  two  years  for  no  fault of the 
worker's. 
In the event of  the transfer of  an employee 
to  ABS Stahl (when he will lose any entitle-
ments enjoyed under the ECSC Treaty), the full 
amount of  personal severance pay will be trans-
ferred immediately to the special ABS account 
(see comments relating to ABS ~pecial  facili-
ties,  p.  18). 
Employment creation measures by 
SWRAG 
One  important condition for the transforma-
tion  of the  Riesa  steel  site  into  a  modern 
industrial site was the reclamation of derelict 
land. 
The necessary preparatory work is an im-
portant aspect of the two "mega-employment 
creation measures", each with around 600 par-
ticipants, operating under SWR AG. A total of 
around 1 530 persons are employed in the two 
large  employment creation measures  and in 
numerous smaller projects.  The table on the 
following  page  gives  a  summary of all  the 
employment creation measures being run at the 
present time by SWR AG. 
For this  exceptional  situation  caused by 
extreme structural breakdown, agreement was 
reached with the Federal Employment Agency 
on an employment creation measure in which 
a single company sponsoring the measure es-
tablishes two employment relationships with 
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the participants, one of  which is active (for the 
employment creation measure) and the other 
passive (from the previous employment), thus 
ensuring that the employees, who (unlike in the 
oldLiinder) are able to transfer smoothly to the 
employment creation measure, retain their en-
titlement to benefits under the ECSC Treaty. 
In  addition  to  "site  recycling",  with  its 
positive effect for both the environment and 
economic and structural policy, the  employ-
ment creation measures also have the function 
of  providing a "stock" of  qualified workers for 
new investors relocating to the old SWR AG 
site. Lists of  names now exist of  employees who 
can be offered specific contracts of employ-
ment  by  new  investors.  Preliminary  agree-
ments with future employees have even been 
signed. 
In order to obtain and improve their quali-
fications, a number ofthe employees benefiting 
from employment creation measures also em-
barked on training courses for up to 20 per cent 
of  their working time, and a smaller number for 
up to 50 per cent. 
Most of the  current employment creation 
measures expire in the first half of 1993. Not all 
the work on redeveloping theSWR site will have 
been completed by then. Since the employment 
market has not yet undergone a radical improve-
ment, and because even the number of  planned 
new jobs cannot be achieved, intensive efforts 
are  being made to  continue the  work  already 
started with an average workforce of 900. Fur-
ther employment creation measures are planned 
for 300 persons on average. 
The number of employees benefiting from 
these  measures  should  be  degressive,  which 
Page9  El6 
Notes f16 Page 10 
Notes 
Employment  company 
Summary of SWR AG job creation measures 
(Status: June 1992) 
1.  Preparation of the site for new occupation 
(1st construction phase) (  630 persons) 
2.  Preparation of the site for new occupation 
(2nd construction phase) (  640 persons) 
3.  Improvement of  employment creation meas-
ures management 
4.  Preparation, coordination and planning clas-
sification of  employment creation measures 
5.  Survey of derelict sites 
6.  Preparation  for  a museum  for  the  former 
steel  site at Riesa 
7.  Survey of  the structural condition ofhousing 
belonging to SWR A  G 
8.  Multi-purpose building at Riesa!Merzdorf: 
-facade cleaning 
-public facilities 
-sanitary facilities 
-housing 
-surrounds 
9.  Work with children at the company holiday 
home 
l 0. Preparations for remedial work on the voca-
tional training centre 
11. Remedial work on the  vocational training 
centre 
means that a start is made with a large number 
of  employees who are then placed in new  jobs as 
the need arises. 
It is planned to hive off a small number of 
selected employment creation measures once 
the State support expires, for example as paint-
ing and decorating firms  and plant hire busi-
nesses. 
12. Resumption ofbusiness relations (trade with 
the east) 
13. Technical  information,  documentation  and 
publicity 
14. Cataloguing of  archives 
15. Social welfare of  employees 
16. Landscaping of open spaces at Riesa-Weida 
17. Planning and control of  employment creation 
measures 
18. Personnel and ergonomic aspects of  employ-
ment creation measures 
19. Materials  and  financial  aspects of employ-
ment creation measures 
20. Maintenance of sports facilities 
21. Control and security of  the Trobitz hazardous 
waste dump 
-supervision 
-engineering treatment 
22. Safety, improvement and remedial work on 
the Zachorna children's holiday camp 
23. Clearance of SWR site at Zeithain 
24. Recycling oftechnical apparatus 
Total workforce under ABM  1 530 
Close links were maintained  with local trades-
men at the planning and implementation stage, 
as a result of  which contracts to the order ofDM 
60 million were placed with small and medium-
sized companies in the region, creating a syner-
getic effect of  structural policy. 
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The  financing of the major employment 
creation measure was - apart from the financ-
ing received from the aforementioned sources 
-only possible with the support ofthe Treuhan-
danstalt Berlin  and with financing  from  the 
"Gemeinschaftswerk Aufschwung Ost" (Con-
certed Efforts for the Recovery of  the East). 
Support at a rate of  100 per cent was provid-
ed for both major employment creation meas-
ures in respect of both personnel and material 
costs. 
The funding  planned for  these  measures 
totals  DM  118.5  million,  of which approxi-
mately  36  million  are  in  the  form  of loans 
underwritten  from  the  Treuhandanstalt  and 
approx. DM 10 million are from funds held by 
the  Land of  Saxony and/or the '"Gemeinschafts-
werk Aufschwung Ost". 
Further training and retraining 
measures at SWR AG 
At  the  start  of the  restructuring  process  in 
1990, the social aspects associated with ensur-
ing regular incomes through payment of the 
maintenance allowance were of  overriding in-
terest for the implementation of FuU (further 
training and retraining) measures. Employees 
with "short-time work zero" status in particu-
lar were assigned to FuU measures (the main-
tenance allowance payable for further training 
and retraining  is  5  per cent higher than the 
short-time working subsidy for a working time 
of  zero hours). 
Considerable numbers of familiarization 
courses were offered initially, although addi-
tional training measures were frequently in-
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eluded.  More  detailed  plans  for  structural 
change and the adoption of concrete reloca-
tion projects by new investors were accompa-
nied in about the second quarter of 1991 by an 
enhanced process of gearing training meas-
ures  to  the  actual  needs  of potential  new 
investors  and the  anticipated local  employ-
ment market. 
Job-related  training  measures  were  also 
provided directly in the parent companies of 
the new investors. 
Training was not only made available in the 
form of  support, in the context of  employment 
creation measures with a training content of 
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Further training and retraining for employees 
ofSWRAG 
from  199~23.  t 1.92 
Subject field  Status of training measures 
E16 
current  completed 
fromABM  fromKUGO  fromABM  fromKUG 0 
Commercial  - 242  - 177 
Computers/hardware and 
software applications  I  50  191  130 
Environmental protection  - 5  19  21 
Welding/Basic and advanced 
courses  32  3  344  -
Construction 
machinery  /transport  112  53  277  18 
Building trades  9  41  - I  -
-------
Electrical 
I  engineering/electronics  13  45  45  28 
Fitter  3  23  89  I  18 
-
Others, and short courses  32  69  218  268 
Total participants  202  531  1183  660 
of  whom female  65  304  125  349 E16  Page 12 
Notes  A 
BSTAHJ.~  GmbH 
20% maximum or 50% maximum of  working 
time, but were also provided on the basis of 
"short-time zero" status. 
During the period under consideration, i.e. 
since 1990, 2 400 employees ofSWR AG have 
completed  a  further  training  or  retraining 
course.  Of these,  approximately  1 300  were 
part-time in conjunction with an employment 
creation measure. 
Notes 
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Gesellschaft fiir 
Arbeitsforderung, 
Beschaftigung und 
Strukturentwicklung 
mbH Stahl (ABS Stahl) 
The formation of  ABS Stahl (company for  job 
promotion, employment and structural devel-
opment in  the steel indust1y),  largely at the 
initiative of the  /G Metal! union,  coincided 
with the creation of  five further ABS common 
funds on  1.1.1992, which are ranked equaiiy 
with the regionaiiy oriented companies with-
in  the  structure of the  At~fbauwerk Sachsen 
(Saxony Redevelopment Board) (seep. 17). 
ABS Stahl is a company with limited liabil-
ity run by a project advisory council. 
ABS Stahl is broken down into subsidiar-
ies, which were established at the most impor-
tant sites of  the Saxony steel industry in close 
association with the various companies. 
A major contributory factor to  the  estab-
lishment of ABS was the fact that the short-
time  workers  with  zero  hours  working time 
employed in the original companies up to the 
end of  1991 were no longer financable because 
of the increasing non-wage labour costs (em-
ployer's contributions to sickness and pensions 
insurance funds must be paid by the company 
on expiry of a special arrangement), and were 
thus facing redundancy. 
This  solution  was  arrived  at  in  order to 
build a bridge for these people and give them 
time to transfer to alternative employment in 
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the "primary" employment market, which had 
already collapsed. 
The contract of employment with the old 
company ceased with their admission into ABS 
Stahl,  and a  smooth transition  into  the new 
employment relationship then took place on 
the basis of  a new contract with ABS. 
The creation of  ABS Stahl marked the start 
of intensive  efforts  to  provide  opportunities 
and improve the chances of individual reinte-
gration through job creation measures and/or 
training. 
In the first month following its foundation, 
the workforce at ABS Stahl had risen to  ap-
proximately 1 300. 
The chart below illustrates personnel de-
velopment at ABS Stahl since its foundation. It 
can be seen that the company managed even in 
the first two months of  its existence to place a 
large  number  of employees  in  employment 
creation and training/retraining measures. 
Financing 
The financial basis for the work of  ABS is, first 
and  foremost,  the  funding  provided  by the 
Bundesanstaltfi"irArbeit (Federal Labour Agen-
cy)  in the  context of the  Labour Promotion 
Law. 
The co-financing of ABS Stahl was made 
possible through financial support provided by 
the  Treuhandanstalt Berlin  and the  Land of 
Saxony. These funds were applied in particular 
to: 
•  the "peak" financing of short-time work-
ing, i.e. the employers' contributions under 
Manual Social Crisis Management 
Fields of activity of  ABS Stahl 
Extrad from the Articles of Incorporation 
"The purpose of  the company is to support the 
planning,  the  organizational  implementation 
and the promotion of  targeted vocational train-
ing and employment measures, in particular in 
accordance with the Labour Promotion Law. 
In conjunction with this, the following fields of 
main interest: 
•  vocational training, 
•  promotion of  employment; 
•  innovative project/product development; 
•  new busines starts 
should focus on the development of regional 
social infrastructure, contribute to the conser-
vation and improvement of the environment, 
and accompany and supplement measures for 
improving the regional economic structure. 
Because ofthe numerous points of  contract and 
interlinking, the four areas of  main interest are 
dealt with by the company in cooperation with 
local authorities, rural districts, companies and 
the  regional  training  and  industrial  develop-
ment facilities." 
para 63.4 of  the Labour Promotion Law in 
respect of: 
- sickness insurance; 
- pensions insurance; 
- unemployment insurance; 
-holidays; 
•  non-wage labour costs, e.g. contributions to 
the Benifsgenossenschaft (employer's lia-
bility insurance association) and  bank charg-
es for wage payments; 
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•  managers'  remuneration  not  financable 
under the Labour Promotion Law. 
A cooperation agreement was entered into 
between the Treuhandanstalt Berlin and ABS 
Stahl, the effect of  which is to assume respon-
sibility for  these  cost elements;  also  gives a 
fundamental assurance of  the material/techni-
cal  support for ABS with material  resources 
from the original companies. This concerns the 
following individual areas: 
•  computer processing  of wage  and  salary 
payments  by  original  companies,  or  the 
financing of a company to do the work; 
•  the use of buildings and land for training 
and  employment  creation  measures,  and 
for business purposes; 
•  the technical equipment of  ABS with vehi-
cles, machinery, apparatus, tools and mate-
rials. 
This was backed up by additional cooper-
ation agreements which the  individual  sub-
Personnel development at ABS Stahl 
Projects 
Full 
Feb  Mar  Apr  Mai  Jun  Jul  Aug  Okt  Dez  Jan 
92  92  92  92  92  92  92  92  92  93 
Employment  company 
sidiaries entered into with the original com-
panies. 
One shortcoming to emerge in the cooper-
ation agreement between Treuhand and ABS 
is the absence of agreed purchase options for 
land and buildings for privatised parts of the 
firm. 
ABS Stahl subsidiary at Riesa 
Close  links  naturally  already  exist  between 
SWR AG and the  ABS  subsidiary at  Riesa, 
given their geographical proximity (the head 
office ofABS Stahl is at Riesa); the Managing 
Director of  ABS Stahl is also a member of  the 
boardofSWRAG. The measures and activities 
accordingly form part and parcel of  the process 
of structural change initiated by SWR AG. 
Employees of ABS 
The employees to be transferred from SWRAG 
to the ABS subsidiary were selected largely 
from  the  point of view of preserving their 
entitlements under the ECSC l;reaty. 
For example, employees who were nearing 
their  55th  birthday  were  not  accepted  into 
ABS, but were left within the structure ofSWR 
AG in the  context of in-house  employment 
creation measures or short-time work zero. 
Those employees who were already pre-
paring themselves specifically for transfer to 
one of  the new investors who had relocated to 
the SWR AG site were also retained within 
the structure of SWR AG. 
Employees from Elektronik Riesa GmbH 
and  TEXTIMA GroBenhain,  in  addition to 
Manual Social Crisis Management Employment company 
those from SWR AG, were taken on by the 
ABS-Stahl subsidiary at Riesa in the interests 
of regionalisation. 
The  training structure within the  ABS 
subsidiary is  illustrated in the Table below. 
The  remarkably  large  proportion of highly 
qualified persons is a peculiarity of  East Ger-
man employment companies. It can be taken 
as  an indicator of the potential capacity for 
innovation available in such companies. 
Projects  known  as  income-generating 
fields were installed alongside the employ-
ment  creation  measures  and  the  training 
measures. These enabled the company to work 
increasingly towards exploiting profitable ar-
eas of activity in the  service sector.  People 
employed in these fields are not participants in 
employment creation measures, nor are  they 
funded under the Labour Promotion Law. The 
following Table provides a summary of  current 
or planned employment creation measures. 
Most  participants  are  engaged  on  structural 
changes  on  the  site  (dismantling  of the  bar 
rolling mill and changes to the business incu-
bator centre, whereas the overwhelming pro-
portion of employment creation measures are 
Managing Director  I 
I 
isllalion  lr 
son nell 
!/Accounts 
ers/Paypol1cy 
trolling 
Purchasing 
ges 
I 
Sponsoring company 
Gr6ditz 
I 
Innovation/ 
Project planning 
Project plann1ng/Des1gn 
PrOJect  development/ 
Market  analysis 
I 
Subsidiary 
Lout  a 
lr-
1-
1-
Training 
Assistance/Guidance/ 
Cooperation 
Further training and 
retra1n1ng 
Tra1n1ng  trend analysis 
I 
Subsidiary 
Delitzsch 
Organization  chart 
ABS  Stahl  GmbH  Riese 
Status:  January 1993 
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Management 
I 
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Qualifications structure 
in the Riesa ABS subsidiary of  ADS-Stahl 
(Status: February 1993) 
of which:  of which: 
Level of qualification  percentage  absolute  weiblich  mannlich 
- -- ---
University graduates  00%  1  1 
Graduate engineers  02%  8  8 
Engineers, coli. cert.  20%  64  28  36 
Foremen (Meister)  02%  8  8 
Skilled workers  66%  215  67 
I  148 
Semi-skilled workers  08%  26  9 
i  17 
.Unskilled workers  01%  2  1  1 
Total  100%  324  105  219 
Employment creation measures of 
ABS Stahl, Riesa subsidiary 
(Status: Dezember 1992) 
I  Dismantling bar rolling mill  (l  00 persons) 
2  Reconstruction of  the business incubator centre 
3  River bank reinstatement of  the river Elbe 
4  Improvements in living environment 
5  Project group 
6  Citizens' advice bureau 
7  Project group AFG amendment (§249h AFG) 
8  River Elbe bank reinstatement, cycle track 
9  Cycle track/pedestrian track, Riesa-Park 
10  River Elbe bank reinstatement, stage 2 
11  Redevelopment of  industrial wasteland/Steinweg 
12  I  Recycling of  electronical apparatus 
13  Provision of  parking spaces 
I 
14  1  Repairofresidential roads and field tracks 
15  Site remedial work/Canitz 
16  Rehabilitation of  town railway station 
17  Wasteland imporvement at Gohlis 
Total employment creation force  ca.40 
Employment  company 
concerned with traditional  areas  such as  the 
improvement of local authority infrastructure 
and measures aimed at improving the environ-
ment and social services (see the Summary of 
employment creation measures next page). 
A  further Table (see  the Summary of in-
come-generating fields next page) provides a 
summary of such projects with  the eventual 
aim of privatisation. These hiving-off opera-
tions  will  initially have a  common manage-
ment structure, the intention being to prevent 
well  equipped  enterpreneurs  going  bust  be-
cause of inadequate familiarity with the run-
ning of a business. 
Income-generating projects 
of ABS Stahl, Riesa subsidiary 
(Status: Dezember 1992) 
1  Cleaning of  glass and buildings 
2  Motor vehicle recycling 
3  Building maintenance, garden care 
site and road cleaning 
4  Auxiliary building and maintenance services 
via works contract 
5  Typing and service office 
6  Commercial office 
7  Local goods transport 
8  Recycling of  plastic waste 
9  Laser and plasma cutting 
10  Training of  long-term unemployed people 
II  Quality assurance/environmental surveys 
12  Software development and sales 
13  Demolition and rehabilitation company 
14  Personnel services  (planned: 100 persons) 
Employees in current projects:  4 
Planned number of  employees  17L 
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The  further training and retraining  Aufbauwerk im 
measures of  ABS-Stahl at Riesa are situat-
ed, in terms of  their content, largely within 
the  framework  already  set  out  for  SWR 
AG, although they are scarcely significant 
in  terms of the number of participants, at 
38  in total (status:  December 1992), with 
the result that they are not covered separate-
ly here. 
Freistaat Sachsen 
GmbH (Free State of 
Saxony Redevelopment 
Company) 
In addition to the special arrangements accom-
panying  structural  change  under the  Federal 
Labour Agency, numerous initiatives were also 
taken at national level in conjunction with the 
Treuhand  and  the  unions  in  support  of the 
transformation process. 
The!G Metal! union in particular has adopt-
ed an  active position in Saxony in relation to 
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Advisory Staff 
~ 
Development and 
support for regional 
companies 
AW**  AW** 
Chemnitz  Zwickau 
Saxony Redevelopment 
Company 
Aufbauwerk im Freistaat Sachsen GmbH) 
(sponsoring company at federal state level)  ~ 
J L 
Sponsoring companies at regional level 
AW**  AW**  AW**  AW**  AW**  AW** 
Vogtland  Pirna  Bautzen  Riesa  Erz- FIOha 
MeiBen  gebirge 
GroJlenhain 
¢I Sponsoring companies 
at sectoral level 
·lABS  ¢  special facilities* 
¢I  Sp.onsoring company 
Science 
} 
AW**  AW** 
Leipzig  Dresden 
·~~~~~--~~--~~--~~~~~~~~~~--~~--~~--~~~~~~  ..  ~· 
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A total of  six ABS special facilities were 
established, as follows: 
- Mechanical  and  Plant  Engineering: 
based at Leipzig; 
- Electrical Industry: based at Dresden; 
- Rail Vehicle and Agricultural Machine-
ry Building: based at Bischofswerda; 
- Steel: based at Riesa; 
- Tool and Textile Machinery Building: 
based at Chemnitz; 
- Road vehicles: based at Zwickau. 
These  ABS  special  facilities,  deriving 
directly from an initiative adopted by the 
Dresden regional office of  the /G Metal/ 
union, created an opportunity for trans-
ferring  into  these  companies  the  large 
numbers of  short-time workers with zero 
working hours who were employed at the 
time in particular within the metal and 
electrical industries in Saxony, and for 
securing their status initially. 
The personal  severance pay due to  an 
employee on his transfer from a releasing 
the  social underpinning of structural change, 
and in  fact  has  played a  leading role  in the 
search for and formulation of active structural 
policy. 
One  significant  result  of these  activities 
was  the  establishment of the  Aujbauwerk in 
Freistaat Sachs  en GmbH  (Free State of  Saxony 
Redevelopment Company) in September 1991. 
Employment  company 
company  to  ABS-Stahl  is  paid  into  a 
special account at ABS. 
This special  facility is  not used for  fi-
nancing the routine business of  the ABS, 
and is also not part of  the estate in bank-
ruptcy,  should the  situation arise.  It is 
used solely for the co-financing of  meas-
ures undertaken by the employment com-
pany at a level equivalent to the achieva-
ble  interest  rates.  The  amount of his 
personal severance pay will be paid  to any 
employee leaving the ABS special facil-
ity. 
By "placing" his severance pay in this 
way, every employee contributes to the 
financing of the employment company, 
even if only to a  comparatively small 
extent. 
It  is thus possible to use the available time 
to  set up new and meaningful employ-
ment creation measures and business ac-
tivity projects, to promote training, and 
by so doing to provide those concerned 
with better chances for re-entry into a job, 
but also to give employees the time to 
search for a new job. 
The redevelopment company is a joint ini-
tiative  by the  public  authorities,  employers' 
federations,  unions  and  the  Dresdner Bank. 
The company has a limited life, initially until 
31.12.1996. 
The  task profile of the  redevelopment 
company has been defined as follows: 
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"The central  task of the  redevelopment 
company is to support company, local author-
ity and regional activities to  secure existing 
jobs and to create new jobs, above all in the 
context of  ABS companies (companies for job 
promotion, employment and structural devel-
opment in the steel industry), through 
a)  advice on the logical and effective uti-
lization of  the opportunities for job creation 
and vocational in-service training provided by 
the Labour Promotion Law; and 
b)  preparation  for integration into old  and 
new businesses and for the establishment of 
new businesses. 
The promotion and the progressive devel-
opment of  a medium-sized business structure 
occupy a leading role in the work of  the rede-
velopment company.  This requires the devel-
opment of  decentralized structures with a view 
to creating jobs from local need analyses and 
organizing training, i.e. finding regional solu-
tions which contribute in a concrete fashion to 
the improvement of  working and living condi-
tions and economic development". 
The  aforementioned  decentral  structures 
were and are established as sponsoring compa-
nies at a regional level (TGR) and as  special 
ABS facilities at sectoral level. 
Provisional assessment 
With the total collapse of  the steel undertaking 
affecting the structure of an entire region, the 
socially acceptable restructuring of  an old and 
antiquated steel site into a modern industrial 
site is a demanding task, which is made all the 
Manual Social Crisis Management 
more difficult by the poor overall economic 
situation in the new Lander and by the fact that 
a basic economic and social change is taking 
place at the same time. 
In  these conditions, optimal use has been 
made of  the available employment market pol-
icy instruments.  One very encouraging aspect 
(from the point of view of environmental and 
employment policy) is the close identification 
with the "site recycling" concept. 
Taking  the  concept  of structural  change 
outlined here as the starting point, and thanks 
to a process of  intensive acquisition, a cooper-
ative  approach  and  optimum support,  it  has 
proved possible to attract a number of  investors 
who hold out considerable hope of  employment 
development for the Riesa region. 
At the time of writing, 51  companies have 
established themselves on the former SWR AG 
site as hived-off operations or relocating busi-
nesses.  Between them, they provided employ-
ment for  2 580 people at the  start of January 
1993; this is an encouraging 80 per cent of  the 
originally  planned  level  of employment.  No 
account was taken of  people working on income-
generating projects run by the ABS-Stahl sub-
sidiary  at  Riesa.  The  number is  expected  to 
increase to 3 200 employees by January 1994. 
The Elbe-Stahlwerke Feralpi GmbH com-
pany will continue the tradition of  steel produc-
tion, albeit with far fewer jobs and much lower 
annual production.  This  plant produces con-
structional steel, essentially intended for sup-
ply to the regional construction industry. Ac-
cording to the experts, a further 1 200 jobs can 
be expected to be created in the surrounding 
region. 
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Not only is the approach to reorganization 
described here important for the region in the 
sense of  employment market policy, but it also 
improves  its  image.  It  also  has  an  indirect 
business-promoting effect, given the right me-
dia coverage. 
Notes 
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It is nevertheless true that the restructuring 
of the Riesa steel site will not offer adequate 
solutions for a large number of  employees, and 
that  the  number  of jobs  in  the  region  will 
eventually be reduced to fewer than half, even 
if all the plans are implemented in full. 
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Model: 
Qualifizierungs-
zentrum 
Qualifications centres of  the kind described 
here  are the former  training facilities  of 
steel companies in regions where such com-
panies  dominated  a  relevant part of the 
employment market and the training supp-
ly. Their training facilities are being trans-
formed on a broad basis of social consensus 
into  qualification  centres  with  a  regional 
accent and are intended to play an active 
part in structural change in the region. 
This concept was developed by the  Indu-
striegewerkschaft Metal! union in conjunction 
with Works Councils and representatives of  the 
trainees and managers from the personnel de-
partments of  the companies originally concer-
ned.  The primary aim was to  ensure that the 
companies upheld their responsibility for the 
region, and to maintain existing capacities. 
In order to guarantee the supply of  training 
places for  the  region,  the  company manage-
ments reach agreement with the other players 
(local authorities, chambers of  trade and indu-
stry and unions) on the formation of limited 
liability companies. These extend the compa-
nies' former training facilities into more gene-
ral-purpose regional qualifications centres. 
The aim of these centres is to maintain the 
existing training capacities and to put them to 
Manual Social Crisis Management 
active use in the structural change in the regi-
on,  developing a distinct regionally oriented 
profile. 
This  includes training for  the  companies 
belonging  to  the  limited  company,  and  for 
small  and  medium-sized  companies  in  the 
region. The range of facilities offered focuses 
on  occupations  and qualifications  for  which 
there is very likely to be a considerable demand 
in the years to come. The qualifications centres 
are  also  concerned with  the  development of 
new products and services and the creation of 
positive site factors for new businesses in order 
to attract new sectors of employment. 
Descriptions are provided below of  two of 
the  four  centres  at  Oberhausen,  Osnabriick, 
Hattingn and Duisburg-Rheinhausen. 
Bildungswerk 
Hattingen GmbH 
(BHW) 
The Hattingen region, a traditional location of 
suppliers  to  the  steel  and mining industries, 
was unable to avoid major job losses caused by 
the coal and steel  crisis.  The  unemployment 
0 
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4.4 per cent in 1978 was still below the average 
for the  Land of North Rhine-Westphalia, alt-
hough at 16.8 per cent by 1988 it had risen well 
above  it.  The  decline  in jobs in  the  metals 
industry at Hattingen, from about 10 500 ( 1978) 
to about 5 200 (1988 ), can be attributed largely 
to the Thyssen Heinrichshiitte (THh) company 
(later renamed as the Vereinigte Schmiedewer-
ke GmbH), where 4 500 jobs were lost during 
the period in question. 
With  the  support  of the  Land of North 
Rhine-Westphalia  and  regional  players  (La-
bour Market Administration, local authorities, 
local IG Metal! union, chambers of trade and 
industry  and  Works  Councils  and  company 
management ofTHh), the shareholders ofVer-
einigte Schmiedewerke (VSG), the city ofHat-
tingen and the Hans-Bockler-Stiftung- a foun-
dation of the DGB (German trade union con-
gress)  - formed  the  Bildungswerk Hattingen 
GmbH (Hattingen  training  company)  on 
21.7 .1988, and by so doing secured the continu-
ed existence of the THh (now VSG) training 
workshop. 
Shareholder 
Share 
inDM 
Vereinigte Schmiedewerke 
12.500 
GmbH 
Stadt Hattingen  12.500 
Hans-Bockler Foundation of  the 
12.500 
DGB 
Ennepe-Ruhr District Council  12.500 
Equity capital  50.000 
Qualifications  centre 
Aims 
The Bildungswerk Hattingen seeks: 
•  to maintain material and human resources 
for qualified training, to separate the initial 
training structure from the requirements of 
major companies, and to prepare people for 
the kind of work and working conditions 
found in small and medium-sized compa-
nies; 
•  to develop training facilities, with content 
and organization tailored to the needs of 
companies in the  region~  and take account of 
the skills and experience of  production and 
maintenance workers; 
•  to combine training and technological inno-
vation, and in so doing to give an impulse 
for  the  spread  and  development of new 
production processes. 
In October 1990, the Ennepe-Ruhr District 
Council, in which Hattingen is situated, deci-
ded to acquire a share in the company, to which 
end the VSG sold half  of  its original investment 
to the District. The company then had the ow-
nership structure shown in the Table. 
Financing 
The  Bildungswerk Hattingen  is  financed,  or 
finances itself through: 
•  Revenue from the Federal/  Lander program-
me for maintaining future-oriented training 
capacity  in  the  coal  and steel  regions of 
North Rhine-Westphalia; 
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Advisory Council 
of the 
Bildungswerk Hattingen 
•  The  Labour Market Administration may 
comment on the employment market and 
training situation and the regional qualifi-
cations needs; 
•  The chamber of  trade and industry is fami-
liar with the regional training situation and 
is able to formulate requirements in respect 
of  training courses; 
e The  Wirtschaftsvereinigung  Stahl  (steel 
trade association) points out the quantitati-
ve  situation and  the  qualitative require-
ments for training from a cross-company 
point of  view; 
•  The  Hans-Bockler Stiftung (foundation), 
as a body for the promotion of study and 
codetermination, develops DGB concepts 
for vocational training, giving special consi-
deration to the interests of  the employees; 
•  Income from training for the internal needs 
of  the VSG; 
•  Income from qualification measures; 
•  Proceeds from development work and out-
side production. 
A board oftrustees was formed to monitor 
the budgetary and economic management of 
the company. It consists of one representative 
for each shareholder and safeguards their rights. 
The board receives professional support for its 
Manual Social Crisis Management 
•  The  Berufoforderungszentrum  Essen  e. V. 
(Essen vocational promotion centre), with its 
experience as a vocational training centre for 
adults,  helps  to  formulate  training  course 
contents and methods; 
•  The City of  Hattingen and the Ennepe-Ruhr 
District Council represent the public interest 
in qualified training in the region, as well as 
the requirements oflocal authority economic 
development and industrial relocation poli-
cy. 
•  The Ministry for Economics, Small Busines-
ses and Technology formulates the objecti-
ves of  the Land, in particular with regard to 
structural change in the Ruhr region; 
•  The  Works  Council  involves  itself in  the 
training of  employees and in the interests of 
trainees and trainers, by indicating possible 
training needs from its point of  view. 
work from the Advisory Council (see Chart). 
It is  an  association of institutions which are 
concerned with problems of  vocational training 
from  various  points  of view  and  thus  have 
access to a broad spectrum of  knowledge and 
experience. 
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66 places per year are available for initial voca-
tional training, the type of occupations being 
characterized less and less by what used to be 
the dominant industry. The training of30 out of 
the 60 trainees in the industrial/technical area 
receives financial support through the Federal/ 
Lander programme; the other 30, together with 
6 commercial trainees, received training in 1991 
to meet the needs of  the VSG. 
The industrial/technical training will be dif-
ferentiated in future, and greater emphasis will 
be placed on commercial training. The BWH 
will also enable its trainees to transfer what they 
have  learned  to  other training  and  working 
conditions in the region, by teaching them key 
non-technical skills such as independence and 
the ability to communicate and cooperate and 
stimulating their motivation  for  further  trai-
ning. The ongoing restructuring ofthe industri-
al  metalworking and electrical trades has  an 
important role to play in all this. It also provides 
small and medium-sized businesses, which are 
either  not  able  or not  prepared  to  meet  all 
aspects of training  themselves,  with supple-
mentary courses on which their trainees can 
obtain qualifications. 
Further training 
As even top-rate initial training is increasingly 
becoming insufficient for an employee's full 
working life, the training centre provides a form 
of training adapted to the needs of  the region. 
Support is provided here for small and medium-
sized companies in  such areas as  computer-
assisted technologies (CNC technology, CADI 
CAM,  and  stored-program  control)  and  hy-
Qualifications  centre 
draulic and pneumatic engineering. In addition, 
the BWH also runs courses at the request of  the 
Labour Market Administration under the pro  vi-
sions of the Labour Promotion Law (e.g.  for 
migrant workers arriving from the East) and 
devises computer courses for commercial trai-
ning. 
Regional cooperation 
The BWH builds up regional cooperation struc-
tures and mounts joint projects in cooperation 
with various other institutions. Most of these 
lead to an environmentally relevant qualificati-
on, such as the concept study "environmentally 
and innovation-oriented training", which was 
implemented jointly with the Department for 
Environmental Protection of  the University of 
Dortmund. 
The aim is to make Hattingen the environ-
mental centre ofNorth Rhine-Westphalia and, 
by maintaining the training facilities of  the coal 
and steel industry, to satisfy the need for quali-
fications of  the regional economy. The training 
centre is also involved in model experiments 
with other sponsors in the region. 
Notes 
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Qualifizierungszentrum 
Rheinhausen GmbH 
(QZR) (Rheinhausen 
Qualifications Centre) 
Following notification by Krupp Stahl AG of 
its intention to close the Duisburg-Rheinhausen 
plant, the employees and their representative 
organizations made a  major public-relations 
bid to save their jobs. One result of  the negotia-
tions between the federal government, theLand 
government of North Rhein-Westphalia,  the 
parties to the collective agreement and the Works 
Councils aimed at securing the existence ofjobs 
and training places in Rheinhausen  was the 
establishment of  the Qualifizierungszentrum 
Rheinhausen (  Rheinhausen qualifications cen-
tre), which can be traced back to an initiative of 
the IG Metal! union. It  was founded as a GmbH 
Share 
Shareholder  inDM 
Krupp Stahl AG  25.000 
Fried. Krupp GmbH  20.000 
Mannesmann Rohrenwerke AG  30.000 
Stadt Duisburg  12.500 
Lower Rhine Chamber of 
Industry and Commerce 
Duisburg-Wesel-Kleve 
at Duisburg  12.500 
Equity capital  100.000 
Manual Social Crisis Management 
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ZENTRUM 
RHEINHAUSEN GmbH 
(limited company) in mid-December 1987 with 
the following shareholder composition: 
The local Labour Market Administration, 
the  Fraunhofer  Institute  for  Microelectronic 
Circuitry and Systems, the University ofDuis-
burg, the Essen Vocational Promotion Centre, 
the Duisburg Chamber of  Commerce, the Min-
istries at federal and Land level, the company 
Works Council and three representatives of  the 
IG Metal! union  are represented on the board 
of trustees. 
Training 
The "traditional" training arm of Krupp Stahl 
AG, which previously concerned itself mainly 
with technical occupations in the steel sector 
and the stock occupations in the industrial me-
tallurgical and electrical sector, was revamped 
to reflect the new metallurgical and electrical 
functions.  Similar changes were made to the 
commercial training arm. 
This reform means that the communication 
of specialized skills is no longer the sole con-
cern, but rather that the trainees should learn to 
adapt independently and flexiblY to new situa-
tions and requirements. Skills of  this kind are f17 Page 6 
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indispensable in the changing regional econo-
mic structure. In addition, the declared objecti-
ve is to improve the chances for young women 
through qualified vocational training. 
A full course of training is offered by the 
Rheinhausen Qualifications Centre in the follo-
wing occupations, at the present time: 
•  Office administration; 
•  Office communications; 
•  Industrial administration; 
•  Forwarding and freight; 
•  Electronics (special subject: industrial en-
gineering); 
•  Communications electronics (special sub-
ject: information technology); 
•  Industrial mechanical engineering (special 
subject: industrial engineering); 
•  Machining engineering (special subject: ma-
chining). 
Further training 
The Rheinhausen Qualification Centre concen-
trates on "applied logistics", "automation tech-
nology" and "office communication and orga-
nization". The courses take account of  the latest 
technical standards and provide not only spe-
cialist skills, but also human values such as the 
ability  to  act  independently  and  team-spirit. 
Notes 
Qualifications  centre 
The intention here is to provide further training 
for workers from companies within the regional 
economy who do  not yet meet, or no longer 
meet, current or future requirements. 
The idea is to match the training to the needs 
of  the client (companies already located in, or 
about to relocate to, the region). 
Innovation 
The Rheinhausen Qualifications Centre is also 
seeking to fill  "niches'' which are ignored by 
other providers of  training. It  perceives a parti-
cular need amongst small and medium-sized 
companies which are in the process of  entering 
new markets as  a result of structural change, 
and where there is a requirement for new skills. 
At the same time companies such as these have 
a need for advice on the use and the organizatio-
nal  incorporation  of new  technologies.  The 
Centre thus hopes to be able to keep pace with 
what  is  happening  in  the  companies  and  to 
provide realistic training. 
It will also seek to cooperate with universi-
ties and other scientific institutions in the regi-
on, as a source of  further ideas. The aforemen-
tioned board of  trustees, which is involved in 
various projects, was formed for this reason. 
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Model: 
ZWAR 
Zwischen 
Arbeit und 
Ruhestand 
The  aim  of ZW  AR  (  =  between  work  and 
retirement  )is to help to stimulate self-help for 
a life in early retirement. People who have 
taken early retirement and their partners 
are supported to develop new life perspec-
tives by way of  neighbourhood schemes and 
projects. 
Background 
ZW  AR was created in 1979 on the basis of 
the experience gained at the University of 
Dortmund over a number of years with its 
"pensioners' studies" and "academy of the 
third  age".  The  initiators  wished  to  find 
ways of dealing with a  new social group: 
the "young old" in regions undergoing in-
dustrial restructuring; this is work with peo-
ple- predominantly steelworkers and mine-
workers  - who  leave  gainful  employment 
early  and  have  to  gear  a  relatively  long 
period of their lives in which they are con-
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fronted with quite different framework con-
ditions. 
They tend to  see  themselves as  having 
been made redundant and "forced" into re-
tirement,  but  also  as  having  had  the  load 
taken off their shoulders and freed to live a 
different life. The "young old" are faced with 
the dilemma of  clearly no longer being need-
ed, in spite of being willing and able. 
Their entry into the "third age" is accompa-
nied by various changes, although these are 
mainly perceived as  being of a negative na-
ture: 
•  Loss of social  status  and social  roles  in 
society; 
•  -Loss of  social contacts at the workplace; 
•  New time structure, maximising their freely 
available time; 
•  Change in self-esteem; 
•  New family situation resulting from being 
home more. 
The project was not linked to the Universi-
ty,  but rather to  companies  and neighbour-
hoods; it attracted support from industrial un-
ions and the HOESCH steelworks. Since 1984, 
ZW  AR has attracted financial support via the 
Ministry for Urban Development and Trans-
port of the Land ofNorth Rhine-Westphalia. 
The  Tragerverein ZWAR e. V.  (ZW  AR spon-
soring association) was established in  1990, 
its  members  coming  from  welfare  associa-
tions,  the  City  of Dortmund  and  the  trade 
umons. 
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Organization 
ZW  AR is subdivided into four types of group 
(see chart): 
•  basic neighbourhood groups; 
•  sub-groups of  the above; 
•  combined groups; 
•  delegates' group 
The  basic groups are the "cells" from which 
all  activities proceed,  and which receive the 
feedback. Based on these are the sub-groups, 
with their various thematic points of  emphasis, 
and the combined groups (see chart), wherev-
Life between work and retirement 
* CG = Combined Group 
er there are insufficient people for particular 
interests  in  the  basic  groups.  The  group of 
delegates takes care of the networking of all 
basic and combined groups. It meets monthly. 
In addition, seminars are held three times a year 
for delegates and for women's affairs, at which 
subjects of  special interest are discussed. 
In the first seven years of  its existence, the 
work of  ZW  AR was directed mainly at estab-
lishing and consolidating groups in parts of  the 
cities, and at developing networks spanning the 
various parts of  the cities. The main emphasis 
since 1986 has been placed on the "advice" and 
"model transfer" aspects. 
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Advice involves the passing on of experi-
ence to other areas of  socio-pedagogical work, 
especially concerning organisational planning 
and implementation, institutional consultancy, 
supervision, and the provision of  assistance in 
connection with the construction of  a ZWAR-
specific approach to "cultural work with older 
people". 
As  far  as  model transfer is  concerned, 
groups were set up  in  various local authority 
areas and there were systematic transfers with 
the towns ofBergkamen, Ahlen, Hamm, Liinen, 
Bottrop  and Herten.  The  starting point as  a 
general  rule  is  a  request for  advice from  an 
institution or a local authority. The next step is 
the provision of  information relating to all ini-
tiatives and associations, etc., which are active-
ly involved in working with old people in the 
local authority area. A group of  sponsors is then 
formed in order to implement the ZW  AR con-
cept, with continuous support and advice from 
ZWAR. 
Target group 
The participants in the ZW  AR scheme are the 
"young  old";  they  are  essentially  industrial 
workers of both sexes who have been made 
redundant under the various early retirement 
arrangements which take effect as early as 50 
(mining) or 55 (steel), as well as the long-term 
unemployed and those who are unfit to work, 
,who have little or no chance of  placement in the 
employment market. The followingdata relat-
ing to participants are available (status 1988): 
•  55 per cent women, 45 per cent men; 
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Quantitative development of 
ZWAR groups 
from 1979 to 1990 
Basic  Sub·  Combined 
Year  groups  groups  groups 
1979  3  -- --
1984  11  approx.  50  4 
1985  15  75  9 
1986  18  81  14 
1987  19  66  19 
1988  22  81  23 
1989  28  127  22 
1990  29  175  31 
•  Average age 60 (women 59, men 61); 
•  73 per cent ofthe women and 77 per cent of 
the  men  have  a  lower secondary  school 
leaving certificate; 
•  8 per cent of  the women and 3 per  cent of  the 
men were still in gainful employment; 
•  28 per cent of  the men were in early retire-
ment; ofthe63 percent  of  the men who were 
already retired, by far the majority had pre-
viously been in early retirement; 
•  Of the women, 21  per cent were in early 
retirement, 71 per  cent were "housewives", 
of whom 14 per cent had only ever been 
housewives, and 57 per cent had previously 
been in gainful employment. 
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This group of  persons may be characterized 
on the whole as follows: 
•  low involvement in social life; 
•  not much disposable income; 
•  needs-oriented, rather than consumption-
oriented; 
•  poor health; 
•  job-related skills; 
•  school career curtailed for historical rea-
sons (lower secondary school leaving cer-
tificate); 
•  lots of  time available; 
•  need for new social contacts. 
Notes 
Life between work and  retirement 
Concept: 
groups as a place of 
learning 
The ZW  AR "teamers" provide support work 
within the groups. They are neither leaders nor 
advisers. The aim is rather for free learning to 
take  place in  a non-hierarchical atmosphere, 
irrespective of  any previously acquired qualifi-
cations and without an ultimate examination 
objective. We know from experience that there 
is a process lasting for three years in which the 
autonomy of  the group grows, the members are 
able to act increasingly independently, and the 
"teamer"-after an initially strong involvement 
in organization and moderation - takes a back-
seat. 
Most group members find themselves in an 
entirely new situation, in that their working life 
was clearly structured. ZW  AR offers no sub-
ject-specific courses or seminars. The principle 
of  process-oriented and product  -oriented learn-
ing calls upon each group initially to identify 
opportunities of  their own accord. As a part of 
this periodic "re-orientation", the participants 
come to  realize that a functioning group de-
pends not on a leader, but rather on individual 
group members. 
One frequent consequence ofthe breadth of 
the  spectrum of interests  is  that  both  group 
members and "teamers" can only cover partial 
aspects of the various subject areas.  In these 
cases, the groups utilize whatever facilities are 
available locally, by inviting experts to act as 
advisers. 
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Frauen entern nun die 
,Vertrouwen": ZWAR 
segelt in den Sommer 
Von Andreas Wonkelstniter 
.Leonen •os"  ~eom es am Doenstag fur dte. Vertrouwen" tm Hetmathafen Dortmund  Dann wtll dte 
Crew  Zwtschen Arbett und Ruhestand" (ZWAR) dte Segel setzen und mtt threm Plattbodenschlff 
aut grolle Tour gehen  Segeltorns den ganzen Sommer uber  Bet strahlendem Sonnenschetn. hof-
fentltch  ausre•chend  W1nd  mochte stch  dte  ZWAR-Segelgruppe 1mmer  etne  fnsche  Bnse um  doe 
Nase wehen lassen 
AngPfan~('n  h,tt  ttllt>~  19RS  <>IPhPn  k.:mn,  In  JPdt>m  Som-
aL'  Z\\'~1{  mol  Htlfe des  Lan- mer sch1pperl  rlu·  !.rew uber 
de-.  "-.R\\  fur  AO 000  Cuhif'n  Kanale. ubf'r  d1e  Nwderl.and.e 
dPn  1\,dHnPnfrdt hter  .,\'er- auch an  d1e .'\lord'.ef' 
trrHJlh()fl"  ur!-.prungltrh  Pill  Do(.h  bevor  <>lf'  m  chesem 
La~ll''l"''X•Pr  lduttP  .,A\s  wir  ~ahr  dUt  groBe  1-ahrt  ~ehen 
dP~ J\.ahn  ddtln  In  Dortmanri  konnte. ~Ianden erneut ~roBe-
an (and gehubrn habPn. Pnt- rP  Reparaturt'n  unrl  Erneu-
det kten \\lr da..,  [)p[ mmd"  c;o  run~en  an.  wurdf>  ddc;  Boot 
Rolnnd  ~l hubPr~  (b~l  Plnf"r  grundhch  uberholt  Anl2,etan-
d!-'r  Z\VAR-Strf•tler  dtP  r,.•on  Ren vun der nPuPn Ruderdn)a-
Be,,pnn  an ddhPI ;c,md  .. ln der  ge-mltSPrvolenkung,wJedie 
4."1  MdlunPIPr ~t<Hkt•n Au Ben- Manns(.hdft  gec;!.Pht  - b1s  zur 
haul w.nren 'lPrho;. daumPnrbk- mmf'n  Kuchent=otn.nchtun~ so-
~  to  !Ax hf'r"  WI!~  nf'Uf'O  Strom- und  Elek-
(,ul  Pin  )clhr  lag  dt>r  1\.abt- trolt>IIungen fPJchten du:- um-
Of"nfrac hter zunachst auf dem  fangrPJ( hen Arbe1ten. llberall 
Tmrkem~n  ,,\\'tr wolltf'n  1hn  wad  noch  gehammerL  ~f'-
st hon  fa.:;t  111  f'Lnen  Hm  hofPn  bohrt,  ge.:;rhhffen  oder  lak-
st.hlf•bt•n".  <.,(  herzt  HPmz  Ro- k.1ert.  Doch smd '>lrh dJt•Sc.htf-
mer  [hO)  ~~ hltellhr h  wurde  fer  emig.  da~ ste  thren  Zetl-
da~  "Sc htff 1n  t-"IOPr  \·VPrfl  ,,gP- plan einhalten konnf'u 
doppPlt"  .;,prtch  c1uf  d1P  Au- .. Am  Donnersla.~  kommt 
tit>nh.aut  wurdf" etnt>  neut> dUt- noch  unser  Putzlappenge-
gebrMhl  schwader an  Bord"  ldchl Ro-
.. Dann haben "'"  <u lang,am  land Schubert  ,\Jnsere Frau-
dngefan~cn, t.'Jn  Schiff daraus  en  ubE"fnehmen  dann  da'i 
J'U  ran.rhen" .  .,o  Pmer  der  Kommandu dn Hord  11nd  rna· 
Schtpper.  Werner  Bergmann  chen  klar  Scht!f"  1<-arfreitag 
{fill In muhe\'DIIer Kle~narbe~l  w>rd  d.- ZWAR·Schtff  tlann 
wurde dds Srhtff auf \'order- erslmdls n.ach der \Vinterpau-
mann  ,liiwhrdt.hl  UnzahhgP  ·  .;~  wtedPr  auslaufeon  EmP 
Stunden tnvPs11ertt' dJt' Cr.Pw  Tour m1l  dPn Frauen steht auf 
Zun~1c h.;;t  hekam rllP  \'prfrou- dem Prograrnm  Zwl1sl liPnn-
wen t>tnen  neuen Aufbau aus  chPnburg  H1erbe1  wollen d1e 
Stahl  Samtl1rhe.:o  lnventar  allen  Ha•Hm  den  blsherJgE"n 
wurdP  twrausgen'>~tf'n, P'i  war  LandrattPn emPn IRhrtorn an· 
nur  nn<  h  der  narkle  Rumpf  b1eten 
vorhanrlen  Dann g1ng's an die  D1enslag  nach  Ostern  gehl 
KahtnPn  Heute hPhndPn sir:h  d1e Crew dann auf groBe Tour. 
zehn Srhlafplatze dllf dPm 18  wud dte Vertrouwen zur Som-
Me1er Iangen  Boot  D1e  Kabt- O"'PffP'>idenz  m  Franeke (Ntth 
nenhohE' wurde vprgroiJert. so  derlande) auslaufen Dann ste· 
daL)  man  nun  bequem  rlann  hen Touren mit den v£>rsch1e-
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ng  Donnerstag/Fre>tag. 8/9 Apnl1993 
Wer kril.ftig zupacken wolf, der muB zur rechten Zett auch Brotzelt halten  (v I ) Roland Schubert. Otto Redder. Werner G1ck und Werner 
Bergmann  (WR-Bolder  Franz Luthe) 
dt>n~l~n  Z\o\'AR-C1U~~f'"ll  aus 
Kanz  NR\V dn  Mt>1.,t  emf Wo-
che  1st  man  auf  hohPr  SPP, 
dann lauft  man \-\IPdPr Pltwn 
Hafpn ,tfl  Jm .1-Jpalherbst  geht'~ 
dann wH•rlPr tn den Helmatha-
fen  Dortmund  H1er  hegl  rl"' 
Plallboden<thtff  <etl  jahren 
tmmer an tletsPlben StPilP 1m 
Marxhafen  .. Zum  Hafenaml 
haben  w1r em gutPS  Verhalt-
ms'  so  Otto Redder (68)  l'n-
weil  des  Ankerplatzes  strhl 
.auch der groBP Contauwr m1t 
Werkzeu~en und Ersatzle1len 
Problenw  hf'rPilf'l  dPn  \1.1 
I  rosen  IHH h  dtP  «IIPn  -~t'~Pl 
,.Du•  '>IIld  au..,  H<~umwollf' urt<\ 
sauRen  "I( h  lw1  RP~P~l  \  Pr-
dammt vuU und da<; g.Pht drum 
rna<  hl1~ tn  dte Arme  ~' hliel\ 
hch :;;md  w1r  mr hi  mt-'hr  da• 
Jungslpn".  -.o  RDianct  s( hu-
bert  .. Wu suchen no( h  ~pon 
<;Ort>n  fur  neuP  ~Pio(PI  Hund 
10 OO:l  llM muOten  on  rloe  l4tl 
QuadralmP.tPr tm.P..,tiPrt  wPr · 
den"  Na  dann  .. AllzPit  Pl.iP 
Handbrell  \Vas'>Pr  unl,·rm 
K1el" 
Notes 
Newspaper article 
The newspaper article describes the 
activities of a  ZWAR group who 
bought and did up a sailing barge and 
used it  for trips from their base in Dort-
mund. 
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Union 
initiatives 
This chapter sets out to describe and doc-
ument  initiatives  by  the  trade  unions 
whose contribution to crisis management 
goes beyond the traditional scope of  union 
activities. At every stage, the unions have 
drawn attention to the responsibility of 
steel and mining companies for the re-
gion. Their argument is that after decades 
of economic exploitation, even  domina-
tion,  of the  people  and  resources  of a 
region, they must not be allowed to aban-
don the people to face  the problems of 
unemployment and the clean-up of huge 
areas that have been contaminated or cov-
ered with concrete. The fact that the un-
ions, too, carry a share of  this responsibil-
ity only dawned on some of  them at a later 
stage. 
A series of  interesting ideas have emerged 
from the mobilization of  union experience and 
imagination, some of  which were implemented 
as  such  and  some  in  association with  other 
plans. A number of  them feature in this manual 
as independent models: 
•  employment companies (El6); 
•  qualifications centres (£17); 
•  Saarland Steel Foundation (El4); 
•  Anti-crisis Division in Luxembourg (EJO); 
•  Fonda de Promoci6n de Empleo (Employ-
ment Promotion Fund) in Spain (E6); 
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•  Begeleidingsdienst Limburgs  Mijngebied 
(Support Service for the Limburg mining 
area) in Belgium (E7); 
The aim of  this Chapter is to present union 
initiatives in a more general form. 
"Frankfurt 
Agreement" 
The "Frankfurt Agreement" between the Iron 
and Steel Industry Federation and theJG Metal/ 
union was the culmination of  a thought process 
which only emerged amongst the German un-
ions at the end of the seventies, once it had 
become clear that the steel crisis was not simply 
a recession, but a far-reaching structural crisis, 
which could not be overcome solely with the 
traditional instruments of  social crisis manage-
ment. 
The "Frankfurt Agreement" is the result of 
the ensuing discussion between the IG Metal/ 
union and the companies and associations. This 
initially produced no spectacular results in the 
"old" Federal Republic, although many of  the 
ideas associated with this Agreement have found 
their way into individual initiatives (see above). 
They only came to  assume  truly  central 
significance when, at the time of  German reuni-
fication and with the collapse of  the economic 
system in Eastern Europe, all the conventional 
instruments of  market economy and neo-liberal 
[olicy failed miserably. 
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Union  initiatives 
Agreement 
between 
Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen- und Stahlindustrie 
(The Iron and Steel Industry Federation) 
and 
The lndustrisgewsrkschaft Metal/ 
(industrial union Metal) 
dated 10 June 1987 
l . In the context of an overall solu-
tion,  the member companies of the 
Iron and Steel Industry Federation (in-
cluding  Mannesmann  R6hrenwer-ke 
and  Saarstahl  Volklingen,  but not 
Maxhutte)  reached  agreement fol-
lowing  discussions  conducted be-
tween the  /G  Metal/ union  and the 
Federal  Ministry  of Labour,  to waive 
the redundancies originally envisaged. 
2. The common view is that it is nec-
essary for the Jobs due to be lost in the 
steel industry in the context of restruc-
turing to be replaced by new jobs, 
especially  in  the  affected  regions. 
Consideration should be given in par-
ticular to the concept of an employ-
ment company proposed by the  /G 
Metal/ union and the proposals sub-
mitted by the companies. The Federal 
Government  Lander, local authorities, 
the JG  Meta/J union and the compa-
nies ore all urged to combine the ap-
propriate measures in an action pro-
gramme for the  steel regions. The steel 
companies in particular undertake to 
ensure future investment will concen-
trate on  the  steel  regions  wherever 
possible. The steel companies will take 
steps to  ensure that  a similar approach 
is  adopted within  the groups them-
selves. 
3. Whereverthiscannotbeachieved 
in  the short  term,  every opportunity 
must  be taken  to ensure  a  socially 
acceptable approach to the prob-
lem.  This  includes the application of 
such  measures as the "replacement 
principle" in relation to the early retire-
ment of older workers, and short-time 
working. 
4. The companies, however, believe 
this  is  only possible  if the authorities 
continue to provide non-repayable 
public financial support at the same 
level as  up to 1985.  The  companies 
must receive equal treatment in this 
respect. 
5. These principles will be expanded 
upon, following detailed agreement 
between all those concerned. 
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Crisis management within the company 
Crisis 
management 
within the 
company 
The expression 'crisis management within 
the company' is  used here to  mean social 
measures within the context of quality-ori-
ented and hence human resource-oriented 
reorganization which contribute to the fun-
damental stabilization of  the companies (or 
parts of companies) which survive the cri-
sis. The examples described here are based 
on  my own involvement in research and 
consultancy over recent years and derive 
exclusively from the steel industry. Chapter 
C5 also contains a number of general com-
ments in this respect. 
The problem 
The traditional patterns of  crisis management 
in the European steel industry all suffer from 
the  (unavoidable)  shortcoming  that  redun-
dancies are undertaken not so much by divi-
sion or workplace, but rather by age groups or 
through voluntary decisions taken by the em-
ployees. 
•  This  creates  a  need  for  very  extensive 
transfers within the works or the company, 
Manual Social Crisis Management 
which have proved to be a challenge to the 
entire  organizational  and  qualificational 
structure. 
•  There  is  at  the  same  time  an  intensive 
process of technical change, with greatly 
changing requirements for  worker train-
mg. 
•  Finally, the old steel industry too has been 
engulfed by theseculartrend towards qual-
ity  production,  again  creating  greatly 
changed organizational and training needs. 
An increasing number of companies have 
reacted by subjecting  their  entire  company 
and organizational philosophy to critical ap-
praisal and change. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  USINOR 
SACILOR, and in particular its flat products 
division  (SOLLAC),  has  taken  the  lead  in 
overcoming Taylorism,  and  has  made most 
progress  in  its  implementation,  combining 
job reductions with job security. 
Alongside  the  French "giant",  there  are 
other examples of smaller companies  from 
almost  all  the  countries  of the  EC,  which, 
though less  spectacular and less  ambitious, 
are  no  less  interesting.  Unfortunately,  time 
and space constraints mean that they cannot 
be dealt with in  detail here. 
We shall concentrate on two similar small-
er  steelworks  (Badische  Stahlwerke  and 
Sheerness Steel). These cannot count on re-
ceiving ECSC SlJpport  and have thus been 
obliged to cope with crisis situations unaid-
ed. 
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Crisis  management within  the  company 
Example 1: 
USINOR SACILOR 
Two collective agreements in  1990  replaced 
the outgoing social plan arrangements CGPS, 
see £12) and were intended to  mark a fresh 
start, after 100 000 jobs had been lost through 
the social plan during the eighties). Job losses 
were now to  be linked for the first time with 
personnel development planning, with the aim 
of securing employment (see C5). 
One of  these was the industry-wide employ-
ment  agreement  (Convention  sur  I 'emploi) 
entered into on 29.10.1990 between the GES-
IM (steel employers' association) and the un-
ions (not including the CGT); this was supple-
mented for USINOR SACILOR by a collective 
agreement (of the same date) on employment 
(Accord collectifsur l 'emploi). 
Both  agreements  aim  essentially  to  solve 
problems  resulting from job-shedding through 
training.  The  complete  picture  only  emerges, 
however, when a third agreement is considered; 
this is the "A. CAP 2000", which was entered into 
on 17.'12.1990, again by the GESIM and all the 
unions apart from the CGT, and which is intend-
ed to  impart flexibility  to  the  previously rigid 
forms of  remuneration and career advancement. 
Training as a means of securing 
employment 
The first two agreements are presented togeth-
er here. They provide for an annual personnel 
planning exercise on the  basis of three-year 
plans, which must contain the following infor-
mation: 
Personnel plan 
•  Development of organizational  structure 
(workforce geared to technical changes); 
•  Planned training measures; 
•  Number,  nature  and  qualifications  of 
planned new appointments; 
•  Details of  particularly old employees; 
•  Scale  and  nature  of measures  aimed  at 
increasing (internal and external) mobility; 
•  Measures  as  a  consequence  of transfers 
within the works, the company or the sec-
tor, and details of  the company departments 
concerned and the personnel groups con-
cerned; 
•  Details of  temporary work, temporary con-
tracts, outside contracts and overtime plan-
ning. 
All this information must be accompanied 
by justifications for  the  individual  measures 
selected. The plans must also be supplemented 
by a critical appraisal of  the previous planning 
year. The package as a whole must be discussed 
with theW  orks Councils and unions and adopt-
ed as a "Plan Social". This gives the unions and 
the Works Councils important and relatively 
comprehensive data on company and person-
nel  planning. 
Recruitment 
Jobs which become vacant as a result of  natural 
wastage and early retirement, or even newly 
created jobs, must in the first instance be filled 
internally,  either  accompanied  by training 
measures for individual employees, or through 
transfers of  suitably qualified personnel. Only 
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then are appointments of''outsiders" permissi-
ble. Priority is  thus given to employees first, 
and then to the recruitment of young people, 
although young workers may not be recruited 
at the expense of  older persons. 
Job-shedding 
The number of  jobs which will be lost in the 
following year, and in which departments, is 
clear from  the  annual  plan.  The  agreement 
contains several arrangements, which always 
take effect when the plans are implemented, 
for the purpose of cushioning the social con-
sequences:  in  conjunction with the publica-
tion of the annual plan (usually in October/ 
November, but not later than  1 January), the 
employees receive information about the ex-
tent of the jobs to  be  lost,  the  departments 
affected and the groups of  employees. Details 
of the  redundancy measures planned by the 
company (for example, early retirement, dis-
missals and transfers, etc.) are set out in the 
"social plan". This is followed by a modified 
and, to some extent, financially less attractive 
social accompanying offer than that included 
in the CGPS  (general social security agree-
ment)  of 1987  and  the  training  agreement 
contained therein (see £12). 
Notes 
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The "competence logic" 
as the central element 
of "A. CAP 2000" 
The  arrangements in  respect of training em-
bodied  in  the  first  two  agreements  must  be 
considered in close association with the third, 
and crowning, agreement, the A. CAP 2000. In 
addition to the  personnel plan and the ''plan 
sociaf', the company is required to  present a 
further training plan each year, which must 
take account of  the development of  the compa-
ny/works and the associated training require-
ments, in the sense of  activity patterns/occupa-
tions. 
Further training planning: 
•  is based on the known changes in what is 
required of particular job patterns; 
•  specifies the needs for the further training; 
•  takes  account  of the  career  wishes  and 
aspirations of  employees. 
All these elements are brought together in 
a  "personal  interview  on  future  training  re-
quirements", with training being regarded as 
an instrument for  safeguarding the  company 
(against competition) and for employees' ca-
reer aspirations. 
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A. CAP 2000: 
In-service training as a pathway to 
promotion 
A. CAP 2000, the "agreement on the course of 
professional activity" (Accord sur Ia Conduite 
de I 'Activite Professionnelle), which is regard-
ed by the "Force Ouvrh?re" union as nothing 
short  of a  revolution,  takes  up  two  central 
aspects which had already been touched upon 
in the employment security agreement: 
The competence logic  (Ia  logique  com-
petence), i.e. acknowledgement of the knowl-
edge and experience gained throughout a per-
son's working life, replaces the former work-
place-focused approach (logique de paste de 
travail). Skills are no longer measured in terms 
of the "objective'' requirements of the actual 
workplace,  but  rather  in  terms  of people's 
range of abilities,  i.e.,  competence (built up 
over their entire life). 
The skills-focused approach is  concerned 
with making effective use of  the existing apti-
tude of  employees, of  making neither excessive 
nor insufficient demands on people, and of  not 
allowing skills to waste away. The career de-
velopment path should match the  skills (and 
desires) of people, and not simply "company 
needs''. The operational planning of the com-
pany must correspond to this aim. The agree-
ment  describes  the  "permanent  interaction" 
between  in-service  training,  acquired  skills, 
and an appropriate  work organization as  the 
"main thrust" of the skills-centred approach. 
The career course (le deroulement de car-
rif?re ), i.e. the change from the previous pattern 
of advancement, which was solely dependent 
on workplace evaluation, to  a vocational ad-
vancement and career pattern, which relates to 
the skills of  the employees, serves their further 
development, and at the same time makes the 
various pay grades more fluid. Skills and remu-
neration/payment  for  work  are  accordingly 
closely related. Payment relates to skills, irre-
spective of  whether the employee concerned is 
employed  in  accordance  with  his  qualifica-
tions.  Company  career  patterns  are  thus  no 
longer dependent on the change to specific jobs 
(whether highly or lowly valued), but rather on 
the knowledge and ability of the employees. 
Notes 
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Example 2: 
Badische Stahlwerke 
AG 
The crisis in a nutshell 
This company, located in Kehl near Strasbourg 
on the Rhine, first hit a crisis in the mid-70s, 
which led it to examine its business concept. A 
change of management brought stability until 
1979. The company was obliged to petition for 
settlement proceedings to be initiated in Janu-
ary  1983,  because  the  parent  group  (Korf) 
found itself  in difficulties, and was finally only 
saved by the issue of  guarantees by the Land of 
Baden-Wi.irttemberg. The settlement procedure 
was successfully completed in November 1984. 
Apart from natural turnover, there have since 
been no redundancies at BSW. On the contrary, 
the workforce has risen above the 1000 level. 
At the centre of  the measures which brought 
success were personnel policy and organiza-
tional, rather than technological, change. The 
changes related to: 
•  the entire company philosophy; 
•  the value attached to the skills and training 
factor; and 
•  work organization. 
Company philosophy 
The concept of cooperation is  central to the 
new management style at BSW. It is linked to 
the conviction that conditions within the com-
pany must be characterized by trust, and that 
Manual Social Crisis Management 
this  can  only  be  created  through  complete 
openness towards the entire workforce.  This 
fundamental  principle  manifests  itself in  a 
comprehensive concept of information which 
permeates the organization ofthe company and 
the  way  it  operates.  We  have  found  much 
evidence that this is  not just theory, but also 
practical reality. 
A central aspect of this philosophy is  the 
belief that optimum and ever improving skill-
ing  of the  entire  workforce  is  an  essential 
prerequisite 
•  for the control of  modem technology; 
•  for the continuous achievement of  the high-
est quality standards; and 
•  for a high degree of  motivation as the basis 
for high productivity. 
Finally,  an  important  component  of this 
corporate concept is the realisation that a high 
level of  skilling demands participation, i.e. an 
involvement-oriented approach to the organi-
zation of the  company and  work.  The basic 
principle is that performance must be worth the 
effort, and that performance appraisal has a lot 
to do with quality. 
Training 
The workforce ofBSW was in no way any less 
well-qualified than those of  other steel compa-
nies. The workforce throughout the European 
steel  industry  is  (was)  subdivided  into  two 
groups: 
•  the largest group by a good margin, consist-
ing of  mainly  job-specific semi-skilled work-
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ers  in  production  and associated sectors; 
and 
•  the group comprising well-trained workers 
with good craft skills in maintenance. 
BSW moved towards providing more train-
ing, both internally and externally, in addition 
to  offering  in-service  training  for  everyone 
with the  aim  of raising the  general  level  of 
skills.  An  additional  objective  in  respect  of 
production was to ensure that as many people 
as possible obtained skilled operative qualifi-
cations.  In  the  period  1979-198 7  alone,  the 
number of  semi-skilled workers fell from 83 to 
3  7%.  At  the  same  time,  the  proportion  of 
skilled  workers  in  the  metalworking  trades 
rose from 17.4 to 45.5 per cent. 
The company established a training centre 
of its own at the start of the 1980s. Around 10 
per cent of  the workforce is made up of  trainees. 
One  feature  unique  to  BSW  is  the  ''hybrid 
skilled worker",  a trained process  mechanic 
with a fully certified additional one-year qual-
ification as a fitter. The opportunity to obtain 
this additional qualification is offered to the top 
twelve apprentices in each intake. 
There is  also a computer-based personnel 
development system covering all members of 
the workforce, in which the whole employment 
history is stored and entered. 
Continuing in-service training is regard-
ed  as  a  right  and  a  duty.  Every  employee, 
including the entire management, is  expected 
to show that he/she has completed a minimum 
of  7 days' in-service training each year. In real 
terms, around 10 per cent of  the workforce (not 
including  trainees)  is  participating  in  such 
training at any given time. Since the start of  the 
1980s, any production downtime has been bal-
anced out by in-service training instead of by 
short-time working. 
In-service training is also taken to include 
greater  awareness  of the  technological  and 
organizational  state  of the  competition.  For 
this purpose, visits are organized to  all those 
plants  throughout  the  world  which  are  as-
sumed to be better in certain respects. Regular 
visits  are  made  to  Japan,  for  example  ( 140 
participants  up  to  1991)  and  the  USA  (250 
participants up to  1991 ).  These visits usually 
include a co11aborative phase. The travel groups 
consist of six persons as a general rule: super-
visory staff at foreman level and skilled work-
ers,  as  we11  as  one  member  of the  Works 
Council. 
Work organization and 
participation 
There is no clearly identifiable concept of  work 
organization. A highly pragmatic approach is 
adopted to many aspects anyhow. The fact is, 
though,  that  the  traditional  individual work-
place structure in  the production area of the 
steel industry no longer exists. The promotion 
lines in the conventional sense have largely or 
completely disappeared, depending on the work 
area.  There is  no  planned and organized job 
rotation, and equal skilling of workers in the 
various units is also not systematica11y sought, 
so  there  is  no  clearly  identifiable  model  of 
group work. There is no doubt, however, that 
the permanent in-service training process and 
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the  fact  that  performance  is  measured  and 
rewarded  not  only  individually,  but  also  in 
group  terms,  has  led  to  highly  flexible  job 
enlargement  and  to  the  formation  of group 
work structures. 
The  steep  rise  in  the  level  of skills  has 
already  led to  maintenance  and repair tasks 
being incorporated very largely in the work of 
the production team Uob  enrichment). 
This work organizational development proc-
ess is accompanied by broadly conceived qual-
ity circle activities, which are  conducted ac-
cording to need and to  the  requisite level of 
intensity.  The  problems or topics  are  set by 
management or by members of the workforce 
and are predominantly of  a technical or safety 
nature. 
In addition to the quality circles, there is an 
excellent and very lively suggestion system. 
Attention is  paid to  putting feasible  sugges-
tions into effect with the minimum delay. 
Success is a saleable commodity 
The approach adopted by the Badische Stahl-
werke has not only made the firm the leader in 
Europe in a steel market (constructional steel) 
which is exceedingly difficult and competitive 
and is battling against cheap imports. BSW is 
now also selling the extensive in-service train-
ing and consultancy know-how gained through 
its involvement in all these activities with great 
success  through  its  subsidiary  company 
Badische Stahl Engineering GmbH. Sheerness 
Steel (see below) was one of its customers. 
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Example 3: 
Sheerness Steel 
Sheerness  Steel,  like  BSW,  is  an  integrated 
mini-steelworks on the Isle of Sheppey in the 
Thames  estuary.  It originally produced pre-
dominantly  constructional  steel,  although  it 
has greatly widened its product range in recent 
years, with the result that higher-quality prod-
ucts account for an increasingly large share of 
production.  Quality  is  the  key  word  in  the 
Sheerness philosophy, which proves to  be a 
"typically British" variant of  the BSW model. 
The plant, which dates from  1972, has trans-
formed itself from a situation in which its very 
existence was in jeopardy at the start of  the 80s 
into a leading candidate at European level (in 
second place behind BSW). It  had 740 employ-
ees in 1991, practically the same as in the year 
of  peak employment in 1976 (754 ). 
Both management and unions at Sheerness 
Steel attribute this remarkable success to  the 
strategy of Total Quality Management which 
the  firm  has  pursued  with  such  impressive 
consistency,  with  broader  and  higher  skills 
levels, flexible working practices, preventive 
safety and health protection, high wages (corn-
pared with the regional norm), an open infor-
mation policy and forms of  direct involvement 
by the  workforce.  Sheerness  Steel  now  also 
sells its know-how, using teams with a similar 
make-up to the BSW travel groups. 
If  we were to describe the process of  change 
at  Sheerness  Steel  in  the  same  detail  as  for 
BSW,  there  would be  much  repetition.  The 
Sheerness management never tire of pointing 
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out that, though they learned a lot from BSW, 
they  tend to  do  things  more  logically,  less 
pragmatically or quite differently, too.  In or-
der to put this to the test, however, we would 
need to  know more and to make direct com-
parisons, not to  say evaluations. This is  nei-
ther possible nor desirable in the given con-
text.  A  single  part,  occupational  safety and 
health,  will  thus  have  to  make  do  for  the 
whole. Sheerness Steel claims to be European 
Champion in this area. 
Preventive safety and health 
protection 
The principal indicator of success for  Sheer-
ness Steel here is the time lost due to industrial 
accidents.  The  not  unambitious aim  is  to  be 
entirely  accident-free. 
As shown in the charts on pages 9 and 10, 
the safety drive had already met with consider-
able success.  However, the time lost through 
accidents had been stagnating for years.  The 
previous industrial safety system, under which, 
as Sheerness admits, management sees, plans, 
decides, and organizes, and which the workers 
then fail to put into practice, was consequently 
replaced by a new four-principle approach as 
follows: 
•  Positive approach to safety: Encourage-
ment, or: "It is feasible to avoid accidents 
and the resultant time lost entirely". Most 
sectors have already completed some year 
without loss of  time through accident. The 
objective  of "accident-free  operation''  is 
achievable once people are firmly convinced 
of  its feasibility. 
•  Awareness of  safety in the whole compa-
ny: Planning-responsibility -accountabil-
ity, or:  knowing how to work safely, and 
making sure that everyone is doing it. 
•  Correct monitoring of safety:  Learn to 
perceive risks, or "Safety enjoys the same 
status as production, costs and quality". 
•  The social approach: Behaviour patterns 
must change, or:  Accident-free operation 
can only exist in  a  company which is  in 
constant change, and in which all employ-
ees are involved in this process of change. 
A ten-point plan is  designed to  put these 
principles  into  effect.  At  the  same  time,  a 
comprehensive health  check  system was  de-
vised and implemented. This covers not only 
annual  examinations,  but also  the  offer of a 
medical consultation on one afternoon per week. 
The response has been very good. No distinc-
tion is  drawn between work-related and, say, 
sporting injuries. 
Evolution of accidents 
The  pattern  of accidents  at  Sheerness  Steel 
indicates that the old system was already being 
applied  with  increasing  success.  Comparing 
the  accident figures  for  1976  with those  for 
1991, it is clear that 87 per cent fewer accidents 
were  reported for  an  almost  identical  work-
force (754:740). 
Let us now examine the principal indicator 
selected by Sheerness Steel itself, viz. the time 
lost  due  to  accident.  The  seriousness  of the 
accidents and the  associated injuries has not 
decreased to anything like the same degree, so 
that the time lost due to  accident has  shown 
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practically no reduction since the start of the 
eighties (see the chart on the following page). 
This is one reason why a stronger commitment 
to worker involvement is being sought -entire-
ly consistent with the rest of the approach. 
Final niggling doubts 
First: The health of employees should be an 
aim in  itself, even for a company whose de-
clared prime objective  is  profitability in  the 
context  of Total  Quality  Management.  One 
wonders whether cost minimization as a goal, 
with  increased  industrial  safety  as  a  means 
(principal  indicator:  time  lost  due  to  acci-
dents),  can  really  constitute  an  effective  in-
volvement objective for employees in the long 
term. 
Second: The declared objective of worker 
involvement at Sheerness Steel is  to  sideline 
Notes 
the unions, in spite of the fact that they have 
shown  a  predominantly  cooperative  attitude 
until now. "Unions", as the Personnel Director 
claimed at one of our interviews, "are simply 
the result of  poor management. Good manage-
ment must aim to have good workers enjoying 
good conditions. Then things will go well for 
the company and there will be no more need for 
unions". 
This idea of  pursuing a union-friendly pol-
icy without unions raises some extremely inter-
esting questions: Does a totally quality-orient-
ed company still  need unions?  Is  individual 
participation possible in the long term without 
collective muscle? Is quality-oriented manage-
ment  capable  in  the  long  term  of avoiding 
crises? What does quality management do with 
the workers in a crisis, if  they have no union(s)? 
And what do the workers do in a crisis without 
union(s)? 
Manual Social Crisis Management Contents 
Index 
Manual Social Crisis Management 
>< 
CD 
"0  c Index 
Index 
(Please observe: The figures given below indicate the Chapter and, if  necessary, the page.) 
A 
Aachen model, 
El3:8,14; 
ABM, 
ABS, 
see Employment creation 
measure 
see Companies for job 
promotion. employment 
and structural develop-
ment 
Accommodation of  interests, 
Bl:l; D34:2; E13:1,5; 
El5:7,8; 
Adaptation leave, 
E11:6; 
Adjustment allowance, 
A2:1; E3:1; El3:7,8,9; 
Age limit, 
AltiG, 
E6:4; E9:2,3,4; E10:8; 
E11:3,4; 
E 12:3,5;El3  :2,3,4,5; 
El5:2; 
see Old-age transitional 
allowance 
Annual hours worked, 
C4:1; 
- reduction in, 
D37; 
Anti-crisis Division, 
ElO; 
ARB  ED Luxembourg, 
EIO; El4; 
Area  recycling, 
D42:2; El6:19; 
Article 56 
(see ECSC Contract); 
B 
BCE, 
see British Coal Enter-
prise 
Begeleidingsdienst Lim  burgs 
Mijngebied, 
Benefits, 
BLM, 
E7; 
A2:3; B2:3; B9:13; 
D26:1; E5:2; E6:5,6; 
E8:1,2; E9:6; El31:4,5; 
E:l9;2; 
see Begeleidingsdienst 
Limburgs Mijngebied 
British Coal Enterprise (BCE), 
E8:1; 
Bundesanstalt ftir Arbeit (BA), 
see Federal Office of 
Labour 
c 
Capital aid, 
D41; E8:3,6,7; E9:5; 
Ell  :7,8; El2:8; 
Cas  sa Integrazioni Guadagni 
Straordinaria(CIGS), 
E5; 
Manual Social Crisis Management 
CdF, 
see Charbonnages de 
France 
Chamber(s) ofTrade and Industry 
(IHK), 
Bll:l5; El2:8; El3:14; 
El7:2,3,5; 
Change in the business, 
E13:1; 
Charbonnages de France, 
Ell; 
Church(  es ), 
Bll  :15; 
Closure, 
D26:1; E11:2,3; 
Codetermination in the coal and 
steel industry, 
E13:16,17; 
Cohesion Fund, 
A2:4; Bl2:17; 
Commune, 
B7:10; 
Company foundation, 
D41; D42:1; El5:4,5,6; 
Consensus, 
Bl:l,2; B7:10; B8:12; 
C5:5; El0:2; El3:7,17; 
E15:7,8; E16:3; 
E17:1,2,5; 
Consolidated mines, 
E3:6; El3:15; 
Continued payment, 
D2:1; 
Contract services instead ofin-
house services, 
C4:1, Dl2; D39; E20:3; 
Contract training, 
C3:1; D23:1,2; El7; 
Contracts, acceptance of, 
C3:1; 
-Acceptance of  contracts 
without full cost 
coverage, 
D8; 
Contracts of  employment, 
C3:1; 
-Expiry oflimited-
duration, 
D29; 
Cooperation, systemic, 
C5:5; 
Cooperation, 
E13:17; El7:4; 
Cost reimbursement, 
D2:1; D3:1; D9; D26:1; 
Crisis careers, 
E9:6; E 1  0:7; Ell  :7; 
El3:11,13,16; El5:7; 
Cushioning, social, 
E8:l;El2:1; El5:1; 
D 
Disincorporation, 
C4:1; D7; D39; 
Dismissal with severance pay, 
E6:5; 
-voluntary, 
D30; El2:3,4; Dismissal(  s  ), 
C4:1; D34:1,2; E9:2; 
El0;1,3,7; Ell  :5; E20:3; 
- with guaranteed 
reemployment 
Dl8; D19; E11:3; 
El2:4; El4:3; 
Diversification, 
E3:4,5,6; E8:3; Ell  :7; 
E20:7; 
Divisionanti-crise (DAC), 
see Anti-crisis Division 
Dortmund Development Centre, 
E16:3; 
E 
EAGGF, 
see European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee 
Fund 
Early pension, 
see EarZv retirement 
Early retirement, 
A2:3; B2:3; C4:1; D33; 
E3:1; E6:4,5; E8:1; E9:2; 
El0:2,7; Ell  ;1,2,3,4,6; 
El2:1,2; El3:5; El3;13; 
El4:3; El5:2; El8:1,3; 
E20:1; 
Early retirement allowance (VOG  ), 
El6:4,7; 
Early pensioning, 
see EarZr retirement 
Economic, Structural and 
Employment Promotion, 
B7:11; E8:3,5; El2:8; 
ECSC, 
see European Coal and 
Steel Community 
ECSC Treaty, 
EIB, 
A2:2; D26:1; 
see European Investment 
Bank 
Employee-run limited companies 
(see also Sociedades 
An6nimas Laborales), 
E15:4,5; 
Employment areas, 
El7:1; 
Employers' association, 
B6; E19:2; 
Employment creation measure 
(ABM), 
El4;3; E16:3,4,7,8,10,1 L 
14,16,18; E19:2; 
Employment, creation of, 
El3:14; El4:3; El6:18; 
Employment development, 
see Economic and 
employment development 
Employment company( ies ), 
C4:1; D40; El4:3; El6:1; El9:2; 
- support for, 
D40; E19:2; 
Employment Development Fund, 
see Fondo de Promoci6n 
de Empleo (FPE) 
Employment, 
El6:1.2; 
- alternative 
C4:1; 025:1; D36; D37; 
D41; El4:1; El6:4; 
- permanentreductionof, 
Cl:2; 01:2; D7; 026:1; 
D27:1; D28:1; D29; 
D30; D31:1; D32; D33; 
034:1; D35:1; 037; 
038; D39; D40; D41; 
D42:1; E3:5; 
- reduction of, 
A:2,5; B3:5; Cl :1,3; 
Dl2; E3:3,6; E7:2; 
E8:5; E9:2; El2:1,2,7,8; 
E14:3; E20:1,3 
- temporary reduction of, 
Cl:2; Dl:2; D7; DlO:l; 
Dl1; D12; D13;1  D14; 
Dl5;D16:1; Dl7; Dl8; 
Dl9; D20; D21:1; 
D22:1; D23:1; E3:3, 
- stabilization of, 
Cl:2; 01:2; 03:1; 04:1; 
05:1; D6; D7; 08; 09; 
E20:1; 
Employment creation (pro-
grammes), internal, 
C2:1; 06; 
Endogenous potential (of  the 
region), 
Al:7; A2:5; B7:11; E3:6; 
Environmental technology, 
E3:4; 
Environmentally safe products, 
El6:3; 
ERDF, 
see European Regional 
Development Fund 
ERGO II, 
A2:9; 
ESF, 
see European Social Fund 
EUROFORM, 
A2:9; 
European Investment Bank (EIB ), 
E2:4; 
European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity (ECSC ), 
A2:1; B9:13; Bl2:17; 
026:1,2; D33; D34:1; 
E4:3; E9:2; El0:2; El5:2; 
El6:9; 
European Agricultural Guidance 
and Guarantee Fund 
(EAGGF), 
A2:4; 
European Regional Development 
Fund (ERDF), 
A2:4; B12:17; 
European Social Fund 
A2:6,8; E7:8; 
EUROTECNET II, 
A2:10; 
EWZ, 
F 
Index 
see Dortmund Develop-
ment Centre 
Familiarization, 
D2:1; D9; D26:1; 
Federal Office ofLabour 
El6:2; 
Flexibilization, qualitative, 
C4:1; 035:1,2; E6:1,3; 
Fondo de Promoci6n de Empleo, 
E6; 
FORCE, 
A2:9; 
FPE, 
see Fonda de Promoci6n 
de Empleo 
Further training and retraining 
(FuU), 
FuU, 
H 
B2:3; B7:11; Bl0:14; 
D28:1; E8:3,5; E9:1; 
E10:2; Ell:2,5,7; 
El2:1,2,3,5,7,8; El4:1,3; 
El6:2,4,7,11,16; 
see Further training and 
retraining 
Hiving-off, 
C4:1;D7;D39; 
- support for, 
038; 040; 041; E12:8; 
Holding area, 
see Dismissal with 
guaranteed reemployment 
Holiday, 
- Trainingholiday, 
C3:1; 016:1; El1:3; 
El2:3,5; 
- Blockholiday, 
C3:1; Dl4; 
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-unpaid, 
C2:l;D20; 
- preference for, 
C3:1; 013; 
HORIZON, 
A2:9; 
Human Resources Development, 
C5:1,2; E20:1 ,6; 
I 
In-house services instead of  contract 
services, 
C2:1; 05;1; 
In-service training offers, 
C3:1; 022:2; El2:2; 
El4:1; E20:6; 
- additional, 
022:1; E20:6; 
In-service training, 
B3:5; E3:4; E4:3; 
E6:4,5,6; El2:3,5; 
El6: 18; El7:6; E20: I ,3; 
E20:6; 
- extension of, 
021:1; E20:6; 
Income-generating fi  e1 ds, 
El6:15,16; 
Income security, 
02:1; 03;1; 06; D9; 
026: 1; 
individual interviews, 
E6:5; Ell:5; El3:17; 
El2:3,4,5; El5:6,7; 
E20:3; 
Information, 
B2:3; B6:9; Bll:l5; 
02:1; DlO; Dll; 026:1; 
034:1; 035:1; El2:6,7,8; 
E20:3,5; 
Involvement, 
- in the reindustrial ization 
of  the region, 
42:1; 
- in regional risk capital 
funds, 
042:1; 
Iron and Steel Employees' 
Readaptation Benefits 
Scheme (I SERBS), 
E9; 
!SERBS, 
J 
see Iron and Steel 
Employees · Readaptation 
Benefits Scheme 
Job placement function, 
Jobs 
E8:5; Ell :2,6; El2:3,6; 
- in-house, 
C3:1; 
- cross-group, 
C3:1; C4:1; 028:1; 
E11:6; 
- enlargement, 
035:1; E20:4,7: 
- enrichment, 
035:1; E20:4,7; 
- rotation, 
035:1; E20:4,7; 
Joint venture company, 
E3:5; El3:14,15; 
K 
KA L (  Knappschaftsausgleichs-
leistung), 
KUG, 
see Miners' Compensation 
Payment 
see Payment for short-
time working 
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L 
Labour Market Administration, 
Bl0;14; 02:1; 03:1; 
026:1; 033; El2:7; 
LEDAII, 
A2:9; 
Lifetime hours worked, 
C4:1; 
- reduction in, 
036; 037; 
Long-term unemployed, 
E16:2; 
M 
Miners' Compensation Payment 
(KAL), 
El3:9,14; 
Mobility, 
Ell :7; E20:2; 
Modernization, 
84:6; C5:1,6; E3:3; 
E10:2; E12:1; 
MUV (Treaty establishing the 
European Coal and Steel 
Community), 
N 
see European Coal and 
Steel Community 
New  business starts, 
Bl1:15; E5:2; E8:3,6,7; 
E9:5;  El1:7; El2:8; 
E15:3; E16:1,16; 
New Business Centre, 
E8:4,8; E15:4; 
Non-acceptance oftrained 
employees, 
C4:1; 031:1; 
Non-extension of  expiring contracts, 
012; 
Notice, 
(see also Dismissal), 
019; 034:2; El2:5; 
El4:3; El9:2; 
- with guaranteed 
reemployment, 
C3:1; D19; El0:2; 
El6:1; 
NOW (EC Programme), 
A2:9; 
0 
0 ld-age transitional allowance 
(AIUG), 
El6:4,7; 
Operating team, 
E4:4; E10:7; 
Operating areas, 
E8:8; 
- Redevelopmentof, 
Ell  :8; El6:7; 
Operating company, 
C4:1; 03:1; E14:1; 
Outplacement, 
E4:3,4,5,6,7; E8:3,4,8; 
Ell :5; E12:3,5,6; El5; 
Overtime, reduction of, 
C2:1; C3:1; DlO; 
p 
Part  -time working, 
E7:10; Ell :4; 
Parties, 
Bl1:15; 
Payment for short-time working 
(KUG), 
B10:14; El6:7,14; 
Pension, 
El5:2; Ell:2; 
Pensioning, 
E13:5; Pensioning, early, 
see Early pension 
Personnel development, quality-
oriented, 
C5:4; E20:1,6; 
Personnel development interview, 
C5:6; E20:4; 
Personnel task forces, 
C2:1; D3:1; D6; 
Personnel reduction, 
see Employment 
Personnel requirement, 
C5:4; E20:2; 
Personnel, reduction in, 
see Employment 
Personnel leasing contracts, 
C3:1; E20:3; 
- terminationof, 
Dl2; 
PETRA II, 
A2:9; 
Pre-early retirement, 
Ell:3,4; El5:2; 
Preservation of  social standing, 
D34:2; 
Product development, 
El7:1; 
Provision of  management know-
how  (for new  business 
starters), 
Q 
D38; D40; D41; E8:13; 
El2:8; 
Qualification (programmes), 
D7; Dl2; D35:1; D38; 
E7:5; Ell :6; El2:3,6,8; 
El4:5; El5:1,3,4; 
El6:1,3; 
- environmentally relevant, 
El6:3; 
Qualifying periods, obtaining, 
Dl:3; 
Quality culture, 
C5:2; E20:1,5,7,10; 
R 
RECHAR. 
A2:7,8; E7:8; 
Recruitment halt, 
C2:1; D25; 
Reemployment, 
Region, 
A2:3; E6:4,5,6; E9:4; 
El0:2; Ell  :3,5; El2;3; 
El4:1; El5:1,3; El6:1,  11; 
Al:7; B8:12; Bl3:18; 
E2:3,4; E4:3; E6:2; E7:2; 
E8:3; El5:1; El6:2; 
El7:1,6; 
Regional Fund, 
see European Regional 
Development Fund 
(ERDF) 
Reindustrialization, 
B2:3,4; B9:13; C4:1; 
E6:1,2,7,8; Ell:7; 
El2:7,8; El5:1,3; 
El6:5,19; 
Release, paid, 
Dl7; Ell:3; El2:1,2; 
Relocation(s), 
C3:1; D26:1; E7:2; E8:2; 
El0:5; Ell:2,3,5; El2:2; 
El3:14; E20:1; 
RENA  VAL, 
A2:6; 
Repatriation assistance, 
Ell:2,5,6; 
Replacement  jobs, 
D7; Ell:S; El5:2; El9:2 
Replacement princi pie, 
Cl:l; El3:2,7; El9:2; 
RESIDER, 
A2:7; E4:2; 
RETE  X, 
A2:6; 
Retirement, early, 
see Early pension 
RICONVERSIDER, 
E4; 
Right to rent company housing, 
Dl:3; Ell:4; El3:9,10; 
Right of  abode, 
see Right to rent company 
housing 
RuhrkohleAG, 
E3; 
s 
Saar Steel Foundation, 
El3:6; El4; 
SAL, 
see Sociedades An6nimas 
Laborales 
Severance, 
C3:1; D.30; D33; E9:2; 
El0;5,7; Ell:4; El2:13; 
El3:9; 
Shifts, limited duration, discontinu-
ation of, 
DlO; 
Short-time working, 
C3:1; D24; ES:l; El0:3; 
El4:3; El6:1,4,15; El9:2; 
E20:6; 
Single-plant agreement, 
DlO; El4:3; 
Social package, 
see also Social plan, 
B3:5; D34:1; El2:2; 
Social assistance, 
El6:2; 
Social plan, 
D26:1; Ell:l,3; El2:1; 
El3; 
Social Fund, 
see European Social Fund 
(ESF) 
Social standing, preservation of, 
DI:2; 
Index 
SociedadesAn6nimas Laborales 
(SAL), 
El5:4,5; 
Solidarity principle, 
see Replacement principle 
Stahlstiftung Saar, 
see Saar Steel Foundation 
Standard instruments, 
A2:3,4; El2:1; 
Standard situation(  s) for aid, 
A2:3; 
Structural change, regional, 
El7:1; 
Structural crisis, 
Cl:l; 
Structural Funds of  the European 
Communities, 
A2:4; Bl2:17; 
Suspension of  contracts of 
employment, 
T 
C3:1; D8; D30; Ell:3,5; 
El2;1; El6:9; 
- temporary, 
C3:l;E6:4; 
Training, vocational, 
see Vocational Training 
Transfers, 
see also Relocation(s) 
Transfers, 
A2:3; C2:1; C3:1; D2:1; 
D9; D33; El0:2,5; Ell :2; 
El2:2; E20:1,2,3; 
Transitional aid, 
E3:4; 
Treaty establishing the European 
Coal and Steel Commu-
nity, 
see European Coal and 
Steel Community 
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Unemployment assistance, 
£14:3; 
Unemployment benetlt, 
£9:3,6; £13:5; £14:3; 
Unemployment fund, 
£10:3; 
Unemployment, 
A2:3; B2:3; £9:2,3; 
£16:4; 
- with contract of 
employment  and wage 
guarantee, 
£5:2; 
Union initiatives, 
E19; 
Union(s), 
v 
B3:5; B4:6; B5:8; D2:L 
D3:L D4:1; 05:1; D6; 
D7; D8; D9; DlO; Dll; 
D12; D13; D14; Dl5; 
Dl6:1; Dl7; Dl8; Dl9; 
D20; D21:1; D22:1; 
D23:1; D26:1; D27:1; 
D28:1; 029; D30; 031:1; 
D32; D33; D34: I; 035;  1; 
D37; D39; £12:1,7; 
£17:5; £18:1; El9; 
Vocational training, 
A2:3; B3:5; £3:4; 
£17:3,6; £20:6; 
see also Qualification 
see also Further training 
and retraining 
Vocational rehabilitation, 
ElSA 
w 
Work, preference for, 
C2:1; D4:1; 
Workforce pool, 
C4:1; D6; D27:1; D40; 
£10:3; 
Works Council, 
y 
B3:5; B4:6; D2:1; D3:L 
D4:1; D5:1; D6; D7; D8; 
D9; DlO; D11; D12; D13; 
Dl4; Dl5; D16:1; D17; 
018; D19; D20; D21:1; 
D22:1; 023:1; 026:1; 
027:1; 028:1; 029; 030; 
031:1; 032; 033; 034:1; 
035:1; 037; £13:1; 
£20:1; 
"Young old people", 
£18:1; 
z 
ZWAR, 
£18 
Manual Social Crisis Management European Union- Commission (ed.) 
Manual 
Social Crisis Management in the Coal and Steel Industries- European Models and Experiences 
by Hans-Werner Franz 
1994-302 pp.- 25,5 x 22,0 em 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of  the European Communities 1994 
ISBN 92-826-5796-5 
The coal and steel industries have been through a series of  severe structural crises which have led to 
serious job losses. An abundant repertoire of  instruments for crisis management has emerged in the 
process, all of  which are characterized by a desire to make necessary changes as acceptable as possible 
to  the persons, companies and regions concerned. Individual instruments have consistently been 
combined in different ways to produce packages of  social measures; these are presented in this manual 
for the first time as models and experiences from seven of  the countries of  the European Community. 
The manual also gives a systematic presentation (in tabular form) of all the customary instruments 
for stabilizing and reducing employment, and names the players involved and the most important 
sources of  support by the European Community. There is an alphabetical index and the book is laid 
out such that it can be used as a guide and reference book in economic crisis situations, not only in 
the coal and steel industries. 